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The current study raises two main questions: (i) How well integrated are the national central
administrations of European nation-states and the administrative apparatus of the European
Union (EU)? And, (ii) how should we account for processes whereby national systems and
the EU administrative apparatus become increasingly intertwined, intermeshed, and
interlinked?
Processes of administrative integration across levels of governance are suggested as one
important indicator of European integration. European integration is not only about the
functional spill-over processes at the EU level, nor has it only to do with grand bargains
amongst the EU member-states. European integration also has to do with the vertical blurring
of governance levels in Europe. How distinct are the decision-making processes of the EU
machinery and the decision-making processes of the various European nation-states? In the
current study, administrative integration is seen as synonymous with the general blurring of
governance levels.
The current study goes largely beyond the neo-functionalist versus intergovernmentalist
distinction. The base-line explanatory framework underpinning the current study is
institutional. Administrative integration reflects, arguably, the organizational structures
embedding national civil servants. Most national government officials have several
simultaneous organizational affiliations. However, some of these affiliations are primary to
these officials, others are considered more secondary. In the current study, national
governmental structures are considered primary to national civil servants, providing cognitive
schemes, guidelines for assessing appropriate behaviour, codes of conduct, as well as cues for
action. These primary institutional affiliations affect not only the calculation of strategic
rationality of the actors, but also contribute to constituting the very identities and role
perceptions of the actors.
EU institutions are considered the secondary institutional affiliations to those national civil
servants studied here. The research focus is directed towards the EU committees located at the
very intersection of the EU bureaucracy and the central administrative apparatus of European
nation-states. Arguably, national civil servants participating on EU committees may
supplement pre-existing identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct with new ones, or
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they may change the very mix between different behavioural patterns and role conceptions.
Furthermore, those national officials attending EU committees with high frequency and for
protracted periods of time might arguably construct new supranational senses of belonging
and role perceptions. As such, administrative integration is phrased: “integration through
participation in EU committees”.
The current study grapples with questions raised by neo-functionalists in the 1950s and 60s,
and by intergovernmentalists in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Amongst those questions raised by
these theoretical approaches, two central questions stand out. Do national officials
participating in EU decision-making processes evoke supranational role conceptions? Second,
are national decision-making processes becoming less tightly co-ordinated, ultimately
blurring the distinction between foreign policy and domestic policy? Both these questions are
at the forefront of the current study. The central question posed is: Do national civil servants
attending EU committees evoke supranational allegiances and do they have co-ordinated
mandates and instructions when attending these EU committees? Administrative integration
reflects processes whereby national officials evoke supranational role perceptions and
processes whereby the co-ordination and gate-keeping roles of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
are considered less important.
The current study reflects a research endeavour that has lasted for about three years. I can still
remember the moment when the research idea was born. A colleague (Morten Egeberg) and I
were visiting The European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA) in the fall of 1997.
More or less coincidentally we got to know Guenther Schaefer at EIPA, one of the leading
scholars on comitology. After five minutes of talking we had developed a joint research
project, of which this dissertation is one spin-off. Prior to our visit at EIPA, Morten and I had
been interested in processes of Europeanization of national government institutions and
decision-making processes. At that time, Guenther Schaefer held a course in “comitology” at
EIPA for national civil servants. We soon reached the consensus that EU committees could be
an adequate testing-ground for hypotheses on Europeanization of national central
administrations. Also, EU committees could be seen as the very institution through which
administrative integration across levels of governance occurred. Hence, the idea was born.
Several of the empirical observations presented in the current study have been presented at
national, Nordic and international workshops in political science. A draft version of Chapter 1
vwas presented at an ARENA seminar April 4, 2000. Two of the current chapters have been
published in slightly different versions elsewhere: Chapter 5 has been published as ‘Multiple
Institutional Embeddedness in Europe: The Case of Danish, Norwegian and Swedish
government officials’, Scandinavian Political Studies, 2000, Vol. 23, No. 4: 311-342. This
article builds on the same empirical data as the current study. A slightly different version of
Chapter 6 has been co-published with Frode Veggeland as ‘Access, voice and loyalty. The
representation of national civil servants in EU Committees’, ARENA working paper, 2000
No. 8.
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SEIZING A MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN INTERGOVERNMENTALISM
AND NEO-FUNCTIONALISM
Hence a form of government has been found which is neither precisely national nor federal;
…and the new word to express this new thing does not yet exist (Tocqueville 1969).
Introduction1
As one cornerstone of European integration, administrative integration denotes how national
bureaucracies and the EU administrative apparatus increasingly intermesh, interact and
ultimately integrate. The overall rationale of this study is to reveal the basic features of this
phenomenon and to account theoretically and empirically for administrative integration across
the EU – nation-state intersection. In the current Chapter the basic research questions are laid
out and the theoretical toolbox is sketched briefly. Finally, the research design applied to
illuminate administrative integration empirically is introduced.
Processes of European integration have attracted major scholarly attention from several
disciplines in the post World War II period. Different theoretical schemes have been
2suggested in order to understand the ups and downs of the integration process. One important
theoretical cleavage has formed between the neo-functionalist account and the
intergovernmentalist notion (Haas 1958; Moravcsik 1993 and 1998). This theoretical cleavage
is still vital in current literature on European integration (e.g. Branch and Øhrgaard 1999;
Cram 1997; Jensen 2000; Jordan et al. 1999; Lewis 2000; Niemann 1998; Sandholtz and
Stone Sweet 1998; Shore 2000). However, owing to an assumed lack of validity as regards the
basic social mechanisms advocated by these two theoretical accounts, an ‘institutionalist turn’
has emerged in more recent literature on European integration (e.g. Andersen 2000;
Armstrong 1998; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Jupille and
Caporaso 1999; Olsen 1998 and 2000a). European studies have developed from analysing EU
institutions towards a studying the EU through institutional lenses.2 The current study aims at
seizing a middle ground between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism by outlining an
institutional account of administrative integration.
Towards a two-dimensional model of administrative integration
The study of European integration may be divided into three basic scholarly traditions,
depending on their research foci. First, early neo-functional accounts emphasised European
integration as the horizontal integration in width and depth at the EU level of governance (e.g.
Haas 1958). Empirical indicators of integration in width were, amongst others, the numbers of
issue areas covered by the Community (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). Indicative of
integration in depth was, for example, the usage of qualified majority voting in the Council of
Ministers. According to neo-functionalists, European integration resembles a steadily
increasing spill-over process across policy sectors as well as loyalty transfers from purely
national institutions towards supranational institutions (Haas 1958; Saeter 1998).
Consequently, neo-functionalism emphasises the vertical integration of national and EU
administrative institutions, decision processes and elite identities. However, neo-
functionalism tends to explain vertical integration with reference to dynamics mostly at the
EU level.
Second, intergovernmental accounts of European integration have mainly studied this
phenomenon as the horizontal co-operation between sovereign nation-states. Applying a two-
level game approach, the EU integration process is perceived as no more than the aggregate
effect of bilateral negotiations amongst the EU member states (e.g. Milward 1992; Moravcsik
31998; Putnam 1988). Parallel to neo-functionalism, intergovernmentalism also pays attention
to administrative integration across levels of governance. However, the explanation of
integration is directed mostly towards national level dynamics. Hence, both neo-functionalism
and intergovernmentalism apply single-level causal models of administrative integration. Both
the neo-functional and the intergovernmental perspectives are spelled out in greater detail
below.
A third and more recent analytical take on European integration views this phenomenon as
resulting from the vertical linkages between the EU level and the national level of governance.
European integration is seen as generally resulting from a blurring of these levels (e.g.
Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Bulmer 1997; Christensen 1981; Coparaso, Cowles and Risse
2000; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Lewis 2000;  Rometsch and
Wessels 1996). “[T]he European Union has passed the boundary from horizontal cross-border
co-operation to vertical policy-making in a dynamic multi-level system” (Larsson and Maurer
2000: 76; Marks et al. 1996). The analytical shift from focusing on horizontal linkages
amongst the sub-components of integration towards focusing on vertical linkages across levels
of governance also have accompanied an ‘institutionalist turn’ in the study of European
integration (Andersen 2000; Jupille and Caporaso 1999; Olsen 2001). Even more, this shift
has accompanied an emphasis on administrative integration as reflecting institutional
dynamics both at the EU level and at the national level of governance. Hence, a two-level or
multilevel casual model has been introduced to render administrative integration intelligible.
In addition, this theoretical turn has blurred the lines between studies of European integration
and studies of Europeanization of the nation-state. This two-level model of administrative
integration is spelled out in greater detail below and in Chapter 2.
The neo-functional approach, the intergovernmental perspective and the two-dimensional
focus on administrative integration may be visualised as follows:
4Figure 1.1 Three analytical foci on administrative integration.
Neo-functionalism:
A two-dimensional focus on
administrative integration:
Intergovernmentalism:
In the reminder of this study, the second approach to the study of administrative integration,
depicted in the above figure, represents a middle ground between the two others. Some
preliminary definitions of administrative integration are given below. However, more
elaborated accounts of this phenomenon is provided in Chapter 4.
In the current study, administrative integration is perceived synonymously with processes of
Europeanization of domestic government institutions and national civil servants. Focusing on
the vertical relationships between the EU level and the national level of governance, both neo-
functional accounts and intergovernmental approaches are important theoretical starting-
points for the study of administrative integration across levels of governance. The neo-
functional perspective perceives these levels as interwoven in fundamental ways, the
intergovernmental account pictures these levels largely as separate governance systems.
Moreover, neo-functionalism basically pictures the integration process as being strongly
affected by the institutional arrangements at the EU level. The way the European Union is
formally organized is seen as having fundamental impact upon the integration process.
Conversely, intergovernmentalists view European integration largely as the aggregate effect of
domestic politics and policies. It is the large member states who fundamentally influence the
path, scope and depth of the integration process. Henceforth, these two approaches apply
single-level causal models to the analysis of administrative integration.
Moreover, neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism pose different scenarios with regard
to processes of Europeanization of domestic institutions, actors and decision processes. Neo-
functionalists stress the way the EU institutions mould domestic institutions and alter
5domestic civil servants’ interests, loyalties and modes of acting. Intergovernmentalists
emphasise that national civil servants who participate on EU institutions are national
representatives and delegates, and that national decision-making processes are tightly co-
ordinated - especially by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While neo-functionalism pictures a
process of ‘Europeanization’ of domestic institutions, actors and decision processes,
intergovernmentalism upholds a scenario of increased ‘domestication’ of domestic
institutions, actors and decision processes despite their exposure towards European dynamics.
The neo-functionalist notion underscores the autonomy of EU institutions, let alone the
sectoral integration and fusion of the domestic government institutions and EU institutions.
Intergovernmentalist perspectives, by contrast, picture the stronghold of the nation-state.
Intergovernmentalism basically argues that domestic governance institutions and EU
institutions are separate levels of governance: They are different arenas for combat and
compromise for rational actors. Neo-functionalism, on the contrary, argues that these levels of
governance are intermeshed in fundamental ways.
Hence, intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism represents one central theoretical
cleavage in the study of European integration, Europeanization and administrative integration.
This cleavage, however, may be seen as two-dimensional: The first dimension regards a
national-supranational spectrum, that focuses on the degree to which the EU system of
governance has any independent impact upon decision processes, identities and role
conceptions amongst its organizational members. Do national dynamics prevail, or are
decision processes basically reflecting new supranational dynamics (e.g. Haas 1958)? The
second dimension regards a sectoral-territorial spectrum. This focuses on the content of the
identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct evoked: Does a territorial logic dominate, or
is it transcended by mere sectoral dynamics (e.g. Lindberg 1963)? This two-dimensional
model of administrative integration may be visualised as follows:
6Figure 1.2 A two-dimensional framework of administrative integration.
                                                                supranational
             territorial/                                                                                       sectoral/
             inter-sectoral                                                                                  intra-sectoral
                                                                    national
According to figure 1.2, intergovernmental dynamics might be transcended along two paths:
First, intergovernmentalism may be transcended under conditions whereby supranational
dynamics exceed national ones (Lewis 2000). Second, intergovernmentalism may be
transcended in situations whereby sectoral dynamics precede territorial ones, emphasising
how the territorial nation-state logic is transcended by mere sectoral and technocratic
dynamics (Radaelli 1999). It is important for the current study that administrative integration
across levels of governance is seen as synonymous with processes whereby
intergovernmentalism is transcended along the two dimensions suggested in figure 1.2 (cf.
also Chapter 2). The current study aims at uncovering scope conditions under which each of
the two dimensions presented above are likely to go to their extreme endpoints.
To measure administrative integration, this study focuses on three dependent variables: the
institutional identifications, role conceptions and co-ordination behaviour evoked by domestic
governmental officials who participate on EU committees. Studying national civil servants
attending EU committees enables us to study administrative integration across the national –
EU intersection. Following the two dimensions presented in figure 1.2, the central question
posed in this study is two-dimensional. First, I ask whether, and to what extent, domestic
governmental officials participating on EU committees enact new supranational identities and
role perceptions. This question relates to the national-supranational dimension of
7administrative integration. Second, this study asks to what extent domestic officials attending
EU committees on non-permanent basis evoke sectoral or inter-sectoral/territorial role
perceptions and modes of acting. This question relates to the sectoral-territorial dimension
outlined above. Both these dimensions have to do with processes whereby
intergovernmentalism may be transcended. The first dimension by adding new supranational
role and identity perceptions to pre-established national role perceptions, and the second as a
result of enacting sectoral based identities, role conceptions and modes of acting. Thus, both
the national and the territorial principle of the nation-state order may be partially transcended.
Under both these conditions administrative integration is fostered.
The independent variables suggested in this study are of an organizational character. The main
hypothesis advanced is that the identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour evoked by
government officials are fundamentally moulded by their organizational affiliations. Past
organization theory, however, has mainly ignored situations whereby individuals
simultaneously have multiple institutional affiliations. This study analyses civil servants
having (at least) dual institutional affiliations - one domestic and one European. Their national
institutional affiliations are at the level of ministries and agencies. Their EU affiliations are
the different EU committees. Moreover, the EU committees are located at the intersection of
the national bureaucracy and the EU decision-making apparatus (Christiansen and Kirchner
2000: 5; Schaefer 2000). EU committees are institutional arrangements that may warrant
administrative integration because they are embedded both at the national and the EU level of
governance. EU committees represent the very “transmission belt” through which
administrative integration come about (Christiansen and Kirchner 2000: 22). Hence, EU
committees “are the manifestation of growing Europeanization of national administrations”
(Larsson and Maurer 2000: 86). Is it likely that domestic civil servants evoke new
supranational and ‘European’ role perceptions when they attend EU committees on non-
permanent basis? Put more precisely, under what conditions are the identifications and role
conceptions evoked by national officials likely to take on supranational characteristics, and
under what conditions is it more likely that this kind of supra-nationalism is curbed? In
addition to the national-supranational dimension, this study analyses the extent to which the
role and identity perceptions and the codes of conduct evoked by these civil servants are
basically sectoral or territorial in character. Administrative integration is perceived as
8processes whereby the identities, role perceptions and modes of decision behaviour evoked
take on sectoral and supranational characteristics.
Important to this study is to specify various scope conditions under which domestic civil
servants (having dual institutional affiliations) evoke supranational role and identity
perceptions, and under what conditions this process is hampered. One vital endeavour is to
identify various conditions under which the representational roles and patterns of behaviour
are likely to follow sectoral or territorial patterns.
This introductory Chapter aims at tracing the general theoretical arguments in brief. The next
section opens up the theoretical schism that has developed within the study of European
integration. The second section aims at bridging the gap between these two theoretical poles
by introducing organization theory arguments. The organization theory arguments suggest
conditions under which intergovernmental dynamics are transcended, ultimately contributing
to administrative integration. Finally, the last section of this Chapter explores the research
design underpinning the current study and presents an overview of the coming chapters.
The intergovernmentalist - neo-functionalist controversy
Intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism represent “unifying theoretical story lines” as far
as European integration is concerned (Andersen 2000: 18). Intergovernmentalism was
basically presented as a response to the neo-functionalist account. This response was partially
triggered by the ‘Euro-sclerosis’ of the 1980s and partly by scholarly criticism of neo-
functionalism (Rosamond 2000). Despite neo-functionalism being developed years before the
intergovernmentalist reaction within the study of European integration, we start by mapping
the latter perspective.3 We move from a scenario advocating the rescue of the nation-state as
seen from the intergovernmentalist perspective towards greater emphasis on sui generis
processes of administrative integration and engrenage, and the partial transformation of
loyalties, interests and action - as seen from the neo-functionalist perspective (Haas 1958: 16).
An intergovernmental account.
Within this study intergovernmentalism is treated as a general theory of European integration
although Moravcsik explicitly limits the validity of the perspective to intergovernmental
conferences within the EU (IGCs) (Moravcsik 1991, 1993 and 1998). Hence, this study
9applies intergovernmentalism to underscore a more basic argument about administrative
integration (Armstrong 1998: 90). One principal argument is that European integration
fundamentally reflects domestic policies and politics. European institutions and decision
processes are seen as aggregate effects of ‘national interests’ pursued by different member
states - especially by the large and most powerful member states. Hence, the EU is seen as a
traditional international organization - or more correctly, as an intergovernmental organization
- where the basic logic is national and territorial (Breckinridge 1997). The EU is seen as an
arena where national actors pursue their basic national interests in combat and compromise
with other national actors. “European integration resulted from a series of rational choices
made by national leaders who consistently pursued economic interests…” (Moravcsik 1998:
3).
Hence, intergovernmentalism draws on a rational choice perspective, which emphasises
decision-processes as products of exogenously defined preferences and strategies (Chong
1996; March and Olsen 1995). Decisions and organizational structures resemble ‘negotiated
orders’. Institutional arrangements are seen as arenas for giving and taking between rational
actors. Preferences and identities are seen to be highly static. According to a rational choice
institutionalist perspective, civil servants that change institutional affiliations “usually change
their strategy, but not their preferences” (Rothstein 1996: 147). Institutional variables are
perceived as intervening variables at best and not as independent variables (Aspinwall and
Schneider 2001). Put more starkly, Pfeffer (1997: 49) argues that the rationalist perspective
“either ignores organizations and institutions almost completely or treats them as a residual
category...”. Organizations constrain the set of potential strategies available to the actors.
“Institutions are conceived as an opportunity structure that constrains and enables the
behaviour of self-interested actors. Institutions limit the range of strategic options that are
available to actors…” (Knill and Lenschaw 2001: 9-10).
Intergovernmentalist accounts markedly reflect this rational choice institutionalist approach by
picturing decision processes directed towards the EU as two-level games where ‘national
interests’ are moulded domestically and then negotiated at different arenas within the Union
(Checkel 1998; Moravcsik 1998; Putnam 1988). “States first define preferences … then
they debate, bargain, or fight to particular agreements” (Moravcsik 1997: 544). Consistent
with the above arguments, domestic officials attending EU committees are not assumed to be
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affected as regards their identities and role perceptions. Quite the contrary, EU committees are
seen as arenas for articulating and aggregating exogenously and nationally defined preferences
(Polsby 1975). Committees are perceived of as meeting points where national actors give-and-
take - do et des (Sartori 1987: 214). Preferences, identities and representational roles are seen
as constructed prior to attending the EU committees. Hence, a rational perspective leaves no
room for outlining any hypotheses regarding changes in officials’ identities, role perceptions
and preferences are concerned. Participating within two-level games, however, may change
the strategies of the participants. That is, their initial strategies might alter due to negotiations
and compromises during committee meetings. However, their initial and basic preferences
(ends) are not altered, only the strategies (means) pursued to fulfil them.
According to an intergovernmental perspective, the most important institution at the EU level
is the Council of the European Union, where cabinet members meet. However, this
intergovernmental arena does not leave any significant or any independent imprints on the
decision processes and the decision outcomes at the EU level, let alone at the domestic level.
EU institutions are largely perceived as arrangements for reducing transaction costs amongst
the member states, being largely principals in the hands of the national agents (Moravcsik
1997). Applying a two-level game approach, the European integration process results from the
pooling of sovereignty by rational actors pursuing their basic national interests. Consequently,
the intergovernmentalist account pictures the stronghold of the nation-state order, increased
national identification and sense of belonging amongst its inhabitants, and ultimately,
increased national differentiation amongst the sub-components of the Union (Milward 1992).
Moreover, intergovernmentalists argue that decision-makers participating within EU
institutions in general - and within the Council of Ministers in particular - tend to be loyal to
the domestic institutions of which they are employed. More generally, domestic civil servants
tend to represent their domestic government when bargaining within different Union bodies.
The role conception evoked is that of a ‘domestic government representative’, seeing
themselves as delegates for their domestic government to the EU. Hence, domestic
representatives are seen as Trojan horses penetrating the EU system of governance (cf.
Chapter 6). In addition to identifications and role perceptions largely being moulded in the
domestic arena, decision processes at the domestic scene are seen as inter-sectorally tightly
co-ordinated (cf. Chapter 5): The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Prime Ministers’ Office
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have their primary responsibility in co-ordinating national ‘positions’, thus contributing to
strengthening the unitary character of the nation-state. EU politics and policies are perceived
of as an extension of national foreign politics and policies. This is reflected in the way
delegates perceive their basic roles and the way they perceive their co-ordination behaviour.
As seen from this perspective, the domestic level of governance and the EU level of
governance are largely separate. Perhaps more correctly, the EU level is not seen as a
governance system in its own right and, hence, not as a distinct level of governance as such.
Hence, the primacy of the nation-state is advocated, emphasising the single-level character of
the nation-state – EU spectrum. On this basis, Moravcsik risks overlook processes of deep
administrative integration across levels of governance. As seen in the next section, the study
of administrative integration across levels of governance has occupied neo-functionalists to a
greater extent. Moreover, arguing that different theories have different domains of empirical
application it may well be claimed that intergovernmental approaches are best suited for
analysing grand intergovernmental bargains (Peterson 1995). Henceforth, the study of day-to-
day administrative integration amongst individual civil servants might arguably be more
adequately accounted for by applying a neo-functionalist approach.
A neo-functional account.
The neo-functionalist perspective, as advocated by Ernst Haas (1958) and his students,
ascribes the EU institutions a more prominent and independent role in the integration process.
According to neo-functionalists, European integration resembles a steadily increasing spill-
over process across policy sectors, as well as loyalty transfers from purely national institutions
towards supranational institutions. Within the current study, the political spill-over hypothesis
of Haas (1958) is at the forefront of the argument. “The idea is that … elites will undergo a
learning process, developing the perceptions that their interests are better served by seeking
supranational rather than national solutions” (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991: 5). Central to Haas,
civil servants participating on EU institutions are likely to change their basic interests,
loyalties and ways of acting (Haas 1958: 16).4 Having accompanied and observed domestic
civil servants repeatedly interacting within the EU institutions, Haas argued that the ‘inner
selves’ of the officials become fundamentally affected. One general insight gained from the
neo-functionalist perspective is that EU institutions have independent impacts upon the
identities, role conceptions and modes of behaviour enacted by civil servants attending EU
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institutions. Hence, officials participating on EU committees may tend to enact new
supranational identities and role conceptions. They will ‘go native’, to utilize an
anthropological phrase, supplementing their ‘domestic’ identities and roles perceptions. What
Haas did not adequately account for was how this change process came about (Pentland
1973), and how this process is partially conditioned by institutional dynamics at the domestic
level of governance. A two-level organization theory approach, however, is presented in the
next section of this Chapter.
As seen from a neo-functional perspective, the EU level of governance and the domestic level
of governance are related in fundamental ways, as shown by Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch
(1995), Wessels (1998), and Joerges and Vos (1999). For the founding fathers of the EU, “it
was deemed essential to create an independent, career civil service whose primary loyalties
and allegiances would be to the European Union rather than to its members’ countries of
origin” (Shore 2000: 139). Amongst neo-functionalists, domestic civil servants were expected
to replace pre-established domestic allegiances with new European identifications when
participating on EU institutions and committees. “Monnet argued for a small groups of highly-
skilled dedicated people independent from national governments, prepared to take decisions in
a collegiate fashion, and loyal to the European spirit” (Radaelli 1999: 33).  Hence,
intergovernmental dynamics are transcended subsequent to new supranational identities and
role conceptions being evoked. Second, neo-functionalism transcends intergovernmentalism
by stressing the sectoral character of these roles and identifications. Building on
functionalism, neo-functionalism moved from “considerations of the flag, of territory and
national prestige to questions of welfare and cooperation” (Taylor 1975: xxiv-xxv, quoted in
Lewis 1999b: 4). Hence, the logic of territoriality is partially bypassed as a central cue for
decision-making behaviour. Consequently, the co-ordination of EU affairs in the domestic
arena is perceived as being less centrally controlled from the Foreign Ministry and Prime
Ministers Office (Lindberg 1963: 79-80). This is seen as a result “of the incipient breakdown
of the differentiation between foreign affairs and domestic affairs” (Lindberg 1963: 80;
Trondal and Veggeland 1999). A great amount of behavioural discretion is available for
domestic civil servants participating on EU committees. Consequently, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the domestic political-administrative leadership will increasingly loose
control of these officials. Civil servants attending EU committees will not act solely as
national representatives, but increasingly as independent sectoral representatives and trustees,
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and increasingly as supranational actors pursuing supranational roles and enacting
supranational identifications (cf. Chapter 6). The domestic principals, thus, may loose control
of the agents as they turn into regular participants on EU committees (Neyer 1999).
The neo-functional perspective offers a fundamentally different view on processes of
administrative integration across levels of governance compared to the intergovernmentalist
account. The descriptions and explanations of, and the prospects for, administrative
integration are perceived as different. However, whereas intergovernmentalists tend to
overlook the integrative and transformative dynamics of EU institutions, neo-functionalists
tend to undervalue the role of domestic politics and institutions. Neo-functionalists tended to
have a rather static view on European nation-states. Hence, neo-functionalist accounts did not
emphasise substantial effects of institutional differences among European states. As
mentioned above, both neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism tend to apply a single-
causal explanation of administrative integration across level of governance. Therefore, a
middle ground between these two approaches to the study of administrative integration is
needed to highlight the multi-level and multi-causal character of this phenomenon.
One important task for this study is to outline scope conditions suggesting ‘situations’ under
which the neo-functional scenario and the intergovernmental scenario are most likely to
materialize. To this end, organization theory arguments are applied emphasising how the
relative primacy of different role and identity perceptions and patterns of acting, partially
reflects the way political and administrative life is formally organized at both the EU level of
governance and at the national level of governance. Moreover, the relative primacy of
different institutional dynamics arguably reflects the way these levels are formally linked. By
way of specifying the organizational structures embedding government officials at both levels
of governance, this study aims at specifying the conditions under which particular identities,
role perceptions and co-ordination behaviour are likely to be evoked by these structures.
Hence, this study aims at seizing a middle ground between intergovernmentalism and neo-
functionalism by way of introducing organization theory. A more thorough discussion of these
arguments is provided in the next section and in Chapter 2.
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Bridging the intergovernmentalist - neo-functionalist divide by introducing
arguments from organization theory
Due to both a widening and deepening of the European integration process in the 1980s and
1990s and a general institutionalist turn in the study of public bureaucracies and organizations
in the 1980s and 1990s, the study of European integration has experienced an ‘institutionalist
turn’ (e.g. Andersen 2000; Armstrong 1998; Aspinwall and Schneider 2001; Bulmer 1993 and
1997; Cram 1997; Egeberg 1999b; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Hix 1998; Jupille and
Caporaso 1999; Olsen 1998 and 2000; Tallberg 2000). This growing influence of organization
theory is also due to an assumed lack of validity regarding the basic mechanisms advocated by
the intergovernmental account and by the neo-functional perspective and to a lack of fit
between empirical observations and theoretical predictions (Caporaso 1998: 349; Lodge 1978;
Olsen 2001; Pentland 1973; Sandholtz 1996). Even more, the growing tendency of applying
institutional approaches to the study of European integration and processes of Europeanization
may be due to an effort at transcending the sui generis treatment of these processes (Andersen
2000: 2; Caporaso 1999; Wallace 2000).
As such, this influence has directed the attention of students of European integration
increasingly towards formal organization structures as explanatory variables. The study of
European integration has developed from a study of EU institutions towards a study of the EU
through institutional lenses. Going beyond the question of whether or not national
bureaucracies become increasingly ‘Europeanized’, this study aims at outlining scope
conditions for deciding how and when such processes are likely to take place. According to
Börzel and Risse (2000: 4) “the issue is no longer whether Europe matters, but how it matters,
to what degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point in time”. As such, the value
added of seizing a middle ground between neo-functionalism and intergovernmentalism has to
do with the possibility of combining insights from both these approaches, ultimately outlining
scope conditions rendering administrative integration intelligible as a two-level phenomenon.
Moreover, going beyond the neo-functionalist versus intergovernmentalist distinction also
implies applying a more middle-range approach (cf. Chapter 3).
The ‘institutionalist turn’ in the study of European integration has revealed that integration is
indeed a multi-level phenomenon. It has become important to render understandable how
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identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct of national civil servants are affected
simultaneously by EU level institutions and by different national institutions. The neo-
functional school emphasised the emergence of supranational loyalties and the fragmentation
and the hollowing out of the nation-state bureaucracy – as shown by Dehouse (1997), Kassim
and Wright (1991), Siedentopf and Ziller (1988), and Wessels and Rometsch (1996). The
intergovernmental perspective pictures the rescue of national bureaucracies and national
identities, as revealed by Mörth and Jacobsson (1998), Milward (1992), and Moravcsik
(1993). An organization theory approach to the study of administrative integration argues that
both these scenarios are partially correct (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Administrative
integration oscillates between neo-functionalist processes and intergovernmental dynamics.
Our task is to determine the institutional scope conditions under which each is most likely to
materialize. As will be accounted for theoretically and demonstrated empirically throughout
the current study, processes of administrative integration are driven by organizational
structures having sectoral and supranational characteristics.
When studying the actual decision behaviour and identities evoked by government officials,
the formal organization of the bureaucracy is shown empirically to be important (Dearborn
and Simon 1958; Egeberg 1999a; Egeberg and Sætren 1999; Lægreid and Olsen 1984).
Hammond (1989) has also revealed logically that the formal build-up of the central
governmental apparatus accompanies particular decision-making behaviour amongst
organizational members. Organizational structures may be seen as mobilizing particular
modes of behaviour, identities and role conceptions. Particular models of man and particular
models of society embedding social interaction may be moulded by particular principles of
organization. “[R]esearch has yet to discover a work setting which leaves people unmarked by
their participation” (van Maanen and Schein 1979: 210, quoted in Scully 2001: 3). As such,
the ‘institutionalist turn’ in the study of European integration draws heavily on old neo-
functionalist insights. “For example, neo-functionalism emphasized such things as actor
socialization, behavioural norms, the internalization of rules, and the development of multiple,
overlapping identities” (Lewis 1999b: 36). This study argues basically that we have to unpack
the organizational structures of the EU system in order to determine which identity, role and
mode of action being evoked by domestic officials attending EU committees. Additionally, we
have to carve up the bureaucratic machinery of the nation-state in order to unravel the dual
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institutional affiliations embedding these domestic government officials, ultimately
determining the relative primacy of different institutional dynamics penetrating them.
A substantial body of literature conceives of the EU system as a novel and partially
‘mysterious’ polity, not resembling anything seen before, I argue that the EU system to a great
extent reflects the structures of nation-state polities (Olsen 2001: 3). This stands in contrast to
arguments stressing that “the European Community is a political entity that does not fit into
any accepted category of government” (Sbragia 1993: 24 – author’s emphasis). My argument
does not ignore idiosyncrasies of the EU system, which contains supranational, multinational,
multi-linguistic and multilevel characteristics. The basic arguments laid out here, however,
stress organizational similarities between the EU polity and other polities. Due to the EU
being described as unique, novel and ‘mysterious’ (Bartolini 1997) and faced with an assumed
lack of appropriate concepts and categories for understanding this polity (Coombes 1970: 101;
Jachtenfuchs 1997: 40), one vital step in this enquiry must be to divide this polity into
empirically meaningful and theoretical enlightening categories.
I argue that the EU system of governance, in general, and the web of EU committees and
working parties, in particular, are organized according to two basic and general principles in
administrative life. Parallel to the sectoral and spatial institutional build-up of the domestic
political-administrative apparatus (sector ministries and agencies versus Foreign Ministries),
the EU Commission and the preparatory expert committees underlying it arguably exhibit
sectoral and functional principles. The Council of the European Union and the web of
working parties organized under it exhibit spatial and territorial based principles of
organization (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Reflecting these organizational principles, I claim
that the EU Commission is more likely to generate sectoral role perceptions and modes of
acting amongst its participants. On the other hand, the Council of the European Union is more
likely to activate territorial and inter-sectoral role perceptions and cross-sectoral modes of
acting amongst its participants. Hence, national civil servants that are solely affiliated to
Commission expert committees are likely to evoke sectoral identifications, role conceptions
and codes of conduct. Conversely, territorial allegiances and role conceptions are likely to be
enacted more strongly amongst civil servants solely attending Council working parties.
Finally, domestic civil servants participating on both Commission expert committees and
Council working parties are likely to be influenced by a mix of sectoral and territorial
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dynamics. Thus, the sectoral and territorial principles of organization underpinning the EU
Commission and the Council of Ministers may account for the sectoral-territorial dimension
of administrative integration presented in figure 1.2.
Moreover, several conflicting principles are often built into organizational structures. Within
the EU Commission a geographical principle runs parallel with the sectoral principle and
within the Council the sectoral principle of organization is present, supplementing the area
principle. What is important, however, is that these additional, and partially contending
principles of organizations, are being biased and skewed by the dominant principle of
organization (Gulick 1937). Hence, certain institutional dynamics are likely to precede other
dynamics. Simply stated, I argue that the uppermost principle of organization of the EU
Commission and the Council is sector and territory, respectively (Egeberg and Trondal 1999)
(cf. Chapter 2).
The overall rationale for being preoccupied with these organizing principles is the idea that
different principles tend to activate different conflicts, identities, role conceptions and modes
of behaviour (Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990; March 1994). Due to the EU Commission and
the Council comprising “a variety of contradictory organization logics” (Christiansen 1997:
87), identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct are assumed to be affected differently
within these organizational settings. National civil servants attending EU committees are
likely to be affected by the uppermost principles present within each committee (Herrmann
and Brewer 2000). Hence, national government officials participating on Commission expert
committees are likely to evoke intra-sectoral identifications, role conceptions and modes of
co-ordination: He or she will conceive of him- or herself as representing his or her ‘own’
policy sector, his or her professional expertise, and tend to co-ordinate within, rather than
across, issue areas. “Coalitions including administrative officials (at the EU and national
levels) … can be seen as the modern version of the system of engrenage built into the original
model of the Community by Jean Monnet” (Radaelli 1999: 40 – original emphasis). As such,
the territorial principle of the nation-state order is partially transcended by sectoral dynamics.
Conversely, government officials attending Council working parties are arguably more likely
to evoke inter-sectoral and territorial identifications and senses of belonging towards the
central government as a whole. Furthermore, co-ordination processes are likely to be inter-
sectoral in nature, ascribing vital importance to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Hence,
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sectoral logics are more likely to be enacted amongst government officials participating on
Commission expert committees, while territorial logics are more likely to accompany
participation on Council working parties. Officials participating on both these EU committees
are likely to evoke a mixture of both these logics. These arguments are laid out more
thoroughly in Chapter 2.
Consequently, intergovernmental dynamics may be transcended more fully within
Commission expert committees than within Council working parties. Moreover, the
Commission expert committees might foster a two-dimensional mode of transcendence. First,
conceiving of EU institutions and EU committees as supranational and over-national entities,5
the nation-state order can be transcended due to new supranational identities and role
conceptions being evoked by the EU committee participants and due to the enactment of
highly sectoralized identities and role perceptions. Council working parties, on the other hand,
are more likely to contribute to a one-dimensional transcendence. While new supranational
identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct might be adopted amongst the participants,
these features are likely to retain their basic territorial characteristics. Figure 1.3 presents two
partially different modes by which intergovernmentalism can be transcended:
Figure 1.3 A two-dimensional model of transcendence.
                                                   national                 supranational
                                                       no                     one-dimensional
              territorial                 transcendence              transcendence
                                            one-dimensional         two-dimensional
                sectoral                 transcendence              transcendence
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As shown by figure 1.3, intergovernmentalism may be transcended one-dimensionally along
each axis. First, evoking sectoral modes of identifying, perceiving ones’ roles and acting need
not solely reflect neo-functional dynamics at the EU level. They may have national origins
from within sectoral ministries and agencies. Furthermore, inter-sectoral and territorial modes
of acting and identifying need not solely reflect domestic impact. They may have
supranational origins, mainly from within the Council of Ministers. A two-dimensional
transcendence of intergovernmentalism, however, requires that supranational role and identity
perceptions are evoked in tandem with highly sectoral roles and modes of action.
In order to seize a middle ground between neo-functional accounts and intergovernmental
approaches to the study of administrative integration, we need to trace how administrative life
is formally organized at both levels of governance as well as how each level of governance is
formally linked together (cf. Chapter 2). The decision behaviour, role conceptions and sense
of belonging evoked by domestic civil servants attending EU committees may partially reflect
their domestic institutional affiliations and partially their EU affiliations. As regards the
relative impact of these levels of governance, I argue in Chapter 2 that the length and intensity
to which officials attend EU committees may increase the likelihood for transcending
intergovernmentalism along the national-supranational axis. However, whether this
transcendence is one-dimensional or two-dimensional is determined by the organizational
structures embedding each civil servant.6 Are they sectoral or territorial in character? In the
current study, intergovernmentalism is arguably transcended two-dimensionally if the civil
servants are embedded in EU committees and domestic government institutions specialized
according to a sectoral principle, and if the civil servants are senior EU committee
participants.
With respect to the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration, the re-
socializing potential of EU committees is likely to be conditioned by the seniority of the
committee participants. Foremost, I argue in the next Chapter that officials who are senior
participants on EU committees are more likely to be re-socialized than officials who are new-
comers (Beyers 1998b; Hooghe 1999a). Officials who generally participate intensively on EU
committees are likely to become re-socialized, that is, to add new supranational identities and
role conceptions to pre-existing ones (Lindberg 1963: 287). Hence, individual seniority at the
EU level may plausibly impinge upon the extent to which the participants will enact
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supranational role and identity perceptions. In addition, institutional seniority is argued to
matter. Civil servants from countries that were amongst the founding fathers of the Union are
more likely to evoke supranational allegiances than civil servants from new member states.
Furthermore, within each nation-state, different government institutions have participated at
the EU level for different periods of time. Officials employed in ministries and agencies
which have been affiliated to the EU for protracted periods of time are likely to evoke
supranational role and identity perceptions more strongly than officials employed in
institutions that are more new-comers at the EU arena.
Consequently, individual and institutional seniority at the EU level may affect processes of
administrative integration. National role and identity perceptions are likely to be largely
sustained amongst officials that are new-comers at the EU arena, whilst a partially new set of
supranational identifications and role concepts are more likely to be enacted amongst more
senior EU participants. Hence, both the length and the intensity to which national officials
attend EU committees many account for the national-supranational dimension of
administrative integration.
Domestic government officials are only part-time participants at the EU level of governance.
Thus, they are likely to be only partially re-socialized at this level. Their primary institutional
affiliations are domestic - within the ministry or agency in which they are employed.
Considering the sectoral-territorial dimension, I hypothesise that officials employed within
domestic agencies are more likely to evoke intra-sectoral roles, identities and modes of co-
ordination than officials employed within domestic ministries. Officials at the ministry level
are thus more likely to evoke more encompassing territorial and inter-sectoral roles, whilst
officials at the agency level are more likely to enact more narrow intra-sectoral expert roles.
Moreover, inter-sectoral roles are more likely to be enacted amongst officials employed within
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs than amongst officials employed within sector ministries and
agencies. Finally, contrary to Haas (1958), the enactment of supranational roles is likely to
supplement pre-established role perceptions, not replace them.
By way of summarizing the core arguments presented above, this study tests the following
causal model:
21
Figure 1.4 The causal model tested.
Organizing principles within
domestic administrative institutions
 and EU committees                                                                              Patterns of co-ordination
                                                                                                                         behaviour
Primary versus secondary
institutional affiliations
                                                                                                                  Role and identity
The length of attending                                                                                perceptions
EU committees
The intensity of attending
EU committees
These causal relationships are basically those that are tested in the current study.7  Empirically
testable hypotheses are derived from the above model in Chapter 2. In the following endnote
the independent and dependent variables in figure 4.1 are operationalized:8
Domestic government officials who participate on EU committees are part of two institutional
systems simultaneously. The goal of this enquiry is to analyse to what extent and how the
institutional scope conditions presented in figure 1.4 affects administrative integration.
Consistent with figure 1.3, intergovernmentalism is transcended along two dimensions if
supranational identities and roles are evoked, and if sectoral roles, identities and modes of
action are enacted amongst domestic civil servants attending EU committees. A middle
ground between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism is seized by way of introducing
organization theory perspectives to the study of administrative integration.
Intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism represent extreme scenarios of administrative
integration; organization theory may identify institutional scope conditions under which each
is more likely to materialize. A more thorough discussion of the independent and dependent
variables, including their mutual relationships, is provided in Chapter 2.
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The research design
There are basically two different modes of conducting social enquiry. The first mode is where
the empirical phenomena are at the centre of the analysis and the purpose is to account for this
in great detail (Pfeffer 1997: 197). The second mode is directed towards constructing theories
and hypotheses, where the theoretical argument is at the centre of the analysis, and empirical
data is applied in order to elucidate this argument (Elster 1989). The empirical field is utilized
as a laboratory for testing hypotheses and illuminating general arguments (Haas 1958; Olsen
2001). Empirical observations are applied for the sake of the argument, not vice versa. This
study is more in the spirit of the second than the first research mode. The overall aim of the
current study is to outline a theoretical argument accounting for processes of administrative
integration across levels of governance. The overall research endeavour is geared towards
identifying scope conditions indicating when intergovernmental dynamics are likely to be
transcended. Empirical observations are gathered to illuminate the validity of the theoretically
suggested scope conditions.
To this end, this study focuses on domestic government officials attending EU committees:
Commission expert committees and Council working parties. As will be argued for more
thoroughly in Chapters 2 and 3, these committees are expected to affect identities, role
conceptions and modes of acting differently. Second, this study compares domestic
government officials from three Nation-States: Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The rationale
for comparing these three Nation-States is due to their different forms and length of
affiliations to the European Union (EU). Denmark became full-fledged member of the EEC in
1973 and Sweden became member of the EU in 1995. Norway has been affiliated to the
Union through the EEA agreement since 1994. However, our study does not analyse the
impact of national forms of affiliation to the EU. Rather, this study analyses the effects
stemming from individual forms of affiliation towards different EU committees.
Our study is at the individual level, not at the aggregate national level. Hence, we want to
study the impact generated by individual affiliations towards different EU committees as
regards the identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct evoked by each individual.
Danish and Swedish officials have access to Commission expert committees and to Council
working parties, Norwegian officials are only allowed to participate in the preparatory stages
of the decision-making processes within the Commission expert committees. Moreover,
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Danish officials have been formally affiliated to these EU committees since 1973. Most of
their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts entered these committees in the middle of the
1990s. Hence, this study focuses on the effects of individual affiliations to different EU
committees, as well as the effects of seniority and intensity of participation on these
committees.
This study analyses the impact stemming from the various domestic institutional affiliations
embedding these participants with regard to their identities and role conceptions. EU
committee participants are heavily pre-socialized and pre-packed from within domestic
government institutions prior to entering EU committees. This study focuses on government
officials employed at the agency level and at the ministry level. In the Scandinavian countries
ministries and agencies are vertically specialized – that is, agencies are formally separated
from cabinet level departments. Thus, agencies are organized at a lower hierarchical level and
agency personnel are expected to act more intra-sectorally and politically neutral than are
personnel at the ministry level. Moreover, our study includes officials having different
positions within the vertical ranks of these ministries and agencies. Are officials employed
within ministries - and in top rank positions - more likely to evoke inter-sectoral modes of
identifying, perceiving ones’ roles and acting than officials employed in medium or lower
rank positions within domestic agencies? Additionally, this study covers officials at the
permanent representations to the EU of these countries. Permanent representations embody
territorial principles of organization more fully than do domestic sector ministries and
agencies. The permanent representations are substituted for the Foreign Ministry in this study
mostly due to the assumed intensity to which officials at the permanent representation interact
with various EU committees. The permanent representatives are also preferred to officials at
the MFA due to the lack of MFA officials participating on EU committees (especially in the
Norwegian case). We ask whether the identities, role conceptions and modes of acting evoked
by permanent representatives differ significantly from those evoked by officials employed
within sector ministries and agencies. Comparing officials at the Brussels-based permanent
representations and officials in the ministries and agencies ‘back home’ enables us to
determine the relative effect stemming from the sheer intensity of involvement in EU
committees (cf. Chapter 4).
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One rationale for using Denmark, Norway and Sweden as comparable cases has also to do
with the domestic government institutions being almost identically constructed within these
countries. As such, only minor variations in our empirical observations are likely to stem from
different state traditions. The institutional build-up of the central administrations of these
three Nation-States, however, is not entirely identical. The greatest potential difference
between these bureaucracies lies in staff size and formal autonomy of the agencies. Both
Danish and Swedish agencies are larger than most Norwegian agencies. Conversely, the
ministry level in Norway is relatively larger in staff-size than in Denmark and Sweden.9
Hence, the autonomy and strength of the agency level is potentially greater in Denmark and
Sweden than in Norway. Moreover, the agency level in Sweden has additional autonomy
compared to their Danish and Norwegian counterparts. Despite these differences, however,
“[s]ince the Nordic countries are more or less similar in a great many respect they stand out as
good examples of comparable cases that fit, very neatly, central requirements of the most
similar system design” (Anckar 1993: 119). It is important to underscore, however, that our
study does not compare across countries. This study analyses only basic theoretical
relationships between organizational structures and behavioural consequences of individual
civil servants.
Third, this study includes civil servants from two different policy sectors - the environment
sector and the field of occupational health and safety. Three basic rationales are advocated in
favour of this empirical limitation. First, both these sectors concern environmental issues –
more broadly in the environmental sector and more narrowly within the field of occupational
health and safety. Second, common for both these policy sectors, the SEA opened up for
qualified majority voting on a great many dossiers (European Commission 95/0155 (CNS);
European Commission 1993; Kronsell 1999: 194; Springer 1992: 101-102). Virtually all
directives enacted within these two policy areas have been subject to qualified majority voting
since the passage of the SEA (European Commission 1993; Jacobsson 1992: 15; Volker 1993:
122). Hence, our empirical observations cannot be traced back to different voting procedures.
Third, while the environment sector is heavily integrated into the EU apparatus, institutionally
and legally, the occupational health and safety sector is less so. This difference is important
because it maximises the possibility of studying officials with various levels of experience
from EU committees. Officials in the environmental sector are more likely to have attended
EU committees more intensively than officials in the field of occupational health and safety.
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Environmental policy was introduced to EU legislation in 1972 and the occupational health
and safety sector was legally integrated into the Treaty in the SEA of 1987 (Moe 1995: 35).
However, the SEA also contributed to legal recognition of environmental legislation by the
EC (Sherrington 2000: 113). Environmental policy has risen from silence to salience between
1972 and 2000. Approximately 90 per cent of all environmental legal acts within the national
legal systems are of EU origin10. There are approximately 100 preparatory expert committees
under the auspices of the EU Commission within this policy field and two Council working
parties exist (Demmke 1998: 14-15; The European Union Encyclopedia and Directory 1996:
178). The environmental field is the third largest policy sector within the EU as measured by
the number of directives implemented: 135 out of 1300 directives implemented up to 31
December 1996 regarded environmental issues (Kronsell 1999: 191-192; Tallberg 1999: 73).
Nearly one-third of the questions discussed within the European Parliament relate to
environmental issues (Kronsell 1999: 192). However, the political salience of environmental
policy has, in general, declined in the 1990s (Sbragia 2000). Within the occupational health
and safety sector, in contrast, not only does the EU produce less legal acts11 but also fewer
expert committees exist. The European Union Encyclopedia and Directory (1996: 238-239)
counts six Commission expert committees within this policy field. Moreover, no Council
working parties exist that are solely responsible for occupational health and safety issues (The
European Union Encyclopedia and Directory 1996: 178). Still, an increased level of EU
activity has been witnessed in the 1990s, firstly, by enacting social policy initiatives of its own
and secondly, by “striking down features of national systems that are deemed incompatible
with the development of the single marked” (Leibfried and Pierson 2000: 284). As such, the
political salience of the field of occupational health and safety has increased in the 1990s.
Henceforth, these two policy sectors are integrated to a different extent into the EU machinery
- both legally and institutionally.12 However, the overall rationale for studying officials
affiliated to these two policy sectors is not due to the potential impact of policy sector as
regards the dynamics discussed above. Rather, the environment sector and the occupational
health and safety sector are selected due to both sectors dealing with fairly similar issues –
environmental issues. Selecting these issue areas enables us to control for possible impact or
noise stemming from policy sector affiliations. The reason for selecting two policy sectors
instead of only one, which might have reduced the above control-problem more fully, has to
do with (i) studying officials with different degrees of experience from EU committees, as
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well as (ii) increasing the N underpinning the study. Simply by studying two policy sectors
contributes to an increase in the N (cf. Chapter 3).
Moreover, what rationale can be given for studying the effects of organizational structures on
the enactment of identifications, role conceptions and modes of behaviour in a multi-level
frame, and not in a purely domestic context? The overall theoretical rationale for applying a
multi-level frame has to do with the national-supranational dimension of administrative
integration presented in figure 1.2. This study aim at seizing a middle ground between
intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism by specifying the institutional conditions under
which supranational role and identity perceptions are attended to. Hence, as regards the two
dimensions addressed in figure 1.2, only the national-supranational dimension is prima facie
multi-level in character. The sectoral-territorial dimension is more general in character. As
such, I argue in Chapter 7 that the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration
is more easily generalisable to other societal contexts than the argument on the national-
supranational nexus of administrative integration. However, a multi-level framing of this
study is warranted to account for the national-supranational dimension of administrative
integration.
One additional rationale behind studying the suggested theoretical propositions (cf. Chapter 2)
in a multi-level context is methodological. Our research units are chosen in an attempt to
falsify the assumed relationships between our independent and dependent variables (Popper
1963: 36). Allow me briefly to elaborate on this: The empirical frame of reference for this
study is domestic government officials having their primary institutional affiliations at the
domestic level. The secondary institutional affiliations of these officials are the EU expert
committees and working parties on which they participate. Generally, we would expect the
relationship between “where you stand depends on where you sit” (Allison 1969) to be weaker
within collegial arrangements - such as the EU expert committees and working parties - than
within hierarchical arrangements, especially when affiliations to these committees are
considered secondary of nature (cf. Chapter 2). The robustness of the relationships between
our independent and dependent variables are assumed further weakened due to the
institutional embeddedness of these actors being multinational and multi-linguistic at the EU
level. Hence, one rationale for choosing EU committees and working parties as a frame for
enquiry rests upon the following methodological consideration: The study of organizational
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identities, role perceptions and decision processes are of general interest in political-
administrative life. The relationships between these dependent variables and our two basic
independent variables ((i) formal organizational structures, and (ii) the length and intensity to
which civil servants attend EU committees), however, are studied under less favourable
conditions in the current enquiry. If significant correlations (in a statistical sense) are indeed
uncovered between these variables, these correlations might be deemed relatively robust. The
baseline logic behind this methodological argument is addressed more thoroughly in Chapter
3.
*   *   *
The empirical data applied to illustrate our general arguments are of several kinds. As will be
revealed more thoroughly in Chapter 3, survey data and interview data are used in order to test
our theoretical arguments. Three empirical studies have been conducted within Danish,
Norwegian and Swedish ministries and agencies. One survey study and one interview study
were conducted amongst civil servants from domestic ministries and agencies within the
environmental sector and the occupational health and safety sector. Additionally, one survey
was conducted amongst officials at the permanent representations to the EU of these three
states. This second study covers officials working within several different policy fields. A
more thorough description and discussion of the empirical data is provided in Chapter 3. The
following ministries and agencies are included in this study:
Denmark: The Department of Environment and Energy, the Environmental Protection
Agency, the National Forest and Nature Agency, the Department of Labour, the National
Labour Market Authority, and the Danish permanent representation to the European Union.
Norway: The Ministry of Environment, the Norwegian Pollution Agency, the Ministry of
Local Government and Regional Development, the Directorate for Labour Inspection, and the
Norwegian permanent representation to the European Union.
Sweden: The Ministry of Environment, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Ministry of
Industry, Employment and Communication13, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration, and the Swedish permanent representation to the European Union.
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Overview of the study
Chapter 1 has introduced the general topic of this study, and outlined the arguments in brief.
Chapter 2 allows us to trace these arguments in greater detail. Chapter 2 elaborates on the
dependent and the independent variables of the study, and outlines plausible causal
relationships between them. Further, Chapter 2 also present hypotheses to be tested
empirically. Next, Chapter 3 introduces the empirical data underpinning this study. Chapter 3
addresses the data being applied to illustrate the theoretical arguments addressed. Further,
Chapter 3 discusses some meta-theoretical problems that relate to the notion of theoretical
refutation, causality and the comparative method. Chapter 4 describes the primary and
secondary institutional affiliations embedding the civil servants studied. More precisely,
Chapter 4 reveals the domestic institutional affiliations of these officials - their hierarchical
positions, their seniority, etc. This Chapter also presents the length and intensity to which
national civil servants participate on Commission expert committees and Council working
parties.
Next, Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the extent to which participation on EU committees
contributes to administrative integration. Thus, these Chapters reveal the extent to which a
weak or a strong mode of administrative integration is emerging across levels of governance
as a result of cross-level participation in Europe. A strong mode of administrative integration
is represented by the evocation of sectoral role and identity perceptions amongst the
committee participants and the enactment of sectoral co-ordination behaviour (Chapters 5 and
6). Furthermore, a strong mode of administrative integration implies the additional
construction of supranational role and identity conceptions (Chapter 6). Furthermore, Chapter
5 and 6 study the causal impact of (i) different EU committee affiliations embedding national
civil servants (Commission expert committees versus Council working parties), (ii) the length
and intensity of participation on such committees, and (iii) various primary institutional
affiliations at the domestic level.
Finally, Chapter 7 draws these analyses to a conclusion. A summary of the most important and
theoretically illuminating propositions and empirical observations are provided in Chapter 7.
This Chapter also addresses the strengths and limits of the analyses by making comparisons to
existing empirical literature on the field and by revisiting the theoretical arguments and the
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methodological choices suggested in this study. Based on this revision, suggestions for further
research on administrative integration are considered.
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Notes
                                                
1
 The author would like to thank Jan Beyers, Jeffrey T. Checkel, Morten Egeberg and Jeffrey Lewis for valuable
comments and criticisms on an earlier version of this Chapter.
2
 Thanks to John Erik Fossum at the ARENA programme for this point.
3
 The general realist perspective within the study of international relations was outlined years before the neo-
functional perspective was addressed (Morgenthau 1973).
4
 The current presentation of neo-functionalism draws largely from Haas’ 1958 book. The transfer of loyalties as
a cornerstone of European integration was underscored in this seminal work. His book from 1964 (‘Beyond the
Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization’) is of less importance to our argument. The 1964
book is more general in character covering global integration, focuses less on loyalty transformations, and less on
the transcendence of the territorial principle of the nation-state order.
5
 Wodak (2000: 22) shows that the self-perceptions of Commission officials apparently reflect the supranational
character of the institution. Most Commission officials conceive of themselves as ‘European’.  However, the
second most important identity of these officials is ‘national’.
6
 The notion of social interaction is implicit within this argument. While recent social constructivist work pays
attention towards social interaction (e.g. Checkel 1999 and 2000; Risse 2000), organization theory pays more
explicit attention towards the organizational structures embedding social interaction (March and Olsen 1989;
Egeberg 1999a).
7
 The mix of neo-functional and intergovernmental dynamics is likely to be more complex in real life situations
than seen from the pure neo-functional and intergovernmental perspectives. Hence, the theoretical arguments
suggested in this study are ceteris paribus in character.
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 Figure 1.5 Operational measures of the independent and dependent variables in Figure 1.4.
Independent variables Dependent variables
Organizational principles:
-A sector principle versus a principle of territoriality.
Institutional affiliations:
-Domestic ministries and agencies,





Length of attendance on EU committees:
-Number of years of attendance.
Intensity of attendance on EU committees:
-The number of EU committees attended,
-The number of formal meetings attended,
-The number of informal meetings attended,
-The proportion of time devoted participating on EU
committees,
-Giving oral presentations during committee meetings.
Co-ordination behaviour:
-Doing clearances with other central administrative
institutions,






-“Do these documents govern your positions?”,
-“I have clear instructions as to what positions to
follow”,
-“I have a great amount of freedom when participating
on EU committees”,
-Officials’ emphasis on professional considerations,
-Officials’ emphasis on ‘national interests’,
-Officials’ contacts with various domestic government
institutions,
-Importance attached to various domestic government
institutions,
-Heeding signals from various domestic government
institutions.
Role and identity perceptions:
-Feeling allegiance towards various domestic
government institutions,
-Feeling allegiance towards various EU institutions,
-Heeding signals from various domestic government
institutions,
-Assigning weight to various considerations,
-Officials’ perceptions of the role of colleagues from
other countries,
-Officials’ perceptions of Commission officials’
independence of particular national interests,
The emergence of an ‘esprit de corps’ in the EU
commitees.
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9
 As regards the ministries and agencies included in this study (see below), the ministry level and the agency level
in Norway are of the same size (as regards staff). In Sweden and Denmark, the agency levels are 57 per cent and
58 per cent larger with respect to staff size than the ministry level, respectively. The following figures give the
precise number of employees in the ministries and agencies covered by this study:
- Denmark: The Department of Environment and Energy (150 employees), the Environmental Protection
Agency (460 employees), the National Forest and Nature Agency (330 employees), the Department of
Labour (150 employees), and finally the National Labour Market Authority (285 employees).
- Norway: The Ministry of Environment (250 employees), the Norwegian Pollution Agency (300 employees),
the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Development (265 employees), and finally the Directorate
for Labour Inspection (170 employees).
- Sweden: The Ministry of Environment (160 employees), the Environmental Protection Agency (500
employees), the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communication (293 employees), and finally the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (300 employees).
10
 741 pieces of legislation has been completed in the environment sector between 1958 and 1992 (Fligstein and
McNichol 1998: 79).
11
 A total of 416 pieces of legislation was completed in this policy sector between 1958 and 1992 (Fligstein and
McNichol 1998: 79).
12
 Still, other policy sectors could also have been selected for this study on the premise of
 
level of EU
involvement into the respective policy areas: For example, the competition sector is heavily integrated into the
EU machinery, whereas foreign policy is, at present, only modestly integrated into the EU aquis. Still, the
environment sector and the occupational health and safety sector are selected for this study also on the premises
of compatibility with regard to domestic government institutions, and to the broader issue area underpinning both
these sectors – environmental policy.
13
 This ministry is a new construction. 1 January 1999 witnessed a merger between the old Ministry of Labour,
the Ministry of Communication, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of Interior.
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CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
A THEORETICAL ACCOUNT ON PRINCIPLES OF ORGANIZATION
You are what you know (CNN 2000)
Introduction1
Owing to accelerating ‘Globalization’ and ‘Europeanization’ two scenarios have been put
forth in current literature analyzing the fate of the nation-state. One intergovernmental
scenario pictures the stronghold of the nation-state, increased national identification, senses of
belonging, and, ultimately, increased national differentiation and sectoral integration at the
nation-state level. Second, one neo-functional scenario pictures the erosion and the hollowing
out of the nation-state, national identities, senses of belonging, and, ultimately, tendencies
towards sectoral differentiation at the nation-state level. While the first scenario highlights the
impermeability of the nation-states’ borderlines, the second focuses on the permeable and
perforated nature of the borders (Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 1999: 29; Offe 1998: 4). This
Chapter argues that both of these scenarios may be partially correct, reflecting different ways
of organizing political and administrative life. Intergovernmentalism may arguably be
transcended more fully if institutions (at the domestic level and at the EU level) are
specialized according to sector, if domestic civil servants participate intensively and for
protracted periods of time within EU committees, and if institutional compatibility across the
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national and the EU level is present. Under these conditions a two-dimensional transcendence
of intergovernmentalism is likely to come about, contributing to administrative integration
across levels of governance.
This Chapter specifies scope conditions, under which intergovernmental dynamics are most
likely to materialize, and scope conditions under which neo-functional dynamics are more
likely to emerge. Organization theory is introduced in order to reveal how intergovernmental
dynamics and neo-functional dynamics reflects organizational structures at different levels of
governance. Hence, the relative primacy of different institutional dynamics reflects how
different organizations (at the domestic and EU level) are formally organized and how these
organizations are formally linked together. Thus, treating the intergovernmental perspective as
our null-hypothesis, this study identifies conditions under which this perspective is
transcended. The overall rationale for studying conditions whereby intergovernmentalism is
transcended relates to our endeavour towards identifying conditions under which
administrative integration is likely to emerge. As the next section reveals, the transcendence
of intergovernmental dynamics is seen as synonymous with processes of administrative
integration. Hence, “the issue is no longer whether Europe matters but how it matters, to what
degree, in what direction, at what pace, and at what point in time” (Börzel and Risse 2000: 4).
Organizations are constantly evolving and changing (March and Olsen 1989). Several studies
describe the EU system of governance as an unfinished polity, as a system in flux being
largely ‘under construction’ (Bulmer 1993: 36; Hooghe 1997: 105; Laffan, O’Donnell and
Smith 1999; Visser 1999: 2). Olsen (2000b) pictures the EU as an unsettled political unity. I
argue, however, that important stabilizing organizational principles are present within the EU
system, just as within domestic governance institutions (Andersen 2000; Egeberg and Trondal
1999; Olsen 2001). Wallace (2000: 531-532) pictures the EU system and the nation-state as
“stabile provisorium” (original emphasis) by focusing on organizational structures as
stabilising mechanisms in organizational life the current analysis is not based on
organizational categories provided by the vast majority of contemporary EU integration
literature. The organizational arguments and dimensions addressed in this study are more
general, applicable to any polity across time and space. Assuming that “the EU system of
governance has some unique properties, whilst also sharing important features with other
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complex polities” (Olsen 2001: 3), “we aim at understanding the unfamiliar with the help
of familiar conceptual lenses” (Jönsson et al. 1998: 320).
One reason for being preoccupied with organizational structures is that they may affect
conflicts and identities, roles and modes of behaviour amongst the organizational members
(Gulick 1937; Hammond 1986; March and Olsen 1989; March and Simon 1958; Rokkan
1970). The basic principles underpinning organizational structures are assumed to mobilise
certain identities, senses of belonging and codes of conduct amongst the organizational
members.
Empirical research show that organizational variables explain decision behaviour, role
perceptions and identity formation more fully than do demographic variables (Christensen and
Egeberg 1997; Egeberg 1994; 1999a; 1999b; Egeberg and Sætren 1999; Meier and Nigro
1976; Searing 1991: 1251-1252; Wallin et al. 1999: 158; Zuna 1998). Further, one reason for
focusing on principles of organization is the assumption that they have policy implications. A
choice of principle is a choice of policy because principles of organization are not neutral to
policy outcomes (Hammond 1986). An additional rationale for focusing on principles of
organization is the possibility of deriving relatively precise empirical propositions from these
(Gulick 1937).
Approaching the dependent variables underpinning this study, I argue that processes of
administrative integration across levels of governance may be measured by (i) the decision
behaviour, (ii) the role perceptions, and (iii) the institutional identities evoked by domestic
officials who attend EU committees.2 The EU system may be utilized as a laboratory for
studying more general theoretical ideas on decision-making processes and for studying the
conditions under which partially new sets of supranational identities and role perceptions are
constructed within penetrated polities such as the EU (Haas 1958; Rosenau 1969).
As seen in Chapter 1, intergovernmentalism may be transcended along two dimensions.
Following this two-dimensional path, two major questions are addressed throughout this
study. First, under what organizational conditions is it likely that domestic government
officials who attend EU committees evoke supranational roles and identities, and under what
institutional conditions are pre-established national identities and role perceptions sustained at
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the EU level? In other words, what are the conditions under which domestic civil servants “go
native” (Christoph 1993: 532), and under what conditions can we observe “a socialization into
a community with common problem definitions and relatively shared approaches to dealing
with them” (Joerges and Neyer 1997: 619)? Under what organizational conditions can we
expect to observe shifts in civil servants loyalties, expectations and political activities (Haas
1958: 16), and under what conditions are national allegiances and role conceptions likely to be
sustained at the EU level of governance (Moravcsik 1993 and 1998)? As to account for the
enactment of supranational role and identity perceptions, the current study emphasis the length
and intensity to which domestic officials participate on EU committees. Second, this study
asks under what organizational conditions roles, identities and modes of acting are moulded
along sectoral or territorial lines. Approaching these two questions from an organization
theory perspective, this study emphasises the significance of organizational borders and the
consequences emanating from redrawing these borders. How may certain principles of
organization within domestic institutions and within EU institutions contribute to the
enactment of certain role and identity conceptions, and codes of conduct amongst the
organizational participants? In sum, intergovernmentalism is assumed fully transcended in
situations whereby supranational identity and role perceptions are constructed and in
situations whereby the character of the evoked co-ordination behaviour is largely sectoral.
The unit of analysis in this study consists of domestic civil servants participating on expert
committees under the EU Commission and working parties under the auspices of the Council
of the European Union. The comitology committees are excluded from this analysis mostly
due to methodological considerations.3 This choice of research units is based on two
rationales: First, officials are the individuals who develop feelings of belonging, who are
exposed to role expectations and who ultimately act. Second, many domestic officials are
exposed to impulses from different social and societal contexts - they are ‘full-timers’ within
domestic government institutions while at the same time being ‘part-timers’ within EU
institutions, attending Commission expert committees and Council working parties.4 Their
primary institutional affiliations are the domestic machinery of governance. The committees at
the EU level are only secondary and supplementary institutional affiliations to these domestic
officials (Egeberg 1999b).
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The first section of this Chapter outlines one organizational theory argument on the
significance of organizational structures with regard to the enactment of identities, role
perceptions and modes of acting. According to a cognitive organization theory perspective,
intergovernmentalism may be transcended if domestic officials attend EU committees
intensively and for protracted periods of time, and if they are affiliated towards government
institutions organized according to a sectoral principle. These two requirements are arguably
fulfilled if government officials participate intensively and for protracted periods of time
within Commission expert committees, especially if these officials are employed in domestic
sector ministries or agencies. Intergovernmentalism is less likely to be transcended amongst
officials at the permanent representations to the EU devoting little time and energy towards
participating on Council working parties. This section provides micro-foundations rendering
these assumptions intelligible. Additionally, some empirically testable hypotheses are outlined
on the basis of this theoretical endeavour. These hypotheses derive from the causal model
presented in Chapter 1 (figure 1.4). Section two discusses the dependent variables
underpinning this study.
Towards an organization theory argument
Organizational dynamics in general, and processes of administrative integration in particular,
can be analysed against the background of a variety of theoretical tool-kits (Checkel 2001;
Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001; Cram 1997; Moravcsik 1998; Olsen 1998). The purpose of
this Chapter is principally to shed light on some selected dynamics of particular relevance to
the topic of this study.5 According to Chapter 1, intergovernmentalism may be transcended
along two axes: a sectoral-territorial axis and a national-supranational axis. When explaining
this dual process of transcendence, however, the same major social mechanisms are at work.
These mechanisms will be addressed in this section by the use of organization theory
arguments.
New-institutional perspectives in organizational analyses present a multitude of foci,
interpretations and levels of analysis (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; March and Olsen 1989 and
1995; Peters 1999; Scott 1987). One common denominator integrating this plurality is the
emphasis attached to contextualized, endogenous decision behaviour, identity and senses of
belonging. People are perceived of as homo politicus as much as homo economicus. Attention
is directed towards the way different institutional contexts mould behaviour, identities and
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roles differently. Institutions not only constrain these elements, they also contribute to the
initial construction of them (Checkel 1998).6 Organization theory perspectives aim at
understanding two interrelated questions. The first is to what extent do organizational contexts
mould decision behaviour, role conceptions and identities (e.g. Aspinwall and Schneider
2001; Bulmer 1997; Knill and Lenschaw 1998; Puchala 1999; Sandholtz 1996)? Second,
organization theory seeks to render intelligible how different organizational contexts affect
identities, role conceptions and modes of acting differently (e.g. Egeberg 1999a; Gulick
1937). Organizational members are perceived of as collections of identities, roles and modes
of behaviour. They are multiple selves (Elster 1986). The argument addressed here claims that
different organizational contexts may contribute to activate some roles, identities and codes of
conduct while de-activating others. This study focuses on domestic government officials
having at least two different institutional affiliations – one domestic and one European. The
main argument outlined below renders plausible that when national government officials ‘go
to Brussels’, they tend to change identities, role perceptions and modes of acting in certain
directions under certain institutional conditions. However, I also argue in this Chapter that, at
the end of the day, the EU committee affiliations embedding these officials are only secondary
to their national institutional affiliations.
It is possible to systematise organization theory perspectives on the basis of different concepts
and along different dimensions (e.g. March and Olsen 1989; Peters 1999; Scott 1987). This
Chapter outlines a theoretical middle ground between neo-functionalist and
intergovernmentalist approaches by outlining a cognitive perspective on organizations. This
perspective suggests that administrative integration is a multi-level phenomenon and is
affected by institutional structures at both the nation-state level and at the EU level. More
precisely, a cognitive perspective emphasises that identities, role conceptions and preferences
are endogenous and thus possible to construct and reconstruct. A cognitive organizational
perspective stresses how exposure towards particular institutional structures may contribute to
the enactment of particular identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct. As shown in the
next section, Council working parties tend to activate territorial and inter-sectoral behavioural
responses amongst the participants whilst Commission expert committees are more likely to
activate intra-sectoral behaviour. Furthermore, a cognitive perspective opens possibilities for
individual roles and identities to oscillate along the national-supranational spectrum. Both the
national-supranational and the sectoral-territorial dimensions are taken into consideration by
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stressing how the domestic and the EU levels of governance are formally linked together and
by emphasising the intensity and length of these linkages.
A cognitive perspective: EU committees as agents of transformation.
The cognitive perspective on organizations was developed within social psychology and
introduced to organizational theory largely by Simon (1957), March and Simon (1958), and by
Cyert and March (1963). Information-based and knowledge-based models in the explanation
of political dynamics are thus not new. Hence, the current interest in the cognitive dimension
of politics has been characterised as more of a rediscovery than of absolute novelty (Radaelli
1999a: 757).
According to a cognitive perspective, organizations are seen as mechanisms of simplification
with respect to information processing. The underlying assumption is that of bounded
rationality (Simon 1957). The possibility for individuals to attend everything simultaneously
is impossible. Hence, attention is seen as a scarce resource. To be able to move beyond
individual bounded rationality, a cognitive perspective sees organizational structures as
mechanisms for coupling and de-coupling actors, problems, solutions and consequences.
Organizational borders are seen as buffers to attention, thereby biasing the information
exposed to each decision-maker (March and Olsen 1995; Scharpf 1977; Tenbrunsel et al.
1996). For organizational designers, one way of reducing information-overload is to carve up
the organization horizontally and vertically thus creating buffers against particular actors,
certain information, certain considerations, and certain stimuli (Gulick 1937; Schattschneider
1960). “Cognitive structures simplify when there is too much, and they thus allow the
perceiver to reduce an enormously complex environment to a manageable number of
meaningful categories” (Markus and Zajonc 1984: 143). Within a cognitive notion,
organizational structures are seen as cognitive buffers to attention and information. “Because
of the limits of human intellective capacities in comparison with the complexities of the
problems that individuals and organizations face, rational behaviour calls for simplified
models that capture the main features of a problem without capturing all its complexities”
(March and Simon 1981: 148). Organizational structures render it possible to decompose
complex tasks into sub-tasks that can be carried out within relatively independent units of
governance. Organizational structures thus contribute to the development of ‘cognitive short
cuts’ for individual decision-makers (Johnson 1987: 45). These shortcuts contribute to the
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creation of cognitive categories and simplified representations of world phenomena to the
individuals (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000: 117). As a result, these phenomena are taken for
granted as “the way we do these things” (Scott 1995: 44). Organizational boundaries thus
affect identities, role perceptions and modes of behaviour because these properties simplify
cognitive search processes and reduce cognitive uncertainty (Castano 2000: 11; Johnson 1987;
March 1994; Stryker 1980).7 In this light, organising political-administrative life represents a
mobilisation of bias (Schattschneider 1960). Cognitive scripts provide “guidelines for sense-
making and choosing meaningful action” (Scott 1995: 44).8 Hence, “identity formation has a
strong cognitive component” (Olsen 2001: 19).
At least two pivotal arguments may be outlined on the basis of a cognitive perspective as
regards the institutional embeddedness of identities, role perceptions and decision behaviour.
First, these features of the self might be moulded and re-moulded on the basis of organizing
and reorganizing organizational boundaries (March and Olsen 1989; Nkomo and Cox jr.
1996). Reorganizing government institutions may alter the flow of information within them,
ultimately changing the flow of information exposed to each decision-maker (Scharpf 1977).
Stated otherwise, certain stimuli tend to produce certain responses. Having internalized a
multitude of codes of conduct, certain stimuli - like organizational structures – make it likely
that the actors evoke or activate only a limited proportion of this repertoire of responses
(Sevòn 1996). Consequently, reorganizing the set of stimuli being exposed to the actor, the
responses to them are likely to alter in systematic manners. Consistent with an instrumentalist
notion, organizational designers may design and redesign organizational boundaries for
instrumental reasons, e.g. strengthening or weakening the likelihood that government officials
evoke particular identities and roles. Secondly, roles and identities may alter when individuals
physically move from one organization to another (Roos and Starke 1981: 299). If
organizational members change organizational affiliations overnight, a cognitive perspective
assumes that the identities, role conceptions and modes of acting may change ‘overnight’.
Hence, when organizational members change organizational affiliations they tend to choose
new ways of acting because they are systematically exposed to new sets of information.
Domestic civil servants attending EU committees have multi-level institutional affiliations.
These officials are employed within domestic ministries and agencies and at the same time
participate within EU committees. Further, these officials have professional affiliations
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towards different disciplines. Hence, decision-makers in current European central
administrations are exposed to multiple, partially contending, sets of information, premises,
considerations and stimuli. When confronted with many different stimuli, officials may have
the capacity to choose which to attend and which to ignore on the basis of their organizational
affiliations (March and Olsen 1989; Ritzer 1996: 334). Viewed from a cognitive organization
theory perspective, however, one important research task has to do with identifying particular
organizational structures activating particular role perceptions, identities, and decision
behaviours. Studying government officials who are members of government institutions at
different levels of governance, organizational linkages between government institutions
represent one vital scope condition that affects the enactment of particular role and identity
conceptions. The current study pays attention to the formal linkages existing between
organizations and to the intensity and length of such linkages. “We may imagine a world
consisting of a set of parts. At the least, administrative integration is caused by some
measure of the density, intensity and character of the relations among the elements of that set”
(March 1999: 134). Henceforth, administrative integration “is a process where the cognitive
dimension of political life matters” (Radaelli 2000: 27).
The following sections identify conditions under which (i) supranational identities, roles and
codes of conduct develop as government officials attend EU committees and (ii) identifying
the conditions under which these features of the self are likely to take on sectoral and
territorial characteristics. Whereas the first question addresses the national-supranational
dimension of administrative integration, the second question regards the sectoral-territorial
dimension. In the following section, the second dimension is discussed first.
Accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension: On principles of organization.
When characterising the EU as a polity in its own right, most recent scholarly contributions
have highlighted the sui generis “uniqueness of the EU as a system” (Saeter 1998: 65; cf.
Caporaso 1999; Wallace 2000: 9). Contrary to such assumptions, one may argue that the EU
system of governance, in general, and the web of EU committees and working parties, in
particular, is organized according to two basic and general principles in administrative life.
Parallel to the sectoral and spatial institutional build-up of the domestic political-
administrative apparatus (sector ministries and agencies versus Foreign Ministries), the EU
Commission and the preparatory expert committees underlying it may be seen as exhibiting
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sectoral and functional principles. Conversely, the Council of the European Union and the
web of working parties organized under it may be seen as exhibiting spatial and territorial
principles of organization (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Notwithstanding several contending
organizing principles co-existing within the Commission and the Council of Ministers, I argue
that the uppermost principles are sector and territory, respectively. Participating within
institutions organized by sector, the organizational members are systematically exposed to
sectoral information and stimuli. Sectoral organizational principles bias and skew identities,
role perceptions and modes of acting in sectoral directions. The area principle, on the other
hand, are arguably more likely to activate more inter-sectoral decision behaviour, role
perceptions and identifications. The following paragraphs elaborate on these propositions.
A large body of literature conceives of the EU system as a novel and partially ‘mysterious’
polity. I argue that the EU system to a great extent reflects the structures of nation-state
polities (Olsen 2001: 3), and reason against arguments stressing that “the European
Community is a political entity that does not fit into any accepted category of government”
(Sbragia 1993: 24 – author’s emphasis). My argument does not ignore idiosyncrasies of the
EU system being supranational, multi-national, multi-linguistic and multi-level (Kohler-Koch
and Eising 1999). The basic argument laid out here, however, stresses organizational
similarities of the EU polity and other polities. Still, due to this polity being described as
unique, novel and ‘mysterious’ (Bartolini 1997), and faced with an assumed lack of
appropriate concepts and categories for the understanding of this polity (Coombes 1970: 101;
Jachtenfuchs 1997: 40), one vital step in this enquiry must be to carve this polity into
empirically meaningful and theoretical fruitful categories.9
Central to any conceptualization of governance systems is that it has to identify dimensions
offering theoretical utility. Moreover, the dimensions have to be precise, rendering each
category mutually exclusive. Finally, the dimensions suggested should be universally
applicable across time and space, rendering it possible to undertake comparative research
across time and space.10 According to these criteria, the majority of current
conceptionalizations of the EU system exhibit weaknesses. Being aware of this, Philippe
Schmitter (1996) sees governance systems as divided along two basic organizational
constituencies: one territorial and one functional.11 As argued in this Chapter, the EU
governance system may also be seen as being organized along these two constituencies. The
43
sectoral and territorial principle of organization introduced by organizational theory supports
the enactment of sectoral and territorial identities, role conceptions and modes of acting.
Moreover, these principles are not sui generis to the EU system. They represent general
principles of political-administrative life. As shown in the following, these organizational
principles offer theoretical and empirical insights regarding the processes of administrative
integration across levels of governance. Henceforth, going beyond the sui generis veiw of the
EU, “we … understand the unfamiliar with the help of familiar conceptual lenses” (Jönsson
et al. 1998: 320).
Organizational structures can be drawn along various lines (Bartolini 1997):12 Luther Gulick
(1937) outlines four basic principles of organization: on the basis of purpose or sector, on
process, on geography, and finally on clientele. The reason for Gulick’s preoccupation with
these principles is the fundamental assumption related to formal structures as political
instruments. Different principles of organization evoke different conflicts, identities, role
perceptions, and patterns of behaviour. Organizing according to the principle of purpose,
sectoral considerations, identities, role perceptions and decision processes are processed and
evoked, contributing to sectoral differentiation and geographical integration. The opposite is
assumed to be the case when organizing according to the principle of area (Gulick 1937).
March and Olsen (1978) add a fifth principle to the four discussed by Gulick, the time
dimension. Almost every organization and every decision process is organized in sequence,
where different problems, solutions and actors are attended to at different phases. A sixth
principle of organization is that of space or physical location (Egeberg 1994; March 1994).
This list of principles, however, is suggestive, not exhaustive. The central point emphasised in
the current study is that the EU Commission and the Council of the European Union exhibits
“a variety of contradictory organizational logics” (Christiansen 1997: 87) and that the sectoral
and territorial principles may account for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative
integration presented in figure 1.2 (cf. Chapter 1).
Generally, when organizing according to the principle of purpose, sectoral based identities,
role perceptions and modes of behaviour will be attended to systematically (Gulick 1937;
Hammond 1986). This organizational model at the nation-state level will strengthen identities,
role conceptions and decision-making behaviour related to sector and function. This
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organizational model applied to the EU system of governance makes understandable the
transcendence of national role perceptions (Herrmann and Brewer 2000). The civil servants
may tend to evoke roles as independent experts or as sectoral representatives. Co-ordination
processes are likely to be intra-sectoral, resulting in poor inter-sectoral co-ordination. “If all
ministerial departments are set up on the basis of purpose, then the task of the chief
executive in the field of co-ordination will be to see that the major purposes are not in conflict
and that the various processes which are used are consistent” (Gulick 1937: 33). As seen from
figure 2.1, the sectoral principle contributes to sectoral fragmentation and variation (e. g.
between the environmental sector and the educational sector) and, ultimately, territorial
integration and standardization (within i.e. State A).
Figure 2.1 Specialization according to the principle of purpose13
  Environment                   Education                       Health                      Agriculture
  - State A                         - State A                      - State A                      - State A
  - State B                         - State B                       - State B                      - State B
Organizing horizontally according to the principle of area, however, allows for inter-sectoral
modes of behaviour to emerge, bridging the gap between sectors through inter-sectoral co-
ordination efforts. As seen from figure 2.2, the area principle of organization is likely to have
an interlocking dynamic across sectoral cleavages that contributes to inter-sectoral integration
and geographical variation. This organizational model at the nation-state level may strengthen
identities and role perceptions related to territory. Civil servants are likely to evoke
overarching role and identity perceptions like that of ‘national representatives’ and national
delegates. Similarly, the co-ordination behaviour evoked by these officials is likely to have a
strong territorial component cutting across different sub-sectors.
Figure 2.2 Specialization according to the principle of area
    State A                           State B                         State C                        State D
  - Health                          - Health                        - Health                       - Health
  - Education                     - Education                  - Education                 - Education
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A parallel argument may be applied to an analysis of the EU system of governance (Egeberg
2001; Egeberg and Trondal 1997 and 1999). Organizing the EU system according to the
principle of purpose, as observed within the EU Commission (Egeberg and Trondal 1997b),
may systematically activate sectorally biased behavioural dynamics (Bellier 1997; Benz and
Eberlein 1999: 342; Egeberg 1996 and 1999b; Hooghe 1997; Michelmann 1978; Middlemas
1995: 242-265). Sectorally defined modes of identifying, perceiving ones’ roles, and acting
does not necessarily imply that these properties are especially focused towards sector A or
sector B, but that they are more generally oriented towards sectoral idiosyncrasies, variation
and differentiation. Swedish government officials report that national interests and conflicts
only rarely dominate the inner life of the Commission (SOU 1996:6: 47). Different dynamics,
however, might dominate at different hierarchical levels within the Commission structure due
to different principles of organization existing at different hierarchical levels (cf. Egeberg
1996). Landfried (1997) shows empirically that even amongst Commissioners a sectoral logic
is prevalent. This may owe to the fact that the demographic profiles of current Commissioners
weaken the impact of their nationalities (MacMullen 1997).14  Similarly, Wodak (2000: 18)
shows that Commission officials at the unit level have mainly a sectoral oriented approach
when assessing the role of the Commission. However, McDonald (1997: 60-61) observes
conflicting identifications amongst Commission officials. These oscillate between an ‘esprit
europèen’ and national identifications. Notwithstanding being largely functionally organized,
the organizational structure of the Commission contains several, partially contending
principles of organization.
The basic organizational structures of the Commission have reminded the same since its
foundation (Metcalfe 2000: 822). For the first time, however, the Prodi administration has
initiated a major organizational overhaul of the Commission. The recent administrative
reforms pursued by the Prodi administration have strengthened the sector-characteristics of the
Commission even further. Officials are increasingly supposed to be recruited on the basis of
merit, the Cabinet system is downsized and made more multinational, Director-Generals
should not be of the same nationality as ‘their’ Commissioner, the President of the
Commission has gained increased authority to compose and reshuffle the Commission team,
all Commissioners (besides Prodi) have moved out of the Breydel building to the site of the
Commission service they head, thus strengthening mutual relationships between the political
and the administrative level of each policy sectors of the Commission (European Commission
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1999a, 1999b and 1999c).15 Physical proximity between organizational units tends to
accompany a co-evolvement of identities in these units (Egeberg and Sætren 1999). The
physical reorganization of the Commission seems to contribute to less co-ordination between
various DGs. Moreover, according to European Voice (2001:6: 12), tendencies towards
‘cabinet government’ in the Commission has accompanied increased supranational identities
amongst the Commissioners. Adding to the sectoralized organizational characteristics of the
Commission, the administrative culture, the co-ordination patterns and identities of
Commission officials are shown to be highly sectoralized (Cini 1996 and 1997; Egeberg 1996;
McDonald 1997). This principle of organization also underpins expert committees organized
under the auspices of the Commission (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Still, the territorial
principle may loom larger at the level of the expert committees than at the level of the services
(Schaefer et al. 2000). This is due to the domestic representation within the expert
committees, which is primarily composed of part-time participants.
The Council of the European Union has been called the “transnational embodiment of the
state” (Lewis 1999a: 7). Organizing according to an area principle, as we observe in the
Council (Egeberg and Trondal 1997b), means that a territorial logic is likely to dominate
patterns of behaviour, identifications and senses of belonging (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 343;
Beyers and Dierickx 1997; Kerremans 1996; Sherrington 2000: 164). Area based behaviours
do not necessarily imply being especially focused towards area A or area B, but being more
generally oriented towards geographical idiosyncrasies, variation and differentiation. Changes
in the Council’s voting procedures towards greater use of qualified majority voting (QMV)
might have strengthened area logics within the Council even further (Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace 1997: 49). Not having the exit option of the veto might increase the volume of
negotiation and compromise between different member states, thereby enhancing territorial
and nation-state dynamics within the Council structure (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997;
Schout 1999: 3). Earlier, when unanimity was a more widespread voting rule in the Council,
the need for negotiations and exchanges between different state representatives was weaker.
The SEA formally codified the actual use of QMV in the 1980s (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace
1997: 50). The possible areas where QMV can be used have been expanded through the
Maastricht and the Amsterdam treaties on, for example, environmental issues and on social
policy measures. Still, consensus is the prevailing norm of taking decisions both at the
minister and at the working party level and the “recourse to explicit veto has declined”
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(Hayes-Renschaw and Wallace 1997: 262; cf. Sherrington 2000: 64; Westlake 1995: 87). As
regards contending organizational principles underpinning the Council, the element of sector
specialization is most prevalent at the working party level. Even at this level it is expected that
domestic officials act as government representatives and not solely as independent experts
(Beyers 1998a and 1998b).
On the basis of the arguments presented so far, hypotheses can be proposed for empirical
testing. Hypotheses numbers 1 and 2, outlined below, are directed towards Danish and
Swedish officials due to their formal participatory rights within Council working parties:
H1: The spatial principle of organization within the Council working parties strengthens the
sense of belonging towards the nation-state and towards the domestic central administration as
a whole.
H2: Participation on Council working parties fosters role perceptions as ‘national
representatives’ and decision processes geared towards inter-sectoral co-ordination through
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Therefore, Council working parties are likely to foster territorial and inter-sectoral
identifications, role perceptions and patterns of co-ordination amongst the participants.
Hypotheses numbers 3 and 4 are addressed to officials from all three Scandinavian countries:
H3: Under the sectoral principle of organization, participation on Commission expert
committees fosters and strengthens the sense of belonging towards sector administrations and
to task roles.
H4: Participation on Commission expert committees accompanies role perceptions as sector
representatives and independent experts, and decision behaviour geared towards intra-sectoral
co-ordination.
Hence, intra-sectoral logics are likely to be evoked by domestic government officials
attending Commission expert committees (H3 and H4) while inter-sectoral dynamics are more
likely to accompany participation on Council working parties (H1 and H2). Ceteris paribus,
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intergovernmentalism is likely to be transcended more fully within the Commission expert
committees than within the Council working parties. This results from the sectoral dynamics
stemming from the sectoral principle of organization underpinning the EU Commission.
However, when participating at the EU level, it is observed that domestic officials frequently
take part in both Commission expert committees and Council working parties (Edwards and
Spence 1994; Hayes-Renschaw 1997; Institut für Europäische Politik 1987). The potential for
transferring role conceptions and identities across the Commission-Council intersection may
be strengthened by such dual participation. The potential for enacting both sectoral and
territorial identities, role conceptions and modes of acting is assumed strengthened by such
cross-institutional participation at the EU level. This is relevant only for Danish and Swedish
government officials, not for their Norwegian colleagues. This potential might partially be
curbed by the mismatch in organizational principles between the two institutions and by the
separation in time and space of these institutions. These Union bodies are organized according
to conflicting principles, are physically located at different points in Brussels whilst also being
activated at different phases within the decision-making cycles of the Union. These factors
increase the likelihood that officials are able to separate the role and identity perceptions that
are enacted within the Commission expert committees and the Council working parties.
Organizing a system of governance according to more than one principle means that several
conflicting considerations might be attended to simultaneously. This contributes to a multi-
faceted system of governance comprising multiple identities, role perceptions and codes of
conduct (Gulick 1937: 34; March 1994; March and Olsen 1995). Partially conflicting
principles of organization are frequently built into each organizational structure, for example
in the German federal system (Egeberg 2001). Due to domestic representation, a geographical
principle parallels the sectoral principle within the Commission expert committees.
Correspondingly, a sectoral principle supplements the area principle within the Council
working parties due to these groups being specialized by sector (cf. Beyers 1998a; Egeberg
and Trondal 1999; Lewis 1998). However, despite these conflicting organizational principles,
the sectoral and territorial principles of organization may be seen as uppermost within the
Commission and the Council, respectively. Hence, sectoral dynamics are likely to take
primacy over territorial dynamics amongst officials attending Commission expert committees.
The inverse pattern occurs amongst those officials attending Council working parties.
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Danish and Swedish officials have full participatory rights in the Council of the European
Union. This can be considered the forum for ‘national interests’ of the member states
(Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 211). Norwegian officials, on
the other hand, do not have access to the Council. Hence, Danish and Swedish civil servants
are likely to be exposed to area based impulses and stimuli at the EU level to a larger extent
than their Norwegian counterparts. Danish and Swedish government officials are likely to be
reminded of their roles as ‘national representatives’ more systematically, frequently and
extensively than their Norwegian colleagues. Norwegian officials solely attending
Commission expert committees are expected to be affected more strongly by sectoral impulses
than by territorial stimuli.
Moreover, co-ordination within and between government institutions may be either written,
oral, or both. Non-mandatory and oral modes of co-ordination are more likely to be enacted
when only few actors are involved in the decision-making process, if the actors share some
fairly general interests, problems or world-views. This scenario is likely within the
Commission expert committees. Co-ordination through written mandates and instructions is
more likely under conditions whereby many actors are involved, more conflicting interests are
to be accommodated, and more problems and world-views have to be taken into consideration
simultaneously. “It is commonly hypothesized that increases in either organizational size or
complexity or both will lead to increased use of written rules…” (March, Schulz and Zhou
2000: 62). This scenario is more likely within the Council working parties. The usage of
written mandates is more likely within institutions organized according to a geographical
principle, which activates national considerations and conflicts amongst the delegates.
National conflicts, considerations and cleavages might activate written co-ordination
procedures in an effort at binding the national delegates. The usage of non-written mandates is
more likely within institutions organized according to a sectoral principle which downplays
national conflicts by activating sectoral interests amongst the trustees (cf. also Chapter 6).
Thus, the use of written instructions as co-ordination tool-kit is more likely to accompany
committee meetings within Council working parties than within Commission expert
committees.
When studying government officials, who have multiple institutional affiliations at different
levels of governance, one has to heed how these levels relate to one another in institutional
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terms. We need to trace how administrative life is formally organized at different levels of
governance and how these levels are formally linked together. The behavioural dynamics
evoked by domestic government officials may be affected by EU committees conditional
upon: (i) the degree of compatibility in organizational structures across levels of governance
and (ii) the length and intensity by which officials participate on EU committees. Accounting
for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration, the effects of particular
organizational principles is strengthened by organizational compatibility (cf. i). Second,
accounting for the national-supranational spectrum of administrative integration,
supranational role and identity conceptions are affected by the length and intensity to which
national civil servants attend EU committees (cf. ii).
Accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension: On organizational compatibility.
“In a multi-level, multi-structured and multi-centered polity with partly autonomous sub-
systems, a key to understand administrative integration may be to study how institutions
relate, balance, collide and penetrate each other” (Olsen 2001: 18). The impact stemming from
organizational principles existing at different levels of governance may be conditioned by the
degree of institutional compatibility across these levels of governance (Caporaso, Cowles and
Risse 2001; Knill and Lehmkuhl 1999; Knill and Lenschaw 1998a; March and Olsen 1995).
By compatibility I mean that different organizations are organized according to the same basic
constitutive principles – e.g. purpose or area. Thus, the notion of organizational compatibility
is more narrowly defined than the concept of institutional compatibility (Knill and Lenschaw
1998b).
From social psychology we have learned that “an event, a concept, an object, or a behavior
that ‘fits’ a particular internal structure is more likely to be attended to and processed than
one that did not” (Markus and Zajonc 1985: 143). Generally, if two organizations have
compatible structures, individuals with dual organizational affiliations are likely to evoke the
same identity and role in both organizations. “People are most likely to integrate pre-existing
roles with their social conceptions of themselves, … when … new roles are compatible with
these conceptions…” (Searing 1994: 400). Moreover, these identities, roles and modes of
behaviour may even be strengthened as a result of having multiple compatible institutional
affiliations. “Sectoralization both of the Commission and various national governments may
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be mutually reinforcing” (Derlien 1999: 9). On the other hand, if these institutions have
incompatible structures, the result may be unclear as to which behaviour is being evoked by
the actors. However, in cases of incompatibility, pre-established role conceptions, identities
and modes of acting are likely to be challenged and modified by the ‘new’ organizational
affiliation. For example, the likelihood of evoking the role as ‘independent expert’ may be
weakened if government officials are employed within domestic agencies and attend Council
working parties fairly frequently. Conversely, the enactment of an ‘independent expert’ role
may be strengthened if one is employed at the agency level and attends Commission expert
committees fairly often.
In general, both Commission expert committees and domestic sector ministries and agencies
can be seen as being organized along the same sectoral lines. Similarly, Council working
parties, domestic Foreign Ministries and permanent representations to the EU may be seen as
organized according to an area principle (Trondal 1999b). Thus, the identities, role
conceptions and modes of behaviour chosen by government officials employed within sectoral
ministries and agencies are likely to be strengthened by the institutional dynamics of the
Commission expert committees more than by the dynamics of the Council working parties.
The inverse relationship is likely amongst officials employed at the permanent
representations. This owes to the fact that permanent representations are formally organized
under the auspices of the MFA, thus embodying territorial principles of organization.
Compatibility in principles of organization may strengthen processes whereby pre-existing
identities and roles are sustained and strengthened as organizational members cross
organizational boundaries.
When identifying institutional compatibility across levels of governance, one has to take into
account the domestic institutional affiliations embedding civil servants. “[N]ational
governments … provide much of the operating life-blood of the EU” (Wallace 2000a: 27-28).
Past research has revealed that the following national institutional structures are important for
the construction of institutional identities, role conceptions and decision behaviour: the
vertical ministry-agency spectrum; the formal hierarchical rank position of the officials; and
the horizontal departmentalization between sector ministries and agencies on the one hand,
and the Foreign Ministries, including their underlying embassies and permanent
representations, on the other. Finally, the educational background of civil servants is shown to
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be important in this respect (e.g. Dearborn and Simon 1958; Egeberg 1994; 1999a; Lægreid
and Olsen 1984; Meier and Nigro 1976; Zuna 1998).
This study directs attention towards the horizontal distinction between sector ministries and
agencies, on the one hand, and permanent representations to the EU on the other hand.
Additionally, two vertical distinctions within the domestic governance apparatus are
emphasised. First, we distinguish between the ministry level and the agency level. Second, we
distinguish between different hierarchical levels within each ministry and agency. Agencies
are generally organized at a lower hierarchical level than the ministries. Owing to the
vertically specialized ministry-agency structure in Denmark, Norway and Sweden, I argue that
officials employed at the agency level, in medium or lower rank positions, are expected to
identify with functional expert roles and act in accordance with their task roles. Those
employed at the ministry level, in top rank positions, are expected to enact cross-sectoral and
more encompassing role and identity perceptions to a greater extent (Egeberg and Sætren
1999; Jacobsen 1960). “Incumbents of leading positions are expected to identify primarily
with the organization as a whole, department heads with their department, and simple
members with their task role” (Mayntz 1999: 83). Moreover, owing to the fact that permanent
representations are formally organized under the auspices of the MFA, thus embodying
territorial principles of organization, permanent representatives are likely to evoke more
encompassing and cross-sectoral behaviours than are officials employed in national sector
ministries and agencies.16
Hypotheses numbers 5 to 7 relate to the primary institutional affiliations embedding domestic
governmental officials.
H5: The potential for enacting sectoral based identities, role conceptions and modes of acting
will be stronger amongst committee participants employed in medium or lower rank positions
in domestic agencies than amongst those employed in top rank positions in domestic
ministries.
H6: The potential for enacting inter-sectoral and more encompassing identities, role
conceptions and codes of conduct will be stronger amongst committee participants employed
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in top rank positions at the permanent representation to the EU than amongst those employed
in medium or lower rank positions in domestic ministries and agencies.
“The members of national delegations in Brussels are situated at the intersection of two
systems of political decision” (Pendergast 1976: 671). Moreover, having the Council of the
European Union, especially the COREPER I and II and the Council working parties, as its
principal responsibility officials at the permanent representation to the EU are more exposed
to the organizational principles underpinning Council working parties than to the organizing
principles of the Commission expert committees. Due to the EEA agreement, officials at the
Norwegian permanent mission to the EU are formally excluded from participating within the
Council working parties. The formal links to the Commission and its expert committees,
however, persist. Hence, the Norwegian permanent representatives are likely to enact sectoral
considerations and identifications more strongly than are their Danish and Swedish
counterparts. Officials at the Danish and Swedish permanent representations are more likely
to enact both territorial and sectoral allegiances due to their dual affiliations to both the
Council working parties and Commission expert committees. Still, owing to the fact that the
uppermost organizational principle of the Norwegian, Danish and Swedish permanent
representations is area, the role perceptions as national representatives is likely to take
primacy over sectoral role orientations.  This renders it likely that officials at all Scandinavian
permanent representations evoke behavioural dynamics that are biased towards the territorial
end of the sectoral-territorial spectrum.
Moreover, “although the governments are free to organize their Permanent Representations as
they choose, the Representations display similarities” in terms of organizational structures and
staff structure (de Zwaan 1995: 20). Within the permanent representations of the three
Scandinavian countries two different institutional realms exist - one diplomatic, territorial
realm and one sectoral realm. On average, these realms are represented in a ratio of
approximately 40:60 (de Zwaan 1995: 22; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997: 220).
Reflecting the organizational build-up of the national administrations, these two realms are
largely a replication of the horizontal distinction between sector ministries and Foreign
Ministries at the domestic level. At the permanent representations, however, the diplomatic
realm consists mostly of officials from domestic Foreign Ministries while officials in the
sectoral realms are mostly delegates from domestic sector ministries and agencies. Officials in
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the diplomatic realms tend to concentrate on salient political issues like institutional
questions, external relations, and financial matters (handled in COREPER II), whereas sector
specialists use more of their working time on various technical dossiers, like agriculture,
transport, environment, etc (handled in COREPER I) (Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997:
224; Westlake 1995). Hence, officials in the diplomatic realms tend to work on issue areas
cutting across various policy sectors. Officials in the different sectoral realms tend to work on
more narrow intra-sectoral issue areas.
Due to institutional compatibility, the potential for being affected by sectoral principles of
organization underpinning the Commission expert committees may be stronger amongst
officials within the sectoral realms than amongst officials within the diplomatic realms of the
permanent mission. Conversely, the potential for being affected by the territorial principle of
organization that is the basis for the Council working parties may be strongest amongst
permanent representatives at the diplomatic realms. By and large, however, the role as
‘independent sectoral expert’ is likely to be evoked more strongly amongst officials within the
sectoral realms of the permanent representations, whilst the role as ‘government
representative’ is more likely to be enacted amongst officials in the diplomatic realms. These
differences partially reflect institutional compatibility between different parts of the
permanent representations and different EU committees. However, these differences are
foremost likely to reflect the different organizational principles existing within different
institutional realms at the permanent representations17.
H7: The likelihood for the enactment of sectoral logics is stronger amongst officials within
the sectoral realms at the permanent representations than amongst officials within the
diplomatic realms of this institution.
*   *   *
Officials attending EU committees are only part-time participants at the EU level. Their
primary institutional affiliations are at the national level of governance. The institutional
identities, role conceptions and patterns of acting evoked by them are thus likely to reflect the
principles of organization at the national level more strongly than the organizational principles
underpinning the EU committees. However, institutional compatibility across levels of
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governance might provide an extra stimulus towards evoking pre-established role and identity
perceptions and patterns of conduct amongst the EU committee participants. Institutional
incompatibility or mismatch, however, may contribute to challenging pre-existing roles and
identities. The next section introduces one additional challenge to pre-established role and
identity perceptions of EU committee participants.
Accounting for the sectoral-territorial spectrum and the national-supranational
dimension: On length and intensity in cross-level participation.
When “members of one polity serve as participants in the political processes of another”
(Rosenau 1969: 46), as is the case when domestic officials participate on Commission expert
committees and Council working parties, the length and intensity of participation on EU
committees may impinge upon the extent to which supranational identities and role
perceptions are evoked by the participants (Trondal 1998). “[T]he relative intensity of
transnational activity … broadly determines variations [in supra-nationalism]” (Stone Sweet
and Sandholtz 1998: 4). I argue that in addition to studying the kinds of linkages that exist at
the intersection of the EU and the nation-state, the number of such linkages make a difference
(Krasner 1988: 75). Apart from being formal members of EU committees, protracted and
intensive interaction and participation within these committees is hypothesized to affect the
enactment of identities and role conceptions amongst the committee members (Checkel 1999:
11). Haas (1958) assumed that participants become ‘locked in’ and socialized by the sheer
intensity of interaction. “The interactive character of decision making extends over time so
that the development of beliefs, rules, and expectations in one organization is intertwined with
their development in others” (March 1999a: 29). According to Deutsch, “common identities
are the product of intensive transactions and communications” (Rosamond 2000: 46).
This general argument rests upon socialization theory, which emphasise a positive relationship
between the intensity of participating within a collective group and the extent to which
members of this group take the world for granted (Meyer and Rowan 1991), become victims
of ‘group think’ (Janis 1982; t’Hart et al. 1997), or develop particular ‘community methods’
(Lewis 2000; Smith 1998: 309). Socialization is seen as a dynamic process, “in which the
actor shapes and adapts the information to his or her own needs” (Ritzer 1996: 348).
Socialization is the process whereby the actors come to identify with their governmental roles.
As such, socialization processes are uni-directional in the sense that the ‘socializor’ educates,
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indoctrinates, teaches or diffuses his norms or ideas to the ‘socializee’. The potential for
socialization to occur is positively related to the duration and the intensity of interaction
amongst the organizational members (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 150; Kerr 1973;
Pendergast 1976; Smith 1992: 58).18 Protracted and intensive exposure towards certain
information increases the likelihood for the enactment of particular identifications and role
conceptions. “Many roles are learned through playing the roles…” (Stryker 1980: 63). The
length and intensity to which national civil servants attend EU committees may affect the
extent to which the participants are affected by the organizational principles underpinning
these committees. In current neo-functionalist analyses, the construction of supranational
allegiances are perceived as being “a function of the duration of the socialization impact”
(Niemann 1998: 437 - emphasis added; McDonald 1997: 51). “Sectors in which cross-
border interaction are relatively more intense will move relatively faster and further towards
supranational policy-making” (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1999: 152).
Two claims are made concerning the outcome of socialization processes. First, the increased
likelihood for identifications to develop towards EU institutions results from “daily
reinforcement” and intensive exposure to new stimuli and information at the EU level (Kerr
1973; Lodge 1978: 241). One consequence of interacting frequently within Commission
expert committees and Council working parties, domestic civil servants are likely to take on
supranational identifications. That is, they identify with EU level institutions within which
they are participating. Supranational identifications, thus, imply identifications with EU level
institutions.19 Intensive participation within EU committees increases the likelihood for
identities and role perceptions to reflect the supranational institutional characteristics of these
committees. However, while Haas (1958) argued that supranational loyalties were likely to
replace pre-existing national identifications, the current study maintains that supranational
identifications supplement pre-established national and sectoral allegiances. Hence, a multi-
faceted and multi-layered conception of identity and role underlies this study (cf. below). Still,
the length and intensity of national officials’ exposure to EU committees might have an
independent causal impact on the enactment of supranational role perceptions. Hence, this
notion of socialization seeks to account for the national-supranational dimension of
administrative integration.
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The second argument on socialization suggests that the intensity and length of participation on
EU committees strengthen the effects of the organizational principles underpinning these
committees. Thus, Council working parties are likely to activate co-ordination behaviour that
is territorial in character, while Commission expert committees are more likely to cultivate
sectoral elements of the co-ordination behaviour enacted (cf. above). Intensive and sustained
participation on these committees is likely to strengthen the territorial and sectoral patterns of
co-ordination. This notion of socialization thus aims at accounting for the sectoral-territorial
dimension of administrative integration.
Commission expert committees and Council working parties are largely collegial
arrangements of a non-permanent nature. They are composed largely of ‘part-timers’ whose
primary institutional affiliations lie elsewhere. The socialization potential is assumed to be,
and is also empirically shown to be, weaker within non-permanent collegial organizations
than within permanent hierarchical organizations. This is empirically revealed within the
European Parliament (Bowler and Farrell 1995; Katz 1997; Scully 1999), within the American
Congress (Fenno 1962), and within EU committees (Egeberg 1999b; Lewis 1999a and 2000;
Schaefer et al. 2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000). Collegial organizations are composed of
members having their main organizational affinities in other organizations. The members are
thus pre-socialized and “pre-packed” before attending the collegium. The socialization
potential of the collegium, however, is strengthened if the committee participants attend often,
if he or she is a senior participant, if the same participants meet regularly, or if each colleague
generally devotes a major amount of time participating within the collegial setting (Checkel
1999: 10; Dierickx and Beyers 1999; Lewis 2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000).20
Empirical evidence indicates that sustained and intensive participation within collegial
arrangements generally affects the role perceptions, senses of belonging and patterns of
behaviour evoked by the colleagues (e.g. Fenno 1962). Thus, in addition to being affected by
the organizational principles of the EU committees, senior EU committee participants are
likely to evoke supranational allegiances (Beyers 1998a). Hence, the length and intensity of
participation is assumed to blur the organizational borders between the collegium and the
‘core-organization’. In this study, this scenario denotes blurring the borders between the EU
level and the domestic central administrative branches.
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Following from this, the intensity and length of cross-level participation may account for the
national-supranational dimension of administrative integration. The length and intensity of
cross-level participation conditions the likelihood that pre-established role and identity
perceptions are sustained at the EU level. If domestic civil servants attend Commission expert
committees and Council working parties relatively frequently, it is more likely that these
officials start identifying with EU institutions, in general, and with the committees more
particularly (Ekengreen 1996; Haas 1958).
As far as the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration is concerned,
intensive and sustained participation on EU committees render it more likely that the evoked
co-ordination behaviour reflects the principles of organization underpinning these committees.
Considering Denmark, Norway and Sweden, civil servants from these countries participate on
Commission expert committees, thus becoming affected by sectoral impulses. Danish and
Swedish civil servants are hypothesized, in addition, to be affected by area based impulses
from within the Council working parties. The exposure to these impulses is strengthened if the
committee participants attend the committees often, if he or she is a senior participant, if the
same participants meet regularly, or if each organizational member generally devotes a major
amount of time participating within the collegial setting. The following hypotheses are
proposed:
H8: These is a positive correlation between the length and intensity of participation within EU
committees and the extent to which the participants become affected by the uppermost
principle of organization present within these committees.
H9: Lengthy and intensive participation on EU committees contributes to the enactment of
supranational allegiances.
Hence, the intensity variable relates both to the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative
integration (H8) as well as to the national-supranational axis (H9).
The general idea behind these two propositions rests on the assumption that the potential for
being affected by particular institutional dynamics relates to the duration of exposure to
certain organizational structures (Checkel 1999: 10; Risse and Sikkink 1999). The potential
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for being socialised and re-socialised increases with protracted memberships within
organizations (Berger and Luckmann 1966) and the potential for co-operation - in large - is
positively related to the duration of interaction amongst the actors (Axelrod 1990).
The independent variables brought together.
A multitude of cognitive borderlines is present between the EU system and the domestic civil
service system. Some are based on different principles of organization, like sector and
territoriality, other are based on the length and intensity to which national civil servants attend
each level of governance. Some borderlines are compatible and some are not. There are also
differences between various nation-states and between different policy sectors as to the degree
of compatibility between national government institutions and different EU institutions. Some
bureaucracies and sectors are more Euro-compatible than others with respect to the
organizational principles underpinning each bureaucracy and each policy sector.
Consequently, the existence of multiple institutional borders between the EU level and the
domestic level implies that the potential repertoire of identities, role conceptions and modes of
acting is large. Hence, “it is not one single form but rather a balanced mixture of different
modes of governance which helps to manage the tensions produced by the multi-level
framework” of the EU (Benz and Eberlein 1999: 343 - original emphasis).
Contending and partially conflicting principles of organization tend to coexist within the EU
committees. Within the Commission expert committees a geographical principle runs parallel
with the sectoral principle and within Council working parties a sectoral principle of
organization exists and supplements the area principle. Hence, one has to replace the
dichotomy between compatibility versus non-compatibility with a continuum in order to grasp
the complexity of the reality. Analytically, however, it is important to understand how
partially contending principles of organizations are likely to be skewed and biased by the
uppermost principle of organization of each EU committee (Egeberg and Trondal 1997b;
Gulick 1937). Hence, elements of geographical specialization within the Commission expert
committees are likely to be biased by the dominant sectoral principle underpinning the EU
Commission. Correspondingly, elements of sectoral specialization within the Council working
parties are likely to be biased by the dominant spatial principle of organization within the
Council of Ministers. Yet, due to the presence of partially contending principles of
organization within these committees, contradictory empirical observations should be
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expected. However, it is important to uphold the distinctions between the organizational
principles advocated in this Chapter. The main effect of one principle of organization might
not be totally drowned by other partially contending principles of organization. Outlining the
theoretical arguments and the hypotheses merely as ceteris paribus clauses, empirical nuances
and richness are sacrificed for analytical simplicity and parsimony.
Further, in EU member states like Denmark and Sweden, the impact of sectoral principles that
dominate the Commission expert committees are likely to be moderated by the effects from
area principles that exist within the Council working parties. This is due to the fact that
domestic civil servants often attend both Commission expert committees and Council working
parties (Edwards and Spence 1994; Hayes-Renshaw and Wallace 1997; Institut für
Europäische Politik 1987). Moreover, the intensity dimension conditions the effects of all
these organizing principles. The impact stemming from sectoral principles of organization
diminishes if the participants seldom join the expert committees. Overall, institutional
seniority at the EU level also conditions the relationships discussed above. Professional
affiliations of government officials add to the potential modifications of the impact of the
organizing principles underpinning the EU committees and working parties. For example, the
impact of the territorial principle underpinning the Council working parties may be modified
if the participants are educated in physics, biology or engineering, etc (cf. Chapter 5). Finally,
the enactment of role and identity perceptions and modes of behaviour are likely to be
fundamentally affected by the domestic government apparatus embedding these officials. The
EU committees on which these officials participate are only secondary affiliations as
compared to the primary affiliations towards the national ministries, agencies and permanent
missions.
Due to the sheer number of organizational borders revealed between the Scandinavian Nation-
States and the EU committees, one danger for the officials is to mix different responses to
different stimuli. This is especially the case if different stimuli are difficult to separate from
each other. “Alternative identities can compete for relevance, even in a given context” (Sen
1999: 15). It may be ambiguous as to precisely which identity and role to evoke in certain
situations because the principles underlying organizations are conceived as ambiguous. Civil
servants may evoke different identities on the basis of one singular organizational principle
(March 1994; Simon 1957).21 Moreover, domestic governmental officials arriving at the
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committee room for the first time may not immediately construct ‘new’ supranational
identities or role conceptions. The new situation to which they are exposed might be perceived
of as novel, unfamiliar and ambiguous to them, thus making it difficult to determine which
identity or role to evoke. The new situation and the appropriate response to it may seem
ambiguous to the actor (March 1994: 137). Several factors contribute to making the
committee context unfamiliar and ambiguous. It is a multi-national and multi-linguistic
context and consists of different national traditions and cultures as regards appropriate
administrative behaviour. The institutional setting is physically distant from the home country
and meeting rooms are considerably larger than what is customary.
Ambiguity regarding which identities and roles to evoke in particular situations easily
activates a logic of recency whereby identities and roles that have been evoked recently are
likely to be evoked again. One implication of the logic of recency is that pre-existing national
allegiances are sustained at the EU level (March 1994: 70).22 In March’s words: “An
individual who has been negotiating a tough contract as an antagonistic lawyer carries that
identity over to the role of diner in a restaurant or driver on a highway” (March 1994: 70). In
the EU context, national officials who have just arrived at the committee room are likely to
evoke well-known identities and roles of a domestic origin. When the situation, and the
response to it, are perceived as ambiguous or novel, the committee participant is likely to
evoke old responses and solutions to new situations (March and Olsen 1989; 1995). However,
consistent with the logic of recency, if committee members attend EU committees often, is a
senior participant, meet regularly with the same participants, and generally devotes a major
amount of time and energy participating within the EU committees, new supranational role
and identity perceptions are likely to be enacted.
Having outlined the theoretical perspective aimed at accounting for administrative integration
across levels of governance, the final section of this Chapter reviews the dependent variables
applied to measure this phenomenon.
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How to measure administrative integration: Conceptions of decision behaviour
and role and identity perceptions
Processes of administrative integration across levels of governance may be measured through
various empirical proxies (cf. Chapter 4). Relevant questions are what is the appropriate level
of analysis and which variables are capable of empirically uncovering administrative
integration? Three general measures are suggested as yardsticks in the current study:
 The decision behaviour of individual officials,
 The role perceptions of individual officials,
 The institutional identities of individual officials.
The current study analyses administrative integration through three dependent variables: the
role conceptions, the identities, and the modes of behaviour evoked by individual EU
committee participants. While identities and roles may vary along both the national-
supranational axis and the sectoral-territorial axis of figure 1.2 (cf. Chapter 1), decision
behaviour is likely to vary solely along the sectoral-territorial dimension. On this basis,
administrative integration might stem from two major sources:
 Participation on EU committees may result in the enactment of sectoral modes of decision
behaviour, roles and identities. However, these variables do not necessarily take on
supranational characteristics.
 Participation on EU committees may result in the enactment of supranational identities
and roles. An example is that of officials identifying strongly with the Council working
parties they attend. Thus, identities are attached towards EU level institutions.
Administrative integration is moderate in each of the above cases where intergovernmentalism
is transcended along only one dimension. A stronger mode of administrative integration
requires that intergovernmental dynamics be transcended along both the sector-territorial
dimension and along the national-supranational dimension. Contrary to the strong and the
moderate mode of administrative integration, a weak mode of administrative integration is
treated as our null-hypothesis and covers situations whereby intergovernmental dynamics
prevail along both axes.
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Owing to the fact that our three parameters of administrative integration are largely ignored
within the study of administrative integration (Trondal 1999b), the following paragraphs aim
at discussing these variables in greater detail. Each variable is presented successively,
followed by a discussion of how each variable is likely to be affected by processes of ‘cross-
level participation’ towards EU committees.
Actual decision behaviour is studied solely in relation to the sectoral-territorial dimension
addressed above. In the current study, it is difficult to assume distinct supranational modes of
acting. Decision behaviour relates to what officials actually do and how they do it. Decision
behaviour may be seen as processes where premises are supplied and chosen (Simon 1957).
Decision behaviour relates to which actors, problems, alternatives and solutions are brought
together and which are held separate. Decision behaviour also has to do with who has contact
with whom, when and how do they have contact, which considerations are attached
importance by officials when making decisions, what signals are assigned weight amongst
government officials in the course of taking decisions, and which officials are paying attention
to which problems, solutions and consequences.
One way of studying decision behaviour within domestic government institutions is to focus
on co-ordination behaviour. The general rationale for studying co-ordination processes relates
to the question of policy coherence. A general political-administrative goal is to prevent
policy fragmentation and to foster policy connectedness. Moreover, shown below, co-
ordination behaviour is indicative of administrative integration. Co-ordination “has become a
much more central concern for policy-makers as they need to operate in multiple arenas (often
simultaneously) … “ (Hocking 1999: 10). However, definitions and perceptions of co-
ordination vary between different authors. Metcalfe (1994) proposes a cumulative Guttman
scale for measuring increased information sharing and increased level of agreement on politics
and policies among different actors. Co-ordination may involve exchange of information,
avoidance of divergences, search for agreements, arbitration, the setting of priorities, and the
formation of strategies (Metcalfe 1994). Co-ordination may also involve bargaining and
arguing amongst different actors (Eriksen and Fossum 2000). Boston (1992, 89) includes acts
like “the avoidance, or at least minimization, of duplication and overlap; the avoidance of
policy inconsistencies; the quest for coherence and cohesion and an agreed ordering of
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priorities; the minimization of conflict…; and the promotion of a comprehensive or ‘whole
government’ perspective against … sectoral perspectives”.
As these definitions reveal, most accounts of co-ordination largely ignore the intra-sectoral
dimension of co-ordination. They solely pay attention to cross-sectoral co-ordination
processes (Schout 1999: 4). This study focuses on both intra-sectoral co-ordination and on
inter-sectoral co-ordination. Inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination denote processes of
horizontal co-ordination between governmental organizations and between different policy
sectors. The Foreign Ministry represents the ultimate cross-sectoral co-ordinating ministry
(Hocking 1999). Conversely, intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination denote horizontal and
vertical co-ordination processes within governmental organizations and within policy sectors.
As indicated above, the co-ordination variable relates solely to the second dimension of our
two-dimensional model. Co-ordination may take on either intra-sectoral or inter-
sectoral/territorial characteristics. Intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination represent a more
adequate measure of administrative integration than inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination. As
elaborate on below, intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination weakens the boundary-maintaining
role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, thus blurring the boundaries between the EU level and
the national level of governance.
Grouping actors, problems, solutions and consequences into different organizational units
encourages co-ordination within units, not between them (Mintzberg 1979: 107). Intra-
sectoral modes of co-ordination relate to processes whereby each policy sector is linked closer
together with respect to actors, problems, solutions and modes of thinking. Intra-sectoral co-
ordination at the domestic level of governance is generally assumed to increase as one moves
down the formal hierarchy and as one moves from the ministry level towards the agency level.
Conversely, inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination are basically inter-organizational in nature.
Inter-sectoral co-ordination denotes co-ordination processes between different ministries and
between different agencies. This mode strengthens the role of ministries with a horizontal co-
ordination obligation within the governmental apparatus, e.g. the Prime Minister’s Office, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. The portfolio of these ministries
crosscut the sectoral principles underpinning sector ministries and agencies. Moreover, inter-
sectoral modes of co-ordination are generally assumed to increase as one moves up the formal
hierarchy and as one moves from the agency level to the ministry level. Further, inter-sectoral
65
modes of co-ordination are assumed to be stronger at the permanent representations to the EU
than within sector ministries and agencies in the ‘home administration’. This study considers
day to day co-ordination behaviour. One may expect the volume of co-ordination to be lower
in periods of day-to-day piecemeal changes compared to situations of crisis management
(Walzenback 1999). During periods of stability, co-ordination is routinized and contributes to
a generally low level of systematic attention devoted towards co-ordination amongst the
decision-makers.
The arguments advocated above stress how modes of domestic co-ordination are likely to
reflect different organizational principles embedded within different EU committees. As
regards administrative integration, this study aims at revealing whether domestic government
officials evoke different modes of co-ordination as a result of participating within different
committees at the EU level. I have argued that administrative integration is promoted more
strongly if domestic government officials participate in Commission expert committees than if
they participate in Council working parties. Moreover, I have claimed that administrative
integration is likely to be stronger when intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination are activated.
Inter-sectoral, or territorial, modes of co-ordination, largely controlled by the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA), are likely to construct administrative ‘filters’ or buffers between
governance levels. Conversely, intra-sectoral co-ordination processes are likely to impair the
co-ordination role of the MFA to a great extent, rendering the domestic level of governance
vulnerable to sectoral penetration and influence from the EU level. Hence, administrative
integration is fostered by the general lack of inter-sectoral co-ordination from the MFA.
Finally, my definition of co-ordination is two-dimensional with regard to the applied
techniques. Co-ordination may be either (i) pro-active, geared towards drawing up written and
clear-cut mandates and instructions, or (ii) re-active and oral, not geared towards outlining any
clear-cut, written instructions. Whereas the first technique tends to foster formally binding and
clear mandates, the second technique tends to produce more unclear mandates. Processes
producing imperative mandates are based upon notions of institutions as coupled and
sectorally co-ordinated systems of governance. The notion of unclear mandates rests upon
notions of institutions as uncoupled, segmented and inter-sectorally fragmented government
systems (Olsen 1988: 162-170). A more thorough theoretical elaboration on different co-
ordination techniques is provided in Chapter 5.
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The second and third dependent variables measuring administrative integration are the role
and identity perceptions evoked by EU committee participants. These variables are almost
completely lacking in contemporary studies of administrative integration (Trondal 1999b;
Trondal and Veggeland 2000). The question posed here is two-fold. First, do government
officials evoke sectoral or territorial roles and identities when participating on EU
committees? I argue that administrative integration is fostered if these roles and identities are
sectoral in nature – thus largely transcending territorial senses of belonging. Sectoral identities
and roles are seen as reflecting institutional dynamics existing within Commission expert
committees and sector ministries and agencies at the national level. Second, is administrative
integration fostered more fully if government officials enact supranational roles and
identities? Identities and roles are defined solely in institutional terms within this study.
Supranational identities and role perceptions thus resemble identifications with EU level
institutions – e.g. towards particular EU committees attended or towards the EU more
generally. All EU institutions are conceived of as supranational entities. Therefore, a strong
mode of administrative integration requires the enactment of supranational identities and role
perceptions as well as the evocation of sectoral allegiances.
In this section, roles and identities are discussed in parallel because these properties of the self
are perceived of as a continuum. Having an identity is a result of internalizing the values and
goals prescribed by the role (Barnett 1993: 274). Moreover, by ‘role’ we usually mean a set of
expectations (norms or rules) that more or less specify the desired behaviour of the actor
(March and Olsen 1989). Roles prescribe how one should act while identities, in addition,
prescribe who one should be. “To the extent that organization members identify with their
organization, they are willing to act spontaneously in its interest, without being told exactly
what to do” (Mayntz 1999: 83). Identification does not require that deviant desires or
behavioural preferences be absent, only that internal (rather than external) sanctioning
mechanisms are sufficiently effective to prevent deviant preferences from being brought into
action. Hence, “the adoption of roles is central to the development of social identities” (Pratt
1998: 196). According to social identity theory, the adoption and enactment of roles are
necessary means for producing identification (Pratt 1998; Stryker 1980). Identities are more
difficult to distinguish from the self than roles, and therefore also more difficult to alter in
different situations. Identification with roles, however, need not come about because “it is
relatively easy to set aside the reality of the secondary internalizations” (Berger and Luckman
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1966: 162). The enactment of roles as ‘independent experts’ or ‘government representatives’
by EU committee participants need not accompany identifications with these roles (cf.
Chapter 6).
The notion of role rests on an analogy of the theatre where the actor is expected to perform
according to a particular script (Stryker and Statham 1985: 330). Consistent with a cognitive
perspective, “the theatre consists of socially constructed players endowed with different
capacities for action and parts to play” (Scott 1995: 42). Simiarly, the current study analyses
civil servants as actors at two different theatres: domestic and European. These officials are
perceived as multiple selves (Elster 1986), having multiple roles and identities (Barnett 1993).
The question thus becomes which script (identity and role) should they enact in which play?
Additionally, is each official able to determine which roles to enact in different plays? Neither
roles nor identities are seen as easily shifting and changing when actors move from one play to
another. Roles and identities are fairly stable features of the self, being relatively robust
characteristics of the actor (Heidar 1997: 93; March and Olsen 1989). Consistent with a
multiple concept of roles and identities, actors may shift the attention towards different roles
and identities when changing play, albeit not always constructing qualitatively new roles and
identities for each new situation or play. Contrary to Haas (1958), the enactment of
supranational allegiances is likely to supplement pre-established national identities, not
replace them. Different plays often have points of resemblance triggering actors to evoke
similar role and identity perceptions. In the study of multilevel governance in the EU, national
ministries and agencies may have several institutional matches with different EU institutions.
This contributes to strengthening pre-existing role and identity perceptions evoked at the
national level of governance when entering EU committees (cf. above).
Why is it important to study identities and roles? First, they provide cognitive, moral and
normative systems of orientation and self-reference. This study emphasises identity and role
concepts as perceived by the officials themselves. We study role and identity perceptions of
civil servants as they “exist in the minds of civil servants” (Saalfeld and Müller 1997: 9).
Second, they provide the actor with a shared system of meaning. Third, they may influence the
framing of action. “What people do and how they do it depends upon how they see
themselves and their world, and this in turn depends upon the concepts through which they
see” (Pitkin 1972: 1). If officials enact more encompassing role conceptions the likelihood for
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cross-sectoral co-ordination behaviour may be enhanced. “One could argue … that the more
officials identify themselves with more overarching entities, the more co-ordination will take
place in a system” (Egeberg and Sætren 1999: 94). Hence, identity and role perceptions
provide “conceptions of reality, standards of assessment, affective ties and endowments, and
thereby with a capacity for purposeful action” (March and Olsen 1995: 30).
Within this study, representational roles may be of three different kinds: the role as
‘government representative’, the role as ‘independent expert’, and finally the role as
‘supranational agent’. We ask whether officials attending Commission expert committees and
Council working parties conceive themselves as being representatives of the nation-state as a
whole (‘government representative’), as representatives of their ‘own’ policy sector, ministry
and/or agency (‘independent expert’), or rather as representatives of the EU, EU institutions
and/or EU policies (‘supranational agent’). As regards identity conceptions, this study asks to
what extent participation on Commission expert committees and Council working parties
strengthen the sense of belonging towards the nation-state as a whole, towards the domestic
governmental apparatus as a whole, towards the EU committees they attend in particular, or
towards the EU more generally. The notion of identities and roles as complementary is
important to this study. Consistent with the notion of the individual as a ‘multiple self’,
individuals are seen as capable of evoking several, partially contending roles and identities
simultaneously (March 1994) or sequentially (Andeweg 1997: 126; Cyert and March 1992).
Due to being exposed to conflicting role and identity expectations at two levels of governance,
government officials may take on a partially conflicting set of roles and identities, e.g.
evoking the role as a ‘government representative’ together with the role as an ‘independent
expert’. The roles and identities considered here are of institutional character.23 Identities are
seen as the feeling of belonging towards different branches of the domestic governmental
apparatus as well as senses of belonging towards different parts of the EU system. A strong
mode of administrative integration arguably requires roles and identities to include both
supranational and sectoral elements.24
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Conclusion
Ideas advanced by neo-functionalists in the 1950s and 60s (Puchala 1999) are the basing of
our study. This study offers an organization theory perspective on penetrative processes and
pays attention to more general mechanisms in organizational life that affect officials’
identities, role perceptions and patterns of acting. Penetrative processes embrace situations
where officials are “members of one policy and serve as participants in the political
processes of another” (Rosenau 1969: 46). I argue in this study that the mechanisms that
integrate bureaucracies across levels of governance are of three kinds. These are, the basic
organizational principles underpinning domestic government institutions and EU committees;
the primary and secondary institutional affiliations embedding civil servants; and the length
and intensity by which national officials participate on EU committees (cf. figure 1.4 in
Chapter 1).
Directing our attention towards principles of organization that link particular nation-states and
particular EU institutions together, this study goes beyond the membership versus non-
membership distinction (Bernitz and Bernitz 1996; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Stubb 1996).
Norwegian government officials may be as integrated into the EU as Danish and Swedish
officials as far as sectoral affiliations towards the Commission expert committees are
concerned. Moreover, Norwegian civil servants do not have access opportunities to either the
Council of Ministers or to the Council working parties in particular (cf. Chapter 4). Hence,
along the sectoral-territorial axis, Norwegian government officials are most likely to locate
themselves close to the sectoral end of the spectrum. Danish and Swedish officials are more
likely to position themselves somewhere in the middle of this spectrum. This argument holds
true for domestic government officials employed within sectoral ministries and agencies as
well as for officials at the permanent representations to the EU. Hence, along the sectoral-
territorial axis most Norwegian officials are likely to transcend intergovernmentalism more
fully than are most Danish and Swedish counterparts.
Along the national-supranational axis, however, an opposite conclusion is more likely.
Generally, arguing that supranationalism stems from the length and intensity of exposure
towards EU institutions and assuming a priori that Danish and Swedish officials attend EU
committees more intensively than their Norwegian colleagues (cf. Chapter 4), supranational
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identities and role perceptions are more likely to be evoked amongst the former than the latter.
Put more generally, officials devoting much time and energy towards attending EU
committees are likely to enact supranational role and identity perceptions. Officials at the
permanent representations to the EU are expected to attend EU committees fairly intensively,
and might thus be expected to take on supranational allegiances fairly strongly (cf. Chapter 4
and 6). The current study highlights the importance of institutional affiliations embedding
individual civil servants to explain administrative integration. Norwegian, Danish and
Swedish officials attending the same EU committees and having similar institutional
affiliations at home are likely to enact similar role and identity perceptions.
A cognitive organization theory perspective enables us to determine the relative primacy of
different institutional dynamics affecting organizational members, thus seizing a middle
ground between intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism. A cognitive perspective reveals
the multi-level character of the EU system and the multi-level character of processes of
administrative integration. When comparing Danish, Norwegian and Swedish officials,
administrative integration is likely to vary along the two dimensions presented. Norwegian
civil servants are likely to enact sectoral identities, role conceptions and patterns of conduct,
albeit evoking supranational identities and role perceptions less frequently. This is not because
they are Norwegian officials but because they participate solely in the “Commission pillar”.
These hypotheses derive from Norwegian civil servants participating within Commission
expert committees with medium intensity and for only shorter periods of time. Danish and
Swedish officials, on the other hand, are more likely to construct partially new sets of
supranational identities and role conceptions when attending different EU committees. Again,
this is not because they are Danish and Swedish officials, but because of the seniority of each
civil servant within various EU committees. Most Danish officials have participated within
EU committees for considerable longer time than their Swedish colleagues (cf. Chapter 4).
Thus, supranational allegiances are more likely to develop amongst Danish committee
participants than amongst their Swedish counterparts.
The civil servants considered in this study have their primary institutional affiliations at the
domestic level. As “travelling national civil servants” (Nedergaard 1994: 26) they are only
part-time participants within EU committees. The enactment of institutional identities, role
conceptions and decision behaviours are likely to be most strongly affected by the
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organizational principles of the domestic bureaucracies. However, intensive and sustained
participation on EU committees may increase the likelihood for the enactment of qualitative
new supranational allegiances.
The next Chapter introduces the empirical data applied to illuminate the theoretical arguments
put forward in this Chapter. The next Chapter also provides methodological and meta-
methodological discussions regarding to how to test these theoretical arguments empirically.
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Notes
                                                
1
 An earlier draft version of this Chapter was presented at the ARENA Annual Conference, 5-6 November 1998.
The author is indebted to the participants at this conference. Additionally, the author would like to thank Jan
Beyers, Ingunn M. Bjørndal, Tom Christensen, Morten Egeberg, Thomas Hammond, James G. March and
Adriaan Schout for valuable comments.
2
 Within current literature on processes of Europeanization of domestic central administrations, two additional
empirical proxies have been emphasised: (i) impacts on formal institutional arrangements (e.g. Caporaso, Cowles
and Risse 2001; Page and Wouters 1995), and (ii) impacts on the policy output or policy outcome within
different policy sectors (e.g. Claes and Tranøy 1999; Steunenberg and Dimitrova 1999).
3
 Empirical studies show that officials participating on both Commission expert committees and comitology
committees have difficulties in telling these committees apart as regards their formal status (Institut für
Europäische Politik 1987: 81; Van Schendelen 1996). “This mixture of working group and comitology
committee sometimes makes it very difficult for national civil servants to know when they have to act as
representative of a Member-State within a Comitology committee and when as an independent national expert”
(Demmke 1998: 17). Excluding the comitology committees from the analysis helps to reduce the likelihood of
mixing different committees, albeit not completely excluding this possibility. Further, why concentrate this
analysis on Commission expert committees instead of the comitology committees? The overall reason for this is
the institutional context in which the Commission expert committees are embedded. These committees have a
clear institutional connection to the EU Commission while the comitology committees have a more ambiguous
institutional position at the intersection of the EU Commission and the Council of Ministers. The Council
working parties, on the other hand, are institutionally located solely within the Council of the European Union.
One argument against excluding the comitology committees from the study is the potential ‘importance’ of these
committees due to the internal market legislation being implemented in the years to come (van Schendelen 1998).
On the other hand, studies indicate that the relative ‘power’ of the comitology committees is limited in the
legislative processes of the EU. Between 1987 and 1996 initial propositions from the EU Commission were
altered and corrected by comitology committees in only 1 per cent of the cases (Van der Knaap 1996: 103-104).
If administrative and legal corrections tell us anything about the relative influence of different institutions, and if
we leave out anticipated reaction from consideration, these figures indicate a low degree of influence of the
comitology system.
4
 The distinction between ‘full-timers’ and ‘part-timers’ is not only a question of the time and energy devoted by
officials towards different organizational contexts. In addition, this distinction is based upon formal institutional
characteristics. In that respect, domestic officials should be conceived of as ‘full-timers’ within their domestic
ministries or agencies and only as ‘part-timers’ at the EU-level of governance due to their formal status as
employees within national ministries and agencies.
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5
 The propositions outlined in this Chapter are ceteris paribus in character. Several intervening variables may
potentially disturb the suggested relationships. For example, officials who have negative experiences from
participating on EU committees may be more reluctant Europeans than officials who have had positive
experiences (Haas 1964; Saeter 1998: 23). Moreover, officials who attend EU committees fairly often need not
be re-socialized. As a consequence of protracted participation on EU committees, officials may become experts
at organizational hypocrisy, that is, de-coupling talk and action (Brunsson 1989). Domestic government officials
may, for instance, pursue other interests within EU committees than originally intended by the domestic
government. As such, this may involve a principal-agent problem (cf. Chapter 7).
6
 One might argue that social constructivist accounts should be consulted in order to understand how organization
members come to construct ‘new’ identities and role conceptions. One main difficulty in applying the social
constructivist notion is the problem of operationalizing and measuring the mutual constitutive dynamic between
structures and actors. This problem is highlighted within empirical work by social constructivists
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Herman 1996; Kier 1996; Price 1995; Risse and Sikkink 1999). A second
problem exhibited by social constructivism is the lack of operationalizable concepts of organizational structures
(Trondal 2001 – cf. Chapter 7).
7
 This way of understanding organizations is also widespread within the new-institutionalism dealing with
institutionalised environments (e.g. DiMaggio and Powell 1991). Institutionalized elements in the environment
develop a rule-like status contributing to cognitive mapping of the environments.
8
 The role of agency, however, is not ruled out of the model. Which identity, role or mode of acting that is
evoked is ultimately a matter of choice, however, largely biased by cognitive limitations and mental maps.
Hence, rational and strategic choices are largely conditional upon the institutional contexts providing cues for
selecting certain identities, roles or modes of acting above others (Sen 1999). Agency is seen as contextualized
and embedded within organizational structures.
9
 Current conceptualizations of the EU system are of a rather pragmatic nature, based on categories largely
emanating from within the international relations school (Sandholtz 1996). Conceptualizations of the Union
emhasize the “EU’s institutional set-up as differing markedly from member state polities” (Kohler-Koch 1998:
3), and that policies within the EU are more like those found between nation-states than those found within them
(Hooghe and Marks 1997 – original emphasis). As I see it, one main problem attached to conceptualizations of
the EU, as addressed within more recent EU literature, is the difficulty of deriving precise and theoretically
illuminating hypotheses from the dimensions addressed. The EU system has been described as a fourth branch or
level of governance (Majone 1993; Egeberg 1980). Likewise, the EU has been seen as a functional, statist and
pluralist system of governance (Kohler-Koch 1998), and as a network mode of governance (Börzel 1998; Kohler-
Koch 1998; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Peterson 1995). Moreover, the EU has been viewed as a multi level,
multi-tiered, and multi-layered system of governance (Jachtenfuchs and Kohler-Koch 1995; Marks et al. 1996),
as an international regime (Breckinridge 1997), and as an imagined and epistemic community (Anderson 1991;
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Haas 1992). Efforts have also been devoted towards conceptualizing different forms of affiliation to the EU:
Nation-states have been conceived of as integrated and affiliated to the Union on the basis of time (multi-speed
Europe), on the basis of space (variable geometry), and on the basis of sector (Europe a la carte) (Stubb 1996).
Nation-states’ forms of affiliation to the Union are also perceived as organized according to the principle of
purpose and/or according to the principle of area, ‘full’ membership comprising both principles (Egeberg and
Trondal 1997b).
10
 This is not an argument about the generalizability of theories. To make universal conseptualizations does not
automatically imply a plea for ‘covering law’ theories. Rather, this argument makes no connection at all between
the empirical conceptualizations of the reality and the theories applied for understanding and interpreting this
reality (cf. Chapter 3).
11
 Along these constituencies, Schmitter (1996) sees four ideal types of polities: Condominio, Consortio,
Confederatio, and Federatio.
12
 Organizational categories addressed by the old institutionalist school (e.g. Weber and Gulick) are applied to
this study. This owes basically to the fact that measurable dimensions and variables are available within the old
institutionalism to a greater extent than in most new-institutionalist approaches.
13
 The examples given in figures 2.1 and 2.2 are only suggestive and illustrative.
14
 According to MacMullan (1998), Commissioners are males, middle aged, and university educated in law or
economics. Their political affiliations have largely been centrist. They also have a parliamentary or ministerial
political career prior to entering the Commission.
15
 Despite having gained increased influence on selecting the Commission team, Spence (2000) argues that the
system of national pressures for particular Commissioners have remained unchanged. “Prodi is said to have
wished for candidates with economic and business experience, only to be faced with several candidates with
purely political backgrounds” (Spence 2000: 7).
16
 In real life situations the distinction between the ministry level and the agency level may differ from nation-
state to nation-state. In all three countries being part of this study, the agencies are formally organized outside the
ministries. However, the formal autonomy of the agency level is somewhat greater in Sweden than in Denmark
and Norway (Lindbom 1997; Lægreid and Pedersen 1999; Petersson 1998). The autonomy of Swedish agencies
is also revealed empirically (e.g. Jacobsson 1984; Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). This autonomy is partially due to
the collegial system of governance in Sweden and partially due to the relative greater staff size of the Swedish
agency level as compared to the ministry level. Thus, separating the role as political loyal and professional
neutral might be somewhat easier to do amongst Swedish officials than amongst Danish and Norwegian civil
servants. Hence, the impact stemming form differences in staff size adds to the impact fuelled by the
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administrative autonomy of the Swedish agencies. Additionally, most Swedish agencies are physically located
more distantly from the ministries than their Danish and Norwegian counterparts. Notwithstanding these
differences, the institutional build-up of the domestic government apparatus in these three countries is fairly
similar.
Considering the ministries and agencies included in the current study, both Swedish and Danish
agencies are larger in staff size than their Norwegian counterparts (cf. Chapter 1). However, the physical
proximity between the ministries and the agencies are not significant, all being located within the capitals of their
respective countries.
17
 Furthermore, one might argue that the sheer number of different government officials representing one nation-
state within one singular EU committee might impinge upon the roles and identities being enacted by each
participant. This is especially the case in committees that are organized according to conflicting organizational
principles, thus providing conflicting role expectations. Both Commission expert committees and Council
working parties are organized according to (at least) two general principles: the principle of purpose and the
principle of area. One can assume that the likelihood for enacting several different roles is negatively related to
the number of committee members representing each nation-state. Here is one illustration. In situations whereby
two officials (e.g. one from the ministry level and one from the agency level) represent one nation-state within
one Council working party, each official is likely to evoke only one set of roles and identities. In this scenario,
civil servants from the ministry level are likely to evoke roles as ‘government representatives’, while civil
servants from the agency level are likely to evoke roles as ‘independent experts’. Conversely, if only one civil
servant from one domestic ministry attend Council working parties, the likelihood increases that this official will
evoke a dual set of roles: that of ‘government representative’ and that of ‘independent expert’.
18
 Contrary to the socialization thesis, one might assume that protracted exposure to certain institutions may teach
actors how to de-couple talk and action - thus keeping the role and identity perceptions of the actors largely
unchanged and unaffected by ways of presenting oneself (March 1984). In the current study however, no efforts
are made to study the relationships between talk and action. Role and identity perceptions are studied separately
from co-ordination behaviour. Still, it might be questioned whether the role and identity perceptions evoked by
officials are myths or reality to them (Brunsson 1989). No solid theoretical solution to this puzzle has yet been
forwarded. When are processes of socialization and re-socialization occuring, and when do individuals ‘talk to
talk’ (cf. Chapter 7)?
19
 The sheer size of societal communities, organizations and collegial arrangements might impinge upon the
construction of identities, role perceptions and codes of conduct. This dimension may also condition the impact
of the intensity dimension. Commission expert committees normally convene from 20 to over 40 people. The
Council working parties total somewhat the same amount of people. Consequently, the potential for intimacy and
for close bargaining and arguing is provided by the size of these committees and groups. This intimacy may
provide for an ‘esprit de corps’ to emerge amongst the participants. However, the committees in this study are of
approximately the same size. Hence, no hypotheses as regard variance in our dependent variables are possible to
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outline on the basis of the size variable. Furthermore, the effect of physical location of government institutions is
assumed to impact on the behaviour enacted by the government officials. Until 2000, the Commission was
physically located at about 60 different places around Brussels and was physically separated from the conference
centre (Centra Broscette) where most of the expert committees meet. The contrary is the case for the Council of
Ministers, physically located within the Justus Lipsius building at Rue de la Loi 175. In addition, the working
parties arrange their meetings within the Justus Lipsius building. Ceteris paribus, the competing sectoral
organizational principle within the Council working parties may loom larger than the competing territorial
organizational principle underpinning the Commission expert committees. This owes largely to the degree of
physical proximity between the core-organization and its sub-committees.
20
 Another argument on temporality emphasises the impact stemming from the births of organizations. Consistent
with Stinchcombe’s birth-mark model (1965), one may argue that processes whereby identities, roles and modes
of behaviour are constructed reflect the period of entrance to the EU; thus reflecting the birth of the formal
affiliation between the Union and each nation-state. After entering EU committees, individual identities, role
conceptions and codes of conduct are only subject to incremental change processes. This argument is not
advocated in the current study.
21
 Hammond (1990) has replied to Simon’s critique by underlining that principles of organizations are not neutral
to policy outcomes. The point advanced by Gulick (1937) is that if the political leadership want to pursue a
specific goal, they should organize according to particular principles in order to reach this goal. Every choice of
principle is ultimately a choice of policy.
22
 This logic is most likely to be activated amongst officials who are newcomers within EU committees. On the
other hand, committee participants who attend the committees often, who are senior participants, who regularly
meet the same committee participants, and who generally devote a major amount of time participating within the
collegial setting are more likely to evoke ‘new’ supranational identities and role conceptions. The new decision
situation at the EU level becomes internalized by the agent, strengthening the likelihood that he or she will evoke
identities and role conceptions on the basis of this new situation. What is appropriate to do, and which role and
identity is appropriate to enact at the EU level become less ambiguous as this level become internalized as part of
cognitive maps of the officials.
23
 This choice may be supported empirically by Wodak (2000). She shows that the articulation of, for example,
supranational identities was couched in terms of organizational roles (Wodak 2000: 42).
24
 Jon Elster (1998) argues that roles often come in pairs, that one role implies the existence of an opposite
number. Similarly, the conception of self is often paired with the conception of an ‘essential other’ or a
‘generalized other’ (Galatzer-Levy and Cohler 1993; Ritzer 1996: 343-344). Our conceptualization of role and
identity, however, does not ascribe this distinction vital importance. The central point made in previous sections
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is that “a sense of belonging appears to be closely interrelated with membership in a political community”
(Aggestam 1998: 7).
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Neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists disagree along, at a minimum, two dimensions:
(i) a national-supranational dimension, and (ii) a sectoral-territorial axis. The first dimension
regards the extent to which EU institutions contribute to construct new supranational
preferences, identities and role conceptions amongst its full-time and part-time participants.
The second dimension regards whether identities, role perceptions and modes of acting are
basically sectoral or territorial in character. I have argued in prior Chapters that a strong mode
of administrative integration is synonymous with the construction of supranational
conceptions of identity and role perceptions, and that these features are basically sectoral in
character. In the current Chapter some methodological questions are addressed. One central
theme is how to test the theoretically derived hypotheses empirically and how to determine
their theoretical robustness. To this end, this Chapter elaborates on the notion of causality,
correlation, refutation, and comparative design.
The notions of statistical correlation and causality are often mixed in social science research.
The first is taken as an indication of the second. The current Chapter argues that correlation is
solely an empirical phenomenon, whereas causality is basically an analytical construct. I also
argue that correlation and causality are elements of a tool-kit in the search for robust scientific
explanations. The notions of correlation and causality are means towards determining the
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relative validity of theoretical arguments. I also argue that the notion of falsification of
theoretical arguments is the main purpose of scientific research and the main procedure to
determine theoretical validity and robustness. However, whereas much contemporary social
science rests, implicitly or explicitly, on the notion of verification, I argue that the notion of
falsification seems more promising (Popper 1963). This is especially so within studies aiming
at constructing and testing theories. Within such studies, the notion of falsification is
necessary in order to identify borders of validity (read: scope condition) for the theories
addressed.
According to an extreme notion of falsification, one singular observation that go counter to
the theoretical assumptions is sufficient to warrant refutation of the argument as a whole
(Popper 1963). A more pragmatic version of the notion of falsification argues that the overall
rationale is to determine the limits of theoretical arguments – to identify the scope conditions
under which these arguments may be valid (Lakatos 1981). Hence, empirical observations
that go counter to expected patterns help to determine the conditions under which the
theoretical argument may be valid. The current Chapter assumes, parallel to Elster (1989) and
Lakatos (1981), that only partial refutations are possible due to an epistemological lack of
general laws within social life. Hence, aiming at identifying the relative validity of theories,
empirical observations that contradict expected patterns do not render the whole theory
refuted; they only identify particular scope conditions under which the theory may be valid.
The next section elaborates on the Popperian notion of falsification. The second section
touches upon the notion of correlation and causality. This section argues that in order to
determine the relative validity of the cognitive organization theory perspective presented in
Chapter 2 it is important to outline mutually exclusive dimensions within this perspective. On
the basis of these dimensions one can derive mutually exclusive and empirically testable
propositions. Chapter 2 has forwarded hypotheses that are, tentatively, exclusive to the
cognitive perspective. The current Chapter juxtaposes methodological arguments for
maximizing mutual exclusivity with regard to these empirical hypotheses.
A cognitive organizational theory perspective stresses how the organizational arrangements
underpinning the EU committee system and national government institutions may foster
particular modes of administrative integration across levels of governance. From the cognitive
perspective it is argued that the formal institutional build-up of domestic government
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institutions and EU committees, as well as the way domestic and EU level institutions are
linked together, may affect processes of administrative integration in particular ways. On the
contrary, we suggest a rational choice institutionalist approach as our null-hypothesis,
emphasising that organizational structures at the EU level of governance do not profoundly
affect processes of administrative integration. One vital endeavour of this study is to
determine the conditions, under which intergovernmental dynamics is transcended, thus
establishing scope conditions under which the cognitive approach to administrative
integration merits validity.
When testing the empirical validity of the cognitive perspective, a comparative design is
applied. This method is utilized in order to maximize the likelihood of refuting this
perspective. In order to test the relative validity of this theory, empirical studies are conducted
under less favourable conditions – that is, conditions under which the likelihood of falsifying
the cognitive perspective is maximized. To this end, administrative integration is studied
within collegial arrangements (committees) at the EU level of governance. I do not study
permanent participants at the EU level of governance, only part-time participants that have
permanent positions and their primary career opportunities within domestic ministries and
agencies.
The next section elaborates on the notions of falsification and verification. The succeeding
two sections elaborate on the notion of correlation, causality and the comparative research
design.
On refutation and falsification
There exist, basically, two different modes of conducting social enquiry. One mode is where
the empirical phenomena are at the centre of the analysis and the purpose is to account for
this. According to Elster (1989: 7), a genuine explanation accounts for what happened, as it
happened. The second mode is directed towards constructing theories and hypotheses. In this
mode the theoretical argument is at the forefront of the analysis and empirical data is collected
in an effort to elucidate this argument. Hence, the empirical field is utilized as a laboratory for
testing hypotheses and illuminating general arguments. Empirical observations are applied for
the sake of the argument, not vice versa. The current study of administrative integration lays
more in the second than in the first category. The overall aim of this study is to outline a
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theoretical argument for how to account for administrative integration across levels of
governance. “The researcher’s job… is primarily to invent theories, and only secondarily to
test them” (Stinchcombe 1968: 3). When studying administrative integration across the
national – EU intersection, the overall research question is how to account for these processes
theoretically and how to measure them empirically. This Chapter deals exclusively with the
latter question.
Contemporary studies of European integration and processes of Europeanization of domestic
institutions and policy processes exhibit an apparent methodological bias towards verifying
theoretical arguments. Efforts towards confronting theories of European integration with
empirical data are often geared towards systematically selecting empirical observations likely
to support (read: verify) the theoretical arguments – not genuinely testing the relative validity
of them (read: falsify). Andrew Moravcsik is currently the most prominent advocate for the
intergovernmentalist account. His theoretical argument is that national interests pursued by
domestic rational actors basically determine the European integration process – its pace,
scope, depth and content (Moravcsik 1998). When studying these arguments empirically,
Moravcsik consults data that are most likely to verify his arguments, that is, studying
intergovernmental bargains amongst EU member states (IGCs). Thus, “the research results
are quite predictable when one looks to intergovernmental bargains for evidence of
intergovernmental bargaining” (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998: 12). This is also evident in
his synthesising presentation The Choice for Europe (1998) where “the selection of cases
makes it easier to confirm the intergovernmentalist story…” (Caporaso 1999: 162-163).
Moreover, it has been advocated that “the generality of confirmed hypothesis within The
Choice for Europe is in part brought by the exclusion of ‘deviant’ cases” (Scharpf 1999:
167). He studies intergovernmental bargains relating to amendments and revisions of the EU
treaties throughout the history of European integration (Moravcsik 1991 and 1998; Moravcsik
and Nicolaidis 1999).
Similarly, neo-functionalists systematically select data most likely to confirm their theoretical
propositions. Neo-functionalism pictures the integration process as being strongly affected by
the institutional arrangements at the EU level of governance. The impact, fuelled by national
interests and institutions, is filtered through institutional structures at the EU level of
governance. As one example, Niemann (1998) studies how loyalties and interests amongst
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domestic government officials are moulded within EU committees and also processes
whereby domestic decision processes and decision processes at the EU level become
increasingly intermeshed. Similarly, Haas (1992) confirms this argument about ‘epistemic
communities’ by studying the development of shared sets of normative and principled beliefs,
shared causal beliefs, shared notions of validity, and a common policy enterprise (Haas 1992:
35).
One trivial question becomes relevant: how many observations are necessary in order to
verify theoretical arguments? In order to escape an infinite regress, the notion of falsification
seems more promising as a ground for testing theories than the notion of verification. “The
basic logical process of science is the elimination of alternative theories” (Stinchcombe 1968:
22). The idea of refutation derives from the logical impossibility of verifying general
arguments on the basis of verifying singular arguments (Hovi and Rasch 1996: 25-26).
Moreover, the idea of falsification is often paired with the notion of covering law theories
(Hempel 1965). Covering law theories emphasise that theoretical arguments have to rest upon
general laws. On this basis, Popper (1963: 36) argues, that “if observations show that the
predicted effect is definitely absent, then the theory is simply refuted. The theory is
incompatible with certain possible results of observations…” (original emphasis). If social
life is influenced by general laws2, then it follows that one singular empirical observation that
goes against this law simply refutes the theory as a whole (Salmon 1998: 162). Moreover,
theories that have survived several attempts at falsification are shown to be robust. Still, they
are not verified (Stinchcombe 1968: 19). “The growth of knowledge proceeds from old
problems to new problems, by means of conjectures and refutations” (Popper 1972: 258).
Contrary to Popper, Elster (1989) argues that general laws are difficult to detect within social
life (even though they may exist). Hence, the notion of covering law applies poorly to social
sciences in general. Social life, in contrast to physical life, embodies wilful human beings. As
Searl (1991) emphasises, the vital factor distinguishing social life from physical life is
intentionality. I do not argue that social actors are perfect rational actors, only that certain
elements of intentionality in social life imply that covering law hypotheses have severe
difficulties within the social sciences. Elster (1989) argues that social dynamics stem from
social mechanisms more than from general laws. Whereas general laws make statements
claiming general and universal validity regarding the relationships between (at least) two
84
variables, social mechanisms claim only conditional validity as regards linkages between
certain variables. Social mechanisms claim validity only under certain conditions (Skog 1998:
25). “Thus, explaining by mechanisms replaces the idea of “if A, then always B” with “if A,
then sometimes B”” (Hovi 2000: 3). Thus, if empirical observations go counter to theoretical
expectations, the theory is refuted only under certain conditions. Hence, only partial
generalizations are possible within social enquiry. Ultimately, only partial refutations are
possible when testing generalizations based upon social mechanisms.
Social mechanisms can be understood as those sets “of stable elements that provide a
plausible account of how I and O are linked to one another” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998: 7
- original emphasis). Social mechanisms are not only those social ‘cogs and wheels’ that bring
this relationship into existence (Elster 1989) but also the “logics by which social scientists
render understandable the reality they depict” (Hernes 1998: 74). Thus, social mechanisms
help to may make explanations more complete “by providing insight into how exactly each
pair of variables in the model is causally connected” (Hovi 2000: 14). The concept of social
mechanism is often paired with the principle of methodological individualism - that is, that
the “elementary ‘causal agents’ are always individual actors…” (Hedstrom and Swedberg
1998: 11). One basic problem exhibited by this methodology, however, is that mechanisms
transcending the logic of consequentiality “must either be ignored…, or they must be
endogenized” (Hedstrom and Swedberg 1998: 12; March and Olsen 1995). Hence, theories
must be parsimonious. The concept of social mechanism implies that social life is affected by
a multitude of different forces: rational choice, emotions, satisficing, logics of
appropriateness, temporality, etc. Cognitive theory largely emphasises an idea of
methodological individualism, albeit applying a bounded logic of consequentiality (March
and Olsen 1989; March and Simon 1958).
Middle-range theories are basically ‘mechanism-driven’ - the central question having to do
with which basic elements link different social phenomena together. Compared to covering
law theories, middle-range theories have a more limited scope of validity. Hence, falsifying
such theories is more likely to result in partial falsification than falsifying covering law
theories. Central to any middle-range theory is detecting scope conditions, specifying
‘switching points’ for when certain social dynamics are likely to materialize than others
(Checkel 1999: 2). Unpacking social mechanisms may help us understand social dynamics
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more broadly, in addition to uncovering their conditional validity (Gilje and Grimen 1993: 81;
Trondal 2001).
Up to this point, it seems that both the notion of verification and falsification is partially
rejected. Still, based upon the concept of social mechanisms (Elster 1989; Hedstrom and
Swedberg 1998), a weak notion of falsification seems to be compatible with a plea for critical
testing of theories within the social sciences (Mjøset 2001).
How do we falsify?
One vital endeavour when seeking to falsify theories is to derive mutually exclusive
hypotheses. On the basis of these hypotheses, mutually exclusive observations may be
detected. “Every ‘good’ scientific theory is a prohibition: it forbids certain things to happen.
The more a theory forbids, the better it is” (Popper 1963: 36). “A theory to be useful must
be specific enough that it might be disapproved” (Stinchcombe 1968: 5). Hence, when
observing one event, some theories are supported and others are refuted (read: partially
refuted).3
In order to illuminate implications accompanying the notion of falsification, we contrast it
again with the idea of verification. As argued above, studies of European integration rest on
the concept of verification. Consequently, when conducting empirical research, the search for
mutually exclusive theories, hypotheses and observations is largely neglected. The importance
of ascribing different values to the same independent variables is often ignored, thus
committing serious methodological errors. The analytical scope of the vast majority of studies
of Europeanization has to do with measuring the impact of EU membership on institutional
configurations and changes in the policy output of domestic policy processes (e.g. Egeberg
and Trondal 1999; Sandholtz 1996). The majority of these studies limit their empirical focus
to EU member states (e.g. Mèny, Muller and Quermonne 1996; Rometsch and Wessels 1996).
In order to measure the impact of EU membership, however, it is crucial to ascribe the
independent variable at least two values, membership and non-membership. Comparative
studies covering nation-states with different forms of affiliation to the EU are currently
lacking.4 By ignoring this category of nation-states, the independent variable takes on only
one value, essentially becoming a constant. The explanatory potential of the analyses becomes
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markedly weakened. Hence, without having an explicit concept of falsification the
explanatory potential of the models is severely hampered.
In order to clearly illuminating the research design accompanying the premises underpinning
the Popperian perspective, we briefly address again the research units that are part of the
current study. In the following, I first discuss how to select research units in order to
maximize the likelihood of refutation. Second, I discuss briefly how to select research units to
maximize the likelihood of identifying mutually exclusive empirical observations.
On the question of refutation, the theoretical argument advocated within this study
emphasises how administrative integration generally is affected by the way that political-
administrative life is formally organized. The enactment of decision behaviour, identities and
role conceptions amongst individual decision-makers is affected by the organizational
structures in which they are embedded. This proposition derives from a cognitive organization
theory perspective. Thus, in order to test the robustness of the assumed relationship between
our independent variable (organizational structures) and the empirical proxies (identities, role
conceptions and modes of acting) the relationships between these variables are studied under
less favourable conditions. Hence, research units were chosen that are less likely to confirm
our hypothesis about significant co-variation between the independent and the dependent
variables.
First, government officials participating within committees are chosen. This selection is based
upon empirical observations indicating that co-ordination practises, identities and role
perceptions are affected less by interim collegial arrangements than by permanent hierarchical
organizations (Bowler and Farrell 1995; Fenno 1962; Katz 1997). Generally, committee
members are only ‘part-time’ participants as contrasted to permanent officials within
hierarchical organizations. The likelihood that ‘part-time’ participants are significantly
affected by their temporal and secondary committee affiliation is modest compared to the
potential impact of more permanent and primary organizational affiliations. In order to
maximize the likelihood of refuting our hypotheses, government officials participating within
committees and working groups in the administrative apparatus of the European Union make
up the sample. At this level of governance a multitude of intervening variables makes it less
likely that government officials are affected by the EU committees regarding their identities,
role conceptions and modes of acting. The EU is, amongst other things, a multinational,
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multicultural, multi-linguistic and multi-level system of governance (Sandholtz and Stone
Sweet 1998). However, the primary institutional affiliations embedding domestic government
officials that participate on EU committees are national. The EU affiliation is only of
secondary importance to these officials. Hence, this selection of research units maximizes the
likelihood that our hypotheses about co-variation between our independent and dependent
variables are refuted. Conversely, if the hypotheses are confirmed by empirical observations,
the robustness of the hypotheses – and the validity of the theoretical argument – is
strengthened. Thus, the overall rationale behind this endeavour is to produce robust theories.
The approach applied to achieve this end is the method of falsification.
In addition, our theoretical argument stresses that different organizational principles tend to
accompany different co-ordination behaviour, role and identity perceptions. That is, particular
values on the dependent variables are assumed to correlate systematically with particular
values on the independent variable. Identities, role conceptions and modes of acting are
assumed to be affected differently within different organizational contexts. Hence, one
important research task is systematically selecting research units (government officials)
having different institutional affiliations  - both at the EU level and at the domestic level of
governance. In order to maximize the mutual exclusivity of our empirical observations,
mutual exclusivity must also be maximized with regard to the institutional affiliations
embedding our research units. The goal is to make “a set of observations which will decide
between two alternative theories…” (Stinchcombe 1968: 25). Accordingly, one endeavour
relates to dividing organization structures into theoretical meaningful and empirical exclusive
categories (cf. Chapter 2). Hence, subsequent to such conceptualizations, the likelihood that
only certain empirical observations may correspond to certain theoretical arguments is
maximised. Thus only certain observations are likely to confirm or falsify our hypotheses.
Assuming that the cognitive perspective on administrative integration is correct, only certain
values on our dependent variables are allowed to co-variate systematically with particular
values on the independent variables (cf. Chapter 2).
Certain theoretical propositions are likely to be valid only under certain institutional
conditions. Some important conditions are clarified in Chapter 2 by conceptualizing
organizational structures embedding social action and by identifying what kind of empirical
observations are compatible with certain organizational structures. On this basis, partial
refutations are possible because mutually exclusive independent variables are constructed.
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Moreover, due to possible refutations being partial, empirical observations going counter to
certain hypotheses help to determine the conditions under which these hypotheses may in fact
be valid, as well as determining the conditions under which these hypotheses are false.
According to Lakatos (1970: 92), “intellectual honesty consists…in specifying the conditions
under which one is willing to give up one’s position”.
On correlation and causality
The notion of refutation and verification is based on correlation and causality as elements of
the explanatory tool-kits. Because the question of causality and correlation has been discussed
from many different angles and at different times in the history of science, I leave this
philosophical heritage behind.
The general argument advanced here emphasises causality as impossible to observe
empirically. The only observable elements in a chain of events are correlations – that is,
proximity in time and space between two (or more) events. Correlation may be defined as
“the extent to which two or more things are related (“co-related”) to one another” (Vogt
1999: 58). Correlation is present if one observes variations in the dependent variable
associated with variations in the independent variables. Several scientific methods are
available within the social sciences to determine the presence of correlation. In order to
unravel and measure the existence of correlation between the independent and the dependent
variables within our study of administrative integration (between organizational structure on
the one hand, and identities, role conceptions and patterns of co-ordination behaviour on the
other), two different techniques are utilized. First, survey techniques are applied in order to
uncover statistical correlations. Survey data are adequate when aiming at testing fairly general
theoretical arguments. In-depth analyses are less possible to conduct on the basis of survey
data than on the basis of qualitative interview data.  However, in-depth analysis is not
necessary for testing theories. “Any effort to illuminate general patterns in complex events
must sacrifice some richness of detail” (Moravcsik 1999: 169). However, interviews add a
depth dimension to the cross-tabulations and regressions made. For the purpose of
maximizing the likelihood of falsifying theoretical arguments, survey data may be seen as one
important source for detecting correlations. Interviews provide only supplementary data to
this end (cf. below).
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The question of causality, however, is not settled on the discovery of statistical correlation.
Causation includes co-variation as well as non-spuriousness (Asher 1976: 11-12). However,
causation has more to it. A cause might be defined as “an event, such as a change in one
variable, that produces another event, such as a change in a second variable” (Vogt 1999: 35).
Causal explanations always comprise a time dimension, or a time sequence. Further, causality
is an analytical abstraction, not an empirical observable phenomenon. Even if the time
sequence is clear, what we observe is correlation not causation. Hence, the question of
causality rests solely on theoretical arguments. What being actually observed is always
correlations between events. The ‘cogs and wheels’ linking different events together are
solely analytical constructs, and are unobservable. The main danger in “confusing statistical
correlation with genuine causation is the danger of confusing symptoms with causes” (Salmon
1998: 45). Likewise, social mechanisms are unobservable analytical constructs (Hedstrom and
Swedberg 1998: 13).
Generally, model simplification has to rest on theoretical grounds (Asher 1976: 12). The
elimination of irrelevant variables has to reflect theoretical argumentation. As mentioned
above, several social mechanisms may link events together, i.e. emotions, rationality,
cognition. These mechanisms are solely theoretical constructs. Different theories emphasise
different social mechanisms. Hence, when aiming at maximizing the likelihood for refutation,
one should apply theories that pay attention to quite different social mechanisms. Moreover,
these theories should be parsimonious with respect to the number of social mechanisms.
Within the study of administrative integration, two major mechanisms have attracted
attention: rationality and cognition. These mechanisms, however, do not fulfil the criteria of
mutually exclusiveness. Both rational and cognitive mechanisms rely on a logic of
consequentiality (March and Olsen 1989), strategic and embedded, respectively. However,
within the study of administrative integration these mechanisms generate different hypotheses
regarding patterns of co-ordination behaviour, identity and role perceptions, and thus foster
different empirical expectations and propositions. As regards the resocializing potential of EU
committees, and thus the potential for administrative integration to emerge, a cognitive
perspective may cause it to be revealed. A rational perspective, on the other hand, argues that
national interests and domestic decision processes hamper processes of administrative
integration. On this premise, cognitive mechanisms are selected as explanatory ‘cogs and
wheels’ for this study (cf. Chapter 2).
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Several other social mechanisms are potential candidates for inclusion into a study of
administrative integration – i.e. the logic of appropriateness (cf. also Chapter 7). This
perspective, as outlined by March and Olsen (1989 and 1995), is excluded from this study due
to the difficulty in developing exclusive and testable hypotheses from it (Peters 1999: 39).
When conducting empirical research on the premises of refutation, several plausible social
mechanisms are often difficult to include due to methodological problems of this kind.
Despite the fact that different institutional approaches often risk being non-falsifiable, the
potential for refutation is severely hampered within the institutional perspective presented by
March and Olsen (Peters 1999: 150). This problem is due largely to the inclusive and
comprehensive understanding of organizational structures as offered by March and Olsen
(1989 and 1995). Within the logic of appropriateness, organizational structures are seen as
formal, cognitive, normative, demographic, temporal and symbolic arrangements (March and
Olsen 1989).5 Based on this broad concept of institutions, it becomes difficult to identify
hypotheses that are exclusive for this theoretical perspective, let alone revealing social
dynamics not covered by this approach. Compared to the rational and the cognitive
perspectives, the possibility for ‘pattern-matching’ may be difficult within the logic of
appropriateness – that is, to compare empirically based patterns with predicted ones (Yin
1984: 109). This difficulty partially reflects the fact that rationalists expect no profound
effects due to organizational structures, cognitivists expect important effects immediately, and
that institutionalists expect effects over time through learning and socialization. Hence, one
can assume that it is easier to establish empirical validation of the two former perspectives
than of the latter approach. The logic of appropriateness includes several possible theoretical
scenarios thus reducing the explanatory potential of each scenario. To give one example, the
logic of appropriateness seeks to account for institutional inertia and evolutionary change on
the one hand and punctuated equilibrium and abrupt change patterns on the other (March and
Olsen 1989; cf. Krasner 1988: 77; Olsen 2001: 16). To site Popper: “The more a theory
forbids, the better it is” (Popper 1963: 36).
Moreover, fruitful theories, in addition to being mutually exclusive, valid and parsimonious,
should be conclusive. That is, that “the core concepts of the model can be translated into
operational terms” (Skjærseth 1998: 99-100). It is always difficult to determine the relative
conclusiveness of different theories. The rational and the cognitive perspectives, however,
seem to be more conclusive than the logic of appropriateness. Indicative of this is the relative
lack of genuine empirical testing (read: attempts of disapproval) of this perspective. Efforts
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devoted towards verifying the theory are more widespread within the literature (cf. Bulmer
and Burch 1998; Knill and Lenschaw 1998).
*     *     *
Consistent with the above arguments, when maximising the refutability of theoretical
arguments, model simplifications should principally rest upon theoretical reasoning. Still,
when determining the relative validity of different theories, empirical enquiries may also be
designed in ways rendering causality more easily detectable. The researcher may intentionally
design the time sequence of the variables. Similarly, the proximity in time and space of these
variables may be systematically structured. Efforts devoted towards designing social enquiries
rest upon an assumption that “persistent statistical correlations … are strongly indicative
of a causal relation of some sort” (Salmon 1998: 48). Different methods are available within
social sciences to this end. The best method is experimental design. Due to difficulties in
utilizing this design in the study of administrative integration another design is applied: the
comparative method.
Towards a comparative design
“Comparison … is the very essence of the scientific method” (Almond 1966: 878). This
might be done across time, across space, or both. The overall rationale behind the comparative
method is to detect co-variation by way of systematically controlling for the effects of
additional variables. The current study analyses the extent to which the impact stemming from
(i) committee affiliation at the EU level and from (ii) different domestic institutional
affiliations are robust under different conditions. That is, to what extent the proposed
relationships between institutional affiliations on the one hand, and identities, role perceptions
and patterns of co-ordination, on the other, are valid irrespective of the different forms of
affiliation towards the EU characterising the three Scandinavian countries. As seen in Chapter
1, the general hypothesis to be tested is whether similar institutional affiliations amongst
national civil servants accompany similar role perceptions, institutional identities and modes
of acting. This study represents no country-by-country comparison.
Two different comparative designs are discussed in the literature. The most similar design,
and the most different method (Collier 1991; Lijphart 1971 and 1975; Smelser 1973). For
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both methods, a “small N, many variables” problem is common to both. I shall discuss four
partial solutions to this problem. These are (i) studying sufficiently equal cases, (ii) studying
key variables, (iii) applying general dimensions for classifying the independent variables, and
finally, (iv) maximizing the number of empirical observations (Collier 1991; Kjeldstadli
1988; Lijphart 1971). The first three suggestions relate to the “many variables problem” and
the fourth solution focuses on the “small N problem”. As will be seen, all these solutions
relate to our prior discussion on refutation and causality.
1) Within the study of administrative integration, I study political-administrative systems
being as equal as possible (Smelser 1973). Ideally, the only difference between our cases
relates to our independent variables. Hence, the most similar design relies upon systematic
selection of cases in order to isolate the effects stemming from the independent variables.6
In our case, data have been systematically selected from three comparable countries –
Denmark, Norway and Sweden. “Since the Nordic countries are more or less similar in a
great many respect, they stand out as good examples of comparable cases that fit, very
neatly, central requirements of the most similar system design” (Anckar 1993: 118).
Given this, and owing to the fact that “the behavior of individuals within the civil
service is partially determined, or at least influenced by…society and by their personal
and professional links with other social institutions”, the noise fostered by irrelevant
variables are minimized when applying the Scandinavian countries as comparative cases
(Peters 1996: 21). Still, the Nordic countries are not perfectly comparable cases, partly
due to differences in administrative systems (Lægreid and Pedersen 1999: 22; cf. endnote
16 in Chapter 2). However, possible noise stemming from different irrelevant variables is
minimized by way of choosing ‘sufficient’ comparable cases: “The ideal is to watch for
…differences or similarities by keeping certain factors constant. Differences are thus
explained by other differences, and similarities by other similarities” (Allardt 1990: 184).
Hence, in order to reduce the “many variables problem”, ‘sufficient’ comparable cases are
chosen to this study.
However, the Scandinavian countries differ as to their form of affiliation towards the EU.
This study examines the robustness of the cognitive organization theory approach by
testing the proposed hypotheses in countries having different forms of affiliation with the
EU. The overall rationale behind this comparative endeavour is to show that “membership
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in the European Union is not necessarily the most appropriate dividing line”, analytically
speaking (Usher 1998: 184). The individual affiliations of each civil servant towards
different EU institutions, in general, and towards different EU committees, in particular,
are suggested as one key explanatory variable for administrative integration across levels
of governance.
2) Consistent with Lijphart (1971), the current study relies upon a few key explanatory
variables: (i) different committee affiliations at the EU level, (ii) different length and
intensity of participation on these committees, and (iii) different domestic institutional
affiliations. Hence, in order to reduce the “many variables” puzzle, our theoretical model
contains only a few variables rather than a long “shopping list” of possible explanatory
variables. Hence, rather than accounting for what happened as it happened (Elster 1989:
7), this study stresses some key variables conceived as vital for understanding
administrative integration.
3) Consistent with the second solution, the third solution to the “many variables” puzzle also
relates to the parsimoniousness of the empirical model. In order to be able to compare key
variables across different political-administrative systems, we have to rely upon general
dimensions on these variables. Whereas Popper (1963) argues that these dimensions have
to be mutually exclusive, Smelser (1973), in addition, calls for universal dimensions. He
argues that the more universal and general these dimensions are, the better they are for
comparative research.7 In our study of administrative integration, several comparative
dimensions of organizational structures are identified. Applying fairly general and basic
dimensions in order to characterize and classify organizational structures, one can conduct
comparative analysis along these dimensions across time and space. Consistent with
Gulick (1937), March and Olsen (1978) and Egeberg (1994), organizational structures
may be seen as specialized according to the principles of purpose, process, area, clientele,
time and physical location (cf. Chapter 2). Being universal dimensions, they warrant
comparison between nearly every political-administrative system across time and space.
As revealed in Chapter 2, the principle of sector and territoriality is of particular
importance to this study.
4) The fourth solution regards the “small N” problem. Comparative designs often have been
paired with small sample size studies. Within this study, the number of empirical
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observations is, as a matter of fact, larger than the number of variables (cf. the next
section). This solution also follows the logic of partial refutation suggested by Lakatos
(1981). We maximize the number of observations in order to escape the “tendency to
reject a hypothesis on the basis of a single deviant case” (Lijphart 1971: 686). When
maximizing N, a single deviant finding has less impact on the results. Hence, only partial
refutations are likely when a large N is available to the analyst.
Data and sampling procedures
This study is based upon two primary empirical sources. The first source is drawn from two
different policy sectors whilst the second source is cross-sectoral. These empirical data are
described and discussed successively in the following.
The first source was two sector-specific studies conducted from summer 1998 until spring
1999 within the environment and the occupational health and safety sectors. These studies
cover domestic government officials employed within ministries and agencies in the three
Scandinavian countries that have experience from Commission expert committees and/or
within Council working parties. The collected data was partially based on structured
questionnaires and partially on semi-structured interviews (see Appendix 1 and 2). 203
questionnaires were distributed to these officials and160 were answered. The overall response
rate was 79 per cent. The individual response rates were 100 per cent in Norway, 73 per cent
in Sweden, and 73 per cent in Denmark:
Table 3.1 Response rate amongst ‘national’ civil servants attending EU committees









Norway…………… 44 44 100 %
Sweden…………… 99 72 73 %
Denmark………….. 60 44 73 %
Total………………. 203 160 79 %
95
The high response rate in Norway is due to close and personal follow-up of each respondent
by the author. The response rate in Denmark and Sweden, however, is also fairly high and
results largely from this author repeatedly requesting replies on the questionnaires. These data
are analysed by using the SPSS 9.0 for Windows. Additionally, 47 face-to-face interviews
have been conducted amongst a systematic selection of officials from the above sample: 25 in
Norway, 11 in Denmark, and finally 11 in Sweden. Of these interviews, 12 were conducted at
the ministry level and 35 were conducted at the agency level. The interviews were based on a
partially structured interview guide providing general and more specific topics for discussion.
Those officials selected for interviews were drawn from the above survey sample (cf.
Appendix 2).
The survey and the interviews are based upon a systematic sample of officials. Prior to
selecting these samples, the author carried out in-depth research in the two policy sectors in
order to locate officials having experience from Commission expert committees and/or
Council working parties. Next, the author called each potential respondent and asked if he or
she was willing to answer a structured questionnaire. 203 officials gave a positive response to
my call. Then, questionnaires were sent to these officials by post. 160 officials actually
answered the questionnaires. Based upon these answers, a sub-sample was drawn for face-to-
face qualitative interviews. The goal was to trace some issues raised in the questionnaire,
thereby obtaining more in-depth knowledge on the casual relationships studied.
The reasons for selecting officials from two policy sectors (the environment sector and the
occupational health and safety sector) and for selecting officials from Denmark, Norway and
Sweden have been accounted for above. At this point it is important to highlight one overall
purpose when designing the layout of the questionnaires. In order to maximize the likelihood
of officials assigning identical scores on questions relating to Commission expert committees
and Council working parties, the officials were asked to give answers to several questions and
simultaneously indicate potential differences between these committees in relation to each
question (cf. Appendix 1). As discussed in Chapter 2, different committees at the EU level of
governance may affect the participants differently. Hence, one should expect different scores
to be assigned to different classes of committees. When, however, maximizing the likelihood
that similar scores be assigned to different EU committees by designing the questionnaire in
particular ways, the robustness of our theory is given a ‘critical test’ (Popper 1963). The
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rationale for this follows the logic of refutation where the likelihood for refuting the cognitive
organization theory perspective is maximized.
Past studies have shown that the validity and reliability of statistical data on self-conceptions
is lower than data on facts (Jacobsen 1999). Our study is largely based on self-conceptions
regarding the co-ordination behaviour and the role and identity perceptions evoked by
national civil servants. In order to increase the validity and reliability of our study, the
respondents were asked to give answers to several questions measuring the same underlying
dimension. For example, in measuring modes of policy co-ordination through the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, several questions were presented to the officials (cf. Appendix 1). Thus,
different variables are utilized in an effort at reducing problems of intra-personal
inconsistency (Jacobsen 1999). The overall rationale for using several different operational
measures for co-ordination behaviour and role and identity perceptions is also to detect
particular empirical patterns (Yin 1993). If several dependent variables coincide empirically
with predicted patterns, the test is shown to be fairly robust. One disadvantage of using
several questions for measuring the same underlying dimension is that the size of the
questionnaire increases (cf. Appendix 1).
A second survey was conducted from fall 1998 to spring 1999 at the permanent
representations to the EU of the three countries. The procedure for selecting this sample was
identical to the procedure applied towards officials in the ‘home administration’. Moreover,
the visual design of the questionnaire was nearly identical to the nationally distributed ones.
In contrast to the domestic study some additional questions were added while other questions
were subtracted (cf. Appendix 3). To maximize the number of observations this study covered
officials from several policy sectors.
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Table 3.2 Response rate amongst officials at the permanent representations to the EU








Norway……... 17 8 47 %
Sweden……... 40 22 55 %
Denmark……. 35 19 54 %
Total………... 92 49 53 %
The response rate in this study was considerable lower than in the corresponding national
survey. This may partially be due to the general high workload at the permanent
representations during the research period. A high workload amongst the Swedish and Danish
permanent representatives stemmed from the introduction of the Euro, the process of
enlargement to the East, the reassignment of the EU Commission, etc. However, we have no
indications that only officials with a low workload answered the questionnaires and therefore
no reason to believe that our sample contains the ‘less important’ officials.8 The low response
rate amongst Norwegian permanent representatives owes mostly to their general lack of
experience in participating on EU committees. They are formally excluded from participating
on Council working parties and the COREPER. Norwegian government officials at the
permanent representations to not participate as intensively within Commission expert
committees as do officials from domestic sector ministries and agencies (cf. Chapter 4).
Moreover, because the permanent representations are divided into one diplomatic realm and
one sectoral realm, questionnaires were distributed to officials in both realms. 20 per cent of
the returned questionnaires came from the diplomatic realm, whereas 80 per cent came from
sector representatives. This sectoral bias in the data parallels the sectoral bias in the data on
the ‘domestic’ civil servants: 28 per cent of the questionnaires were received from the
ministry level, while 72 per cent of the answers came from agency personnel.
The sample of respondents and informants represented in these two studies are not
representative in any meaningful sense. In both studies the samples were systematically
selected and such data samples do not warrant empirical generalizations. Still, analytical and
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theoretical generalizations are possible owing to the general nature of our theoretical
arguments (Yin 1993). We use empirical proxies that reflect more general phenomena.
Certain biases are likely to accompany systematic samples. Still, not all biases are equally
problematic. The biases discussed below are unproblematic. Our analytical task requires us to
select a sample of respondents that reflect the “average” committee participant in Europe. It is
less important to get a sample that mirrors the average domestic civil servant of each nation-
state. However, our samples may include the following empirical biases. First, the research
has been conducted within “small” nation-states. “One bias that may accompany this selection
is that those originating from smaller member states have been shown to express somewhat
more supranational attitudes than their colleagues from larger countries” (Egeberg 1999b:
464; Beyers 1998a). Second, officials in medium or lower rank positions dominate the
samples compared to officials in top rank positions. In the ‘home administrations’, answers
were received from director generals and deputy director generals (3 per cent), from heads
and deputy heads of unit/division (25 per cent), and finally from heads of section, senior
advisors and advisors (72 per cent). In the survey covering officials at the permanent
representations to the EU, 25 per cent of the answers came from heads and deputy heads of
unit/division, while 75 per cent of the answers come from head of section, senior advisors and
advisors (cf. Chapter 4).
Previous studies show that decision behaviour enacted by officials at medium or lower rank
positions is sectorally oriented. Similarly, officials in medium or lower rank positions evoke
role conceptions that are more sectorally oriented than those enacted by colleagues in top rank
positions (Christensen and Egeberg 1997; Zuna 1998). Hence, our data exhibit sectoral biases
stemming from the hierarchical positions of the officials. Finally, systematic biases relating to
the ministry-agency spectrum are apparent within the data set. Based on a systematic selection
of officials along this axis, answers were received from officials from sector ministries (28 per
cent) and from vertically subordinated agencies (72 per cent). Similarly, amongst officials that
were interviewed face-to-face, 74 per cent were employed at the agency level, while 26 per
cent were employed at the ministry level, thus corresponding to the survey sample. Similarly,
at the permanent representations to the EU, 20 per cent of the returned questionnaires came
from officials at the diplomatic realm, whilst 80 per cent came from sector representatives.
Moreover, biases in the two data sets also relate to the educational backgrounds of the
officials: 73 per cent of the officials employed within domestic ministries and agencies and
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who participate on EU committees are educated in technical disciplines. Officials at the
permanent representations are educated in law and economy to a greater extent - 49 and 32
per cent, respectively (cf. Chapter 4). These biases may accompany tendencies towards
expressing more sectoral identities, role conceptions and co-ordination behaviour.
The questionnaires utilized in these two studies were written in Norwegian (cf. Appendix 1
and 3). Despite certain biases that might accompany the use of Norwegian as regards
officials’ understanding of the questions, no systematic errors have been registered to support
such concerns. Similarly, during the interviews the questions were posed in Norwegian and
the answers were given in the officials’ native language (cf. Appendix 2). No major
misunderstandings were registered during the interviews.
Conclusion
Comparative designs generally are applied in order to make correlation easily detectable. The
ultimate goal is to better identify causality between certain variables by carefully designing
the study. Despite efforts towards detecting causality on empirical grounds, however, the
concepts of causality and social mechanisms are solely theoretical constructs.
Moreover, causality and correlation are elements from a tool-kit in the search for robust
theories. To this end, the notion of refutation is taken to be adequate. Moreover, parallel to
Elster (1989) and Lakatos (1981), only partial refutations are assumed possible due to an
epistemological lack of general laws within social life. Middle-range theories call for
identifying the relative validity of theories. Hence, empirical observations that counter
expected patterns do not refute the whole theory but only identify scope conditions under
which the theory may be valid, as well as the conditions under which it may prove false.
A cognitive organization theory perspective stresses how organizational arrangements
underpinning EU institutions and committees foster particular modes of administrative
integration across levels of governance. Moreover, we argue that the formal institutional
build-up of domestic bureaucratic institutions and the way the domestic institutions and the
EU institutions are linked together affect processes of administrative integration in particular
ways. Our null-hypothesis states that organizational structures at different levels of
governance do not significantly affect processes of administrative integration. In order to test
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the relative validity of the cognitive approach, two surveys and one interview study have been
conducted under less favourable conditions, that is, conditions under which the likelihood of
falsifying the cognitive approach is maximized. To this end, administrative integration is
studied within collegial arrangements (committees) at the EU level of governance. Permanent
participants at the EU level of governance are not studied; only part-time participants having
their primary institutional affiliations within domestic ministries, agencies and permanent
representations to the EU.
Empirical observations serve as the basis for providing opportunities for refuting middle-
range theories. The cognitive perspective on administrative integration is taken as a ‘critical
test’ within this study on the basis of survey data and supplemented by interview data. Two
major sources of empirical data are provided: (i) statistical and interview data on committee
participants from the three Scandinavian countries, working within the environment sector
and the field of occupational health and safety; (ii) statistical data on officials at the
permanent representations to the EU of these states, working within different policy sectors.
Due to the fact that our sample is systematic, no empirical generalizations are warranted.
Particularly those empirical descriptions that are provided in Chapter 4 may reflect the sample
more than the theoretical universe. Hence, our observations in Chapter 4 are not
representative for all those participating on EU committees. However, when analysing more
general theoretical relationships between various independent and dependent variables in
Chapters 5 and 6, sampling biases are less problematic.
In the following Chapters the data presented above are studied using univariate, bivariate, and
multivariate analyses. In Chapter 4 univariate and bivariate techniques are mostly used to
reveal patterns of cross-level participation in Europe amongst domestic government officials.
Chapter 4 reveals the formal institutional affiliations embedding the government officials, the
intensity to which these officials attend EU committees, their educational backgrounds, etc.
Next, Chapters 5 and 6 analyses how such cross-level participation affects modes of policy
co-ordinating amongst the participants (Chapter 5), and the enactment of particular role and
identity perceptions (Chapter 6).
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Notes
                                                
1
 The author is indebted to Jeffrey Lewis and Robert Zuna for valuable comments to an earlier draft version of
this Chapter.
2
 General laws are conceived as similar to covering law hypotheses (Hempel 1965). A covering law hypothesis
can be understood as a special case of a probability law where the likelihood of its validity is equal to one (p =
1).
3
 Considering situations whereby theories are refuted, Popper’s assumption rests on a premise of reliability. That
is, no errors are involved in the research process as such, nor that the empirical observations can be derived from
the research design more generally. Hence, any element of systematic or random errors must be eliminated in
order to render refutation possible (Gilje and Grimen 1993: 76). Empirical observations must be traceable back
to the independent variables of the study, not to any random or systematic error (Hovi and Rasch 1996: 27).
4
 One exception to this trend is the anthology edited by Hanf and Soetendorp (1998) comparing Norway,
Switzerland and eight EU member states.
5
 While formal structures are seen as formal rules in the rational perspective, the cognitive perspective perceives
formal structures as buffers to attention and information.
6
 Hence, statistical generalizations to a theoretical universe are impossible when systematic samples are applied.
Statistical significance tells us nothing about this universe, only, at best that the theoretical relationships studied
are relatively robust ones.
7
 What dimensions is most suitable for comparative research? Structures, actors, decision processes and policy
outputs have been suggested in the literature. Still, other candidates have been put forward within comparative
policy and comparative administration literature. At this stage, I want to argue in favour of using organizational
structures as the comparative dimension instead of policy content/policy output. This is mostly due to the lack of
adequate conceptual schemes for identifying dimensions that are mutual exclusive and robust as far as policy
content is concerned (Peters 1996: 29). Sufficiently universal and basic dimensions are indeed available as
regards organizational structures (e.g. Gulick 1937).
8
 Thanks to Svein S. Andersen at the ARENA programme for this point.
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CROSS-LEVEL PARTICIPATION IN EUROPE
Introduction
One vital driving force lurking behind processes of administrative integration is cross-level
participation amongst national civil servants (Schaefer 2000: 22). One prerequisite for shifts
to occur in role and identity perceptions and modes of acting amongst government officials is
that they actually come together and interact mutually. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 have provided
theoretical and methodological frames for this study, the current Chapter places the study of
administrative integration into empirical frames. This Chapter provides an overview of
patterns of cross-level participation amongst Scandinavian government officials. The
questions raised are which EU committees these officials attend, how frequently do they meet,
how long have they participated, in which domestic government institutions they are
employed? Since role and identity perceptions and modes of policy co-ordination reflect
multiple institutional affiliations at both the EU level and the national level of governance, the
current Chapter describes these affiliations. Before doing so, however, the first section
elaborates on how to perceive administrative integration more generally. Section one follows
up one central theme discussed in Chapter 1 and provides a more thorough discussion of the
notion of administrative integration. Next, section two provides a short overview on past and
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contemporary studies of EU committees, thus, providing a bibliographical framing of our
study. Finally, sections three and four describe patterns of cross-level participation amongst
those Danish, Norwegian and Swedish civil servants studied here.
Bureaucratic integration1
Administrative integration, as seen here, is a relatively embryonic field of study. Still, “[t]his
notion of ‘bureaucratic interpenetration’, and the image it evokes of individuals becoming
snared in the EU’s expanding webs and networks, is crucial for understanding the way
European integration is conceptualised by EU elites” (Shore 2000: 147). This phenomenon
might be understood as a process and not a fixed state of affairs. The mutual relationships
between administrative systems constitute ever-changing phenomena in political-
administrative life. Just like single organizations are in constant states of flux’, the
relationships between organizations are constantly evolving. Moreover, administrative
integration is relational - covering the relationships, interdependencies and interconnections
between different administrative systems and between the members of these systems (Spinelli
1966). Furthermore, administrative integration is seen as a continuum, ranging from weak to
strong modes of integration (Trondal 1999b). As discussed more thoroughly below, weak
administrative integration requires that actual contacts occur between at least two
administrative systems. A stronger notion of integration requires, in addition, that these
contacts mutually affect the systems and the individual members within them (cf. Chapters 5
and 6). Hence, integration is seen as an outcome more than a process. Finally, administrative
integration is not uni-dimensional (e.g. Hix 1999). It might be seen as a two-dimensional
phenomenon, covering a sectoral-territorial dimension and a national-supranational dimension
(cf. Chapters 1 and 2).
Several suggestions as to how to view administrative integration have been addressed in the
literature (cf. Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 1999: 75). In an abstract vein, March (1999b: 134)
conceives of administrative integration as gauged at measuring the “density, intensity and
character of the relations amongst the elements of different administrative systems”.
Moreover, “’integration’ signifies some measure of the density, intensity and character of the
relations among the constitutive elements of a system” (Olsen 2001: 4). Somewhat more
concrete, Scheinman (1966: 751) sees administrative integration as the “intermingling of
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national and international bureaucrats in various working groups and committees in the
policy-making context of the EEC” (cf. Cassese 1987; Pag 1987). Similarly, Majone (1996)
“refers to the idea of copinage technocratique to denote the interaction between Brussels
officials, experts from industry, and national civil servants” (quoted from Radaelli 1999a: 759
– original emphasis). Similarly, Rosenau (1969: 46) defines administrative integration as
penetrative processes whereby “members of one polity serve as participants in the political
process of another”. Common to all these conceptualizations is an emphasis on the mutual
relationships and cross-level participation between governance systems and the members of
these systems. As such, the above conceptions of administrative integration represent weak
definitions of this phenomenon, emphasising that different administrative systems actually
come into mutually contact of some sort.
Approaching a stronger conception of administrative integration, Barnett (1993: 276) asks,
“what happens when state actors are embedded in two different institutions … that call for
different roles and behaviour?” Similarly, Olsen (1998a: 2) asks, “what happens to
organized political units when they become part of a larger unit?” In a more assertive vein,
Eriksen and Fossum (2000: 16) argue that “integration, in the true meaning of the term,
depends on the alteration, not the aggregation of, preferences”. European integration in
general and administrative integration more particularly, thus denotes processes whereby
organizational dynamics and behavioural logics are transformed amongst European
institutions and decision-makers. While the above paragraph defines administrative
integration in a weak sense, Barnett and Olsen apply a stronger definition of this phenomenon
by emphasising how the systems are mutually affected by increased contact. Moreover, whilst
Olsen operates at the system level of analysis, Rosenau and Barnett apply the individual
government official as the unit of analysis (cf. also Shore 2000). Finally, parallel to Olsen
(1998a) and Eriksen and Fossum (2000), the current study views administrative integration as
having to do with the vertical relationships across levels of governance (cf. figure 1.1 in
Chapter 1).
This study applies both a weak and a strong definition of administrative integration. Weak
administrative integration covers actual contact patterns between administrative systems as
measured by the cross-level participation conducted by the individual members of these
systems. Cross-level participation denotes national civil servants participating on EU
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committees.  This pattern of integration is revealed empirically in the current Chapter. As seen
above, however, a stronger definition of administrative integration emphasises how such
cross-level participation affects the systems (mutually) and the individual members within
them. This concept of integration is traced in Chapters 5 and 6.
The individual is the unit of analysis in this study. Individual civil servants are those who
travel to Brussels in order to participate in meetings and groups. Obviously, several
government officials formally and actually do represent their ministry, agency or nation-state
when participating at these meetings (cf. Chapter 6; see also Egeberg 1999b; Schaefer et al
2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000). However, we analyse the representatives themselves, not
whom they represent as it is the individual officials who act and who ultimately foster
processes of administrative integration across levels of governance (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). The
third and fourth levels of governance become increasingly integrated through patterns of
participation cutting across these levels, thus contributing to (mutual) inter-penetration of
these levels (Rosenau 1969). Such patterns of cross-level participation are formally
institutionalized within the EU committees. Consistent with the arguments presented in
Chapter 2, EU committees can be seen as transformative meeting places for actors, problems,
solutions, identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct and are thus adequate arenas for
studying administrative integration (Haiback 2000; Lewis 2000; Schaefer 2000; Trondal
1999b; Van Schendelen and Pedler 1998). “In qualitative terms, committees provide the
foundation for ‘bureaucratic’ integration theories that emphasise the emergence of a European
bureaucratic elite or envisage the ‘fusion’ of national and European state bureaucracies”
(Gehring 1999: 195).
From the late 1960s onwards, a growing literature on administrative integration emerged in
the wake of accelerating processes of European integration. Studies of public administrations
discovered how domestic administrative systems became increasingly embedded within
international political orders. Consequently, the multi-level character of domestic
administrative systems attracted increased scholarly attention. Early scholarly contributions on
administrative integration revealed how the domestic-international distinction became blurred
due to the intermingling of national and international bureaucrats (Cassese 1987; Christensen
1981; Egeberg 1980; Feld and Wildgen 1975; Hopkins 1976; Kerr 1973; Mørch 1976; Pag
1987; Pendergast 1976; Scheinman 1966: 751; Scheinman and Feld 1972). Highlighting
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‘bureaucratic inter-penetration’ across levels of governance, this literature emphasised that the
“description of the Community as ‘above’, ‘alongside’ or ‘outside’ the member states were
useless oversimplifications” (Pag 1987: 446; Rosenau 1969; Scheinman 1966). The national
level and the Community level were described as mutually interwoven and intermixed in
fundamental ways (Demmke 1998: 15). This body of literature addressed to what extent
national government officials become regular participants at the EU level of governance
(Rosenau 1969). Only scarce attention was devoted to studying how such cross-level
participation affected the ‘inner selves’ of the participants as such, let alone their actual
decision-making behaviour (cf. Chapters 5 and 6) (see however Feld and Wildgen 1975; Kerr
1973; Pendergast 1976; Scheinman and Feld 1972). As such, the weak notion of
administrative integration underpinned these studies.
Despite this growing scholarly interest for administrative integration across levels of
governance, little light has been shed on the dual character of the European Union
bureaucracy, which consists partially of permanent officials and partially of officials who are
temporary participants in the committee system of the Union (Buitendikj and Van Schendelen
1995: 43; Cini 1996). “Research on committees and comitology has long been a neglected
issue in European integration studies” (Neyer 1998: 148). The 1990s has witnessed a
significant increase in the scholarly attention devoted towards EU committees, in particular,
and administrative integration, in general (Beyers 1998a and 1998b; Beyers and Dierickx
1997; Christiansen and Kirchner 2000; Egeberg 1999b; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; European
Parliament 1998: 5; Joerges and Vos 1999; Lewis 2000; Pedler and Schaefer 1996; Schaefer
2000; Schaefer et al. 2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000; Van Schendelen 1998; Vos 1999).
According to Coombes (1970: 243), “since about 1963 the Commission’s own work has
become dominated by … various intermediary committees of national representatives”.
Different measures have been applied to studying the extent to which bureaucratic integration
actually occurs through these committees. One such measure has been the number of EU
committees and agencies existing at the EU level (e.g. Institut für Europäische Politik 1987;
Kreher 1997; Pedler and Schaefer 1996). Other empirical proxies applied in the study of
administrative integration have been the number of travels to Brussels conducted by domestic
officials (Christensen 1981; Demmke 1998; Van Schendelen 1996), the number of domestic
government officials attending committees at the EU level (Hopkins 1976; Mørch 1976;
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Scheinman 1966), the number of days in session pursued by these committees (Wessels
1998), etc. The EU bureaucracy is made up of permanent Eurocrats together with “travelling
national civil servants” (Nedergaard 1995: 26). Indicative of the “factual enormity of the
committee phenomenon” (Weiler 1999: 340 – original emphasis), Van Schendelen (1996)
estimates that about 50 000 domestic officials are temporarily engaged in the administrative
work of the Union per year.2 Bach (1992: 24) estimates that national bureaucrats make 360
000 officials journeys to Brussels every year due to activities in the Union. Furthermore, the
Commission organized about 5 500 committee meetings in 1989 requiring approximately 64
000 person-days (Buitendijk and van Schendelen 1995). In the Council, Hayes-Renshaw and
Wallace (1997: 70) estimate that 3000 to 4000 officials from the national capitals attend
meetings every day and that approximately 2000 days are spent in committee meetings each
year (cf. Westlake 1995: 62).  The committee members within these EU committees are
regular participants who meet each other relatively frequently (Institut für Europäische Politik
1987). Moreover, several of these officials participate both in Commission expert committees
and in Council working parties (Schaefer 1996). Hence, “Brussels is truly an over-crowded
policy arena” (Wright 1996: 152).
Despite difficulties in estimating the exact number of EU committees (Falke 1996; Van der
Knaap 1996; Wessels 1998: 218-219), “for the 1990 budget year the Commission mentions
a total of 994 committees with financial authority to meet” (Buitendijk and Van Schendelen
1995: 40). Schaefer (2000: 11) assumes that “there are probably 700 to 800 [Commission
expert] committees”. However, despite the great number of committees existing at the EU
level, “a complete and reliable survey of the committee - and expert - or working group
system as well as an in-depth analysis of its performance in practise is still missing” (Institut
für Europäische Politic 1989: 14; cf. also Butt-Philip 1991; Cassese and Della Cananea 1991).
However, theoretically informed and empirically illuminating studies of how such cross-level
participation influence the participants themselves are generally lacking (e.g. Joerges and
Everson 2000). This study, in particular Chapters 4, 5 and 6, seeks to reduce this lack of
research.
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The parallel European administration: Past and contemporary studies
One way of classifying the EU committee system is to divide it into (i) preparatory expert
committees under the EU Commission, (ii) Council working parties, and (iii) comitology
committees (Schaefer 1996 and 2000). These committees deal with policy areas falling under
the first pillar of the Community. The comitology committees are excluded from this analysis
mostly due to methodological considerations (cf. endnote 3 in Chapter 2). The preparatory
Commission expert committees consist mainly of domestic government officials, in addition
to representatives from the relevant DG in the Commission (the chair of the committees).
Representatives from the industry, universities, and from interest organizations also frequently
attend these committees. The main function of these committees is to “assist the Commission
in drafting proposals for legislation in the Commission” (Schaefer 1996: 19). Domestic
government officials attending Commission expert committees are formally regarded by the
EU Commission as independent experts, not constrained by clear-cut mandates, obligations or
particular governmental loyalties. The Council working parties, on the other hand, consist
mainly of domestic government officials, representatives from the permanent representation in
Brussels, representatives from the Presidency (the chair of the working parties), and
representatives from the Commission. The main function of these committees is to “prepare
decisions of COREPER and the Ministers on the basis of Commission proposals” (Schaefer
1996: 19). Within these committees domestic government officials are expected to act like
national delegates with written and binding instructions, and with clear governmental
loyalties. Most Commission expert committees and Council working parties convene between
20 and 40 participants.
Past and contemporary literature on EU committees and working parties is mainly directed
towards studying the comitology system. This body of literature pays only secondary attention
to the Council working parties and the preparatory Commission expert committees. In the
following, a fourfold classification scheme of this literature is suggested. A major part of the
scholarly literature on EU committees is (i) oriented towards the historical development of the
committee system, with particular emphasis attached to internal reforms of this system
(Ballmann 1996; Bradley 1997; Bücker et al. 1996; Demmke et al. 1996; Egan and Wolf
1998; Haibach 2000b; Vos 1997); (ii) is formal-legalistic, focusing on legal typologies of
these bodies (Bertram 1967; Bücker et al. 1996; Dogan 1997; Haibach 1997; Hankin 1997;
Joerges 1997; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Schindler 1971; Vos 1999); (iii) emphasises the
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number of committees, the number and types of participants and meetings, the size of these
committees (Ballmann 1996; Cassese and Della Cananea 1991; EURO-CIDCE 1996; Falke
1996; Institut für Europäische Politik 1989; Lindberg 1963; Mørch 1976; Pag 1987; Schaefer
1996; Van der Knaap 1996; Vos 1999; Wessels 1990 and 1998); and finally, (iv) theory
oriented studies, trying to understand this phenomenon more broadly (Bücker et al. 1996;
Egan and Wolf 1998; Egeberg 2001; Eriksen 1998; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Lindberg 1963;
Neyer 1999b; Trondal 1999b; Wessels 1998). Amongst those scholarly contributions written
in the 1960s and 1970s - and to some extent in the 1980s - the legal and historical approaches
tend to dominate the analyses.
Recent scholarly contributions on EU committees are generally more theoretically oriented
but only very few studies are empirically rich (cf. also Chapter 7). Amongst the more recent
studies on EU committees that have an empirical orientation a few endeavour to measure and
assess the transformative dynamics fostered by this committee system (e.g. Van Schendelen
1998). Two pioneer empirical contributions were Scheinman and Feld (1972), and Feld and
Wildgen (1975). One basic insight gained from their research is that political attitudes and
orientations amongst domestic government officials become moulded when participating on
EU committees. On the other hand, Kerr (1973) and Pendergast (1976) observed the pivotal
role played by domestic institutions in moulding the attitudes and role perceptions of domestic
civil servants. Hence, these early empirical studies indicated that administrative integration
reflects the impact of both EU committees and domestic government institutions. Still, one
fundamental weakness exhibited by these contributions concerns the lack of distinction
between different types of EU committees. This has led to sweeping generalisations and
general assertions such as “the dichotomy of national governments and Community
institutions dissolves and is replaced by a dense system of interacting national and European
groups as well as sub-units of formal actors both from the member states and the Union”
(Ballmann 1996: 4).
In addition to these early empirical studies of EU committees, a study from The Institute für
Europäische Politik (1987) discloses the number of EU committees and the intensity of
networking that occurs within them. Possible effects from such cross-level participation with
respect to the participants’ identities, role conceptions and modes of acting, however, are
rarely analysed. A defining characteristic of this body of literature is the tendency to neglect
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the re-socializing potential of the EU committees. The majority of past literature on EU
committees has been concerned with measuring the actual volume of cross-level participation
as such.
Generally, the majority of those attending Commission expert committees and comitology
committees are private sector representatives (Institut für Europäische Politik 1987).
Government officials do not attend these committees to the same degree. Most of those
attending Council working parties, however, are government officials. Reporting on
government officials, Wessels (1990: 235) observes that “technical and ‘internal’ affairs
ministries are considerably involved in EU committees”. As shown below, this is more so in
the Commission expert committees than in the Council working parties. Still, contacts with
EU bodies, including committees, “is a normal, although not dominant, part of day-to-day
activities of national civil servants” (Wessels 1990: 235).
The next two sections of this Chapter analyses cross-level participation amongst domestic
government officials from the three Scandinavian countries. Cross-level participation signifies
that government officials have institutional affiliations at (at least) two levels of governance.
The first section considers various primary institutional affiliations embedding these officials
whilst the second section provides data on different secondary EU affiliations that embed
them. Together, these primary and secondary institutional affiliations are applied as
independent variables in Chapters 5 and 6. The following operational measures are proposed
as empirical proxies of these institutional affiliations:
Primary institutional affiliations:
- Whether officials are employed at the ministry level or at the agency level.
- Whether officials at the permanent representations to the EU are employed within the
diplomatic realm or within different sectoral realms.
- The formal rank positions of these officials.
- The seniority within current position, current institution, and in the domestic central





- Whether domestic officials attend Commission expert committees and/or Council working
parties.
- The proportion of time devoted to participate on these.
- For how many years have these officials attended EU committees?
- The number of committees attended.
- The number of committee meetings attended.
- The duration of committee meetings.
- Whether, or not, these officials give oral presentations during committee meetings.
- Are these officials routinely invited to attend these committees?
- Informal contacts with fellow committee members outside formal committee meetings.
Multiple institutional affiliations amongst Scandinavian civil servants
As regards the degree of cross-level participation between the EU system and the domestic
government apparatus, several variables might measure it. For example, Christensen (1981)
studied the travel patterns amongst Danish government officials going to Brussels and
Wessels (1990) studied the amount of participation in EU committees amongst German civil
servants. Other variables can be added to such a list: the frequency of participation on EU
committee meetings, the number of committees officials attend, the level of engagement and
involvement in formal negotiations within these committees, the frequency of informal
contacts prior to such meetings, the frequency of consultations after these meetings (by phone,
post, e-mail, fax, etc.), etc. Most of these variables are addressed in this Chapter.
The next two sections show how Norwegian, Danish and Swedish government officials are
involved in cross-level participation. The first section shows the primary institutional
affiliations embedding these officials. That is, whether they are employed at the ministry level
or at the agency level, their formal rank position in the domestic civil service, etc. The second
section focuses on their committee affiliations at the EU level. This section is divided into two
distinct parts. In one part different measures are applied to account for different committee
affiliations at the EU level. In the second part various operational measures are applied to
analyse the length and intensity of these affiliations.
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Primary institutional affiliations
Primary institutional affiliations are of a permanent nature and secondary institutional
affiliations are only temporary. Table 4.1 presents the ministry-agency affiliation embedding
domestic civil servants and the diplomatic-sectoral affiliation of officials at the permanent
representations to the EU.
Table 4.1 Percentage of domestic officials and permanent representatives attending EU
committees.
Institutional affiliations:                      domestic officials                 permanent representatives
Sector ministries……………. 28 --
Agencies……………………. 72 --
Diplomatic realms………….. -- 22





As seen from table 4.1, domestic agency personnel participate more frequently in EU
committees than do ministry personnel. Moreover, at the permanent representations officials
employed in different sectoral realms attend EU committees more frequently than do officials
in the diplomatic realm. The proportion of officials within Norwegian ministries and agencies
who are involved in EU related dossiers has increased considerably in the 1990s (Egeberg and
Trondal 1997a). From being an exclusive group of “Eurocrats” under the EEA negotiations
(Christensen 1996; Kux and Sverdrup 1997), almost 50 per cent of the officials are currently
engaged into EU related work in one way or another (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Trondal
1999a: 54-57). Similarly, the proportion of Swedish officials engaged in EU related work has
increased significantly in the 1990s, especially after 1995 (Larsen, Lægreid and Wik 1999: 57;
Statskontoret 1996:7 and 2000:20; Sundström 1999).
Processes of administrative integration are reflected in the organizational arrangements that
exist within national ministries and agencies. One general tendency is apparent regarding how
EU dossiers are organized into existing government institutions in different EU member
states. EU related dossiers are largely integrated into pre-existing sector departments and units
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at the ministry level and at the agency level. Only seldom are special co-ordinating units
constructed solely responsible for EU issues. It is striking, on the one hand, to observe the
establishment of separate, specialized EU co-ordination units within ministries and agencies
in relatively new member states and, on the other hand, to observe the withering away and the
dissolution of these units in ‘older’ member states (Bulmer and Burch 1999). So, EU dossiers
are organized into pre-existing institutional arrangements to a larger extent in old member
states than in new member states and in applicant states (e.g. Àgh 1999: 843). Similarly,
tendencies towards sectoral integration of EU dossiers at the domestic level are observed to a
greater extent in policy sectors having old traditions of handling EU affairs than in sectors
being relative new at the EU arena (Trondal 1999c; Statskontoret 1996:7: 68 and 2000:20A:
30-31).
In the Norwegian government apparatus EU dossiers tend to be organized into pre-established
divisions and units (integrated institutional solutions) (Larsen et al. 1999: 138). Specialized
institutional arrangements are chosen less frequently within the Norwegian ministries and
agencies. In comparing the institutional arrangements over time in Norwegian ministries, an
overall pattern of institutional stability is revealed, interrupted only by a marked increase in
the number of integrated solutions in the middle of the 1990s. This period is distinguished by
the presence and salience of ‘the EU question’ as to whether or not Norway should become a
full member of the EU (Narud and Strøm 2000). During the so-called ‘interim period’
approximately 16 per cent of all units or sections at the ministry level were characterised as
having EU dossiers added to pre-existing divisions or units (Trondal 1996). Similarly, the
present situation is characterised by integrated solutions. Integrated organizational solutions
also dominate the Danish and Swedish government apparatus at present (e.g. Sjölund 1994:
386; Statskontoret 2000:20A: 30-31).
Table 4.2 shows the percentage of officials in our sample with different rank positions in the
ministries, agencies and at the permanent representations to the EU.3
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Table 4.2 Distribution of officials’ ranks (%).
Ranks: domestic officials permanent representatives
Director general, deputy director
general…………………………….. 3 0
Head/deputy of unit/divisiona……... 25 25






a) e.g. assistant director general, principal officer.
b) e.g. advisor, executive officer, senior executive officer.
The observations in table 4.2 contradict Simon’s (1957: 294) general assertion that “as the
higher levels are approached in administrative organizations, the administrator’s “internal”
tasks … decrease in importance relative to his “external” tasks …”. The typical EU
committee participant is employed at the agency level and in middle or lower rank positions.
The same is true at the permanent representations the typical EU committee participant is
employed in lower rank positions. Hence, the number of external contacts towards EU
committees increase as one moves down the formal hierarchy within national governmental
institutions. Trondal (1998: 286) shows that this tendency is significant at the ministry level
and at the agency level within the Norwegian government apparatus (cf. Bulmer and Burch
1999: 21 and 29). The rank positions of the officials may be indicative of the highly technical
nature4 of most dossiers handled by most EU committees (Page 1997: 3). At the national level
of governance, technical issues of the kind dealt with by most EU committees are normally
delegated from the political level to the bureaucratic machinery. Hence, the observations
shown in table 4.2 may reflect institutionalized practises at the national governance level.
Moreover, officials attending ECs tend to be employed, to a larger extent, in positions
earmarked for specific professional groups than are officials attending WPs (Statskonsult
1999:6: 27-28). This follows from the technical nature of the work within ECs but can also be
due to the fact that agency officials educated in technical disciplines attend many ECs. To
summarize, EU committee participants are recruited amongst medium and bottom rank expert
officials employed in positions earmarked for specific professional groups.
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Table 4.3 displays the relative seniority of officials attending EU committees. The table
clearly shows that ministry and agency officials attending EU committees have a generally
high level of seniority at the domestic level of governance. The mean scores for the length of
service in current position is 7 years, in current institution 11 years, and in the central
administration as a whole 13 years. The overall mean score of 10 years is close to the average
length of service in the Norwegian ministries (11 years) (Christensen and Egeberg 1997: 97).
Hence, officials attending EU committees have generally served for quite a long time in the
domestic government apparatus before attending EU committees. However, this observation
does not counteract the observation made in the previous table. The rank variable correlates
significantly and positively only with the length of service in the central administration as a
whole (r = .19*). This correlation, however, is not very strong nor do the other two variables
presented in table 4.3 correlate significantly with the rank variable. Despite this, we may
expect these officials to be highly pre-socialized and “pre-packed” before entering EU
committees. From this follows a general resistance towards altering identity and role
perceptions and modes of acting amongst these officials (cf. Chapters 5 and 6).
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Table 4.3 Distribution of length of service (%).
Length of service: domestic officials permanent representatives
In current position:
0-3 years………………………….. 36 86
4-6 years………………………….. 16 12
7-9 years…………………………... 20 2
10-12 years………………………... 15 0
13-15 years………………………... 6 0
16 years, or longer………………… 7 0
Mean length of service (years)…….. 7 2
In current institution:
0-3 years………………….………. 15 78
4-6 years…………………………... 15 13
7-9 years…………………………... 20 5
10-12 years………………………... 19 0
13-15 years………………………... 12 3
16 years, or longer………………… 19 3
Mean length of service (years)…….. 11 3
In the central administration as a
whole:
0-3 years………………….……….. 8 7
4-6 years…………………………... 13 16
7-9 years…………………………... 20 21
10-12  years……………………….. 14 14
13-15 years………………………... 11 14
16 years, or longer………………… 34 28
Mean length of service (years).……. 13 12
Mean N……………………………. 161 50
Officials at the permanent representations have served for considerably shorter time periods in
current position and in current institutions than their domestic colleagues (cf. table 4.3). The
mean scores for length of service in current position is 2 years and in current institution 3
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years. They have served approximately the same number of years in the central administrative
apparatus as a whole (12 years) before having acquired a position at the permanent
representation, as have officials in domestic ministries and agencies (13 years). Officials at the
permanent representations may also be expected fairly pre-socialized and “pre-packed” before
entering EU committees. The general picture from table 4.3 indicates that recruitment to the
permanent missions is not a reward only to officials with long careers in the national
bureaucracy. Officials with fairly short careers in the central administrations are also given
positions at the permanent representations.
Consistent with table 4.3, table 4.4 shows that officials attending EU committees are generally
middle-aged:
Table 4.4 Distribution of ages (% and cumulative %).
       domestic officials         permanent representatives
Ages: % Cum. % % Cum. %
25-34 years….…….. 10 10 27 27
35-44 years….…….. 33 43 36 63
45-54 years….…….. 38 81 27 90
55-64 years….…….. 17 98 11 101
65 years, or more…. 2 100 0 101
N…………………..                     156                                                        45
                                                     (100)                                                    (100)
As seen from table 4.4, officials at the permanent representations are somewhat younger than
officials in the national ministries and agencies (cf. Statskonsult 1999:6: 26; Trondal 1998:
286). Moreover, age and seniority are themselves strongly inter-correlated.5 Thus, the officials
studied tend to have served for fairly long periods of time in the domestic government
apparatus (table 4.3) and to be middle-aged (table 4.4). Moreover, while officials in the
national ministries and agencies have served in the national civil service for longer periods of
time than their colleagues at the permanent representations (table 4.3), officials at the
permanent representations are somewhat younger than officials in the national ministries and
agencies (table 4.4).
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Adding to past socialization experiences, the educational background of the sampled officials
is assumed to affect the identities, roles and modes of action evoked by them. Table 4.5
provides an overview of the educational backgrounds represented in our samples.
Table 4.5 Distribution of professional backgrounds (%).
Professions: domestic officials permanent representatives
Law……………………. 14 49
Economy………………. 8 32
Social sciences…….…... 4 12





a) e.g. physics, biology, engineering, chemistry.
Within the domestic administrations, table 4.5 shows that committee participants are mostly
educated in technical disciplines. At the permanent representations, lawyers are represented
more extensively. What plausible reasons can be suggested for this difference? First, the high
proportion of experts at the national level might reflect the fact that most officials come from
the agency level (72 per cent) and are employed in medium and lower rank positions (72 per
cent). Professional expertise might be deemed vital for being appointed to an executive
position in the first place and for performing adequately as a participant in Commission expert
committees. At the permanent representations, officials are employed primarily in sectoral
realms (78 per cent) and in medium rank positions (75 per cent). From these figures it does
not follow that most of the permanent representatives are lawyers. Still, law might be
considered an adequate expertise needed to perform adequately as a permanent representative
and as a participant in Council working parties. Assuming that the EU system in general, and
the Council of Ministers in particular, is a regulatory system par excellence (Majone 1996),
one would expect lawyers to be recruited extensively to Council working parties. As seen in
table 4.6 (below), officials at the permanent representations are more frequent attendants at
the law-making machinery of the Council working parties.6 This pattern is reversed for
Commission expert committees (cf. table 4.6 below). The work is of more technical nature in
the Commission expert committees than in the Council working parties (cf. Chapters 5 and 6).
This might explain why the proportion of technical experts is larger amongst those attending
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EU committees from the domestic ministries and agencies than amongst the permanent
representatives. However, the domination of technical experts from national ministries and
agencies might also reflect the two issue areas covered in this study - the environment sector
and the field of occupational health and safety. These sectors require highly specialized skills
(Flynn 2000: 86-90; Vos 1999).
*   *   *
To sum up the observations so far, the committee participants from the ‘home
administrations’ are mostly employed at the agency level, in middle or lower rank positions,
and are trained in technical disciplines. As such, these officials are expected to evoke sectoral
role and identity perceptions, and modes of acting (cf. Chapter 5 and 6). Furthermore, these
officials are middle-aged, having served in the domestic government apparatus for relatively
long periods of time. Being highly “pre-packed” before travelling to Brussels for committee
meetings, one can assume that ministry and agency personnel only marginally enact
supranational allegiances (cf. Chapter 6). Officials at the permanent representations are mostly
employed in the sectoral realms of this institution, in medium or lower rank positions, and are
trained in law. These officials are likely to evoke a mixture of sectoral and inter-sectoral roles,
identities and modes of acting (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). Moreover, the permanent representatives
are also middle-aged officials, albeit somewhat younger than their colleagues in the domestic
administrative institutions. However, they have served for shorter periods of time in current
position and in current institution than their domestic counterparts. Still, permanent
representatives have served for relative long periods of time in the central administration as a
whole prior to entering the permanent representation. Most of them also return to the domestic
government apparatus after finishing their stay in Brussels. As such, one might expect both
types of officials to be reluctant to changing pre-established role and identity perceptions in
the direction of the supranational end of the national-supranational spectrum of figure 1.2 (cf.
Chapters 1 and 6).
However, the secondary institutional affiliations considered in the current study may increase
the likelihood for changes to occur in these variables and especially to increase the likelihood
that supranational role and identity perceptions are attended to by EU committee participants.
Administrative integration across levels of governance is arguably affected by (i) forms of
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affiliation towards different EU committees, and (ii) the length and intensity of participation
on these committees.
Secondary institutional affiliations
In this section, attention is first attached towards (i) the EU committees to which domestic
civil servants attend and then towards (ii) the intensity and length to which national officials
participate on these committees.
Participation on EU committees.
The officials were asked to report whether or not they have attended ECs and/or WPs recently,
or in the past. The following table presents the proportion of officials in our sample that has
attended EU committees.
Table 4.6 Percentage of officials who have attended EU committees.
domestic officials permanent representatives
Commission expert committees… 97 68
Council working parties..……….. 44 92
Mean N………….………. 161 50
Table 4.6 shows an inverse relationship between the percentage of officials from the ‘home
administration’ and officials at the permanent representations. Officials within the ‘domestic
administration’ participate more on ECs and officials at the permanent representations attend
WPs more often. This may, however, partly reflect the fact that Norwegian officials solely
attend ECs (cf. table 4.7 below). The difference between domestic officials and permanent
representatives may also explain why committee participants in the domestic administrations
are mainly trained in technical disciplines whilst officials at the permanent representations are
mainly educated in law (cf. table 4.5).
Distributed by country, the following table compares Norwegian, Swedish and Danish
government officials’ participation on ECs and WPs.
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Table 4.7 Percentage of officials that have attended ECs and WPs, by country.
                                        domestic officials                               permanent representatives
Norway Sweden Denmark Norway Sweden Denmark
ECs……... 100 97 93 88 68 58
WPs…….. 0 47 82 63 100 95
Mean N…. 44 72 44 8 22 19
As shown in table 4.7, with the exception of officials at the permanent representation,
Norwegian officials attend solely ECs. The fact that some Norwegian permanent
representatives have attended WPs may reflect the fact that they attended WPs during the so-
called ‘interim period’ of 1994 (Trondal 1996). During this period Norway was negotiating
for full EU membership status and the government officials were allowed to attend EU
committees, including WPs, albeit without formal voting rights. Table 4.7 also reveals that
Swedish and Danish domestic administration officials attend ECs relatively more frequently
than do their colleagues at the permanent representations. Consistent with the general pattern
shown in table 4.6, WP participants are mostly recruited amongst permanent representatives.
Table 4.8 reveals the amount of time officials devotes to participation on Commission expert
committees and Council working parties. Increased time of involvement in EU committees is
assumed to increase the exposure to new information from these committees, thus fostering
changes in the roles, identities and modes of acting amongst the participants.
Table 4.8 Percentage of officials devoting a large proportion of timea participating on
EU committees during the last year.
domestic officials permanent representatives
Participation on ECs……….…… 34 27
Participation on WPs…………… 31 93
Mean N…………………………. 139 34
a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: very much (1), fairly much (2), both/and (3),
fairly little (4), very little (5).
As seen from the above table permanent representatives tend to devote more time to
participation on EU committees than their colleagues do from the capitals. Moreover, officials
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from the domestic administrations have an equal distribution of time devoted to attending ECs
and WPs. Officials at the permanent representations, however, use considerably more time
within WPs than within ECs. Moreover, going beyond table 4.8, 31 per cent of the Swedish
and the Norwegian officials who are employed in the domestic administrations report that they
devote a large proportion of time to EC participation. (This value scale corresponds to the
dichotomised five-point scale of table 4.8.) 41 per cent of the Danish officials report devoting
the same amount of time to ECs. Finally, comparing Swedish and Danish officials attending
WPs, 33 per cent of the Swedish officials and 38 per cent of the Danish civil servants report
that they devote a large proportion of time to participating on WPs. Thus, Danish officials
seem to devote more time to participating on EU committees than the Swedish officials.
Norwegian civil servants take third place by attending solely ECs.
In Chapter 2 we suggested that officials at the agency level attend ECs more frequently than
officials at the ministry level, reflecting the highly sectoralized and technical character of
these committees. The following table confirms this proposition. However, some significant
deviations from the patterns are also seen.
Table 4.9 Percentage of officials from different institutional realms who attended
Commission expert committees and Council working parties during the last year.
                                            domestic officials                             permanent representatives
Sector ministries Agencies Sectoral realms
The diplomatic
realms
ECs………….... 80 80 57 10
WPs…………... 43 24 71 40
Mean N……….. 44 115 35 10
According to table 4.9, EC participants are recruited from both ministry personnel and agency
personnel (cf. Jacobsson and Sundström 1999a: 13 and 1999b; Larsen, Lægreid and Wik
1999: 68; SOU 1996:60: 36; Statskonsult 1999:6: 24; Statskontoret 1996:7: 133; Trondal
1999b and 1998). In absolute numbers, however, agency officials attend ECs more extensively
than ministry personnel. WP participants are mostly recruited from ministry personnel (cf.
SOU 1996:6: 35). Similarly, at the permanent representations, most EC participants are
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employed in sectoral realms. Moreover, WP participants are most frequently recruited from
officials employed in the sectoral realms of the permanent representations. Most of the
officials at the diplomatic realm attend Council working parties. Hence, EC and WP
participants at the permanent representations are recruited from different institutional realms.
However, similar to table 4.8, permanent representatives participate mostly on Council
working parties while officials from domestic ministries and agencies mostly attend
Commission expert committees.
The relatively high proportion of officials from domestic ministries and agencies attending
ECs compared to attending WPs might reflect the fact that Norwegian officials solely attend
ECs. The following table makes an analysis similar to table 4.9 but distributed by country.
The permanent representatives are excluded from this table due to the fact that Norwegian
permanent representatives seldom join EU committees and due to low sample size.
Table 4.10 Percentage of officials from national sector ministries and agencies having
attended Commission expert committees and Council working parties during the last
year, by country.
                                        sector ministries                                             agencies
Norway Sweden Denmark Norway Sweden Denmark
ECs……... 92 67 85 90 78 74
WPs…….. 0 72 46 0 22 52
Mean N…. 13 18 13 30 54 31
Table 4.10 reveals that officials from different countries attend different EU committees. As
expected, most of the Norwegian officials in the sample have attended ECs during the last
year. However, amongst the Swedish civil servants, ministry officials have attended more
WPs than ECs and most of the Swedish agency officials have attended ECs. Danish civil
servants, however, have attended more ECs than WPs during the last year. One caveat is
warranted. The sample size underpinning table 4.10 is fairly low in each column so
conclusions should be drawn with caution. The value added by analysing table 4.10 compared
to solely analysing table 4.9 has to do with revealing cross-country differences with respect to
the intensity to which national officials participate on various EU committees.
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Finally, table 4.11 investigates the extent to which particular educational backgrounds are
systematically related to the propensity to attend certain EU committees.
Table 4.11 Percentage of officials with different educational backgrounds attending
Commission expert committees and Council working parties.
                                                            domestic officials                  permanent representatives
ECs WPs ECs WPs
Law……………………….. 13 24 50 50
Economy………………….. 6 7 27 32
Social sciences……………. 4 2 15 11









Most significantly, table 4.11 shows that national ministry and agency officials attending EU
committees are mostly technical experts, regardless of the type of EU committees they attend.
Similarly, officials at the permanent representation attending EU committees are mostly
lawyers, regardless of the type of EU committees attended. As such, contrary to our
expectations outlined in Chapter 2, the figures presented in table 4.11 display no significant
correlation between educational background and recruitment to particular EU committees.
When compared to table 4.9, it seems that the ministry-agency variable is more significant in
explaining the propensity for officials to attend either ECs or WPs than the educational
variable. However, domestic officials who are technical experts are represented to a larger
extent within ECs than within WPs. Moreover, domestic officials trained as lawyers attend
WPs to a greater extent than ECs. These observations support the propositions suggested in
Chapter 2. Amongst permanent representatives no significant co-variation is found between
educational background and the type of EU committees attended. Hence, table 4.11 provided
mixed support to the propositions suggested in Chapter 2.
*   *   *
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To sum up the observations made so far, one overall picture can be identified. The typical EC
participant is employed both at the agency level and at the ministry level, has a position which
is earmarked for particular professional groups, and is employed in a middle or lower rank
position. EC participants are mostly educated in technical disciplines. WP participants, on the
other hand, are typically employed at the permanent representation to the EU, in different
sectoral realms, in medium or lower rank positions, and are educated in law. However, a large
proportion of WP participants is also recruited from national ministries and agencies. The role
perceptions and patterns of co-ordination behaviour evoked by officials attending EU
committees may be expected to reflect various national institutional affiliations. The ministry-
agency variable might be particularly useful in accounting for the sectoral-territorial
dimension of administrative integration (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). In order to account for the
national-supranational dimension of administrative integration the final section of this Chapter
considers the length and intensity to which national officials attend EU committees.
Length and intensity of cross-level participation.
The co-ordination behaviour, as well as the role and identity perceptions, evoked by national
civil servants are likely to stem partly from the kind of institutional links existing across levels
of governance and partly by the intensity and length of such linkages. “The frequency of
communication among individuals is a key variable to students of socialization” (Pendergast
1976: 674). Table 4.12 gives an overview of central contact patterns with different EU
institutions chosen by the EC participants and WP participants covered in our sample.
As seen from table 4.12 (cf. beneath), contacts outside their ‘own’ EU committee is
significantly affected by the primary institutional affiliations embedding these civil servants.
Officials at the ‘home administrations’ tend to have fewer contacts with other EU institutions
compared to officials at the permanent representations. Officials in the ‘home administration’
tend to have contacts with DGs working within their ‘own’ policy sector – that is, with the
DG for Employment and Social Affairs on health and safety issues, and with the Environment
DG on environmental issues. One official claimed that “I take care of interests in the
Commission daily” (Source: Danish agency official – author’s translation). Officials at the
permanent representations have more frequent contacts with DGs working in other policy
fields7 and with COREPER I and II. Contacts with the COREPER imply contacts with ‘own’
ambassador or deputy ambassador or with ambassadors or deputy ambassadors from other EU
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member states. Still, as regards differences between those attending ECs and those attending
WPs, EC participants at the permanent representations have considerably fewer contacts with
other DGs and with the COREPER compared to permanent representatives attending WPs.
Moreover, officials attending WPs have contacts with MEPs more frequently than have EC
participants. Hence, table 4.12 indicates that domestic government officials attending ECs
tend to have more intra-sectoral contacts with various EU level institutions while permanent
representatives attending WPs tend to have more inter-sectoral contacts with EU institutions.
Table 4.12 Percentage of officials attending ECs and WPs who had the following
contacts during the last year.a
                                                                                                                          permanent
                                                                         domestic officials                  representatives
ECs WPs ECs WPs
Contacts with DGs working within my
own policy sectorb…………………… 22 33 -- --
Contacts with other DGs…………….. 9 13 29 63
Contacts with participants at
COREPER I and IIc……………….…. 2 12 22 83
Contacts with MEPs……………….. 0 2 0 18
Contacts with officials at the
European Court of Justice…………… 0 0 0 0
Mean N………………………………. 143 59 19 40
a) The variables presented in this table involve officials who had these contacts fairly often, or very often. This
dichotomy builds on the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly
seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
b) Within the environment sector this involves contacts with the Environment Directorate General, while
within the occupational health and safety sector this involves contacts with the Employment and Social
Affairs Directorate General. This involves contacts with the chairperson of the relevant committee.
However, because only 22 per cent of the EC participants and 33 per cent of the WP participants have
contacts with their ‘own’ sector DG, these contacts are most likely to be with persons other than the
chairperson.
c) Contacts with the COREPER imply contacts with ‘own’ ambassador or deputy ambassador or with
ambassadors or deputy ambassadors from other EU member-states.
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The committee participants were asked to indicate the year in which they made their first
appearance in the EU committees. Since Norway and Sweden became formally affiliated to
the EU in 1994 (through the EEA agreement) and Denmark having been EU member since
1973, the data set has been divided into two separate parts. One part considers officials who
have participated in EU committees since before 1994, the other part comprises officials who
entered EU committees for the first time after 1994. Based upon this distinction, table 4.13
reveals differences between the majority of Danish officials and Norwegian and Swedish
officials.
Table 4.13 Distribution of first year of attendance (%).
                                                            domestic officials                   permanent representatives
ECs WPs ECs WPs
Between 1994 and 1998……. 61 48 52 64









Table 4.13 reveals that most of the officials attended EU committees for the first time after
1994. Moreover, because most of the EU committees have existed for fairly long periods of
time, often more than 10 years (Institut für Europäische Politik 1987: 5), a moderate
proportion of the officials also have participated for several years, that is, before 1994.
Officials attending ECs or WPs report that the same officials usually meet several times in
different committee meetings (Source: interview). Thus, “changes in the composition of
these committees occur relatively infrequent” (Institut für Europäische Politik 1987: 6). The
officials were presented with the following question: “Do the same officials normally attend
meetings”? 89 per cent of the EC participants and 83 per cent of the WP participants from the
‘home administration’ responded “fairly often” of “very often” on this question. The
corresponding responses from permanent representatives were 83 per cent from the EC
participants and 95 per cent from the WP participants. These observations are confirmed in
our interviews, which show that the same officials frequently attend several meetings, both
within ECs and WPs. No major differences were observed between Norwegian, Swedish and
Danish officials in this respect in either the interview data or the survey data. As discussed in
129
Chapter 6, regular meetings and interaction amongst the same people can allow an ‘esprit de
corps’ to emerge in the EU committees.
Next, tables 4.14 and 4.15 give an overview of the number of committees to which these
officials have attended.
Table 4.14 Percentage of officials participating on EU committees.
                                                      domestic officials                       permanent representatives
Number of officials: ECs WPs ECs WPs
0 committees………… 2 2 21 13
1-4 committees………. 86 86 34 40
5-9 committees………. 9 8 31 25
10-19 committees……. 3 2 3 13
20-49 committees……. 1 3 3 8
50-99 committees……. 0 0 3 0
100-199 committees…. 0 0 0 0
200-299 committees…. 0 0 0 0
300-399 committees…. 0 0 3 0
400-499 committees…. 0 0 0 3










Table 4.15 Percentage of officials participating on EU committees, by country.
A) Commission expert committees
                                                  domestic officials                          permanent representatives
Norway Sweden Denmark Norway Sweden Denmark
0 committees………. 0 3 0 67 15 0
1-4 committees…….. 93 84 81 0 54 30
5-9 committees…….. 5 11 11 17 31 40
10-19 committees….. 2 2 5 0 0 10
20-49 committees….. 0 2 3 17 0 0
50-99 committees….. 0 0 0 0 0 10













B) Council working parties:
                                                          domestic officials                       permanent representatives
Sweden Denmark Sweden Denmark
0 committees……………. 3 0 5 0
1-4 committees………….. 85 88 45 44
5-9 committees………….. 9 6 20 38
10-19 committees……….. 0 3 25 0
20-49 committees……….. 3 3 5 13
50-99 committees……….. 0 0 0 0









Table 4.14 reveals that most of the officials have attended between 1 and 9 EU committees.
On average, EC participants and WP participants coming from national ministries and
agencies attend 3 committees. One reason why officials attend both ECs and WPs may be
because they often follow EU directives from the Commission phase to the Council phase.
Comparing these figures with observations made in table 4.6, we see that officials in domestic
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ministries and agencies attend ECs more frequently than WPs (97 per cent and 44 per cent,
respectively). However, these officials attend the same number of ECs and WPs (table 4.14).
These figures thus reflect the fact that national officials attend ECs more extensively than
WPs. However, the intensity of participation on these committees is equally distributed
amongst the EC participants and the WP participants. On the other hand, officials at the
permanent representations participate mainly on WPs (92 per cent) (cf. also table 4.6). Still,
these officials tend to participate on an equal number of ECs and WPs. They mostly attend
between 1 and 9 committees – both the ECs and the WPs. Moreover, some officials at the
permanent representations have not attended any committees at all.
Table 4.14 shows that the majority of the permanent representatives have participated on more
EU committees than have the ministry and agency personnel. The mean score amongst
permanent representatives attending ECs and WPs is 17 committees. Hence, the mean score
amongst permanent representatives is considerably higher than the corresponding mean score
amongst the officials coming from the capitals (3 committees). These figures correspond to
the data presented in table 4.8, which show that officials at the permanent representations
generally devote more time and energy to participating on EU committees. These figures
reveal that the permanent missions to the EU are located at the intersection of the nation-state
and the EU system of governance.
Table 4.15 (A) and (B) shows that most Norwegian, Danish and Swedish domestic officials
have participated between 1 and 4 committees. At the permanent representations, however,
the difference between Norway and the two EU member states crystallises. While 67 per cent
of the Norwegian permanent representatives have never attended ECs, most of the Swedish
and Danish permanent representatives have attended between 1 to 9 ECs. More generally table
4.15 reveals that Norwegian domestic officials participate on ECs to the same extent as their
Swedish and Danish colleagues. Swedish and Danish officials, however, have participated on
more WPs than have their Norwegian counterparts.8
The above tables have accounted for the total number of committees to which the officials
have attended across time. Tables 4.16 and 4.17 focus on more recent participation within EU
committees: during the last year, and during the last month.
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Table 4.16 Percentage of officials who attended EU committee meetings during the last
year and the last month.
A) Domestic officials:
                 Last year                    Last month
ECs WPs ECs WPs
No participation…... 9 20 76 62
1-9 meetings……… 85 56 24 38
10-19 meetings…… 5 19 0 0
20-29 meetings…… 0 2 0 0
30-39 meetings…… 0 2 0 0
40-49 meetings…… 0 0 0 0
50 meetings or
more………….…… 1 2 0 0










                 Last year                    Last month
ECs WPs ECs WPs
No participation…... 0 0 30 0
1-9 meetings……… 52 2 70 66
10-19 meetings…… 33 0 0 16
20-29 meetings…… 0 6 0 16
30-39 meetings…… 5 16 0 3
40-49 meetings…… 0 10 0 0
50 meetings or
more………….…… 10 65 0 0










Table 4.17 Percentage of officials in the domestic administrations who attended EU
committee meetings during the last year, by country.a
                       ECs                        WPs
Norway Sweden Denmark Sweden Denmark
No participation 7 10 11 17 24
1-9 meetings…. 93 83 79 50 62
10-19 meetings. 0 7 10 23 14
20-29 meetings. 0 0 0 3 0
30-39 meetings. 0 0 0 3 0
40-49 meetings. 0 0 0 3 0
50 meetings or











a) This table does not involve officials at the permanent representations to the EU. Neither does it involve
official’s monthly participation on EU committees. This owes to the general low N within these two
distributions.
As seen from table 4.16, most EC and WP participants from the capitals seem to attend
between 1 and 9 meetings per year. On average, EC participants have attended 4 meetings last
year, whilst WP participants have attended 6 meetings. However, most EC participants and
WP participants from the ‘domestic administrations’ have not attended meetings during the
last month. The mean score amongst EC participants last month is 0 meetings, whilst the
corresponding mean score for WP participants is 1 meeting. At the permanent representations,
however, most officials seem fairly active during the last year and during the last month. The
mean score amongst EC participants at the permanent representation is 13 meetings for the
last year. The corresponding mean amongst the WP participants is 82 meetings; these
participants at the permanent representations seem particularly active in attending EU
committees. Moreover, officials at the permanent representations also seem somewhat more
active during the last month compared to the officials from the national level. The mean score
amongst EC participants is 2 meetings last month and the corresponding mean score for WP
participants is 10 meetings. These figures also confirm that permanent representatives are
more active with the Council working parties than with the Commission expert committees.
134
When comparing the overall degree of cross-level participation amongst ‘domestic
representatives’ and ‘permanent representatives’, the latter are more active with the former.
This observation is consistent with the observations presented in tables 4.8, 4.14 and 4.20.
Finally, in table 4.17, no major differences can be observed between the Scandinavian
countries as regards the sheer number of EC meetings attended during the last year. The more
general pattern shown in table 4.16 is that permanent representatives attend EU committees
more intensively than do the domestic officials capitals.
Next, how many days in session do these committee participants normally have?
Table 4.18 Percentage of meetings of given duration.
                                              domestic officials                          permanent representatives
ECs WPs ECs WPs
1 day………….. 64 73 100 89
1-2 days………. 27 24 0 6









As seen from table 4.18 domestic officials have generally more days in session than have
officials at the permanent representations. The physical proximity between the committee
meeting rooms and the permanent representation buildings may partly explain this. Moreover,
Norwegian officials seem to attend 1-2 days sessions to a larger extent than do Danish and
Swedish officials (46 per cent, 23 per cent and 18 per cent, respectively). Norwegian officials
thus seem to devote the same amount of time and energy in attending Commission expert
committees as do Swedish and Danish civil servants.
Tables 4.19a and 4.19b report results on the questions: “do EU committee participants give
oral presentations during committee meetings, and are they routinely invited to attend
committee meetings?”
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Table 4.19a Percentage of officials giving a positive answera to the following questions.
                                                              domestic officials                permanent representatives
ECs WPs ECs WPs
“Do you give oral presentations
during committee meetings?”.… 48 55 41 92
“Are you asked routinely to
attend committee meetings?”…. 90 87 79 93
Mean N………………….. 149 61 37 50
a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3),
fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
Table 4.19b Percentage of officials within domestic government institutions routinely
invited to attend EU committees, by country.a
Norway Sweden Denmark
ECs…………………….. 81 92 95
WPs………………….… 0 89 84
Mean N………………... 43 47 36
a) The variables presented in this table regard officials being asked fairly often, or very often to attend these
committees. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2),
both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
As shown in table 4.19a, participants within ECs and WPs are routinely invited to attend
meetings. No major differences are observed between Norwegian officials and officials from
Sweden and Denmark with regard to the extent to which they are routinely invited to attend
EC meetings (table 4.19b). Parallel to this observation, most of the Danish and Swedish
officials are also routinely invited to attend WPs. Hence, only a very small proportion of the
committee participants has been subject to self-selection.
Which institutions normally invite officials to attend EU committee meetings? As seen from
our data (even though they are not presented above), officials at the permanent representations
tend to be invited by the Commission and the Council of Ministers to attend ECs and WPs,
respectively. Amongst domestic representatives, EC participants are mostly invited directly by
the Commission (87 per cent) whilst WP participants are mostly invited by one’s own
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government institution at the domestic level (57 per cent). When comparing the three
Scandinavian countries, no major differences emerge regarding the procedures used to select
committee participants. These figures support the intergovernmental nature of the Council
working parties as well as the relative transcendence of intergovernmentalism within the
Commission expert committees (cf. also Chapters 5 and 6).
Regarding the extent to which officials give oral presentations during the committee meetings,
table 4.19a reveals that 50 per cent of the officials give oral presentations fairly often during
EC and WP meetings. Only 27 per cent of the Norwegian domestic officials attending EC
committees give oral presentations fairly often or more frequently. Consistent with these
figures, one Norwegian EC participant reported that, “we sit somewhat on the side-line in the
EU system. We are not treated as full members of the committee” (Source: interview -
author’s translation). The corresponding figures amongst Swedish and Danish officials are 61
per cent and 51 per cent, respectively. Similarly, 41 per cent of the Swedish and Danish
permanent representatives give oral presentations during meetings in ECs and most of these
officials give oral presentations during WP meetings (92 per cent). Assessing the degree of
intensity of involvement in the EU committees, oral presentations appear to be a vital variable
this respect. On this measure, Norwegian officials seem less intensively engaged in the daily
work of the EU committees than their Swedish and Danish counterparts. The figures
presented below also support the observation that Norwegian officials are less intensively
engaged in the day-to-day activities of the EU committees (cf. table 4.21).
Table 4.20 is concerned with the informal contacts made outside formal EU committee
meetings.
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Table 4.20 Percentage of officials who have the following informal contacts with other
committee participants outside formal committee meetings.a
                                                                                                                             permanent
                                                                                domestic officials              representations
ECs WPs ECs WPs
Contacts with other committee participants:
            - before formal meetings………….. 37 35 48 85
            - after formal meetings…….………. 28 25 46 85
Mean N…………………………………….. 141 57 23 40
a) The variables presented in this table involve officials conducting informal contacts outside formal
committee meetings fairly often, or very often. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale:
Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
Table 4.20 shows that informal contacts outside the committee meetings are more frequent
amongst permanent representatives than amongst domestic representatives. Moreover, such
contacts are distributed equally between the “before” and “after” formal committee meetings
for both the EC and WP participants. Thus, permanent representatives are involved in the
informal EU committee networks more extensively than domestic officials. This may partially
be explained by the fact that permanent representatives devote more time to participating in
EU committees, as shown in table 4.8, compared to officials from the domestic ministries and
agencies. Permanent representatives also attend both more EU committees and formal
meetings than their national colleagues (cf. table 4.14 and 4.16). This helps to explain why
permanent representatives have more informal contact with fellow committee participants
outside the meeting rooms (table 4.20). However, committee participants coming from the
domestic administrations have slightly more frequent informal contacts before formal
committee meetings than after such meetings. As such, ex ante contacts are deemed more vital
for these officials than ex post consultations.
When asked what kind of informal contacts were conducted by Norwegian, Swedish and
Danish civil servants, the following distribution results:
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Table 4.21 Percentage of officials within domestic government institutions who have the
following contact patterns outside formal EU committee meetings, by country.a, b
Contact patterns: Norway Sweden Denmark
Face-to-face contacts………. 11 32 39
Telephone, e-mail, fax……... 33 51 43
Mean N…………………….. 39 69 38
a) The two variables presented in this table regard officials who have these contacts fairly often, or very often.
This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly
seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
b) No officials from the permanent representations answered this question. Moreover, this question did not
differentiate between EC participants and WP participants.
As seen from table 4.21, Norwegian officials have considerably fewer face-to-face contacts
outside formal committee meetings than their Swedish and Danish counterparts. Also,
contacts by phone, e-mail and fax amongst the committee members are less frequently used by
Norwegian officials than by Swedish and Danish officials. “We often have contacts between
the meetings – rather informal and personal contacts” (Source: interview: Swedish official –
author’s translation). This indicates that the Norwegian officials have fewer informal contacts
outside formal committee meetings than Swedish and Danish officials. This observation is
supported empirically by Larsen, Lægreid and Wik (1999: 72), and underscores the
observations above (cf. table 4.15).
*         *         *
One final question considers whether the different variables presented in this Chapter are
strongly inter-correlated or not. Within the field of political behaviour, a number of studies
have shown that different measures of intensity and length of participation are closely related.
Scoring high on one dimension increases the likelihood of scoring high on other dimensions.
Endnote 9 presents the inter-correlations that are significant at 95 % and 99 % levels.9 Table
4.22A shows that different measures of intensity and length of participation tend to be
statistically significantly correlated. Most significantly, national ministry and agency officials
that participate intensively on ECs also tend to participate intensively on WPs. Having
participated within EU committees for long periods of time increases the likelihood for
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intensive participation, especially with regard to informal contacts. Thus, officials
participating on many formal committee meetings also tend to participate informally at the EU
level (cf. Lægreid 1999). Informal contacts seem to develop during formal meetings within
ECs and WPs.
As seen from the permanent representatives’ point of view, some of the same tendencies
observed amongst the domestic officials are revealed in table 4.22B in Endnote 9. Similar to
the domestic officials, the overall picture presented by the permanent representatives is that
different measures of intensity and length of participation on EU committees tend to go
together. Intensive participation on ECs is shown to correlate with intensive participation on
WPs. Likewise, informal participation on these EU committees is seen to correlate positively
with formal participation within the same committees. Generally, permanent representatives
attend many EU committees (table 4.14), devote much time and energy towards attending
these committees (table 4.8), attend many formal committee meetings (table 4.16), and have
many informal contacts with other committee participants outside the committee rooms (table
4.20).
Finally, the tables presented above have utilized different empirical indicators for length and
intensity of cross-level participation. One rationale behind applying different operational
measures of the same theoretical variables is to detect particular empirical patterns (cf.
Chapter 3). Empirically, many of the variables measuring length and intensity of cross-level
participation are shown to have significant inter-correlations. More specifically, length of
cross-level participation is significantly associated with intensive participation.
Conclusion
To summarise the observations, two overall empirical patterns may be identified: One relates
to the EC - WP distinction and the other to the ‘home administration’ – permanent
representation axis. Considering the first dimension, the typical EC participant is employed at
the agency level as well as at the ministry level, has a position that is earmarked for particular
professional groups, and is employed in a middle- or lower-rank position. Moreover, the EC
participants studied here are mostly educated in technical disciplines, like physics,
engineering, etc. WP participants, on the other hand, are typically employed at the permanent
representation to the EU, in different sectoral realms, have medium or lower rank positions
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and have a legal education. However, a large proportion of the WP participants is also
recruited from national ministries and agencies. Due to the differences between EC and WP
participants we may expect differences with respect to the evoked role and identity
perceptions, and the modes of acting chosen by the EC participants compared to the WP
participants (cf. Chapters 5 and 6).
As far as the differences between officials from the ‘home administration’ and officials at the
permanent representations are concerned, committee participants from the ‘home
administrations’ are mostly employed at the agency level, in medium or lower rank positions,
and are trained in technical disciplines. As such, these officials are likely to evoke sectoral
role and identity perceptions, and modes of acting (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). These officials are
also middle-aged and have served in the domestic government apparatus for relatively long
periods of time. Officials at the permanent representations, on the other hand, are mostly
employed in sectoral realms, in medium or lower rank positions, and are trained in law. These
officials are likely to evoke a mixture of sectoral and inter-sectoral roles, identities and modes
of acting (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). These officials are also middle-aged, albeit being somewhat
younger than their colleagues in the capitals. They have served for shorter periods of time in
current position and in current institution than their domestic counterparts. They have,
however, served for relatively long periods of time in the central administration as a whole
before entering the permanent representations. Most of them also return to the domestic
government apparatus after finishing their stay in Brussels. Consequently, one might expect
officials at both the permanent representations and in the domestic administrations to be fairly
reluctant and hesitant to change their pre-existing role and identity perceptions towards the
supranational end of the national-supranational spectrum. Therefore, supranational roles and
allegiances are likely to be evoked only marginally. Permanent representatives, however,
generally participate more intensively on the EU committees than their domestic colleagues.
This observation makes it more likely that supranational role and identity perceptions are
evoked amongst permanent representatives than amongst ‘domestic representatives’ (cf.
Chapter 6).
The most significant difference observed between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish officials
relates to which type of EU committees they attend. Whereas Danish and Swedish
government officials participate on both ECs and WPs, their Norwegian counterparts have
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access only to the ECs. This difference is reflected markedly in the data presented in this
Chapter. This difference has also led to major differences between officials at the permanent
representations of Norway and officials at the Danish and Swedish permanent representations
in terms of cross-level participation. The Norwegian permanent representatives fairly seldom
attend EU committees, their Swedish and Danish counterparts are more heavily engaged in
both ECs and WPs, albeit mostly in the latter. As seen from the ‘domestic administrations’
point of view, however, no major differences are observed between the three countries as
regards the intensity to which officials attend ECs. Norwegian officials attend ECs to
approximately the same extent as their Danish and Swedish colleagues. Still, Danish and
Swedish officials have additional access to the WPs, and Danish officials have, on average,
participated on EU committees for longer periods of time than have their Norwegian and
Swedish counterparts. Danish and Swedish EU committee participants tend to have more
intensive informal contacts outside the formal committee meetings than the Norwegian
committee participants. Also, the Norwegian participants talk less during EU committee
meetings than their Danish and Swedish counterparts. We expect that, supranational role and
identity perceptions are likely to be evoked more markedly amongst the Danish and Swedish
officials than amongst their Norwegian colleagues.
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Notes
                                                
1
 This section, and the following section, builds from Trondal 1999b.
2
 A corresponding total of 25 561 officials have permanent positions within the different Union bodies. Of this
total, 17 946 officials are employed by the Commission (70 per cent), while 2 225 officials work permanently
within the Council structure (9 per cent) (Fligstein and McNichol 1998: 73).
3
 The occupational titles presented in table 4.2 correspond to an official document published by the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1999b).
4
 This does not, however, imply that technical issues may not be politically salient. For example, the cumulative
effect of incremental technical decisions may have large political implications.
5
 Within the domestic level institutions: Pearson’s r between age and seniority in current position is r = .46**;
Pearson’s r between age and seniority in current institution is r = .62**; and Pearson’s r between age and
seniority in the central administration as a whole is r = .67**. Seniority in current position, in current institution
and in the central administration as a whole are themselves significantly inter-correlated. At the permanent
representation Pearson’s r between age and seniority in current position is r = .61**; Pearson’s r between age and
seniority in current institution is r = .23; and Pearson’s r between age and seniority in the central administration
as a whole is r = .63**. Also, at the permanent representations these three seniority variables are significantly
intercorrelated, except for the relationship between seniority in current position and seniority in the central
administration as a whole.
6
 The Commission and the Commission expert committees also “make laws”, however at an earlier stage in the
decision-making process. Furthermore, the Council has delegated law-making authority to the Commission on a
great many policy fields. In order to monitor this delegated power the Council has required the establishment of
comitology committees. These committees are not included in our study.
7
 Amongst officials in the domestic administrations, contacts are most likely to be directed towards other DGs
than the two sector-DGs mentioned above. For permanent representatives contacts with their ‘own’ DG may
include other DGs than the DG for Employment and Social Affairs and the Environment DG. This owes to the
fact that our sample of permanent representatives includes permanent representatives from several different
policy areas.
8
 There are one outlier in tables 4.14 and 4.15B. This respondent has participated in several hundred ECs and
WPs. This is an agriculture official at the Danish permanent representation whose attendance on EU committees
can be characterised as extremely intensive. This official has worked at the Danish permanent representation for
2.5 years.
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9
 Table 4.22 Inter-correlations between variables measuring length and intensity of cross-level
participation (Pearson’s r).a, b
A) Domestic officials:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
1. number of
ECs….……... .32** .85** -.18*
2. number of














year in WPs... .30** .19* .30*
7. oral
presentations
in ECs…….... .47** .29* .29**
8. oral
presentations















Mean N……..                                                                                    119
*) p  .05               **) p  .01
a) This table presents only correlations that are significant at the 95 % or 99 % levels.
b) Some of the variables above are ‘natural’ metric variables, i.e. the number of ECs and WPs attended, the
number of meetings attended, etc. Other variables in the above tables are substantially non-metric
variables, i.e. whether officials are routinely invited to attend ECs, building on the following five-point
scale: very often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5). In an effort at utilising
as much information in such variables as possible, they are treated as metric variables in the statistical
analyses. The low N in the analyses also renders the analysis vulnerable for dichotomies where the
univariate distributions are skewed, rendering some cells nearly empty. Thus, all the variables in the two
tables above are treated as metric variables, thus, including all their original values (as shown in previous
tables). A high value is given to those having participated in few committees, in few formal meetings, having
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participated for few years. A high value is also given to those being routinely invited to attend meetings,
those giving oral presentations often, and those attending many informal meetings.
As seen from the above table, officials attending many ECs also seem to attend many formal EC meetings
(Pearson’s r = .85**), but conduct few informal meetings with colleagues from these committees (Pearson’s r = -
.18*). Officials attending many ECs tend to be senior participants, thus, having attended ECs for many years
(Pearson’r r = .32**). Officials attending many WPs tend to be senior participants within both ECs (Pearson’s r =
.35**) and WPs (Pearson’s r = .44**). “I often follow the dossier between expert committees and working
parties” (Source: Swedish official attending ECs and WPs – author’s translation). Officials attending man WPs
tend to have many formal meetings in WPs (Pearson’s r = .95**). Officials attending many WPs tend to be
routinely invited to attend ECs (Pearson’r r = .19*) and tend to give oral presentations in EC meetings (Pearson’s
r = .24**). As regards the length of participation on EU committees, officials tend to have made their first
appearance within ECs and WPs at approximately the same time (Pearson’s r = .81**). Senior EC participants
give few oral presentations during EC meetings (Pearson’r = -.17*). Officials having many formal WP meetings
during the last year also have many informal contacts with other WP participants (Pearson’s r = .30*) are
routinely invited to attend ECs (Pearson’s r = .19*) and give oral presentations during EC meetings (Pearson’s r
= .30**). Indicating the close links that exists between participating on ECs and WPs, officials giving oral
presentations in ECs also tend to give oral presentations in WPs (Pearson’s r = .47**), and have many informal
EC meetings (Pearson’s r = .29*). These officials also tend to become routinely invited to attend formal EC
meetings (Pearson’s r = .29**). Officials giving oral presentations during WP meetings also tend to become
routinely invited to attend WP meetings (Pearson’s r = .35**) and have many informal meetings with other WP
participants (Pearson’s r = .38**). Finally, officials having many informal meetings with other EC participants
also tend to have informal meetings with WP participants outside the formal meetings (Pearson’s r = .50**).
B) Permanent representatives:
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.
1. number of ECs………….... .84**
2. number of WPs….……….. .57 .70** .80**
3. time of arrival in ECs…….. .92**
4. time of arrival in WPs…….
5. number of formal meetings
last year in ECs……………...
6. number of formal meetings
last year in WPs……………..
7. oral presentations in ECs…
8. oral presentations in WPs... -.45*
9. routinely invited to ECs?....
10. routinely invited to WPs?. .68**
11. informal meetings with
EC participants……………...
12. informal meetings with
WP participants……………...
Mean N………………………                                                                          36
*) p  .05               **) p  .01
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As seen from the above table, permanent representatives attending many ECs also attend many formal EC
meetings (Pearson’s r = .84**). Officials attending many WPs have generally participated for long periods of
time within both ECs and WPs (Pearson’s r = .57* and .70**, respectively). Senior officials within ECs also tend
to be senior participants within WPs (Pearson’s r = .92**). Officials routinely invited to attend WPs also tend to
have many informal contacts with other WP participants (Pearson’s r = .68**). Less easily to interpret is the
negative correlation between “oral presentations during WP meetings” and “being routinely invited to attend
ECs” (Pearson’s r = -.45*).
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CHAPTER 5
MULTIPLE INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS IN EUROPE
EFFECTS ON THE CO-ORDINATION BEHAVIOUR
OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Introduction1
Chapter 4 revealed the “factual enormity of the committee phenomenon” (Weiler 1999: 340 –
original emphasis). Past and more recent literature on EU committees have measured the
degree of cross-level participation through these committees in various ways. One question
less frequently addressed in this literature is how cross-level participation in Europe affects
the actors themselves – their identities, role conceptions and modes of acting. The current
Chapter considers this question by analysing how participation on EU committees
accompanies certain co-ordination behaviour amongst the participants. The current Chapter
also analyses how different primary institutional affiliations accompany particular co-
ordination behaviour.
As the boundaries between the nation-state bureaucracy and the EU become increasingly
blurred due to processes of cross-level participation, the boundary-maintaining role of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) may be affected in particular ways. In this Chapter we ask
to what extent the gate-keeping role of the MFA, the last stronghold of the nation-state, is
affected by the cross-level modes of participation revealed in Chapter 4.2 Is the co-ordinating
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role of the MFA affected differently by different EU committees – that is, by Commission
expert committees and Council working parties? Additionally, we are interested in how the
co-ordination role of the MFA is affected by different domestic institutional structures
embedding civil servants.
Within existing research on processes of Europeanization of domestic institutions and policy
processes, at least two classes of empirical observations are highlighted. First, EU
membership contributes to fragmentation of domestic decision processes, promoting a general
lack of coherent policy approaches towards the EU amongst different domestic government
institutions (e.g. Dehousse 1997). Secondly, EU membership has been observed to foster and
strengthen domestic co-ordination processes, ultimately strengthening the gate-keeping role of
the Foreign Ministry (e.g. Bulmer and Burch 1998; Spence 1999: 249). “Indeed,
paradoxically, both centralised co-ordination and the countervailing phenomenon of sectoral
segmentation … appear to be on the increase” (Wright 1996: 155). However, theoretical
explanations put forward in the literature have largely ignored this paradox (Dehousse 1997;
Lindberg 1963; Moravcsik 1998; Wessels 1998). An apparent puzzle has thus arisen. While
domestic co-ordination processes have been observed to oscillate along a sectoral-territorial
spectrum, theories that explain these processes are largely based on uni-dimensional
explanatory variables. The emphasis is directed to either inter-sectoral co-ordination dynamics
(Moravcsik 1998; Hocking 1999) or to intra-sectoral processes of fragmentation (Dehousse
1997). Only occasionally do scholars pay systematic attention to different co-ordination
dynamics (cf. Derlien 1999; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Metcalfe 1994; Schout 1999)
The puzzle, as outlined here, emerges prominently within studies of EU committees. The vast
majority of this body of literature pictures EU committee meetings as generally business-like,
depoliticized, consensual and technocratic. They emphasise ‘technocratic collusion’ at the
Community level (Dehousse 1997: 48; Wessels 1998 and 1999: 265). Current studies of EU
committees largely ignore the differentiated institutional character of the EU committees, and
emphasise their commonality as a symptom of administrative integration and engrenage,
more broadly (Joerges and Neyer 1997; Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 1999; Neyer 1999). Our
analytical effort, outlined in Chapter 2, is focused towards emphasising that different
organizational principles may affect administrative integration differently. When accounting
for different co-ordination dynamics within domestic government institutions, this Chapter is
concerned with the multiple institutional embeddedness of domestic civil servants. They are
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employed within domestic ministries and agencies and simultaneously are part-time
participants within different EU committees. This Chapter shows that government officials
attending Commission expert committees (ECs) report that their co-ordination behaviour
differs from those officials participating on Council working parties (WPs). Furthermore,
officials employed in domestic ministries are seen to co-ordinate differently from officials
employed in domestic agencies or directorates.
Generally, studies on policy co-ordination pay more attention to inter-sectoral processes than
to intra-sectoral processes (Derlien 1999: 1; Hocking 1999; Schout 1999: 4). Inter-sectoral
modes of co-ordination denote linkage processes across policy sectors with regard to actors,
problems, solutions, consequences, role conceptions and identities are concerned. In the
current study, inter-sectoral co-ordination resembles horizontal inter-ministerial co-ordination
behaviour. On the other hand, intra-sectoral co-ordination resembles both horizontal and
vertical co-ordination within each government institution and vertical co-ordination across the
ministry level and the agency level.
Furthermore, my definition of co-ordination is two-dimensional as regards the techniques
applied. Co-ordination may involve (i) pro-active processes for drawing up written and clear-
cut mandates and instructions, or (i) re-active and oral processes, not geared towards outlining
any written instructions. The first process tends to foster formally binding mandates and the
second process tends to produce more ambiguous mandates. While processes for producing
imperative mandates is based upon the idea of institutions as coupled, sectorally co-ordinated
systems of governance, the notion of ambiguous mandates rests upon perceiving institutions
as uncoupled, segmented and inter-sectorally fragmented government systems (Olsen 1988:
162-170).
Linking this study to past and contemporary theories of European integration, I have argued in
Chapter 1 that organization theory constitutes a theoretical bridge between intergovernmental
perspectives and neo-functional accounts. With reference to domestic co-ordination processes,
intergovernmental perspectives emphasise the primacy of inter-sectoral co-ordination
processes and neo-functional accounts pay greater attention to intra-sectoral processes (e.g.
Lindberg 1963; Moravcsik 1998). The cognitive organizational theory perspective outlined in
Chapter 2 argues that both these scenarios may be partially correct because they reflect
different organizational principles. The cognitive organization theory perspective outlined
150
provides microfoundations for accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension of
administrative integration. Chapter 2 argued that the territorial logic of the nation-state,
emphasised within intergovernmental accounts, can be transcended subsequent to intra-
sectoral modes of co-ordination taking primacy over inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination. In
practice, this may imply that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is largely by-passed as a vital co-
ordinating institution at the domestic level. As the MFA loses control of EU policies and
politics at the domestic level, sector ministries and agencies may be sectorally penetrated
from the EU level (Egeberg and Trondal 1999). Moreover, these dynamics are likely to be
fuelled by the sectoral organizational principles that underpin the EU Commission and the
Commission expert committees, in particular. This mode of sectoral penetration of sector
ministries and agencies, however, may be filtered and modified to some extent if the MFA is
perceived as a central co-ordinating body. The Council of Ministers and the Council working
parties, in particular, can contribute to the empowerment of the MFA as a vital co-ordinating
unit.
In this Chapter, administrative integration reflects processes whereby domestic co-ordination
processes are affected significantly by the organizational principles underpinning Commission
expert committees.3 Hence, consistent with prior arguments outlined in Chapters 1 and 2,
intra-sectoral co-ordination processes are fairly strong indicators of administrative integration.
Inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination, in contrast, are indicative of intergovernmental
dynamics and largely go counter to processes of administrative integration. Administrative
integration thus requires the co-ordination behaviour of civil servants to be close to the
sectoral end of the sectoral-territorial dimension presented in Chapter 1. This weakens the
boundary-maintaining role of the MFA. Thus, “institutional fragmentation may … assume a
positive significance for the purposes of administrative integration” (Cassese 1987: 19).
In the following, a short resume of the main theoretical arguments outlined in prior Chapters
is provided. Next, an empirical analysis is conducted, revealing how different formal
organizational arrangements, and their mutual linkages, are reflected in the way domestic civil
servants conceive of their own co-ordination behaviour.
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Deriving empirical propositions from theory
Two pivotal assumptions have been outlined in Chapter 2 on the basis of a cognitive
organization theory perspective. First, decision behaviour may be moulded and re-moulded on
the basis of organizing and reorganizing organizational boundaries (March and Olsen 1989;
Nkomo and Cox jr. 1996). Reorganizing from one principle of organization to another may
alter the flow of information within organizations, which ultimately changes the flow of
information to each decision-maker. So, when organizational members change organizational
affiliations they may tend to choose new ways of acting as a result of being exposed to new
sets of information.
Civil servants from domestic ministries and agencies attending EU committees have
multilevel institutional affiliations. In addition to their ministry/agency affiliation and their
EU committee affiliation these officials have professional affiliations towards different
disciplines. Hence, national decision-makers may be influenced by multiple and partially
contending sets of information, premises and considerations. One task in Chapter 2 was to
identify the conditions under which particular institutional affiliations of individual civil
servants accompany particular co-ordination behaviour amongst them. Studying government
officials who are members of government institutions at different levels of governance, I
emphasise organizational linkages between government institutions as one vital scope
condition that affects the co-ordination behaviour evoked by government officials. One
central aspect of multiple institutional affiliations relates to the formal linkages between
organizations and to the intensity and length of such linkages.
To summarize the main arguments of Chapter 2, the following propositions may be
forwarded. Inter-sectoral co-ordination modes are most likely to be evoked amongst domestic
officials who are educated in law, economy or social sciences, participate on Council working
parties, who have seniority and who participate intensively on these committees, who have
top-rank positions at the permanent representations to the EU, and who belong to the
diplomatic realm of this institution. Conversely, intra-sectoral modes of co-ordinating are
more likely to accompany domestic government officials educated in technical disciplines,
who participate intensively and for long periods of time on Commission expert committees,
and who are employed in medium or lower rank positions within domestic sector ministries or
agencies.
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Administrative integration is arguably stronger amongst officials enacting intra-sectoral
modes of co-ordination than amongst officials evoking inter-sectoral co-ordination behaviour.
The empirical record: What co-ordination processes tell us about administrative
integration
This section shows how different EU committee affiliations and different national
institutional affiliations affect domestic modes of co-ordinating EU related dossiers. The
following reveals how these officials’ co-ordination behaviour reflects the type of EU
committee that is attended. The next section seeks to control statistically for the length and
intensity of participation on these EU committees. The final section shows how co-ordination
processes reflect various institutional affiliations at the domestic governance level. The
following analysis does not determine the relative explanatory potential of each independent
variable. The principal rationale is to illustrate how each variable influences particular modes
of co-ordination behaviour. In the reminder of this Chapter, several different dependent
variables are used to measure co-ordination behaviour. The overall rationale for using several
different empirical proxies on the co-ordination variable is to detect empirical patterns. If
several operational measures coincide with predicted patterns the test is shown to be robust
(cf. Chapter 3).
Different EU committee affiliations: Effects on co-ordination behaviour
I have argued that the level of policy co-ordination is likely to be greater amongst civil
servants attending Council working parties (WPs) compared to officials attending
Commission expert committees (ECs). Moreover, I expect that officials who solely participate
on ECs will co-ordinate less actively than those officials who also attend WPs. Table 5.1
provides an overview of different efforts at co-ordinating EU related dossiers, paying
particularly attention to different techniques applied to this end.
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Table 5.1 Percentage of officials using different co-ordinating techniques.a
                                                                      domestic officials         permanent representatives
Co-ordination techniques: EC WP EC WP
Doing clearances with other central
administrative institutions before
attending EU committeesb…………. 58 87 68 79
Doing informal clearancesc………… 77 72 -- --
Doing formal clearances…………… 32 64 -- --
Drawing up problem notesd………... 41 75 45 43
Drawing up frame notes………….... 42 79 40 60
Drawing up instructions…………… 37 92 30 89
”Do these documents govern your
positions”?e………………………… 81 95 82 100
Mean N…………………………….. 133 56 21 34
a) In the following tables, N varies somewhat, reflecting the extent to which the respondents have answered
different questions. However, by using the mean N, extreme variations in N are omitted.
b) This variable, and the following two variables, involve officials doing clearances to a fairly great, or very
great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Great extent (1), fairly great extent
(2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
c) This question, and the following question, was not presented for the permanent representatives.
d) This variable, and the following two variables, regard officials who outline these documents fairly often, or
very often. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2),
both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
e) This variable regards officials who report that these documents govern their positions to a fairly great
extent, or great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: To a very great extent (1),
to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5).
Table 5.1 reveals that the use of clearances between national governmental institutions is
more frequent amongst WP participants compared to officials participating on ECs. Still, the
amount of inter-sectoral co-ordination is high amongst those participating on ECs. This may
partially is due to the territorial organizational principle within the ECs. It may also reflect the
primary institutional affiliations that embed the EU committee participants (cf. the next
section). Moreover, policy sectors are frequently organized differently between the EU
Commission and the domestic government institutions. Institutional misfit can lead to cross-
sectoral co-ordination efforts at the domestic level, for example, between different ministries,
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between different agencies or directorates, and between ministries and agencies (cf. Jacobsson
and Sundström 1999b; SOU 1996:6: 51; Trondal 1996). Inter-sectoral co-ordination that
reflects institutional misfit, however, need not involve the MFA. More frequently, cross-
sectoral co-ordination processes that accompany institutional misfit tend to strengthen the co-
ordination role of sector ministries and agencies:
“I have to work towards several DGs. This makes it difficult to find responsible
institutions at the domestic level. This implies having contacts with several ministries”
(Source: Norwegian ministry official – author’s translation).
Additionally, table 5.1 reveals that the relative high frequency of cross-sectoral modes of co-
ordination in ECs may also be due to the heavy use of informal clearances amongst the
participants. Supporting this interpretation, table 5.1 shows that WP participants use formal
co-ordination arrangements more frequently than EC participants. EC participants tend to be
guided by informal clearances to the same extent as WP participants. Statskonsult (1999:6:
43) report that written frame notes are used less frequently as co-ordination tool-kits amongst
Norwegian EC participants compared to officials attending comitology committees (cf.
Statskonsult 2000:3: 51). In the Norwegian central administration, written problem notes and
frame notes are intended to provide background information on EEA legislation in the issue
area at hand, as well as reviews of existing national legislation. Additionally, these documents
are to include discussions on budgetary implications, surveys on the interests of other
countries, etc. (Statskonsult 1998: 190-195). As seen from our data, EC participants from all
the three Scandinavian countries use informal co-ordination arrangements more frequently
than do WP participants (cf. table 5.1). “We use mostly informal contacts towards the
ministry” (Source: Norwegian agency official participating on ECs – author’s translation).
Table 5.1 also reveals that written instructions are used more frequently amongst officials
attending WPs than amongst officials attending ECs. These observations are also supported in
qualitative interviews. While officials negotiate under fairly clear and written instructions
within WP meetings, less clear and often implicit mandates tend to accompany negotiations
within EC meetings (Source: interviews).
Hence, the relative propensity to apply written problem notes, frame notes, and instructions
vary between the two classes of committee participants. Still, no significant difference is
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identified between the two classes of committee participants with regard to the extent to
which written instructions, problem notes or frame notes affect the positions taken by the
participants during EU committee meetings (table 5.1).
“I am quite self-driven on these meetings” (Source: Norwegian EC participant –
author’s translation). Still, “there are clear differences as regards the instructions
one gets prior to the two types of committees” (Source: Swedish official participating
on both ECs and WPs – author’s translation).
Following the distinction between (i) pro-active and written modes of co-ordination, and (ii)
re-active and oral modes of co-ordination outlined in Chapter 2, this analysis shows that
participants on WPs tend to use the former co-ordination technique while oral co-ordination
modes are evoked more extensively by EC participants. Within the Swedish government
apparatus, written instructions have been increasingly used after Sweden joined the EU in
1995 (Jacobsson and Sundtröm 1999b: 72). Still, even within the Norwegian central
administrative apparatus formal co-ordination efforts are evident (cf. table 5.1) through the
use of collegial committees constructed for handling EU related subject matters (Trondal
1998: 290). In Norway, the EEA agreement accompanied the construction of a three-layered
hierarchical co-ordination apparatus (Statskonsult 1995:15). Since it is often harder to change
or replace old institutions, new ones are often constructed for particular purposes (March and
Olsen 1995). Past research indicates that Norwegian civil servants that participate on ECs
tend to co-ordinate EU dossiers through co-ordinating committees, headed by the ministry
most affected (“special committees”). These committees are specialized by sector, largely
mirroring the DG structure of the EU Commission (Statskonsult 1999:6: 38 and 43; Trondal
1998: 291). Similarly, co-ordination through intra-ministerial committees is even more
frequent amongst Norwegian officials. Conversely, inter-ministerial co-ordination through the
“Co-ordination board”, headed by the MFA, is reported to be relatively modest amongst
Norwegian officials attending ECs (Trondal 1998: 290). This committee is cross-sectoral in
character and has a more overarching co-ordination rationale. Issues that are not agreed on in
the lower-ranking special committees are referred to the Co-ordination Board. Finally, co-
ordination through a cabinet committee composed of cabinet representatives is activated only
on politically sensitive issues. So far, few directives have attracted political attention in
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Norway. From this it follows that the substantial co-ordinating role of the cabinet committee
has been essentially nil.4
Despite the use of formalized co-ordination committees, most evidence shows that the
substantial content of frame notes, problem notes, etc. are provided for by departments and
units within each ministry and agency and to a lesser extent by these co-ordination
committees (Statskonsult 1995:15 and Statskonsult 2000:3: 61; Sundström 1999: 51-52;
Trondal 1998). The role of the EU co-ordination committees tends to be more symbolic and
procedural than substantial, both in Norway and to some extent in Denmark (Nedergaard
1994; Sundström 1999; Trondal 1996 and 1998). Tendencies towards using domestic co-
ordination committees are greater amongst the Danish WP participants than EC participants
(Table 5.1; cf. Statskonsult 1995:15; Trondal 1996: 62 and 76). Sweden never established a
corresponding committee structure.
When comparing officials who only participate on Commission expert committees with those
who also attend Council working parties, most of the tendencies revealed in table 5.1 are
repeated. 5
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Doing clearances with other central
administrative institutions before
attending EU committeesa……………… 61 54
Doing informal clearances……………… 81 72
Doing formal clearances………..………. 27 37
Drawing up problem notesb…………….. 39 45
Drawing up frame notes………………... 39 45
Drawing up instructions………………... 28 48
”Do these documents govern your
positions”?c……………………………... 76 88
Mean N…………………………………. 60 45
a) This variable, and the following two variables, regard officials doing clearances to a fairly great extent, or
very great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Great extent (1), fairly great
extent (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
b) This variable, and the following two variables, regard officials outlining these documents fairly often, or
very often. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly often (2),
both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
c) This variable regards officials who report that these documents govern their positions to a fairly great
extent, or very great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Great extent (1),
fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
The distinction made in table 5.2 corresponds to the distinction made between Norwegian
officials (participating on Commission expert committees only) and Danish and Swedish
officials (participating on both Commission expert committees and Council working parties).6
The only striking difference between table 5.1 and table 5.2 regards the first dependent
variable. Officials who only attend ECs make inter-organizational clearances more frequently
than officials also attending WPs. This difference may reflect the frequent usage of informal
clearances amongst EC participants (cf. Olsen 1996: 103). The overall pattern revealed by
table 5.2 indicates only marginal differences between officials solely attending ECs compared
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to those who also take part in WPs. These findings are supported by qualitative interviews. “It
is important that Swedish positions within ECs are consistent with what being said within
WPs” (Source: Swedish official attending both ECs and WPs – author’s translation). Thus,
officials participating on both ECs and WPs anticipate the importance of presenting consistent
positions on both committees (Spence 1997: 112-113) and are exposed to fairly similar
sources of information.
Some other observations made in table 5.1 are supported in table 5.3. Officials participating
on WPs see their instructions as being considerably clearer than those participating on ECs:
Table 5.3 Percentage of officials who agree on the following assertions.a
                                                                domestic officials             permanent representatives
Assertions: EC WP EC WP
“I have clear instructions as to
what positions to follow during
EU committee meetings”…….... 27 64 24 59
“I have great amount of freedom
when participating on EU
committees”…………………… 45 16 37 26
Mean N………………………... 139 58 20 37
a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following three-point scale: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).
Table 5.3 also shows that the amount of perceived leeway or behavioural discretion that
relates to modes of proceeding, ‘positions’ to follow, roles to evoke, etc, is significantly
higher amongst officials participating on ECs compared to those participating on WPs (cf.
table 5.17). Norwegian officials attending ECs report having few clear guide lines from the
political-administrative leadership or from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (cf. Statskonsult
1999:6: 45). “Lack of clarity as far as the formal role of the MFA is concerned may imply that
the MFA increasingly is put on the sideline” (The Norwegian Foreign Ministry 1999a: 23 –
author’s translation). However, every participant works under some kind of national mandate
and instructions (cf. tables 5.1 and 5.2). As seen in the qualitative interviews, the amount of
behavioural discretion available to the participants seems far more extensive within the ECs
than within the WPs.7
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“I work under limitations set by the ministry, otherwise I have behavioural
discretion”. However, “if the ministry means something else than I do, I have to take
the ministry’s point of view into account” (Source: Norwegian agency official
participating on ECs – author’s translation).
At the permanent representations to the EU the same tendencies are revealed regarding modes
of co-ordinating. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 measure the perceived importance of their own
professional expertise and the importance attached to ‘national interests’ amongst EU
committee participants:
Table 5.4 Percentage of officials emphasising professional considerations and national
interests.a
                                                              domestic officials                permanent representatives
EC WP EC WP
Professional considerations….. 88 75 86 82
The ‘national interests’ of my
own country………….………. 70 82 86 95
Mean N………………………. 140 58 22 39
a) This table involves officials paying fairly great, or very great emphasis towards these considerations. This
dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very great (1), fairly great (2), both/and (3), fairly
little (4), and very little (5).
Table 5.5 Percentage of officials agreeing on the following assertions.a
                                                                  domestic officials             permanent representatives
Assertions: EC WP EC WP
“The positions I take are based on
my professional expertise”.……... 47 33 32 25
“I take the positions which I
believe is to the interest for my
country”………………………… 49 56 62 61
Mean N 138 58 20 34
a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following three-point scale: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).
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Table 5.4 indicates that officials attending ECs report their ‘positions’ to be based on
professional expertise more extensively than their colleagues participating on WPs. Table 5.5
reveals that ‘national interests’ are given greater importance amongst officials attending WPs
as a catalyst for determining their ‘positions’ than are professional expertise.
“Within EC meetings it is often underscored that ‘this is a technical discussion’.
This, in order to emphasise political considerations shall not be taken. Still, one is
somewhat sensitive towards ‘Sweden’” (Source: Swedish EC participant – author’s
translation). “The political aspect plays a big role both within ECs and WPs, but
loom largest in the Council… The technical aspects are more predominant within the
Commission” (Source: Danish official – author’s translation).
Thus, the type of EU committees attended significantly affects the general level of inter-
organizational co-ordination. As such, the level of administrative integration across levels of
governance is significantly affected by the committee affiliations embedding national civil
servants.
The co-ordination role of the MFA is one critical indicator of administrative integration by
indicating the level of boundary-maintaining governance pursued by the nation-state towards
the EU. The following two tables show the relative proportion of officials conducting inter-
organizational clearances with the MFA (tables 5.6a and 5.6b), and the proportion of officials
doing intra-organizational clearances with other departments within their own governmental
institution (tables 5.7a and 5.7b):
Table 5.6a Percentage of officials receiving clearances from the Foreign Ministry.a, b
                                             domestic officials                           permanent representatives
EC WP EC WP
Yes…………… 33 53 67 81










Table 5.6b Percentage of domestic officials receiving clearances from the Foreign
Ministry.a, b
Participate on expert committees only








a) These tables include officials using fairly much, or very much of their time participating on EU committees.
This dichotomy combines values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: very much, (1), fairly much (2),
both/and (3), fairly little (4), very little (5).
b) This variable has the two following values: Yes (1), No (2).
Table 5.7a Percentage of officials seeking clearances with other departments within their
own government institution before entering EU committees.a
                                             domestic officials                           permanent representatives
EC WP EC WP






Table 5.7b Percentage of domestic officials seeking clearances with other departments
within their own government institution before entering EU committees.a
Participate on expert
committees only







a) These tables include officials doing intra-organizational clearances fairly often, or very often. This
dichotomy builds from combining values 1 and 2 on the following five-point scale: Very often (1), fairly
often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
The results presented in tables 5.6a and 5.6b are not completely comparable to those
presented in tables 5.7a and 5.7b. Still, they reveal some interesting differences. As expected,
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WP participants utilise clearances more frequently than EC participants – both intra-sectorally
(table 5.7a) and inter-sectorally (table 5.6a). The co-ordination dynamics driven by WP
attendance are captured in the following quotation: “I know very well the Swedish position”
(Source: Swedish WP participant – author’s translation). On the other hand, those
participating on ECs conduct clearances more frequently intra-sectorally than inter-sectorally.
The differences between Norwegian officials and Danish and Swedish officials (tables 5.6b
and 5.7b) are largely due to the latter having additional attendance on Council WPs. Still,
Danish and Swedish officials who participate solely on ECs report a generally low tendency
for inter-sectoral co-ordination, especially towards the MFA, compared to their national
officials attending WPs (Source: interviews).8 “I have nothing to do with the MFA at all”
(Source: Swedish EC participant – author’s translation). Officials report that inter-state
bargaining dominates WP meetings to a larger extent than EC meetings. This reflects the
territorial principle of organization underpinning the Council of Ministers, in general and the
WPs, in particular. Territorial dynamics loom larger within the WPs than within the ECs (cf.
Chapter 6 – table 6.8). This difference explains the more extensive enactment of cross-
sectoral co-ordination behaviour amongst officials attending WPs compared to those
participating on ECs (Source: Danish official participating on both ECs and WPs). As such,
the EC-WP nexus affects co-ordination behaviour amongst the participants more strongly than
the EU membership and non-membership distinction.
When consulting table 5.6b, the patterns presented in table 5.6a become clearer. Only 25 per
cent of those officials participating only on ECs make clearances with the MFA while 56 per
cent of those who also attend WPs make such clearances (cf. table 5.6b). Finally, table 5.6a
reveals that clearances with the MFA are conducted more frequently amongst officials at the
permanent representations than amongst officials within the ‘home administrations’. This can
be due to the fact that permanent representatives attend WPs more frequently than officials
within the ‘home administration’ (cf. Chapter 4). However, it can also reflect the fact that the
permanent representations embody territorial principles of organization to a greater extent
than do the domestic ministries and agencies (cf. below).
These observations are further supported in table 5.8:
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Table 5.8 Percentage of officials agreeing on the following assertions.a
                                                                        domestic officials        permanent representatives
Assertions: EC WP EC WP
“I have to co-ordinate with the MFA
or with other central co-ordinating
units”……………………………….. 15 49 19 57
“My position has been co-ordinated
with all relevant ministries”………... 26 61 29 74
“My position has been co-ordinated
with all relevant departments within
my own insitution”………………… 58 78 -- --
Mean N…………………………….. 137 58 21 37
a) Values 1 and 2 combined on the following three-point scale: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).
Table 5.8 clearly shows that participation on different EU committees tends to accompany
different patterns of co-ordination amongst the participants. Inter-sectoral modes of co-
ordination are evoked more frequently amongst officials participating on WPs compared to
those attending ECs. “All ministries get involved as dossiers are sent to the Council after
having been in the Commission” (Source: Danish official – author’s translation). The first
column of table 5.8 shows that the majority of EC participants co-ordinate their positions with
other departments within their own institution, that is, intra-sectorally. At the other end of the
intra-/inter-sectoral spectrum, they seldom co-ordinate with the MFA or with other central co-
ordinating units (cf. Sundström 1999: 52-53). Moreover, cross-sectoral modes of co-
ordination are pursued more extensively amongst officials at the permanent missions
compared to officials within the ‘home administration’ (cf. table 5.8).
Co-ordination involves contact patterns towards other governmental institutions as well as
contacts within each institution. The following table 5.9 reveals how participation on different
EU committees accompanies different contact patterns amongst the participants.
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Table 5.9a Percentage of officials having contacts with the following domestic
government institutions.a
                                                                         domestic officials       permanent representatives
Government institutions: EC WP EC WP
The domestic Parliament……………… 8 18 0 4
The political leadershipb……………….
Inter-sectorally:
21 53 19 47
The Foreign Ministry…………………. 12 52 29 62
Other ministries……………………….. 28 54 47 37
Intra-sectorally:
With domestic agencies within my own
policy sectorc………………………….. 67 78 63 80
With my own superior ministryd……… 56 75 75 95
Mean N………………………………... 84 40 17 34
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The Foreign Ministry………. 7 20
Other ministries…………….. 25 33
Intra-sectorally:
With domestic agencies
within my own policy sectorc. 56 79
With my own superior
ministryd……………………. 61 49
Mean N……………………... 50 37
a) The variables presented in these two tables include officials having contacts fairly often, or very often with
the government institutions listed above. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: Very
often (1), fairly often (2), both/and (3), fairly seldom (4), and very seldom (5).
b) This regards contacts towards the political leadership in the capital.
c) This variable regards officials employed at the ministry level within the domestic bureaucracy. This
limitation does, however, not relate to officials at the permanent representations.
d) This variable regards officials employed at the agency level within the domestic bureaucracy. This
limitation does not relate to officials at the permanent representations.
The upper halves of tables 5.9a and 5.9b consider inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination.
Consistent with prior observations made in this Chapter, one of the most striking observations
from tables 5.9a and 5.9b relates to the difference between the two classes of committees.
Inter-sectoral contact patterns are evoked more frequently amongst officials attending WPs
compared to officials on ECs. Most clearly, contacts with the MFA, being the ministry
formally embodying the territorial principle of the nation-state order most strongly, is
significantly stronger amongst the WP participants than amongst the EC participants.
Officials participating on ECs have more frequent contacts with other sectoral ministries than
with the MFA, the domestic Parliament or the national political leadership. When adding
intra-sectoral contact patterns to this picture, the tendency from table 5.8 is repeated in table
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5.9a. Officials participating on ECs make relatively more frequent use of contacts with other
government institutions within their ‘own’ policy sector than with government institutions in
other policy areas. Still, intra-sectoral contact patterns are pursued even more strongly
amongst WP participants than amongst EC participants, that is, towards sectoral agencies and
ministries within their ‘own’ policy area (cf. Beckman and Johansson 1999; Statskontoret
1996:7; Trondal 2000). When comparing officials, who only participate on ECs with those
who also attend WPs, the same tendencies shown in table 5.9a are repeated in table 5.9b.
Together, tables 5.9a and 5.9b reveal that officials who attend ECs tend to co-ordinate within
their own government institution.
“The instructions are cleared within the agency if it is consistent with the official
policy. If one has doubts, one sends the instructions for clearance within the
ministry” (Source: Norwegian agency official participating on ECs – author’s
translation). Partially due to the technical nature of the subject matters at hand within
ECs, “this work is a one-man-show” (Source: Danish EC participant – author’s
translation). “I often write my own positions. I get more discretion as the subject
matters get increasingly technical. In larger questions the positions have to be better
anchored” (Source: Swedish EC participant – author’s translation).
Finally, modes of policy co-ordination can be measured by how civil servants perceive the
relative importance of different government institutions. Contact patterns do not provide an
adequate understanding of the perceived importance of these contacts. Table 5.10 (a and b)
reveals how EU committee participants view the relative importance of different domestic
government institutions.
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Table 5.10a Percentage of officials assigning weight to the following government
institutions when important decisions are reached.a
                                                                       domestic officials         permanent representatives
Government institutions: EC WP EC WP




41 88 -- --
The Foreign Ministry….………….…. 19 42 -- --
Other ministries……………………… 29 59 33 46
Intra-sectorally:
Inputs from:
My own superior ministryb….………. 82 91 95 100
Domestic agencies within my own
policy areac…………………….…….. 68 64 90 85
Importance to:
My own superior ministryb………….. 64 86 76 100
Domestic agencies within my own
policy areac…………………………... 70 60 63 60
Mean N………………………………. 80 38 19 33
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Table 5.10b Percentage of domestic officials assigning weight to the following












The Foreign Ministry………. 19 20
Other ministries…………….. 29 29
Intra-sectorally:
Inputs from:
My own superior ministryb… 83 80
Domestic agencies within my
own policy areac.…………… 71 64
Importance to:
My own superior ministryb… 73 49
Domestic agencies within my
own policy areac……….…… 58 82
Mean N…………………….. 49 37
a) The variables presented in these two tables involve officials attaching fairly much weight, or much weight to
the government institutions listed above. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: much
weight (1), fairly much weight (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), and very unimportant (5).
b) This variable regards officials employed at the agency level within the domestic bureaucracy. This
limitation does, however, not relate officials at the permanent representations.
c) This variable regards officials employed at the ministry level within the domestic bureaucracy. This
limitation does not relate to officials at the permanent representations.
Consistent with the figures presented in tables 5.9a and 5.9b tables 5.10a and 5.10b show that
different EU committees do indeed affect the relative importance attached to different
government institutions. Most significantly, this difference centres on the importance assigned
to government institutions inter-sectorally. Officials attending ECs tend to assign less weight
to the political leadership, to the MFA, to other ministries, and to the domestic Parliament
than to officials attending WPs (cf. Sundström 1999: 42-46). Moreover, officials who only
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attend ECs attach greater importance to government institutions within their ‘own’ policy
sector and attach considerably less importance to institutions in other policy fields. The
inverse pattern is revealed amongst officials attending WPs. Moreover, officials participating
on both WPs and ECs tend to pay attention towards, i.e. their ‘own’ ministry and their ‘own’
agency (cf. table 5.10b).
The analysis tends to confirm our main hypothesis that the organizational principles
underpinning EU committees affect the actors serving within them. Most importantly,
however, this analysis reveals how attendance on different EU committees has different
effects on co-ordination processes in domestic bureaucracies. EC participants seem to co-
ordinate more strongly intra-sectorally than inter-sectorally. WP participants tend to co-
ordinate more strongly inter-sectorally. One some occasions, however, the differences in co-
ordination behaviour between the EC participants and the WP participants are marginal. This
partially reflects the influence of contending organizational principles that underpin these
committees. Additionally, it may also reflect the fact that many Danish and Swedish officials
attend both ECs and WPs. However, the lack of differences between the EC participants and
the WP participants as to their co-ordination behaviour may also reflect these officials having
similar national institutional affiliations (cf. below).
The above analysis does not provide an understanding of the extent to which EU committees
affect the participants’ co-ordination behaviour. The next section analyses the relative impact
of the length and intensity of attendance on EU committees.
Length and intensity of participation on EU committees: Effects on co-
ordination behaviour
“Negotiations within ECs and WPs sometimes last for years and take place among almost
the same set of delegates…” (Neyer 1998: 159). As such, socialization dynamics may come
into force. On average, Danish civil servants have participated for longer periods of time
within EU committees than their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts (cf. Chapter 4).9 On
this basis, the data sets have been separated into two distinct parts: The first part includes
those officials who have participated since before 1994 (involving most of the Danish
officials) and the second covers those officials who entered EU committees after 1994
(involving most of the Norwegian and Swedish officials). In the following analysis only those
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correlations that are significant at the 95 % level and the 99 % level and those correlations
exceeding .40 are presented10. As such, only fairly strong and robust tendencies are
highlighted in the tables presented beneath.
First, table 5.11 presents significant correlations between length of participation on EU
committees and modes of policy co-ordination.11
Table 5.11 Correlations between the length to which officials participate on EU
committees and their co-ordination behaviour (Pearson’s r).a
                                                                         domestic officials       permanent representatives
Co-ordination behaviour: EC WP EC WP
Doing clearances with the MFA before
attending EU committeesb..……….…... -.23**
Drawing up problem notes……………. -.27* -.41
Drawing up frame notes………………. -.34**
Drawing up instructions………………. -.20* .47**
Do these documents govern the
positions followed in committee
meetings?……………………………… .26* .35*
Importance attached to the MFA……… -.26*
Co-ordination with all relevant
departments within my own institution.. .28**
Mean N……………………………….. 140 56 20 30
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials who entered EU committees for the first time after 1994 (coded 2) and officials
who have participated since before 1994 (coded 1).
b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: variable 1: Yes (coded 1), No (coded 2);
variable 2, 3 and 4: very often (coded 1), fairly often (coded 2), sometimes (coded 3), fairly seldom (coded
4), very seldom (coded 5); variable 5: to a very great extent (coded 1), to a fairly great extent (coded 2),
both/and (coded 3), to a fairly small extent (coded 4), to a very small extent (coded 5); variable 6: very
important (coded 1), fairly important (coded 2), both/and (coded 3), fairly unimportant (coded 4), very
unimportant (coded 5).
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As seen from table 5.11, the use of written instructions, problem notes and frame notes as co-
ordinating tools relates negatively to the length of participation on ECs and WPs. Being a
senior participant within EU committees decreases the likelihood of using binding and written
mandates. Senior WP participants still report that these documents tend to govern the
positions to be followed during WP meetings (r = .26*). The same tendency is seen amongst
senior WP participants at the permanent representations (r = .35*). Senior EU committee
participants thus seem to co-ordinate less by written procedures than do more junior
participants. However, when written mandates are being drawn up, considerable weight are
attached to them (r = .26*). Furthermore, EC participants who have participated for long
periods of time tend to attach less importance to the MFA as a co-ordinating ministry than
shorter term EC participants (r = -.26*). Contrary to this, senior EC participants seem to co-
ordinate more intra-sectorally, within their ‘own’ institution (r = .28**). Similarly, veteran
officials at the permanent representations, serving on ECs utilize problem notes as co-
ordination tool-kits to a lesser extent than officials who have participated for shorter periods
of time (r = -.41). Hence, they are more likely to ‘go native’ with respect to co-ordinating
modes as they become senior participants within the EU committees. On the other hand, WP
participants at the permanent representations, having participated for long periods of time on
WPs, tend to utilize written instructions more extensively than permanent representatives who
have attended WPs for a shorter period of time.
As expected, when exposed to different EU committees for longer periods of time, officials
become increasingly affected by the uppermost organizational principles underpinning these
committees. This observation is valid both amongst domestic officials and amongst
permanent representatives. Hence, the length of participation on EU committees strengthens
the impact of the uppermost organizing principles of the EU committees.
In additional to the effects of individual seniority, one can add the impact of the intensity of
participation of domestic officials: the number of committees they attend, the number of
formal and informal meetings attended, the degree of activism (oral presentations) during
these meetings, etc. Generally, one can assume intensity to correlate positively with the
degree to which officials are affected by the committees’ organizational principles.12
Table 5.12 analyses how, and to what extent, the number of committees to which national
civil servants attends accompany certain co-ordination behaviour amongst them.
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Table 5.12 Correlations between the number of EU committees attended and the co-
ordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).a
                                                                         domestic officials       permanent representatives
Co-ordination behaviour: EC WP EC WP
Contacts with the MFAb………………. -.31**
Importance attached to the MFA……… -.37**
Importance attached to the political
leadership……………………………... -.21*
“My position has been co-ordinated
with all relevant ministries”…………... -.17*
Drawing up problem notes……………. -.45
Drawing up frame Notes…………….... -.41
Mean N………………………………... 139 -- 19 --
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials who have participated on a maximum of 2 EU committees (coded 2) and
officials who have participated on more than 2 EU committees (coded 1).
b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1, 5 and 6: often (1), fairly
often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5); variable 2 and 3: very important (1), fairly
important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); variable 4: always (1), half of the
time (2), never (3).
This table indicates that the impact of particular organizing principles is strengthened by the
intensity of attendance. Officials in the ‘domestic administrations’ participating on many ECs
seem to co-ordinate inter-sectorally less frequently than do officials participating on fewer
ECs. Officials attending many ECs tend to have few contacts with the MFA (rm= -.31**),
attach less importance to the MFA and the political leadership (r = -.37** and -.21*,
respectively) and finally, assert that their positions have been co-ordinated poorly with all
relevant ministries (r = -.17*). Similarly, officials at the permanent representations attending
many ECs tend to co-ordinate intra-sectorally less strongly than do officials participating on
fewer ECs (r = -. 45 and -.41).
Furthermore, when studying the correlations between the number of formal meetings attended
and the co-ordination behaviour evoked, the same tendencies revealed in table 5.12 are
repeated in table 5.13:
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 Table 5.13 Correlations between the number of formal EU committee meetings
attended and the co-ordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).a
                                                                        domestic officials        permanent representatives
Co-ordination behaviour: EC WP EC WP
“I take the positions I believe are to
the interest for my country”b………… -.24**
Are problem notes, frame notes and
instructions governing the positions
followed in committee meetings?…… -.49*
“I choose the positions to follow”….... .54* .45**
Mean N……………………………… 138 -- 21 28
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials how have attended 4 meetings, or more per year (coded 1) and officials who
have attended between 0 and 3 meetings per year (coded 2).
b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1 and 3: always (1), half of the
time (2), never (3); variable 2: to a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly
small extent (4), to a very small extent (5).
Table 5.13 also reveals how the impact from the organizing principles are strengthened by the
number of formal meetings attended by the national civil servants. Domestic EC participants
who attend many EC meetings tend only marginally to “take the positions [they] believe are
to the best interest for [their] country” (r = -.24**). Similarly, officials at the permanent
representations who attend many EC meetings report that problem notes, frame notes and
instructions only marginally govern their positions (r = -.49*) and that they are increasingly
able to “choose the positions to follow” based on the behavioural discretion available to them
(r = .54*). Strongly indicative of the effect of the number of formal EU committee meetings
attended, permanent representatives attending many WPs report that they are able to “choose
the positions to follow” (r = .45**). Hence, the dynamics result from the territorial principle
of organization is partially circumvented by the effect of participation intensity on the WPs.
Despite attending Council working parties and being employed at the permanent missions to
the EU, officials who attend many EU committee meetings tend increasingly to choose the
positions to be pursued. This observation is indicative that the intensity of attendance might
have an autonomous and independent causal impact on co-ordination behaviour.
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While tables 5.12 and 5.13 focused primarily on EC participants, table 5.14 considers mostly
WP participants. Consequently, most of the numbers presented in the two former tables have
signs opposite to those presented in table 5.14. Still, the general observations are the same:
intensive participation on EU committees tends to strengthen the impact of the underlying
organizational principles. Hence, when analysing the effects of the number of informal EU
committee meetings to which national civil servants attend, the same tendencies as unveiled
in tables 5.12 and 5.13 are repeated in table 5.14:
Table 5.14 Correlations between the number of informal meetings conducted with other
EU committee participants and the co-ordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).a
                                                                           domestic officials     permanent representatives
Co-ordination behaviour: EC WP EC WP
Importance attached to my own agencyb.. .19*
Drawing up problem notes……………... .44 .53*
Drawing up frame notes………………... .52**
Are these documents governing the
positions followed in committee
meetings?……………………………….. .40**
“I have clear instructions as to what
positions to follow”…………………….. .30* .51**
Contacts with the political leadership…... .62** .43**
Mean N…………………………………. 134 59 20 36
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials who have informal meetings with other committee participants fairly great
extent, or very great extent (coded 1) and officials who have fewer informal meetings with other committee
participants (coded 2). This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (1),
to a fairly great extent (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5).
b) The co-ordination variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1: very important (1), fairly
important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); variable 2, 3 and 6: often (1),
fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5); variable 4: to a very great extent (2), to a
fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5); variable 5: always
(1), half of the time (2), never (3).
Table 5.14 shows that intensive participation on Council WPs, measured by the number of
informal contacts pursued with fellow committee participants outside formal committee
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meetings, contributes to strengthen and support the impact of the geographical organization
principle built into the WPs. The general observation made in table 5.14 is that the amount of
intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral co-ordination is stronger amongst officials who have many
informal meetings with fellow WP participants compared to those with fewer such contacts.
As such, intensive informal contacts strengthen the effects of the particular organizational
principle of the WPs. These observations indicate that officials who devote much time and
energy towards EU committees are affected by the organizational principles underpinning the
EU committees.
However, table 5.14 also reveals two partially deviant observations. First, officials having
many informal contacts with fellow EC participants tend to co-ordinate strongly. Still,
intensive informal interaction amongst EC members tends to accompany stronger intra-
sectoral co-ordination patterns (r = .19*). Hence, this observation corresponds closely to the
predicted pattern. Second, permanent representatives having many informal contacts with
fellow EC members tend to have more extensive contacts with the national political
leadership when compared to permanent representatives who have less informal networks
with fellow EC members (r = .62**). This relationship may reflect the strong element of
territorial organization that underlies the permanent representations. Hence, intensive
participation on EU committees may support and strengthen the impact of the primary
institutional affiliations that embed the participants (cf. below).
Our analysis so far seems to confirm the theoretical propositions presented in Chapter 2. The
length and intensity of being exposed to certain organizational structures, even though these
structures are of secondary nature and embedded within collegial arrangements at the EU
level of governance, strengthens and support the effects generated by these structures. Further,
this section has indicated that intensive participation on EU committees strengthens the
effects from the organizational principles underpinning the primary institutional affiliations
embedding the participants (cf. table 5.14). However, this section also shows that the length
and intensity to which national government officials attend EU committees may have an
independent impact on modes of policy co-ordination amongst these participants. Being an
experienced and senior EU committee participants might outweigh some of the dynamics that
result from the EU committees’ organizational principles (cf. table 5.13). Summing up the
main observations provided in this section, administrative integration is promoted more
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amongst officials attending many ECs and who also attend many formal and informal EU
committee meetings.
The next section uncovers the extent to which the relationships presented so far are filtered
and modified by the various primary institutional affiliations that embed the EU committee
participants.
Different national institutional affiliations: Effects on co-ordination behaviour
The following section unveils how various domestic institutional affiliations affect modes of
policy co-ordination. More precisely, the following section illuminates the independent
(controlled) effect of domestic institutional affiliations on modes of policy co-ordination.
Thus, the control variable in the following section is the EU committee affiliations embedding
these officials.
Past research on decision-making behaviour amongst Norwegian civil servants reveal that the
ministry-agency nexus significantly affects modes of policy co-ordination (Christensen and
Egeberg 1997; Lægreid and Olsen 1984). Chapter 2 argued that cross-sectoral co-ordination
modes are more likely to be evoked amongst officials at the ministry level than at the agency
level. Moreover, the permanent representations, formally embassies under the auspices of the
MFA, are mainly organized according to a territorial principle. As such, permanent
representatives are likely to locate themselves close to the territorial end of the sectoral-
territorial dimension with respect to their co-ordination behaviour. Officials within the
diplomatic realms at the permanent representations, however, are more likely to enact cross-
sectoral modes of co-ordination than officials within the sectoral realms. The latter are
delegates from domestic sector ministries.
Consistent with the above propositions, table 5.15 reveals that cross-sectoral modes of co-
ordination, especially through the political leadership and the MFA13, are conducted more
extensively by officials at the ministry level than by agency personnel. Officials at the agency
level, on the other hand, pay considerably more attention to professional considerations, that
is, take positions on the basis of their own professional expertise, than do ministry level
officials. The same tendencies are revealed amongst the permanent representatives. Those
employed in the diplomatic realm have more frequent contacts with the MFA than officials in
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the sectoral realms. Henceforth, table 5.15 indicates how cross-sectoral modes of co-
ordination are strengthened as one moves from the agency level towards the ministry level
and as one moves from the sectoral realms towards the diplomatic realm at the permanent
missions. Table 5.15 also shows that these effects are present under different conditions, that
is, when controlling for the EU committee affiliations embedding these officials. The signs of
the correlations presented in table 5.15 are the same across the EC-WP nexus. This
observation reflects the pivotal and independent role played by the domestic institutional
affiliations in affecting modes of policy co-ordination.14 Consistent with these observations,
officials within the diplomatic realm at the permanent representations evoke cross-sectoral
modes of co-ordination more frequently than do their colleagues within the sectoral realms.
This effect is also shown to be robust when controlling for the EC-WP committee affiliations
embedding the permanent representatives.
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Table 5.15 Correlations between primary institutional affiliations and the co-ordination
behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).a
                                                                    domestic officials            permanent representatives
Co-ordination behaviour: EC WP EC WP
Contacts with the political
leadershipb………………………... .21* .42**
Contacts with the MFA…………... .32** .35* .49* .43**
Importance attached to the political
leadership………………………… .27**
Importance attached to my own
agency……………………………. -.35*




“I have to co-ordinate with the
MFA, or with other central
administrative institutions”………. .19* .37**
“My position has been co-
ordinated with all relevant
ministries”………………………... .23** .40**
“I often choose the positions to
follow in committee meetings”…... -.26**
“The positions I follow is based on
my professional expertice”……….. -.35** -.29*
Mean N…………………………… 118 56 22 36
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials within the domestic bureaucracy who are employed at the ministry level
(coded 1) and officials at the agency level (coded 2). At the permanent representations to the EU this table
compares officials from the diplomatic realms (coded 1) and officials employed within different sectoral
realms (coded 2).
b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1 and 2: often (1), fairly often
(2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5); variable 3, 4, 5 and 6: very important (1), fairly
important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); variable 7, 8, 9 and 10: always
(1), half of the time (2), never (3).
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As one example, when controlling for the EU committee affiliation, the impact of domestic
institutional affiliation is significantly negative depending on whether positions are “based on
professional expertise”. One Norwegian agency official reports that,
“I get no clear positions telling me what to say within the group” (author’s
translation). Similarly, one Swedish agency officials argues that “[i]t is difficult to
know what is the Swedish point of view” (author’s translation).
Still, no domestic officials participate on EU committees without mandates of some sort.
However, the amount of behavioural discretion available to the officials is reported to be more
substantial amongst officials at the agency level compared to officials at the ministry level
(Source: Interview). Moreover, at the agency level the amount of behavioural discretion is
greater amongst the Swedish officials than amongst the Danish and Norwegian civil servants:
52 per cent of Danish and 47 per cent of Norwegian agency officials report fairly great
amount of rule following in their daily business, the corresponding number in Sweden is 32
per cent (cf. Lægreid and Pedersen 1999). Despite these differences table 5.15 reveals that
particular national institutional affiliations accompany certain co-ordination behaviour
amongst Norwegian, Danish and Swedish EU committee participants. This statistical
relationship is shown to be robust when controlling for the various EU committees attended
by these officials. The fact that the signs of the relationships in table 5.15 are the same
amongst EC participants and WP participants partially reflects the strong impact of national
institutional variables (cf. the multiple regression analyses reported in endnote 18 of this
Chapter).
The values presented in table 5.15 indicate that some of the observations presented in the first
part of this Chapter, which reveal how different committees at the EU level affect co-
ordination behaviour, may be spurious. However, it is not possible to test for spuriousness in
the current analysis because in the questionnaire the committee affiliation variable is merged
with each dependent variable presented in table 5.15 (cf. Appendix 1 and 3).15
Table 5.16 reveals the effects generated by the formal rank positions of the EU committee
participants:
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Table 5.16 Correlations between rank positions within domestic government institutions
and the co-ordination behaviour evoked (Pearson’s r).a
                                                                          domestic officials      permanent representatives
Co-ordination behaviour: EC WP EC WP
Importance attached to the interest of
my own countryb…..………………….. .26**
“I have clear instructions as to what
positions to follow”…………………… .19*
“I often choose what positions to
follow”………………………………… -.21*
“I have great amount of freedom when
participating on EU committees”……... -.27**
Contacts with the MFA……………….. .40
Mean N………………………………... 139 -- 20 --
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials in top rank positions (coded 1) (director general, deputy director general,
head/deputy of unit/division) and officials in medium rank positions (coded 2) (head of section, senior
advisor, advisor).
b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: Variable 1: very important (1), fairly
important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); Variable 2, 3 and 4: always (1),
half of the time (2), never (3); variable 5: often (1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very
seldom (5).
As seen from table 5.16, officials in top rank positions tend to carry out cross-sectoral modes
of co-ordination more than officials in medium or lower rank positions, independent of their
diverse EU committee affiliations. However, table 5.16 does not adequately control for the
committee types that embed the civil servants. This is due to the lack of significant
correlations between rank positions and co-ordination behaviour amongst the WP participants.
What table 5.16 does reveal is that officials in top rank positions who attend ECs seem to
attach greater importance to the interest of their own country than do officials in medium or
lower rank positions (r = .26**). Similarly, officials in top rank positions report receiving
clearer instructions as to what positions to follow during EU committee meetings than
officials in medium or lower rank positions (r = .19*). Officials in medium rank positions
attending ECs often choose what positions to follow during the committee meetings (r = -
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.21*) and have greater leeway when participating (r = -.27**). The inverse pattern is revealed
amongst officials in top rank positions attending ECs.
Finally, government officials are highly pre-socialized and “pre-packed” before entering
formal positions within national ministries and agencies. Prior professional training may
continue to affect modes of behaviour after officials are assigned formal positions within
highly formalized organizations like domestic ministries and agencies. Table 5.17 takes into
consideration prior professional training amongst civil servants. Relating to the sectoral-
territorial dimension of co-ordination, law, economy and the social sciences are seen as
representing cross-sectoral disciplines and technical disciplines are associated with more
sectoral professions:16 As such, officials educated in law, economy and social sciences are
expected to co-ordinate more strongly across policy sectors than officials educated in
technical disciplines.
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Table 5.17 Correlations between formal education and the co-ordination behaviour
evoked (Pearson’s r).a
                                                                           domestic officials      permanent representatives
Co-ordination behaviour: EC WP EC WP
Contacts with the political leadershipb.. .29* .38*
Contacts with the MFA……………….. .34** .49**
Heeding signals from the political
leadership……………………………... .22* .55*
Heeding professional considerations….. .36*
Importance attached to the MFA……… .48**
“I have to co-ordinate with the MFA, or
with other central administrative
institutions…………………………….. .41**
Mean N………………………………... 139 33 24 37
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This variable compares officials educated in law, social sciences and economy (coded 1) and officials
educated in technical disciplines (coded 2).
b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: variable 1 and 2: often (1), fairly often
(2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5); variable 3, 4 and 5: very important (1), fairly
important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5); variable 6: always (1), half of the
time (2), never (3).
Table 5.17 shows that educational background and professional affiliations do impact on
modes of policy co-ordination. Lawyers, economists and social scientists tend to co-ordinate
cross-sectorally more frequently than officials educated in various technical disciplines,
regardless of the EU committees attended. Conversely, technicians co-ordinate intra-
sectorally to a larger extent than lawyers, economists and social scientists. For example,
lawyers, economists and social scientists at the permanent representations tend to co-ordinate
cross-sectorally (paying attention to signals from the political leadership), whereas technicians
at the permanent representations co-ordinate more intra-sectoral, regardless of the EU
committees attended. Thus, modes of policy co-ordination tend to correlate with educational
backgrounds as much as with committee affiliations.
*     *     *
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Since we are left with some statistically significant bivariate relationships between some
independent variables and some dependent variables, multiple OLS regression analyses are
provided. I have shown above that it is not possible to uncover the relative explanatory
potential of the EU committee affiliation variable. The following paragraphs study the relative
explanatory potential of (i) the intensity and length of participation within EU committees,
and (ii) different primary institutional affiliations.17 This analysis, however, concentrates on
the data from the ‘domestic officials’. No regression analysis has been conducted on the data
from the ‘Permanent representation’ data due to low N (cf. the above tables). The multiple
regression analyses are presented in the following endnote:18
Firstly, the multiple regression analyses presented in tables 5.18 and 5.21 unveil that the
intensity of attending EU committees have a significant and independent impact on the co-
ordination behaviour evoked by the participants. Hence, the intensity to which national
officials attend EU committees seems to have a stronger impact on the co-ordination
behaviour evoked by the participants than the sheer length of participation. Attending many
EU committees and informal meetings is a stronger predictor of the co-ordination behaviour
evoked by the participants than the length of attendance. Officials participating intensively on
EU committees tend to co-ordinate less than officials participating less intensively. Still, the
relative explanatory potential of the EC-WP variable is not identified on the basis of these
figures. Tables 5.22 to 5.27 in endnote 18, studying the relative explanatory potential of
different primary institutional affiliations, the ministry-agency variable turns out most
important. Officials at the ministry level tend to co-ordinate more strongly cross-sectorally
than officials at the agency level.
Conclusion
Studies of public administration increasingly try to understand how multi-level institutional
structures affect decision processes at each level. This study suggests ways of conducting
such studies. Our initial arguments emphasise that primary institutional affiliations may
provide vital cues for decision behaviour within government organizations. However, this
Chapter also identifies conditions under which secondary institutional affiliations towards
Commission expert committees and Council working parties affect the co-ordination
behaviour enacted by the participants. Under conditions of intensive and protracted cross-
level participation, domestic co-ordination processes may reflect the EU committee
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affiliations embedding national civil servants. I have argued that different organizational
principles – domestically as well as within various EU committees – are likely to affect modes
of co-ordination.
The empirical analysis presented in this Chapter supports these arguments. With respect to the
principles of organization, inter-sectoral modes of policy co-ordination tend to be evoked
more extensively amongst officials participating on Council WPs than amongst those
attending Commission ECs. Moreover, as regards techniques applied to co-ordinating EU
dossiers, written instructions are reported more frequently amongst WP participants than
amongst EC participants. Among the latter, anticipated reaction and unwritten ‘positions’ are
more common. Moreover, the effects from the different organizational principles are
strengthened subsequent to officials attending these committees with a high level of intensity.
Hence, officials attending ECs fairly intensively are shown to co-ordinate less strongly than
officials participating fairly intensively on WPs. Assuming that the general lack of policy co-
ordination within national central administrations propels administrative integration,
administrative integration is fostered most extensively amongst officials who are intensive
attendants to Commission expert committees, especially if the participants attend many
committees and a great deal of formal and informal committee meetings. This Chapter has
revealed that the intensity to which national civil servants attend EU committees has an
independent causal impact on their co-ordination behaviour. The multiple regression analyses
also show that the intensity dimension has stronger explanatory power than the length
dimension for the evoked co-ordination behaviour.
Notwithstanding these observations, this study also indicates the pivotal role played by
domestic institutions in affecting the co-ordination behaviour of national civil servants. When
controlling for different EU committee affiliations, the current study reveals that domestic
institutional affiliations have independent causal impact on the co-ordination behaviour
evoked by national officials. Moreover, the regression analyses indicate that the relative
explanatory power of the intensity and length variable is generally lower than that of domestic
institutional affiliations. Thus, despite providing clear indications of the re-socializing
potential of EU committees (cf. Chapter 6), this analysis also shows that the ministry versus
agency distinction is important when accounting for the co-ordination behaviour of EU
committee participants.
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Henceforth, administrative integration, as measured by the co-ordination behaviour evoked by
national civil servants attending EU committees, seems strongly affected (i) by the
organizational principles of EU committees and domestic government institutions, and (ii) by
the intensity to which national officials attend EU committees. When comparing Norwegian,
Swedish and Danish civil servants, Norwegian officials attend solely Commission expert
committees organized according to a sectoral principle. Moreover, Norwegian officials
participate fairly intensively on these committees. Hence, administrative integration is shown
to be fairly strong amongst Norwegian government officials. This is due to the weaker level
of cross-sectoral co-ordination behaviour evoked by the Norwegian EC participants. The EEA
agreement may, thus, provide for fairly strong administrative integration across levels of
governance. Danish and Swedish officials, in contrast, have dual institutional affiliations
towards both ECs and WPs. Moreover, Danish and Swedish government officials generally
attend EU committees more intensively than do their Norwegian colleagues. (cf. Chapter 4).
Officials at the Danish and Swedish permanent representations interact fairly intensively
towards the WPs (cf. Chapter 4). Having demonstrated that intensity of participation on EU
committees has an independent causal impact on modes of policy co-ordination,
administrative integration is fostered amongst Danish and Swedish officials attending EU
committees. However, administrative integration is less strong amongst those Danish and
Swedish officials attending WPs fairly intensively. Finally, the current analysis also reveals
that various domestic institutional affiliations have significant and independent impact on the
co-ordination behaviour evoked by EU committee participants.
The next Chapter moves towards measuring administrative integration through the identities
and role perceptions evoked by the EU committee participants. The next Chapter also studies
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 Hocking (1999) argues, however, that the notion of the gate-keeping role of the MFA must be understood
ideal-typically. The MFA has never had omnipotence as far as governance of the domestic-international interface
is concerned. “Rather [the MFA has] been more usually engaged in bureaucratic bargaining processes with other
government agencies intent on carving out for themselves a role in various areas of international policymaking”
(Hocking 1999: 3). As such, “’gate-keeping’ continues to be what it has frequently been, namely a shared
activity, on occasions involving conflicts with other key government departments” (Hocking 1999: 14).
3
 The current chapter analyses how different organizational principles, as embedded within the EU Commission
and the Council of Ministers, affects modes of co-ordination. The modus operandi of the Commission and the
Council is different. They are located at different phases of the decision-making cycles of the EU machinery.
Still, the current chapter does not make any efforts at theorizing decision-phases. Organizational principles are
put to the fore in this study partly because organizational principles are under-researched in general, and partially
because one can derive testable hypotheses from the notion of organizational principles more easily than from
the notion of decision-phases.
4
 A similar observation is made in Germany where the co-ordination role of the MFA is seen as synonymous
with that of  “a postman” (Derlien 1999: 5).
5
 Due to small N and to few officials participating solely on Commission expert committees it is not possible to
make this distinction in the data from the permanent representations. This argument is valid for all tables
presented within this chapter. Moreover, tables making the distinction between officials solely attending ECs
and officials attending both ECs and WPs are presented only when the latter distinction accompanies
observations that deviate significantly from the ‘original’ table. This argument is valid also for chapter 6.
6
 Still, 38 (53 per cent) of the Swedish officials and 6 (14 per cent) of the Danish officials participate solely on
ECs. Hence, the distinction made in table 5.2 does not correspond perfectly to the distinction between different
countries. Moreover, 32 (44 per cent) of the Swedish officials and 35 (80 per cent) of the Danish officials
participate on both ECs and WPs. Finally, only 2 (3 per cent) of the Swedish officials and 1 (3 per cent) of the
Danish officials participate solely on WPs. To sum up, amongst the Danish and Swedish officials 38 per cent
(44) participate solely on ECs, 58 per cent (67) participate on ECs and WPs, while 3 per cent (3) participate
solely on WPs (cf. also Chapter 4).
7
 40 per cent of the officials solely participating on Commission expert committees report their decision
behaviour to be governed by rules and practises to a fairly great extent, or more. On the other hand, 52 per cent
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of those officials participating on both ECs and WPs report their decision behaviour to be governed by rules and
practises to a fairly great extent, or more.
8
 Time pressure is reported as one additional hindrance for co-ordination (cf. Hayes-Renschaw and Wallace
1997: 237). Still, time pressure is reported to be more extensive in the Swedish than in the Norwegian central
administration (source: interviews; cf. Larsen et al. 1999: 123; SOU 1996:6: 65; Sundström 1999: 41). “There
is usually only a weak or two between the mailing of the agenda and the plenary meetings” (Van Kippersluis
1998: 56). This observation is only partially supported by Schaefer et al. (2000: 6): According to Schaefer et al.
(2000), the availability of documentation for committee meetings is mostly a day or two before in the Council
working parties. However, most of those officials attending Commission expert committees report that they
receive documentation a week before the meetings. Consequently, the potential for making co-ordinated
preparations before committee meetings should be better amongst those officials attending the Council working
parties. Thus, the time pressure on Norwegian officials attending Commission expert committees should be
greater than the corresponding time pressure on Swedish and Danish officials attending Council working parties.
Moreover, the technical complexity of many EU directives – especially within the environmental field – adds to
these co-ordination problems (Jordan et al. 1999; Sundström 1999: 42). Technical complexity is also a major
hindrance for the politicisation of EU questions. Within the Norwegian Parliament only a few MPs are able to
derive political implications from the vast majority of EU directives (Nordby and Veggeland 1999).
Finally, additional explanations of the co-ordination behaviour evoked by EU committee participants is
the increased number of issue areas dealt with at the EU level, the political salience of different issue areas for
the national political leadership, the six-month long Presidency of the EU, and the co-ordination needed during
Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) (Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000: 4-5).
9
 In our sample from the ‘home administration’, 51 per cent of the Danish officials entered ECs before 1990,
whereas only 5 per cent of the Norwegian officials and 2 per cent of the Swedish officials entered them before
1990. Regarding participation on WPs, all of the Swedish officials entered these committees for the first time
after 1994 (when Sweden became affiliated to the EEA agreement), while most of the Danish officials entered
long before 1994 (cf. Chapter 4).
10
 Most of the variables presented in tables 5.11 to 5.19 are not ‘natural’ metric variables. Most of them may
substantially be viewed as non-metric variables, i.e the variable ‘co-ordination with all relevant departments
within their own institution’ has the following values: always (1), half of the time (2), seldom (3). Other
variables have five values, i.e. the importance attached to the MFA, having the following values: very important
(1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5). In an effort at utilising as
much information as possible contained in such variables, they are treated as metric variables in the statistical
analyses. Moreover, the low N renders the analysis vulnerable for dichotomies where the univariate distributions
are skewed, rendering some cells close to empty. This problem is reduced when using the original value-scale on
the variables. Moreover, an ad-hoc procedure has been applied in the current analysis. Correlations exceeding
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.40, but which is not significant, are presented in the tables. Correlations exceeding .40 are strong, but might be
insignificant due to low N.
11
 Owing to systematic selection of data, significance tests do not reveal any information about any theoretical
universe. On the contrary, however, significance may tell us something about the robustness of the relationships
tested (cf. Chapter 3). Moreover, owing to the low N, and aiming at studying only fairly robust relationships,
Pearson’s r not being significant at the 95 % or the 99 % levels, or Pearson’s being lower than .40 are not shown
in the tables. On this basis, the likelihood for random errors is reduced.
12
 Those officials participating on many EU committees also seem to take part in many formal meetings
(Pearson’s r = .23**, N = 159). Moreover, those attending many committees are also generally senior
participants (Pearson’s r = .34**, N = 159) (cf. Chapter 4).
13
 Pearson’s r = .32**, N = 148 amongst the domestic ministry and agency officials.
14
 The fact that EC and WP participants enact fairly similar co-ordination behaviour may also reflect the dual
role expectations presented to these officials. Owing to contending principles of organization present within both
ECs and WPs, officials at the ministry level are expected to act like ‘government officials’ and ‘expert
representatives’ within both ECs and WPs (cf. Chapter 6).
15
 A test of the independent explanatory status of EU committee affiliation would require cross-tabulations, at
least controlling for the ministry-agency affiliation. This test is not done here because it would render only a few
units in some of the cells (especially amongst ministry officials – cf. Chapter 3 on the number of officials
underpinning this study).
16
 The general role orientation of lawyers, economists and social scientists are likely to be more cross-sectoral
(generalists) whereas the general orientation of officials educated in various technical disciplines is likely to be
more intra-sectoral (specialists). However, linking law, economy and social sciences into the same variable gives
one major problem. While the law education and various economy educations are professional in character,
which may instil strong professional allegiances in the officials, most social science disciplines are cross-
disciplinary. Thus, the level of professional allegiance may differ between these disciplines (Zuna 1999).
17
 Diagnostics of collinearity between the independent variables analysed in tables 5.18 to 5.28 unveil no
indications of multicollinearity. Thus, the independent variables seem to have independent causal impact on the
dependent variables.
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18
 Multiple regression analyses:
Table 5.18 Factors related to the importance attached to the MFA: EC participants (Pearson’s r and
beta).a, b
Pearson’s r Beta
Length of participationc……………………………... -.26* -.18
Number of committees attended……………………... -.38** -.33**
Mean N………………………………………………... 94
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
Adjusted R2 = .16  (R2 = .17)
a) Due to low N in some analyses, we use the adjusted R2 in some tables in order to correct for possible
skewness in the data.
b) The dependent variable has the following values: very important (coded 1), fairly important (2), both/and
(3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).
c) Independent variable 1 has the following values: entered EU committees for the first time after 1994 (coded
2), entered EU committees before 1994 (coded 1). Independent variable 2 has the following values: having
participated on a maximum of 2 EU committees (coded 2), having participated on more than 2 EU
committees (coded 1).
Table 5.19 Factors related to what extent frame notes, problem notes and instructions govern the positions
followed during EU committee meetings: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta
Length of participationb……………………………... .26* .17
Number of informal meetings attended……………… .40** .35**
Mean N………………………………………………... 58
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
Adjusted R2 = .15 (R2 = .18)
a) The dependent variable has the following values: to a very great extent (coded 1), to a fairly great extent
(2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5).
b) Independent variable 1: cf. the value labels in table 5.18. Independent variable 2: having informal meetings
with fellow committee participants fairly often, or more, (coded 1), fewer informal meetings (2).
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Table 5.20 Factors related to contacts with the MFA: EC participants (Pearson’s r and beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta








*) p  .05          **) p  .01
R2 = .06
a) The dependent variable has the following values: very often (1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom
(4), very seldom (5).
b) Independent variable 1 has the following values: cf. table 5.18. Independent variable 2 has the following
values: ministry level (1), agency level (2). Independent variable 3 has the following value: law, social
science, and economy (1), technical disciplines (2).
Table 5.21 Factors related to the importance attached to the political leadership: EC participants
(Pearson’s r and beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta
Numbers of committees attendedb…………………….. -.21* -.23*
The ministry/agency affiliation……………………….. .27** .32**
Mean N………………………………………………... 99
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
R2 = .15
a) The dependent variable has the following values: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3),
fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).
b) Independent variable 1 has the following values: cf. table 5.18. Independent variable 2 has the following
values: cf. table 5.20.
Table 5. 22 Factors related to contacts with the MFA: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta
The ministry/agency affiliationb………………………. .35** .36*
Educational background………………………………. .49** .32**
Mean N………………………………………………... 39
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
Adjusted R2 = .32 (R2 = .39)
a) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.
b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.
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Table 5.23 Factors related to contacts with the political leadership: EC participants (Pearson’s r and
beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta
The ministry/agency affiliationb………………………. .21* .28*
Educational background………………………………. .29* .17
Mean N………………………………………………... 82
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
Adjusted R2 = .12 (R2 = .15)
a) The dependent variable has the following values: often (coded 1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly
seldom (4), very seldom (5).
b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.
Table 5.24 Factors related to contacts with the political leadership: WP participants (Pearson’s r and
beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta
The ministry/agency affiliationb………………………. .42** .50**
Educational background………………………………. .38* .16
Mean N………………………………………………... 38
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
Adjusted R2 = .30 (R2 = .34)
a) Value labels: cf. table 5.23.
b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.
Table 5.25 Factors related to the following assertion: “I often choose what positions to follow”: EC
participants (Pearson’s r and beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta
The ministry/agency affiliationb………………………. -.26** -.30**
Formal rank…………………………………………… -.21* .16*
Mean N………………………………………………... 132
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
R2 = .12
a) The dependent variable has the following values: always (1), half of the time (2), never (3).
b) Independent variable 1 has the following values: cf. table 5.20. Independent variable 2 has the following
values: top rank positions (1), medium or lower rank positions (2).
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Table 5.26 Factors related to signals from the political leadership: EC participants (Pearson’s r and
beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta
The ministry/agency affiliationb………………………. .30** .31**
Educational background………………………………. .22** .10
Mean N………………………………………………... 132
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
R2 = .11
a) The dependent variable has the following values: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3),
fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).
b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.
Table 5.27 Factors related to the following assertion: “I have to co-ordinate with the MFA, or with other
central administrative institutions”: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta
The ministry/agency affiliationb………………………. .37** .26**
Educational background………………………………. .41** .31**
Mean N………………………………………………... 45
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
Adjusted R2 = .17 (R2 = .22)
a) The dependent variable has the following values: often (coded 1), fairly often (2), sometimes (3), fairly
seldom (4), very seldom (5).
b) Value labels: cf. table 5.20.
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CHAPTER 6
ACCESS, VOICE AND LOYALTY
REPRESENTATIONAL ROLES AMONGST NATIONAL CIVIL
SERVANTS ATTENDING EU COMMITTEES
Introduction1
The role of EU committees in the EU decision-making process has been subject to increased
academic interest during the last years, partly due to the important role of committees in the
operation of the single European market (Chapter 4; cf. Joerges and Vos 1999; Van
Schendelen 1998). Chapter 4 has shown that a large number of representatives from national
government administrations participate on EU committee and become "fused" in important
decision-making and decision-shaping processes at the European level. National civil servants
have gained better access to the EU institutions and play important roles as both voices of
national views in the EU and as voices of narrow special interests (Rometch and Wessels
1996; Trondal and Veggeland 2000). Previous studies have also indicated that participation
on EU committees creates a potential for affecting the roles and loyalties of the participants
(Christoph 1993; Egeberg 1999b; Joerges and Neyer 1997; Kerremans 1996; Schaefer et al.
2000; Trondal and Veggeland 2000).
These observations lead to one question that have attracted less scholarly attention. When
attending EU committees, what kind of representative roles do the participants evoke? In
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other words, do national civil servants, when attending EU committees, consider themselves
mainly as national government representatives, as independent experts, or merely as
supranational agents? Do they represent their national governments, particular professional
interests or supranational EU interests when attending EU committee meetings? The current
study thus confronts one classical problem in public administration that of the inherent
conflict built into the domestic government apparatus between political loyalty to the political
leadership and professional autonomy (Christensen 1991; Jacobsen 1960 and 1966).
However, the EU level adds a new dimension to this classical conflict: supranational
allegiances. According to intergovernmental perspectives, the EU is an arena for bargaining
between national government representatives. According to this view the possibility for role
conflicts to emerge is not acknowledged, or at least not taken into serious consideration.
Implicit in the intergovernmental perspective is a notion of ‘imperative representation’ (see
below) where the civil servants are expected to behave solely as national representatives.
However, as asserted by neo-functionalists, civil servants may over time shift loyalties from a
national to a supranational level; thus approaching the idea of liberal representation (Egeberg
1999b; Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998). Additionally, because national officials are
primarily employed in sectoral ministries and agencies at the national level and participate on
highly specialised expert committees and networks at the EU level (cf. Chapter 4), they may
put more weight on professional autonomy than on political loyalties.
I have argued in Chapter 2 that a cognitive organization theory perspective may occupy a
middle ground between the intergovernmental and the neo-functional notion of European
integration. Moreover, a cognitive organization theory perspective is warranted in order to
pay adequate attention to the potential conflicts between political loyalty, professional
autonomy, and supranational allegiances. Implicit in the cognitive approach to administrative
integration is a notion of ‘ambiguous representation’ (see below), where the civil servants act
upon multiple roles and allegiances. The ambiguity lies in the fact that it is not always clear to
whom the representative is responsible. Which of the role conceptions most strongly evoked–
the government representative role, the independent expert role or the supranational agent role
- depend on the institutional affiliations that embed the civil servants. A cognitive perspective
on administrative integration presupposes that the civil servants' main loyalty will remain at
the national level as long as their primary institutional affiliations are to national government
institutions. However, a situation of ambiguous representation questions the possibility of
maintaining strict national control over the committee participants.
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As such, the mix of different role and identity perceptions evoked by EU committee
participants may reflect the particular institutional affiliations embedding the civil servants. In
the following, an elaboration of the notion of representation is provided. Next, three models of
representation are suggested: imperative representation, liberal representation, and ambiguous
representation. Finally, this Chapter applies empirical data on Danish, Norwegian and
Swedish government officials attending Commission expert committees and Council working
parties in order to test the merit of the cognitive perspective on administrative integration.
The concept of representation
The concept of representation is poorly understood and has meant different things to those
who have studied it (Pitkin 1972). At the etymological level, representation means, “making
present again” (Pitkin 1972: 8). Thus, representation means “the making present in some
sense of something which is nevertheless not present literally or in fact” (Pitkin 1972: 8-9 -
original emphasis). “The term ‘representation’ directs attention first of all, to the attitudes,
expectations and behaviours of the represented” (Eulau et al. 1959: 743). As such,
representation depends, amongst other things, on how it is conceived by the representative
and by the represented. One vital question is how people come to perceive this conception.
Suggestively, the role and identity perceptions evoked by national civil servants are vital in
determining their representational status. The representative status is measured not so much
by procedures for selecting the representatives, their demographic characteristics, or by the
output of action pursued by the representatives, as by the role and identity perceptions evoked
by them (Lægreid and Olsen 1978: 16-17).2 An individual is representative in a symbolic
sense ‘by what he is or how he is regarded’ (Pitkin 1972: 113).
Representation always involves a relationship between the representative(s) and those
represented; “the relationship between the representative and the represented is at the core of
representational theory” (Eulau 1959: 743). Theories of representation have been mainly
occupied with the relationship between the electorate and the elected politicians. This study
emphasises the relationships between individual civil servants and bureaucratic institutions at
the national and at the EU level of governance.  This relationship may be based on trust or
enmity, on formal or informal rules, on shared notions of representative quality or on
contending notions of true representation. More importantly for our study, the symbolic
relationship between representatives and their constituents may vary between two extremes.
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At one extreme, representation means evoking role and identity conceptions that are closely
and solely knit to constituents (an imperative notion of representation). On the other extreme,
representation means having the free will to evoke roles and identities that deviate from this
constituency (a liberal notion of representation). Between these extremes, representation
means having multiple role and identity conceptions, thus highlighting a notion of role
conflict (an ambiguous notion of representation). Hence, the ambiguous nature of
representation represents a middle ground between the imperative and the liberal notion of
representation. A more thorough elaboration of these three models of representation is
provided in the next section.
Role and identity perceptions are important to study because they have “a significant
influence on human behaviour” (Sen 1998: 5). Studying roles and identities as the actors
themselves conceive of them, “we will be in the best possible position to explain the
behaviour” of these actors (Searing 1994: 14; cf. Eulau 1959: 746; Wish 1980: 535). A further
rationale for studying the symbolic aspects of representation is the lack of such research in
general, and especially the lack of such research in studies of EU committees. “Over forty
years after the European project began, it is striking how little we know about its socialization
and identity-shaping effects on national agents” (Checkel 1999: 545; cf. also Caporaso,
Cowles and Risse 2001; Szakolczai 1998: 1). Finally, studying EU committees can also show
how multiple institutional affiliations trigger role conflicts and identity conflicts amongst the
domestic government officials attending these committees.
Deriving empirical propositions from theory: Three models of representation
Three different models of representation are outlined in this section. However, these models
have different analytical statuses in this Chapter. The notions of imperative representation and
liberal representation are outlined in an effort to present three different representational roles:
a ‘government representative’ role, an ‘independent expert’ role, and finally a ‘supranational
agent’ role. The idea of ambiguous representation is used primarily to show how the potential
mix of these three representational roles may shift under different institutional conditions.
An imperative notion of representation.
At one extreme, the idea of imperative representation maintains that “true representation
occurs only when the representative acts on explicit instructions from their constituents”
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(Pitkin 1972: 146). From a symbolic viewpoint, true representation occurs only when
representatives evoke roles that are tightly knit to their constituents. Defenders of this concept
tend to view representatives as uni-dimensional servants and delegates with respect to
institutional affiliations and allegiances (Olsen 1988: 162). “The possibility of conflict in
role orientations is clearly envisaged and resolved in favour of subordinating one’s
independence to what is considered a superior authority” (Eulau 1959: 750).
As seen from an imperative perspective, domestic civil servants evoke solely the role as a
‘government representative’ when attending EU committees. As such, role conceptions are
seen as rigidly fixed and stable, impossible to mould or remould during EU committee
meetings. EU committees are viewed as intergovernmental arenas for a “give and take”
between sovereign nation-states mediated through their delegates. Thus, participation within
EU committees has no significant impact on the role and identity perceptions evoked by the
delegates (cf. Chapter 1). If the representative, however, does evoke roles and identities that
deviate significantly from the ‘government representative’ role, the representative may be
recalled, either permanently or temporarily (Christophersen 1986). The delegates, thus, have
clear incentives not to deviate from the ‘government representation’ role when attending EU
committees.
A liberal notion of representation.
At the other extreme lies the idea of “complete independence” of the representative (Pitkin
1972: 146). True representation emerges only when the representative has the leeway to
evoke role and identity perceptions which may deviate from the ‘government representative’
role. Representational roles must “not be bound by instructions, from whatever source, but
must be guided by what Burke called ‘his unbiased opinion, his mature judgement, his
enlightened conscience’” (Eulau 1959: 744). Defenders of this representation concept tend to
view political questions as difficult and complex and beyond the capacities of ordinary
individuals. Representatives are seen as experts with a great deal of behavioural discretion at
their disposal, resembling Plato’s ‘wise men’ pursuing “superior understanding of the subject
and the procedures of decision-making” (Rometsch and Wessels 1997: 216). Decisions are
reached by trustees on the basis of ‘the best arguments’ (Olsson 1993). The liberal concept of
representation builds on a deliberative perspective where free individuals act to reach the
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‘best’ solutions on the basis of the ‘best’ arguments (Christophersen 1986: 37; Eriksen and
Fossum 2000; Eulau 1959: 744).
The liberal representation concept signifies that weak links may exist between representatives
and those they represent. To give one example, frequent interaction with representatives from
other EU member states during EU committee meetings may increase the likelihood that the
representatives ‘go native’. Frequent participation on committees may also affect the role and
identity perceptions evoked by the participants (Joerges and Neyer 1997). Being supranational
institutions, frequent interaction on Commission expert committees and Council working
parties may influence national civil servants to evoke supranational role and identity
perceptions. A supranational role involves conceiving of one self as an ‘EU participant’ or,
more accurately, as an ‘EU committee participant’ (cf. Chapter 2). These role and identity
perceptions are likely to be moulded differently within Commission expert committees and
Council working parties. Commission expert committees, organized according to a sectoral
principle, deal with highly complex and technical dossiers and involve domestic civil servants
with high technical expertise (cf. Chapters 2 and 4). Hence, officials attending these
committees are likely to enact the role of an ‘independent expert’. Council working parties,
which are organized according to a geographical organization principle, deal with more
politicised issues and recruit civil servants with educational backgrounds mainly from law (cf.
Chapters 2 and 4). These officials are likely to evoke the ‘government representative’ role
more strongly than the ‘independent expert’ role.
Hence, EU committees may be seen as transformative entities that contribute to the enactment
of supranational role and identity perceptions amongst the participants. Even more, intensive
and protracted participation on EU committees can increase the likelihood that supranational
role and identity perceptions are enacted amongst the participants. In the current study, the
liberal representation model involves two role perceptions that transcend the ‘government
representative’ role: (i) the ‘independent expert’ role, and (ii) the ‘supranational agent’ role.
Moreover, parallel to figure 1.2 in Chapter 1, the ‘independent expert’ role transcends
intergovernmentalism along a sectoral-territorial dimension; the ‘supranational agent’ role
transcends intergovernmentalism along a national-supranational axis. Intensive and sustained
participation on Commission expert committees increases the likelihood that the participants
evoke the two latter role perceptions. Intensive and sustained participation on Council
working parties is more likely to mobilise supranational and government representative roles
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amongst the participants. The liberal representation concept highlights a delegation problem
(Kiewiet og McCubbins 1991; Pollack 1997), along both the sectoral-territorial axis and the
national-supranational axis. The crucial point of this problem is the degree to which civil
servants (agents) act on role and identity perceptions of their own choosing rather than on
those of the government (principals). This problem can occur in those instances where
committee participants develop loyalties that are in conflict with their role as national
government representatives. The delegation problem and the problem of representation,
therefore, are different sides of the same coin (Mayntz 1999).
An ambiguous notion of representation.
A middle ground between the imperative and the liberal models of representation is seized by
the notion of ambiguous representation (Olsen 1988). Whereas the basis for representation is
fairly clear and uncontested in the two former models, representative quality has no clear
basis in this third model. Rather, the representative is seen as having multiple obligations,
institutional affiliations and allegiances. The uni-dimensional model of representation is
superseded by a concept of multiple representation, which also introduces role conflict as a
constitutive aspect of self (Barnett 1993: 276; Elster 1986; Jacobsen 1960; Lægreid and Olsen
1978; March and Olsen 1989; Stryker and Statham 1985: 336).3 The idea of role conflict
introduced by ambiguous representation might be visualised as follows:
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Figure 6.1 A geometrical triangle of representation.4
                                             The ‘supranational agent’ role
 Role conflict
   
                            NS        NS
The ‘government           The ‘independent expert’
representative’ role     role
         ST
Key:
NS: the national – supranational dimension of administrative integration
ST: the sectoral – territorial dimension of administrative integration
Ambiguous representation introduces organizational variables as scope conditions that affect
the relative validity of the two extreme representation modes presented above. As such,
institutional factors give momentum to the model presented in figure 6.1. The possible mix of
role perceptions evoked by an official will be different under different ‘institutional
conditions’ (cf. Eulau 1959: 750). Representatives are embedded within formal organizations
that focus only on selected aspects of the reality (Olsen 1988: 167-168; Schattschneider
1960). Representatives also have multiple memberships and true representation is a function
of the mix of different role and identity perceptions stemming from these memberships. The
representative quality is a result of the interplay and conflict between various representational
roles (March and Olsen 1989; Olsen 1988: 169). In being exposed to contending role
expectations from different institutions, representatives may take on a partially conflicting set
of roles. The notion of representative ambiguity therefore views government systems as
fragmented and with multiple representative channels (Rokkan 1966). It becomes increasingly
201
difficult to determine who the representatives actually are and who they represent (Olsen
1988: 170).
Identifying the institutional contexts in which the representative(s) are embedded can reduce
representative ambiguity (Aggestam 1998: 7). In the following, some scope conditions, or
independent variables are suggested as "switching points” between the roles shown in figure
6.1. The role perceptions evoked by EU committee participants are likely to be affected by the
EU committees on which they attend and by the domestic government institutions in which
they have permanent positions. Committee members can be seen as wearing a modern Janus
face (Lewis 1998: 483). When domestic government officials participate on EU committees,
“they must understand the perceptions and preferences of their interaction partners as well as
those of their own organization …” (Mayntz 1999: 84). Generally, we expect that intensive
and sustained participation on EU committees is likely to accompany the enactment of
supranational role perceptions by the participants. Moreover, assuming that Commission
expert committees are largely sectoral in character, officials that frequently attend
Commission expert committees are likely to evoke supranational roles that are largely
sectoralized in character. Hence, officials devoting a great deal of time and energy attending
Commission expert committees are likely to evoke roles as ‘independent experts’ and as
‘supranational agents’ more extensively than roles as ‘government representatives’ (Egeberg
1999b; Trondal and Veggeland 2000; Veggeland 2000). As such, the likelihood of enacting
role perceptions that are tightly linked to their own domestic government institution is
weakened. Officials frequently attending Council working parties are more likely to evoke a
mixture of ‘supranational agent’ roles and ‘government representative’ roles.
The concept of ambiguous representation implies that the roles evoked by civil servants are
affected most strongly by their primary institutional affiliations. From a cognitive
organization theory perspective, the primary institutional affiliations embedding civil servants
affect their role and identity perceptions more extensively than their EU committee
affiliations (Egeberg 1999b; Herrmann and Brewer 2000: 13; Trondal 2000). Moreover,
domestic civil servants have many different institutional affiliations at the domestic arena.
These affiliations include: employment at the permanent representations or in the national
bureaucracy, employment at the ministry or agency5, employment at the sectoral or the
diplomatic realms of the permanent missions, employment in medium or top rank positions,
they are senior officials or have served for only shorter periods of time within the domestic
202
central administration, they have different degrees of behavioural discretion at their disposal,
etc. Generally, most of these primary institutional factors are likely to influence processes
through which the representatives enact supranational role perceptions (Mayntz 1999: 84-85).
However, these primary institutional affiliations are likely to have different impacts on the
‘independent expert’ role and the ‘government representative’ role. As will be empirically
illustrated in the next section, sectoral role perceptions are likely to be evoked more
extensively by domestic officials at the agency level than amongst officials at the permanent
representations, and more by officials in medium or lower rank positions than by officials in
top rank positions.
A cognitive organization theory perspective introduces “switching points” in the role conflict
model presented in figure 6.1. However, the scope conditions suggested above are not
exhaustive, only suggestive. The central idea is that multiple institutional affiliations may
affect the relative strength of the representational roles enacted. This has the effect of making
representation largely ambiguous to the representative. In the next section we study
empirically the extent to which access to EU committees affects the loyalties of the
participants (read: their role and identity perceptions). Two main hypotheses are tested. The
first is that intensive and protracted participation on Commission expert committees and
Council working parties (read: access and voice) results in loyalty shifts and loyalty transfers
amongst the participants (read: the enactment of ‘supranational agent’ roles). The second is
that the mix of intra-sectoral and inter-sectoral role and identity perceptions (‘independent
expert’ roles and ‘government representative’ roles) is affected in particular ways by different
EU committees and by different domestic institutional affiliations. Thus, both the national-
supranational dimension and the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration
are accounted for in the current Chapter. The ambiguous representation model is empirically
illustrated in the following sections.
The empirical record: Representational roles amongst Scandinavian EU
committee participants
In the following section, two main questions are considered. Does attendance on different EU
committees and being from different domestic administrative institutions accompany
particular representational roles amongst national civil servants? This question mainly relates
to the sectoral–territorial dimension of administrative integration. Independent expert roles
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represent the sectoral end of this spectrum whilst the government representative role
represents the opposite end of this axis. The second question is how the intensity and length
of participation on EU committees affect the national-supranational role dimension. Having
assumed in Chapter 2 that the length and intensity to which civil servants attend EU
committees influence supranational role perceptions, the second section is devoted to the
national-supranational dimension of administrative integration.
The first section, however, illustrates how participation on different EU committees can cause
different role and identity perceptions amongst the delegates. In the following, different
operational measures are used to illuminate different representational roles. Similar to Chapter
5, different dependent variables are applied in the current Chapter to detect certain empirical
patterns (Yin 1993).
Accounting for the sectoral-territorial role dimension.
Effects of EU committee affiliations.
Suggestively, the ‘government representative’ role is attended to more extensively by WP
participants than by EC participants. Table 6.1 applies different operational measures to show
the ‘government representative’ role.
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Table 6.1 Percentage of officials evoking a ‘government representative’ role.a
                                                                                                                              permanent
                                                                                     domestic officials          representatives
The ‘government representative’ role: EC WP EC WP
Feeling allegiance towards my own government. 81 93 85 97
Heeding signals from the political leadership….. 62 95 59 97
Heeding the interests of my own country………. 70 82 86 95
Feeling allegiance towards the MFAb……….…. -- -- 44 59
Mean N…………………………………………. 138 56 21 36
a) Variables 1 and 4 presented in this table involve officials feeling allegiances to a fairly great extent, or very
great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (1), fairly
great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly small extent (4), very small extent (5). Variables 2 and 3 presented in
this table involve officials attaching fairly great, or very great emphasis towards certain considerations or
interests. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very important (1), fairly important (2),
both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).
b) This question was not presented to officials from the domestic bureaucracies.
The most general observation made in this table is that the majority of national civil servants
attending EU committees tend to evoke the ‘government representative’ role. The percentage
of EC participants who evoke a ‘government representative’ role is lower compared to the
WP participants on all the dependent variables presented in table 6.1. This pattern holds for
both officials in the ‘domestic administrations’ and the permanent representations. Officials
attending ECs pay considerably less attention to signals from the political leadership
nationally (62 per cent and 59 per cent amongst ‘domestic officials’ and permanent
representatives, respectively) than do officials attending WPs (95 per cent and 97 per cent
amongst ‘domestic officials’ and permanent representatives, respectively). This difference
reflects the fact that officials attending ECs receive fewer instructions from the political and
administrative leadership than do WP participants (cf. Chapter 5). However, signals coming
from the political leadership may be highly sectoralized. This variable is thus less indicative
of the ‘government representative’ role than the other variables presented in table 6.1.
Going beyond table 6.1, comparing domestic officials solely attending ECs and domestic
officials attending both ECs and WPs, the latter tend to evoke the ‘government representative’
roles more markedly than the former category of officials. Together with table 6.1, these
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figures indicate that officials attending Council working parties tend to enact more cross-
sectoral role and identity perceptions than those who attend Commission expert committees.
Despite some minor differences are observed between EC and WP participants, a second
general observation that can be made in table 6.1 is that all officials attending different EU
committees tend to enact a ‘government representative’ role. In this respect, no major
differences are seen between officials attending different EU committees. This observation is
also supported in the interviews: One Norwegian ministry official reports that:
“I represent Norway. I pay attention to the interests of the ministry as a whole”
(author’s translation). Similarly, another Norwegian agency official reports that,
“[w]hen the policy is decided, one is committed to this” (author’s translation). A third
Norwegian agency official claims that, “I represent Norway and the central
administration, not my self or my professional expertise” (author’s translation).
Swedish civil servants make the same observation: “I feel strongest allegiance to
Sweden, but develop a certain amount of loyalty to the committee. Still, this loyalty
never exceeds the loyalty to the [agency]” (Source: Swedish agency official – author’s
translation). Similarly, one Danish ministry official reports that, “I represent [the
ministry] and Denmark. I do not represent independent expertise” (author’s
translation).
Moreover, the interviews indicated elements of role complementarity as much as role conflict.
Evoking a ‘government representative’ role may not necessarily conflict with developing
‘independent expert’ roles and ‘supranational agent’ roles. Having multiple institutional
affiliations, these officials turn into ‘multiple selves’ (Elster 1986). One Swedish ministry
officials reports that he feels a strong sense of ‘esprit de corps’ in the EU committees and, at
the same time, he feels strong allegiances to his own government and his own ministry.
Similarly, one Danish ministry official reports that “I have a strongest national identity, but
this [identification] should be in accordance with the principles of the [EU] Treaty” (author’s
translation). Despite evoking a mixture of different role perceptions the above observations
indicate that the sectoral-territorial dimension and the national-supranational dimension
indeed are separate dimensions with respect to administrative integration. However, the
officials seem to pay sequential or situational attention towards different representational
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roles, thus being able to evoke a role repertoire based on partially contending institutional
allegiances and conflicting expectations.
The next table applies different operational measures illuminating the extent to which EC
participants evoke the independent expert role more strongly than do WP participants.
Table 6.2 Percentage of officials evoking an ‘independent expert’ role.a
                                                                                                                              permanent
                                                                                   domestic officials           representatives
The ‘independent expert’ role: EC WP EC WP
Feeling allegiance towards my own profession. 43 40 33 28
Feeling allegiance towards my own policy
sector………………………………………….. 63 59 75 61
I heed professional considerations……………. 88 75 86 82
Mean N……………………………………….. 113 42 19 32
a) Variables 1 and 2 presented in this table involve officials feeling allegiances to a fairly great extent, or very
great extent. This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (1), fairly
great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly small extent (4), very small extent (5). Variable 3 presented in this table
involves officials attaching fairly great, or very great emphasis towards professional considerations. This
dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3),
fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).
Compared to table 6.1, table 6.2 shows that national civil servants who attend EU committees
tend to evoke ‘independent expert’ roles to a considerably lesser extent than the ‘government
representative’ role. Hence, officials tend to locate themselves at the territorial end of the
sectoral-territorial spectrum with regard to representational roles. Still, similar to table 6.1,
table 6.2 also reveals expected differences between EC and WP participants. Consistent with
the propositions outlined in Chapter 2, EC participants tend to enact independent expert roles
more strongly than WP participants. This difference is shown both amongst ‘domestic
officials’ and permanent representatives. For example, permanent representatives attending
ECs tend to feel allegiance towards their own policy sector more strongly than permanent
representatives attending WPs (75 per cent and 61 per cent, respectively). One Norwegian
agency official attending ECs reports that,
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“in the group you sit as an individual” (author’s translation). Another Norwegian
agency official attending ECs claims that, “the allegiances go to the profession, not to
the government” (author’s translation). Indicating the differences between ECs and
WPs, one Swedish agency official reports that, “I do not represent Sweden. I represent
independent expertise. When the dossiers are sent [from the ECs to the WPs],
however, Sweden as a nation becomes more important [as a reference point for
identification]” (author’s translation). As such, “the technical [aspects] are most
predominant in the [expert] committees” (Source: Danish agency official – author’s
translation).
Similarly, domestic officials attending ECs tend to heed professional considerations more
markedly than do domestic officials attending WPs (88 per cent and 75 per cent,
respectively). Moreover, extending table 6.2 when comparing domestic officials solely
attending ECs and officials attending both ECs and WPs, the former category tend to evoke
‘independent expert’ roles more strongly than the latter (95 per cent and 78 per cent,
respectively).
As expected, officials attending Commission expert committees tend to enact more intra-
sectoral role and identity perceptions whilst those attending Council working parties tend to
evoke more encompassing role perceptions. The differences between these participants,
however, are not large as far as the enactment of ‘independent expert’ roles are concerned.
Hence, similar to the observations made in table 6.1, officials attending both ECs and WPs
tend to evoke a mixture of ‘government representative’ roles and ‘independent expert’ roles.
This observation might reflect the fact that these two role perceptions are more
complementary than conflicting. One Norwegian agency official reports that:
“I am more government representative than independent expert. In Norway, however,
there are no conflicts between these roles in my policy sector. National interests
coincide to some extent with the expertise” (author’s translation).
This observation might reflect the fact that sectoral and territorial organizational principles are
built into the EU committees. However, as will be accounted for more thoroughly below, role
enactment also reflects particular national institutional affiliations embedding these committee
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participants. Thus, the perceived complementarity between different roles may reflect the
sheer multitude of institutional affiliations and allegiances that embed these officials.
In addition to indicating their self-perceptions, the respondents were also asked to indicate
how they perceive and assess the roles of their fellow colleagues within the EU committees.
In addition to being self-conscious regarding their own representational roles, officials may
also have strong opinions on how their colleagues perform and act in the EU committees
(Giddens 1989: 700; Ritzer 1996: 342). Do they perceive of other colleagues merely as
‘independent experts’ or largely as ‘government representatives’, or do they view them as
having more mixed roles?
Table 6.3 Percentage of civil servants perceiving colleagues from other countries as
mainly ‘independent experts’ or ‘government representative’.
                                                                                                                             permanent
                                                                                   domestic officials           representatives
Colleagues roles: EC WP EC WP
Mainly ‘independent experts’………………... 32 16 32 12
Mixed roles…………………………………… 38 16 41 5









Table 6.3 shows that officials’ perceptions of other colleagues are significantly affected by
their committee affiliation. EC participants tend to view other colleagues as more
‘independent experts’ than ‘government representatives’. Still, the majority of EC participants
tend to view other colleagues as having a mixed role orientation. On the other hand, officials
attending WPs tend to view other colleagues as merely ‘government representatives’. These
observations are significant amongst both ‘domestic officials’ and permanent representatives.
Hence, table 6.3 largely confirms the observations made in tables 6.1 and 6.2 and indicates the
transformative effects of EU committees embedding national civil servants. However, the fact
that different EU committees activate different role perceptions can also reflect the fact that
different organizational principles evoke different parts of complex selves (Elster 1986;
March 1994).
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Effects of primary institutional embeddedness.
Despite participating intensively and for protracted periods of time within EU committees, the
primary institutional affiliations of civil servants are national. Most of their time and energy
are used in the national ministry, agency or permanent mission to the EU. Their career
possibilities depend heavily on their national performance. As such, their EU committee
affiliations are secondary to their national institutional affiliations. Hence, the representational
roles evoked are likely to reflect strongly their national institutional affiliations. The following
section highlights the independent effects of various domestic institutional affiliations. Thus,
the control variable in the following section is committee affiliations at the EU level. The
representational roles enacted are likely to vary according to different primary institutional
affiliations.
Reflecting the spatial organizational principle underpinning the permanent representations to
the EU, permanent representatives are likely to evoke ‘government representative’ roles more
strongly than officials employed in sector ministries and agencies. Moreover, reflecting the
stronger element of the spatial organizational principle at the ministry level than at the agency
level, officials at the ministry level are likely to evoke more encompassing representative
roles than do officials at the agency level. Likewise, officials in top rank positions are more
likely to enact ‘government representative’ roles than officials in medium or lower rank
positions.
First, table 6.4 shows how primary institutional affiliations embedding ‘domestic’ civil
servants and permanent representatives affect their enactment of ‘government representative’
roles and ‘independent expert’ roles. The institutional affiliations considered in this table are
the ministry/agency affiliation and the diplomatic/sectoral affiliation at the permanent
missions.
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Table 6.4 Correlations between primary institutional affiliations and the
representational roles evoked (Pearson’s r)a, b.
                                                                                                                            permanent
                                                                                   domestic officials           representatives
Representational roles: EC WP EC WP
The ‘government representative’ role:
Feeling allegiance towards my own
government…………………………………….









The ‘independent expert’ role:
Feeling allegiance towards my own profession.









Mean N………………………………………... 131 50 20 33
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials within the domestic bureaucracy who are employed at the ministry level
(coded 1) and at the agency level (coded 2). At the permanent representations to the EU this table compares
officials from the diplomatic realms (coded 1) and officials within different sectoral realms (coded 2).
b) All the dependent variables in this table have their original values: variable 1 and 3: to a very great extent
(1), to a fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5); variable 2
and 4: very important (1), fairly important (2), both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).
Table 6.4 largely confirms that officials at the ministry level tend to evoke the ‘government
representative’ role more strongly than officials at the agency level. Ministry officials tend to
feel allegiance to the national government (r = .20*) and heed signals from the political
leadership (r. = 30** amongst EC participants and r = .29* amongst WP participants) more
strongly than agency personnel. On the other hand, agency personnel tend to evoke the
‘independent expert’ role fairly strongly. They tend to feel allegiances towards their own
profession more strongly than do ministry personnel (r = -.20*), and they to pay attention to
professional considerations more strongly than do ministry officials (r = -.24** amongst EC
participants and r = -.31* amongst WP participants). No significant correlations were found
amongst the permanent representatives.
Table 6.5 shows how the formal rank positions within domestic ministries, agencies and
permanent representations accompany certain role perceptions amongst the participants.
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Table 6.5 Correlations between rank positions within domestic government institutions
and the representational roles evoked (Pearson’s r)a, b.
                                                                                                                              permanent
                                                                                   domestic officials            representatives
Representational roles: EC WP EC WP
The ‘government representative’ role:









*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials in top rank positions (coded 1) (director generals, deputy director generals,
head/deputy of unit/division) and officials in medium rank positions (coded 2) (head of section, senior
advisor, advisor, executive officer).
b) The dependent variable in this table has the original values: very important (1), fairly important (2),
both/and (3), fairly unimportant (4), very unimportant (5).
Only one variable had a significant correlation with the rank variable. As expected officials in
top rank positions tend to evoke the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than
officials in medium rank positions. That even top rank officials attending ECs tend to report
that they ‘heed the interests of [their] own country’ indicates the strong impact of primary
institutional affiliations.
Accounting for the national-supranational role dimension.
The final role perception considered in this study is the ‘supranational agent’ role. This role
has to do with the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration presented in
figure 1.2 (cf. Chapter 1) and in figure 6.1. Assuming that EU institutions and EU committees
are supranational institutions, attendance at EU committees may cause the enactment of
‘supranational agent’ roles.
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Table 6.6 Percentage of officials evoking a ‘supranational agent’ role.a
                                                                                                                             permanent
                                                                                   domestic officials           representatives
The ‘supranational agent’ role: EC WP EC WP
“An ‘esprit de corps’ emerges over time in the
EU committee”……………………………….. 36 34 57 65
Feeling allegiance towards the ECs attended…. 31 -- 37 --
Feeling allegiance towards the WPs attended… -- 39 -- 58
Feeling allegiance towards the European Union 26 20 37 34
Mean N………………………………………... 114 47 20 34
a) Variable 1 involves officials agreeing fairly much, or agreeing very much towards this assertion. This
dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: agreeing very much (1), agreeing fairly much (2),
both/and (3), agreeing fairly little (4), agreeing very little (5). Variables 2, 3 and 4 presented in this table
involve officials feeling allegiances to a fairly strong extent, or very strong extent. This dichotomy builds
from the following five-point scale: to a very great extent (1), fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), fairly
small extent (4), very small extent (5).
Compared to tables 6.1 and 6.2, the proportion of officials that evoke a ‘supranational role’
and identity perception is lower than that enacting a ‘government representative’ role and an
‘independent expert’ role. Arguing that the EU committee affiliations embedding national
civil servants are secondary to their national institutional affiliations, we proposed in Chapter
2 that national officials attending EU committees would enact the ‘supranational agent’ role
perception with less strength than the ‘government representative’ role. Tables 6.1 and 6.6
largely confirm this proposition. Therefore, when attending EU committees supranational
allegiances tend to be more weakly enacted than pre-existing role perceptions.
“It is hard to change ways of acting and thinking” (Source: Swedish agency official –
author’s translation). “I have not developed any sense of belonging to the EU. I have a
realistic view on the EU, as a partner to which no emotional connections are
established. Still, I have close relationships to individuals in the group” (Source:
Danish agency official – author’s translation).
Moreover, as seen from table 6.6, it is difficult to detect clear correlations between EU
committee affiliations and the extent to which supranational role and identity perceptions are
evoked. This may reflect the fact that the national-supranational dimension is affected less by
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the committee affiliations of the officials and more by the length and intensity to which the
officials attend these committees (cf. the next sub-section).
A significant difference is seen between officials from the domestic administrations and those
at the permanent representations. As seen from table 6.6, officials at the permanent
representations evoke supranational role perceptions more strongly than do officials in the
domestic ministries and agencies. This may reflect the fact that officials at the permanent
representations tend to participate more intensively on the EU committees (cf. Chapter 4). The
tendency amongst permanent representatives to enact allegiances towards the supranational
level is clearly shown in the first variable of table 6.6. Permanent representatives tend to
experience the emergence of an ‘esprit de corps’ within the committees to a considerably
larger extent than do domestic officials. This may reflect the sheer intensity to which
permanent representatives attend EU committees (cf. Chapter 4 and the next sub-section of
this Chapter). However, amongst those domestic officials who interact frequently with their
fellow committee colleagues, supranational role perceptions are enacted:
“I feel a certain sense of belonging to the group, or to individuals of the group,
especially to Nordic colleagues whom we meet occasionally in other contexts”
(Source: Norwegian agency official – author’s translation).
Finally, to indicate the tendency for evoking supranational allegiances, the respondents were
asked to indicate to what extent Commission officials are perceived as being independent of
particular national interests.
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Table 6.7 Percentage of civil servants perceiving Commission officials as mainly
independent or mainly dependent of particular national interests.
                                                                                                                            permanent
                                                                                   domestic officials           representatives
EC WP EC WP
Mainly independent…………………………… 61 65 73 65
Mixed role…………………………………….. 24 19 27 35









The above table illustrates the supranational component of the EU Commission as perceived
by the national officials attending EU committees. Viewing the Commission as largely
independent of particular national interests may be interpreted as reflecting supranational
allegiances.6 No major differences are observed between EC and WP participants in this
respect. Similar to table 6.6, the only significant difference is unveiled between permanent
representatives and national officials. While 15 per cent of the latter tend to perceive the EU
Commission as mainly dependent on particular national interests, none of the permanent
representatives share this view. Hence, supranational identifications are enacted more
vigorously amongst permanent representatives than amongst ‘national’ civil servants.
*   *   *
To summarize the above observations, national government officials tend to enact the
‘government representative’ role more strongly than the ‘independent expert’ role when
attending EU committee. These two roles are evoked even more extensively than the
‘supranational agent’ role. Still, significant differences have been shown between officials
having different institutional affiliations. EC participants tend to evoke the ‘independent
expert’ role more strongly than the ‘government representative’ role, whilst the reverse is
observed amongst WP participants. Hence, the committee affiliations embedding these
officials partially account for the sectoral-territorial role conflict. Consequently, the
hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 have been largely confirmed in the above analysis, thus
indicating that different committee affiliations at the EU level accompany different role and
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identity perceptions amongst the participants. The spatial principle of organization
underpinning the WPs tends to accompany cross-sectoral role and identity perceptions
amongst the participants, the sectoral organization principle built into the ECs is reflected
only in the enactment of intra-sectoral roles and identifications amongst the delegates.
As far as the national-supranational dimension is concerned, no major differences have been
observed between EC and WP participants with respect to enactment of the ‘supranational
agent’ role. On the national-supranational dimension, however, major statistical variations
have been found between permanent representatives and ‘national’ officials. This is partially
due to the permanent representatives attending EU committees more intensively than
‘national’ officials. The former tends to evoke supranational role and identity perceptions
more strongly than the latter. However, no robust test was conducted in the above analysis
regarding effects from the intensity and length of participating on EU committees. However,
no definite conclusion can be drawn at this stage on the causes of supranational role and
identity perceptions. Therefore, in the following section the length and intensity of
participation on EU committees are suggested as one vital institutional condition for the
emergence of supranational allegiances.
The length and intensity of participation on EU committees: Effects on supranational
allegiances.
One central theoretical proposition presented in Chapter 2 has to do with the national-
supranational dimension. Intensive and protracted participation on EU committees strengthens
the likelihood that supranational role perceptions are evoked amongst the participants,
regardless of the underlying organizational principles. Assuming that EU institutions, in
general, and Commission expert committees and Council working parties, in particular, are
supranational institutions, intensive exposure to these bodies are likely to result in the
enactment of supranational role and identity perceptions amongst the participants. Hence,
dynamics of re-socialization at the EU level are assumed to be activated by prolonged
exposure to supranational institutions.
Similar to our analyses in Chapter 5, the analyses conducted beneath apply several different
operational measures of the underlying theoretical dimension. In the following analyses the
dependent variables shift between tables. This is due to the fact that only those empirical
proxies, amongst several potential, that correlate significantly with the independent variables
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are presented. This procedure reduces the size of the tables and helps to focus our attention
only on the most revealing observations.
Table 6.8 shows how the length of attendance on EU committees is conducive to
supranational allegiances.
Table 6.8 Correlations between length of participation on EU committees and the
enactment of supranational roles (Pearson’s r).a, b
                                                                                                                             permanent
                                                                                   domestic officials            representatives
The ‘supranational agent’ role: EC WP EC WP
“An ‘esprit de corps’ emerges over time in the
EU committee”………………………………... .05 -.39** -.06 .05
Mean N……………………………….……….. 140 57 23 39
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials who entered EU committees for the first time after 1994 (coded 2) and officials
who have participated since before 1994 (coded 1).
b) The dependent variable in this table has its original values: agreeing very much (1), agreeing fairly much
(2), both/and (3), agreeing fairly little (4), agreeing very little (5).
As seen in the above table, WP participants who have participated for relatively long periods
of time tend to experience the emergence of an ‘esprit de corps’ in the committee to a lesser
extent than officials than are new-comers to these committees. This rather contra-intuitive
observation can be explained by the fact that the WPs’ geographical principle of organization
weakens tendencies for the development of a ‘club-feeling’ amongst the delegates. The
notions of national conflicts and compromises tend to overshadow tendencies to transcend
this organizational logic within the WPs.
However, table 6.8 will not be given any thorough examination here. There are one
fundamental rationale for this. The OLS regression analysis presented in table 6.11 (cf.
below) reveals that the bivariate correlation presented in table 6.8 is not significant. Table
6.11 shows that the number of informal EU committee meetings conducted during the last
year is a more adequate explanation of processes of re-socialization to supranational
identifications than the length of participants’ attendance at these EU committees. The
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intensity variable indicates the level of more recent involvement and interaction with fellow
committee participants. The ‘length of participation’ within EU committees (table 6.8) only
measures at what time the officials made their first appearance in the EU committees, not how
intensively these officials have interacted within these committees ever since.
Table 6.9 reveals how the number of committees attended by national civil servants and
permanent representatives affects the enactment of supranational allegiances.
Table 6.9 Correlations between the number of committees attended and the enactment
of supranational roles (Pearson’s r).a, b
                                                                                                                             permanent
                                                                                   domestic officials           representatives
The ‘supranational agent’ role: EC WP EC WP
Feeling allegiance towards the European Union .35** .02 -.04 .02
Mean N……………………………….……….. 128 49 21 35
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials who have participated on a maximum of 2 committees (coded 2) and officials
who have participated on more than 2 EU committees (coded 1).
b) The dependent variable in this table has its original values: to a very great extent (1), to a fairly great extent
(2), both/and (3), to a fairly little extent (4), to a very little extent (5).
In conjunction with the re-socialization thesis outlined in Chapter 2, EC participants who
attend many committees tend to feel allegiance towards the EU as a whole more strongly than
EC participants attending fewer committees. Supporting the hypothesis on the re-socializing
power of EU committees, one Norwegian agency official attending ECs reports that,
“it is important to participate on several meetings in order to learn the history of the
group” (author’s translation).
Finally, table 6.10 shows how the ‘supranational agent’ role evoked by EU committee
participants reflects the number of informal meetings with fellow committee participants
outside the committee rooms.7
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Table 6.10 Correlations between the number of informal meetings attended and the
enactment of supranational roles (Pearson’s r).a, b
                                                                                                                              permanent
                                                                                   domestic officials            representatives
The ‘supranational agent’ role: EC WP EC WP
Feeling allegiance towards the EU committees
attended………………………………………..










Mean N………………………………………... 114 44 22 36
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
a) This table compares officials who have informal meetings with other committee participants to a fairly great
extent, or to a very great extent (coded 1) and officials who have fewer informal meetings with fellow
committee participants (coded 2). This dichotomy builds from the following five-point scale: to a very great
extent (1), to a fairly great extent (2), sometimes (3), fairly seldom (4), very seldom (5).
b) The dependent variables in this table have their original values: variable 1: to a very great extent (1), to a
fairly great extent (2), both/and (3), to a fairly small extent (4), to a very small extent (5); variable 2:
agreeing very much (1), agreeing fairly much (2), both/and (3), agreeing fairly little (4), agreeing very little
(5).
Table 6.10 provides evidence of a re-socializing dynamic. Officials who have a great deal of
informal contacts with fellow EU committee participants tend to evoke supranational
allegiances more strongly than officials with fewer informal contacts at the EU level.
Permanent representatives who have a great deal of informal contact with other committee
participants tend to feel stronger allegiance towards those committees that they attend than
permanent representatives who have fewer informal contacts (r = .52* amongst the EC
participants and r = .39* amongst the WP participants). Hence, “a feeling of participation in
the EU - as an organization - develops” (Source: Swedish agency official – author’s
translation). Similarly, officials having frequent informal contacts with other committee
participants tend to report that an ‘esprit de corps’ emerges in the committees more strongly
than amongst officials having fewer informal contacts (r = .23** and .43** amongst
‘domestic’ officials attending ECs and WPs, respectively. r = .35* amongst permanent
representatives attending WPs). This observation might reflect the fact that most Commission
expert committees and Council working parties convene between 20 and 40 officials and that
the same officials meet each other fairly regularly (cf. Chapter 4). Consequently, the potential
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for intimacy and for friendship to develop is driven by the size of these committees. This
intimacy provides for an ‘esprit de corps’ to emerge amongst the participants, especially if the
they interact fairly intensively (cf. Lewis 2000). Finally, ‘domestic’ government officials
having frequent informal interaction with other WP colleagues tend to view the EU
Commission as being mainly independent of particular national interests (this figure is not
presented in table 6.10). The above observations are significant irrespective of the EU
committees attended and whether they are permanent representatives or ‘domestic’ officials.
These correlations seem to be robust since they receive empirical support under different
institutional conditions. Moreover, the above observations are also supported empirically in
the interviews amongst ‘national’ civil servants:
“We talk together at the pub in the evenings. Then we get good contact. The same
individuals arrive at several meetings. We call each other and send e-mails to each
other. An ‘esprit de corps’ emerges in the group” (Source: Norwegian agency official
– author’s translation). “We have regular e-mail contacts. An enormous feeling of
collegiality emerges amongst the Nordic colleagues. A strong sense of allegiance
develops in the groups when you have participated for 5 years. It becomes your baby.
It becomes so collegial” (Source: Norwegian agency official – author’s translation).
“The dinners in the evenings are important arenas for talk. We spend a lot of time
together” (Source: Norwegian agency official – author’s translation). The same
official reports that, “I travel from Norway as an ‘ambassador’ for Norway, only to
return as a representative for the EU Commission. I often feel stronger allegiance to
my Swedish colleague than to my Norwegian colleagues” (author’s translation). “We
have frequent contacts between the meetings, rather informal personal contacts. This
result in a certain allegiance to the committee and to the individuals who attend”
(Source: Swedish agency official – author’s translation).
The enactment of the ‘supranational agent’ role thus reflects the intensity of informal
interaction amongst the committee participants. As indicated above, one obvious factor
behind these correlations is the size of the committees. The limited number of officials
attending EU committees accompanies intensive personal connections and even friendships.
“The size of the groups has impact. One learns to know the other participants in small
groups” (Source: Swedish ministry official – author’s translation).
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*   *   *
To summarize the main observations in this sub-section, the intensity of participation by
national civil servants on EU committees has an independent casual impact on the propensity
to which the participants enact supranational roles. As such, a positive relationship is
demonstrated between the intensity of participation and the enactment of supranational
allegiances. Additionally, having a great number of informal contacts with fellow committee
participants tends to accompany the enactment of supranational role and identity perceptions.
Combining this conclusion with insights gained in previous sections of this Chapter,
intergovernmental dynamics are transcended more fully by officials attending ECs and by
officials who generally attend these committees intensively.
The socializing power of EU committees partially re-socializes the participants to developing
a supranational sense of identification. Yet, how can we be certain that supranational loyalties
stem from socialization dynamics and not out of self-selection of civil servants with pre-
established supranational loyalties? Our data reveal that the majority of the sampled EU
committee participants are selected by others to attend EU committees (cf. table 4.19a and
4.19b). Only a minority of committee participants has been subject to self-selection. However,
one could assume that officials with pre-established supranational loyalties are over-
represented in the national civil service at large. However, studying officials employed within
administrative institutions that have few specialised EU units, it is likely that recruitment are
based on merit rather than on particular institutional allegiances (cf. Chapter 4). Therefore,
supranational allegiances can hardly be seen to reflect processes of self-selection to the EU
committees. Rather, supranational role perceptions are likely to reflect the intensity to which
national civil servants attend EU committees (cf. tables 6.11 and 6.12 below).
Moreover, one explanation could be that the enactment of ‘supranational agent’ roles partially
reflects re-socialization processes at the EU level and partially reflects the lack of clear and
mandatory instructions from the national political-administrative leadership (cf. Chapter 5).
However, national co-ordination is mostly concentrated on governing the actual decision-
making behaviour of the EU committee participants (Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000;
Metcalfe 1994). For instance, Norwegian officials who attend Commission expert committees
are intended to draw up instructions considering the following aspects: background and status
on the particular dossier, existing national regulations, Norwegian interests on the subject
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matter, the present bargaining situation and finally, administrative, economic, budgetary and
juridical consequences (The Prime Minister’s Office 1997). Beyond this, national instructions
have seldom the intention of entrusting the participants with particular loyalties, identities or
allegiances.
*     *     *
Moreover, since we are left with some statistically significant bivariate relationships amongst
some independent and dependent variables, multivariate OLS regression analyses are
warranted in an effort at unveiling spuriousness. Before deciding on which independent
variables and which dependent variables to include into a multiple OLS regression analysis,
however, the level of multicollinearity between the independent variables has to be decided.
Diagnostics of collinearity between the independent variables analysed below unveil no
indications of multicollinearity. Thus, the independent variables seem to have independent
causal impact on the dependent variables. This analysis, however, concentrates on the data
from the ‘domestic officials’. No regression analysis has been conducted on the data from the
‘Permanent representation’ data due to low N (cf. the above tables). W analyse the relative
explanatory power of (i) the length to which national officials participate on EU committees,
and (ii) the number of informal meetings conducted outside the formal committee meetings.
Hence, the multiple OLS regression analyses conducted below relate solely to the national-
supranational role dimension. The regression analyses are presented in the following
endnote:8
Tables 6.11 and 6.12 in endnote 8 indicate that the intensity to which national civil servants
participate on EU committees affects their enactment of supranational role and identity
perceptions. Officials with a great deal of informal contacts with fellow committee
participants tend to assert that an ‘esprit de corps’ emerges in the committees and view
Commission officials as independent of particular national interests. Conversely, the length of
participation on EU committees is shown to have no independent explanatory power as far as
the representational roles are concerned.
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Conclusion
An inherent conflict between that of being a ‘government representative’ and that of an
‘independent expert’ is built into the role as a civil servant. When Norway joined the EEA
agreement in 1994 and when Sweden joined the EU in 1995, following Denmark as a full-
fledged EU member, a second conflict dimension became vital for the role and identity
perceptions of the civil servants – a national-supranational dimension. Intergovernmental
perspectives and neo-functional accounts on European integration have long emphasised a
more uni-dimensional conception of representative quality, emphasising an imperative model
of representation and a liberal model of representation, respectively. However, a cognitive
organization theory perspective is introduced in this study in order to account for the
representative ambiguity that results from the multiple institutional affiliations, obligations
and allegiances embedding national civil servants attending EU committees.
Empirically, the current Chapter shows that the sectoral-territorial role dimension
predominates amongst national civil servants attending EU committees. Most national
government officials evoke a ‘government representative’ role and an ‘independent expert’
role when attending EU committees, but they tend to pay most attention to the former role
perception. Moreover, some statistical variation is revealed in the data: officials attending
Council working parties tend to enact the ‘government representative’ role more strongly than
those attending Commission expert committees. This variation, however, is only marginal.
When the respondents were asked to assess the roles of their fellow committee colleagues, a
significant difference is observed between respondents attending ECs and those attending
WPs.
The current Chapter has revealed that various primary institutional affiliations account more
adequately for the sectoral-territorial role dimension than does the EC-WP distinction. As
such, top rank ministry personnel tend to enact the ‘government representative’ role more
strongly than the ‘independent expert’ role. An inverse empirical pattern is demonstrated
amongst middle or lower rank agency personnel. As such, the above analysis highlights the
pivotal role played by domestic government institutions with respect to the representational
roles of national civil servants. Moreover, different institutional affiliations nationally tend to
accompany different role and identity perceptions amongst the officials.
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The ‘supranational agent’ role is evoked less strongly than the ‘government representative’
and the ‘independent expert’ roles. The national-supranational role dimension is thus evoked
less extensively than the sectoral-territorial role dimension. Still, permanent representatives
tend to evoke the ‘supranational agent’ role more strongly than ‘domestic’ officials. This
difference is shown to reflect the intensity to which permanent representatives participate on
EU committees.
Mirroring the mixed set of roles and identifications evoked by these officials, the current
Chapter underscores the ambiguity that underpin the representational roles enacted by
domestic government officials attending EU committees. These officials have several
institutional affiliations and different cues for action and role enactment. The classical conflict
in public administrations between political loyalty and professional autonomy isreflected in
this study, albeit adding a new supranational dimension to it. The representative quality is
shows not to be a fixed property, as asserted by the concept of imperative and liberal
representation, but rather is a dynamic and flexible feature. The representative quality of




                                                
1
 The conceptual frames applied in this Chapter build largely from Trondal and Veggeland (2000). An earlier
version of this Chapter was presented at a research seminar at ARENA April 4, 2000. The author would like to
thank all the participants who attended this seminar for stimulating comments. The author is also indebted to Jeff
T. Checkel, Morten Egeberg, Johan P. Olsen and Frode Veggeland for valuable comments on an older version of
this Chapter. The title of this chapter is inspired by Albert O. Hirschman’s seminal work ‘Exit, Voice and
Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and States’ (1970). Whereas loyalty represents an
intervening variable in Hirschman’s analysis, this variable is a dependent variable in the current Chapter.
2
 At least four concepts of representative quality may be identified in the literature. First, representation as
“acting for” (Pitkin 1972: 112). This notion of representation claims that “true representation entails
responsiveness to the represented, attention to his wishes or needs” (Pitkin 1972: 113). Representation entails
acting in accordance with the wishes and interests of those they represent. Second, demographic representation
“depends on the representative’s characteristics, or what he is or is like, on being something rather than doing
something” (Pitkin 1972: 61 - original emphasis). Third, formalistic representation “defines representation in
terms of a transaction i.e. election that takes place at the outset, before the actual representing begins” (Pitkin
1972: 39). Fourth, symbolic representation means representation “by what he is or how he is regarded” (Pitkin
1972: 113). The loyalties and identities enacted by the representatives determine whom they represent (cf. Birch
1971: 15; Olsen 1988: 157-158).
3
 When actors try to cope with role and identity conflicts, existing roles and identities may be “strengthened,
combined with other identities and roles, modified or dropped” (Christensen and Røvik 1999: 168).
Complementary strategies for coping with role conflicts are (i) to live with them and to cultivate the differences
(Jacobsen 1960; Smith 1992); (ii) to de-couple conflicting roles or role elements (DiMaggio and Powell 1991);
(iii) to attach sequential attention towards contending role and identity perceptions (Simon 1957); and finally (iv)
institutional compartmentalization between different roles and identities (March and Olsen 1989 and 1995;
Stryker and Statham 1985: 337). “[W]ork on role conflict generally takes for granted that conflicting
expectations must somewhat be resolved” (Stryker and Statham 1985: 337). As seen above, however, this need
not be the case. Coping with role conflicts is not synonymous with resolving those conflicts.
4
 This model is ideal typical. The role perceptions presented are to be seen as mutually exclusive, analytically
speaking.
5
 In the Scandinavian countries agencies are formally separated from cabinet level departments. Thus, agencies
are organized at a lower hierarchical level and agency personnel are expected to evoke more intra-sectoral role
perceptions and identifications than personnel at the ministry level.
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6
 This question can also be interpreted as a factual question. In the current study, however, civil servants’
perceptions of Commission officials’ independence of particular national interests are seen as reflecting
supranational allegiances.
7
 The effects stemming from the number of formal meetings within EU committees did not turn out correlate
significantly with any of the dependent variables studied here. Therefore, this variable is excluded from the
analysis.
8
 Multiple regression analyses:
Table 6.11 Factors related to the following assertion: “An ‘esprit de corps’ emerges over time in EU
committees”: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).a, b
Pearson’s r Beta
Length of participationc…………………….…………. -.39** -.12
Number of informal meetings attended…….…………. .43** .43**
Mean N………………………………………………... 57
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
Adjusted R2 = .30 (R2 = .34)
a) The dependent variable has the following values: agreeing very much (1), agreeing fairly much (2),
both/and (3), agreeing fairly little (4), agreeing very little (5)
b) Due to low N in this table, we use the adjusted R2 in order to correct for possible skewness in the data.
c) Independent variable 1: entered EU committees for the first time after 1994 (coded 2), having participated
since before 1994 (coded 1). Independent variable 2: having informal meetings with fellow committee
participants fairly often, or more (coded 1), having fewer informal meetings (coded 2).
Table 6.12 Factors relating to civil servants’ perception of Commission officials’ independence of
particular national interests: WP participants (Pearson’s r and beta).a
Pearson’s r Beta
Length of participationb…………………….………………. -.31* -.14
Number of informal meetings attended…….………………. .32* .28*
Mean N……………………………………………………… 56
*) p  .05          **) p  .01
Adjusted R2 = .07 (R2 = .10)
a) The dependent variable has the following values: very independent (1), fairly independent (2), mixed roles
(3), fairly dependent (4), very dependent (5).
b) Value labels: cf. table 6.11.
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Building on theoretical arguments and the empirical observations provided in this study, the
current Chapter draws these to some firm and some tentative conclusions. The following
points are recapitulated in the current Chapter. The first section summarizes the major
empirical observations. These include the degree of cross-level participation conducted by
national civil servants towards EU committees (Chapter 4), the co-ordination behaviour
evoked by EU committee participants (Chapter 5), and finally the role and identity
perceptions enacted by these participants (Chapter 6). The next section compares these
empirical observations with pervious empirical findings and more recent scholarly
contributions. The third section assesses the theoretical approach to administrative integration
outlined in Chapter 2. The fourth section evaluates the data and the methodology used to
throw light on the theoretical propositions. The final section suggests prospects for future
research on administrative integration in particular and European integration more generally.
What guidelines can the current study provide for future research on processes of European
integration, on administrative integration, and on dynamics of Europeanization of domestic
institutions and policy processes?
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Summary of the empirical observations
On cross-level participation.
As seen in Chapter 4, the typical EC participant is employed at the agency level as well as at
the ministry level and occupies a middle or lower rank position. Moreover, the EC
participants studied here are mostly educated in technical disciplines, like physics,
engineering, etc. WP participants, on the other hand, are mostly employed at the permanent
representations to the EU are placed in different sectoral realms of this institution, have
middle or lower rank positions and are educated in law. However, a large proportion of the
WP participants is also recruited from national ministries and agencies.
Second, Chapter 4 revealed differences between officials at the ‘home administration’ and
officials at the permanent representations. Committee participants from the ‘home
administrations’ are mostly employed in medium or lower rank positions at the agency level,
and are trained in technical disciplines. Furthermore, these officials are middle-aged and have
served in the domestic government apparatus for relatively long periods of time. Officials at
the permanent representations, on the other hand, are mostly employed in medium or lower
rank positions in sectoral realms, and are trained in law. These officials are also middle-aged,
albeit being somewhat younger than their colleagues in the capitals. They have served for
shorter periods of time in current position and in current institution than have their fellow
colleagues in the ‘domestic administration’, although they have served for relatively longer
periods of time in the national bureaucracy before entering the permanent representations.
Most of them also return to the domestic government apparatus after finishing their stay in
Brussels. Moreover, permanent representatives generally participate more intensively on EU
committees than their national colleagues.
The most significant difference observed between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish officials
relates to which type of EU committees they attend. While Danish and Swedish government
officials are allowed to participate on both ECs and WPs, their Norwegian counterparts have
access only to the ECs. This difference has also led to major differences between officials at
the permanent representations of Norway and officials at the permanent representations of
Denmark and Sweden in terms of cross-level participation. Norwegian permanent
representatives seldom attend EU committees: Their Swedish and Danish counterparts are
more heavily engaged in the day-to-day work of both ECs and WPs. As seen from the
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‘domestic adminstrations’ point of view, however, only marginal differences are observed
between the three Scandinavian countries as regards the number of ECs attended. Most of the
Norwegian officials studied here attend ECs to approximately the same extent as their Danish
and Swedish colleagues. Still, Danish and Swedish officials have additional access to the WPs
and Danish officials have, on average, participated on EU committees for longer periods of
time than have their Norwegian and Swedish counterparts. Additionally, Danish and Swedish
EU committee participants tend to have more intensive informal contacts outside the formal
committee meetings than their Norwegian counterparts. The Norwegian participants talk less
during EU committee meetings compared to their Danish and Swedish colleagues.
To conclude the observations on cross-level participation, the major differences between
Norwegian, Swedish and Danish civil servants relate to the types of EU committees they
attend. Moreover, Danish and Swedish permanent representatives participate more intensively
on EU committees than the Norwegian permanent representatives. The Danish, Norwegian
and Swedish EU committee participants have fairly similar national institutional affiliations.
Assuming that administrative integration ultimately reflects the primary institutional
affiliations embedding these officials, only marginal differences are expected between the
Scandinavian officials as to the degree of administrative integration across levels of
governance.
On co-ordination behaviour.
Chapter 2 has emphasised that the primary institutional affiliations embedding individual
decision-makers provide vital cues for affecting their decision behaviour. However, Chapter 5
also identifies conditions under which secondary institutional affiliations with Commission
expert committees and Council working parties may affect the co-ordination behaviour
enacted by national government officials. Under conditions of intensive and protracted cross-
level participation, domestic co-ordination processes may reflect the EU committee
affiliations embedding national civil servants. Moreover, I have argued that different
organizational principles – domestically as well as within various EU committees – are likely
to affect modes of co-ordination in particular ways.
The empirical analysis of Chapter 5 supports these arguments to a considerable degree. As far
as the principles of organization are concerned, inter-sectoral modes of policy co-ordination
tend to be evoked more strongly amongst officials participating on Council working parties
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than amongst officials attending Commission expert committees. Moreover, as regards
techniques applied for co-ordination, written instructions are reported more frequently
amongst WP participants than amongst EC participants. Amongst the latter, anticipated
reaction and unwritten ‘positions’ are more common. Moreover, the effects stemming from
the different organizational principles underpinning ECs and WPs are strengthened
subsequent to officials attending these committees with a high level of intensity. Hence,
officials attending ECs extensively tend to co-ordinate their positions less strongly than
officials with intensive participating on WPs. Assuming that a general lack of policy co-
ordination within national central administrations generates administrative integration,
integration is fostered most extensively amongst officials who intensively attend Commission
expert committees. Hence, intergovernmentalism is transcended more fully amongst EC
participants than amongst WP participants, especially if the participants attend many
committees and if they attend a great deal of formal and informal committee meetings. Some
empirical observations presented in Chapter 5 indicate that the intensity to which national
officials attend EU committees has an independent causal impact on the co-ordination
behaviour pursued by the actors. The multiple OLS regression analyses show that the
intensity dimension has a stronger explanatory power than the length dimension.
Notwithstanding these observations, this study also indicates the pivotal role played by
domestic institutions in affecting the co-ordination behaviour of national civil servants. When
controlling for their different EU committee affiliations, the current study shows that the
domestic institutional affiliations embedding the EU committee participants have independent
causal impact on their co-ordination behaviour. Moreover, the multiple OLS regression
analyses indicate that the relative explanatory value of the intensity and length to which
national officials participate on EU committees is generally lower than the causal weight of
domestic institutional affiliations. Thus, despite providing clear indications of the re-
socializing potential of EU committees (cf. Chapter 6), the current study also shows how the
ministry versus agency distinction accounts for the co-ordination behaviour of EU committee
participants.
Therefore, administrative integration, as measured by the co-ordination behaviour evoked by
national civil servants attending EU committees, seems strongly affected (i) by the
organizational principles underpinning EU committees and the domestic government
institutions and (ii) by the intensity to which national officials attend EU committees.
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Comparing Norwegian, Swedish and Danish civil servants, the former solely attends
Commission expert committees organized according to a sectoral principle. Moreover,
Norwegian officials participate fairly intensively on these committees, as measured by the
number of committees and meetings attended. Hence, administrative integration is shown to
be fairly strong amongst Norwegian government officials. This is due to the weaker level of
cross-sectoral co-ordination behaviour evoked by the Norwegian EC participants. The EEA
agreement may provide for strong administrative integration across levels of governance.
Danish and Swedish officials, in contrast, have dual institutional affiliations to both ECs and
WPs. Moreover, Danish and Swedish government officials generally attend EU committees
more intensively than do their Norwegian colleagues. (cf. Chapter 4). Officials at the Danish
and Swedish permanent representations interact intensively towards the WPs (cf. Chapter 4).
Chapter 5 demonstrates that the length and intensity to which national officials attend various
EU committees have a significant and sometimes independent effect on their co-ordination
behaviour. For example, permanent representatives who attend many formal meetings within
Council working parties tend to “choose the ‘positions’ to follow” (cf. table 5.13). The effects
likely to stem from the territorial principle of organization are partially circumvented by the
effect of the intensity of participation on the WPs. Also, the sheer intensity to which civil
servants attend EU committees is shown to have a stronger independent causal impact on their
co-ordination behaviour than the length of attendance.
Having demonstrated that intensity of participation on EU committees has an independent
causal impact on modes of policy co-ordination, administrative integration is strongly fostered
amongst Danish and Swedish officials attending EU committees. However, administrative
integration is less strong amongst those Danish and Swedish civil servants that attend WPs
fairly intensively. Finally, the current analysis also reveals that various domestic institutional
affiliations have significant and independent impact upon domestic co-ordination behaviour.
Hence, administrative integration, measured by co-ordination behaviour is affected differently
by the various institutions embedding them.
On representational roles.
Chapter 6 shows tjat the sectoral-territorial role dimension predominates amongst national
civil servants attending EU committees. Most national government officials evoke a
‘government representative’ role and an ‘independent expert’ role when attending EU
committees However, they pay most attention to the ‘government representative’ role.
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Moreover, officials attending WPs tend to enact the ‘government representative’ role more
strongly than do the EC participants. This difference, however, is only marginal. However,
when the respondents were asked to assess the roles of their fellow committee colleagues, a
significant difference is observed between respondents attending ECs and those participating
on WPs.
Additionally, this study has revealed that various primary institutional affiliations more
adequately accounts for the sectoral-territorial role dimension than does the EC-WP
distinction. As such, ministry personnel in top rank positions tend to enact the ‘government
representative’ role more strongly than the ‘independent expert’ role. Hence, Chapter 6
highlights the pivotal role played by domestic government institutions in affecting the
representational roles of national civil servants. Moreover, different national institutional
affiliations tend to accompany different role and identity perceptions amongst the officials.
Chapter 6 also reveals that national civil servants attending EU committees tend to enact the
‘supranational agent’ role less strongly than both the ‘government representative’ role and the
‘independent expert’ role. The national-supranational role dimension is evoked less
extensively than the sectoral-territorial role dimension. Permanent representatives tend to
evoke the ‘supranational agent’ role more strongly than do ‘domestic’ officials. This
difference reflects the relatively high participation intensity on EU committees amongst the
permanent representatives.
Mirroring the mixed set of roles and identifications evoked by these officials, this study
shows the ambiguity that underpins the representational roles enacted by domestic
government officials attending EU committees. These officials have several institutional
affiliations and different cues for action and role enactment. The classical conflict in public
administrations between political loyalty and professional autonomy is thus reflected,
although adding a new supranational dimension to it. The representative quality is not a fixed
property, as asserted by the notion of imperative and liberal representation, but rather a
dynamic and flexible feature.
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Administrative integration reconsidered.
Studying administrative integration through empirical proxies shows that “membership in the
European Union is not necessarily the most appropriate dividing line” (Usher 1998: 184). As
the EU becomes increasingly differentiated, allowing for various levels of ‘enhanced co-
operation’ and different forms of affiliation, the membership versus non-membership
dichotomy becomes a less adequate explanation of administrative integration (cf. European
Voice 2000, No. 13). This study reveals that national government officials attending
Commission expert committees evoke approximately the same set of representative roles and
co-ordination behaviour. Moreover, civil servants attending Council working parties tend to
evoke fairly similar role perceptions and modes of co-ordinating their positions. Hence,
similar institutional affiliations towards EU level institutions are a more significant
explanatory variable than the membership versus non-membership dichotomy. We will return
to this puzzle in the third section of this Chapter. Hence, representative quality and
behavioural patterns are not fixed properties, as asserted by neo-functionalist and
intergovernmentalist accounts, but rather a dynamic and flexible feature as asserted by the
cognitive approach (Beyers 1998a; Checkel 1999; Kerremans 1996; Lewis 2000; Trondal
2001).
We have observed the development of new supranational loyalties that may undermine the
trust between the political leadership and civil servants. The formative and transformative
effect of EU committees as regards the loyalties of national officials represents a delegation
problem. Of course, the representatives must have some professional autonomy in order to
make use of their special expertise and to learn from colleagues in the committees.
Nevertheless, shifts of loyalties represent a challenge to the ability of national governments to
assure that national representatives attending EU committees act in accordance with the
interests of their government. However, the salience of this challenge is partially conditioned
by the various national institutional affiliations that embed EU committee participants. As
seen from the current study, administrative integration across levels of governance reflects the
dual institutional affiliations that embed civil servants at both the EU level and the national
level.
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The empirical observations compared
In the following section the empirical observations summarised in the previous section are
compared with empirical observations made from past and more recent scholarly
contributions. The major body of literature on EU committees is of recent origin, reflecting
the lack of systematic scholarly attention to this phenomenon in the past (Haibach 2000a: 38).
Most of the literature surveyed in this section deals with the relationships between EU
committees and the Scandinavian countries. However, comparisons outside Scandinavia are
also provided.
On cross-level participation.
Within Norwegian ministries and agencies the proportion of officials involved in EU related
dossiers has increased considerably in the 1990s (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a). From being an
exclusive group of “Eurocrats” under the EEA negotiations (Christensen 1996; Kux and
Sverdrup 1997), almost 50 per cent of the officials are currently engaged in EU related work
in some way or another (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Trondal 1999a: 54-57). Similarly, the
proportion of Swedish officials engaged in EU related work has increased significantly in the
1990s (Larsen et al. 1999: 57; Lægreid 2000; Olsson 1993: 340; SOU 1996:6: 33;
Statskontoret 1996:7; Sundström 1999). Similarly, every government official in the Swedish
central administration is increasingly affected by EU dossiers on a daily basis (Statskontoret
2000:20: 45). No corresponding upsurge in the volume of EU related work has been
documented in the Danish central administration in the 1990s. The increased workload in the
Swedish bureaucracy it not paralleled in the Norwegian central administration (Jacobsson and
Sundström 1999b: 17).
Recent studies of processes of Europeanization of Scandinavian central administrations
largely support the observation made in Chapter 4. EC participants are recruited amongst both
ministry personnel and amongst agency personnel (cf. Jacobsson and Sundström 1999a: 13
and 1999b: 30; Larsen, Lægreid and Wik 1999: 68; SOU 1996:60: 36; Statskonsult 1999:6:
24; Statskonsult 1999:6: 24; Statskontoret 1996:7: 133; Trondal 1999b and 1998). WP
participants, however, are recruited mostly amongst ministry personnel (cf. Jacobsson and
Sundström 1999b: 30 and 2000: 99; SOU 1996:6: 35; Statskontoret 2000:20: 78). Moreover,
Beyers (2000: 5) reveals that Belgian government officials at the department level are far
better represented within different EU institutions than politicians. “Euro-level actors have
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almost no relations with national political elites” (Beyers 2000: 9). Hence, “[t]he interlocking
of the European and the national is accompanied by a sharp disjuncture between policy
making and politics” (Laffan 1997: 24). Hence, national politicians seem non-privileged in
the cross-level networks in Europe in that they mostly react to the moves of national civil
servants. Our study shows that officials attending Council working parties have far better
contacts with the national political-administrative leadership than those participating on
Commission expert committees.
Moreover, paralleling the observations made in Chapter 4, the number of external contacts
with EU committees increases as one moves downwards the formal hierarchy within
governmental institutions. Trondal (1998: 286) shows that this tendency is significant at the
ministry level as well as at the agency level within the Norwegian government apparatus (cf.
Bulmer and Burch 1999: 21 and 29). Similarly, Falkner et al. (1999: 502) show that Austrian
officials in medium rank positions attend EU committees more frequently than officials in top
rank positions. These observations may partly reflect the fact that officials from small
European states attend EU committees more extensively than officials from larger European
countries (Schaefer et al. 2000: 8). Schaefer et al. (2000) show that this observations is valid
for officials attending Commission expert committees, Council working parties and
comitology committees. Parallel to our observations, EC participants tend to be employed in
positions earmarked for particular professional groups (Statskonsult 1999:6: 28).
One of the most significant difference between Danish, Norwegian and Swedish officials
relate to which class of EU committees they attend. While Danish and Swedish government
officials are allowed to participate on ECs and WPs, their Norwegian counterparts have solely
access to the ECs. However, some Norwegian officials attend ECs to the approximately same
extent as their Danish and Swedish colleagues. This last observation goes largely counter to
past research indicating that Norwegian government officials generally have to take initiatives
themselves in order to get access to meetings within the Commission expert committees
(Trondal 1999a: 56). The current study shows that Norwegian officials have almost equal
access to the Commission expert committees as their Danish and Swedish counterparts.
However, the Norwegian officials studied here have considerably fewer face-to-face contacts
outside formal committee meetings than their Swedish and Danish counterparts. The
Norwegian officials also make fewer oral statements during EC meetings than the Danish and
Swedish officials. These observations are supported empirically by Larsen et al. (1999: 72).
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Lægreid (2000: 12) observes that “Norway is the only country where formal meetings [within
the Commission] are more frequent than informal meetings”. Similarly, Middelthon (2000)
shows that while the Swedish Occupational Safety and Health Administration strengthened
the level of participation on Commission expert committees after Sweden became EU
member in 1995, The Norwegian Directorate for Labour Inspection experienced hard times in
this respect. Similarly, Jacobsson and Sundström (2000: 99) show that Norwegian ministries
and agencies have fewer contacts with Commission expert committees than their Swedish
counterparts. As such, Norwegian officials seem to attend Commission expert committees
somewhat less intensively than their Danish and Swedish colleagues (Jacobsson and
Sundström 1999b).
When comparing the observations from the scholarly literature with the empirical
observations provided in Chapter 4, a reasonable degree of fit is discerned.
On co-ordination behaviour.
Parallel to the empirical observations summarised in the first section of this Chapter, research
shows that domestic co-ordination processes are at least two-dimensional in character: intra-
and inter-sectoral (Egeberg and Trondal 1999; Hanf and Soetendorp 1998; Harmsen 1999;
Metcalfe 1994; Rometsch and Wessels 1996; Trondal 1998). Some scholars observe policy
fragmentation, sectorization, bureaucratization and deparliamentarization of domestic EU
policy processes (Burnham and Maor 1994; Cassese 1987; Dehousse 1997; Dimitrakopoulos
1995; Hopkins 1976; Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000; Siedentopf and Ziller 1998; Spence
1995), others report cross-sectoral co-ordination processes and political-administrative
steering as the central mode characterising EU policy making at the domestic level of
governance (Bulmer and Burch 1998; Hocking 1999; Rometsch and Wessels 1996;
Walzenback 1999). Comparing the three Scandinavian countries, intra-sectoral modes of co-
ordination are observed in the Norwegian central administration after Norway joined the EEA
agreement in 1994, with a subsequent impairment of the co-ordination role of the MFA on EU
related dossiers (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a and 1999; Lægreid 2000; Trondal 1996, 1998;
1999a and 1999d; Trondal and Veggeland 1999). The weak co-ordination role of the
Norwegian MFA has “contribute[d] to a segmented state becoming increasingly
segmented…” (Sverdrup 2000: 76). Within the Danish and Swedish central administrations,
on the other hand, co-ordination processes after EU membership have tended to oscillate
between intra - and inter-sectoral modes (Beckman and Johansson 1999; Dosenrode 1993;
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Ekengren and Sundelius 1998; Grønnegård Christensen et al. 1994; Jacobsson 1999;
Nedergaard 1994; Pederson 2000; SOU 1996:6; Statskontoret 1996:7; Trondal 1996).
Moreover, the co-ordinating role of the MFA seems somewhat greater in Denmark and
Sweden – and also in Finland – than in Norway (Lægreid 2000; Raunio and Wiberg 1999;
Ruin 1999; Sidenius 1997). Recently, the co-ordination role of the Prime Minister’s Office
has increased to the disadvantage of the MFA, in Denmark, Norway and Sweden (Dosenrode
2000: 390; Kassim, Peters and Wright 2000; Sverdrup 2000).
Parallel to our observations, Larsen et al. (1999: 151) and Lægreid (1999: 25) find that within
the Norwegian central administration intra-sectoral policy co-ordination is more widespread
than inter-sectoral co-ordination, due to Norwegian government officials being affiliated
solely to the Commission ECs. As mentioned above, inter-sectoral modes of co-ordination are
reported to be more widespread in the Danish and the Swedish central administrative services
(Lægreid 1999; Nedergaard 1994; SOU 1996:6; Statskontoret 1996:7 and 2000:20). For
example, Olsen (1996: 105) observes that the Danish Department of Labour has daily contacts
with the MFA on EU related dossiers. Similarly, Jacobsson and Sundström (2000: 98) show
that the majority of the EU related issues within the Swedish central administrations are co-
ordinated. Contrary to this observation, Larsen et al. (1999: 22) and Trondal (1996, 1998 and
1999a) observe that the EEA agreement, and participation on ECs, tend to accompany
increased intra-sectoral co-ordination behaviour amongst Norwegian civil servants. Similarly,
Statskonsult (1999:6: 44) observes that most of the Norwegian EC participants receive few
instructions from the political-administrative leadership. Larsen et al. (1999: 52) reveal a
declining co-ordinating role of the Norwegian MFA on EU related issues. This may partly
reflect weak links existing between the Norwegian MFA and various Commission expert
committees (Larsen et al. 1999: 67; Trondal 1996, 1998 and 1999a; Trondal and Veggeland
1999). Still, Pedersen (2000: 223) observes that Danish government officials attending
Commission expert committees mostly work only under instructions from their home sector
ministry. Thus, attendance on Commission ECs seems to accompany a weakened co-
ordinating role of the MFA.
Some scholarly contributions underscore that Europeanization of domestic administrative
systems reflects the membership versus non-membership distinction. Lægreid (1999: 20-21)
observes that inter-sectoral contact patterns and co-ordination efforts are more widespread
within the Danish and the Swedish government apparatus than within the Norwegian
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bureaucracy, subsequent to their different forms of affiliation with the EU. Similarly, in
contrast to Norwegian government officials, Swedish officials have fairly frequent contacts
with the political leadership in their EU related work (Jacobsson 2000: 20; Sundström 1999:
39). Tendencies towards increased ministerial control and supervision vis-à-vis the agency
level is also observed within the Swedish environment sector (Kronsell 1999: 205) as well as
within the Swedish central government apparatus at large (Riksrevisionsverket 1996:50;
Statskontoret 1996:7: 118). “The EU-membership has contributed to increased regulation of
the activity of the agencies” (Riksrevisjonsverket 1996:50: 349 – author’s translation;
Statskontoret 2000:20 and 2000:20B). However, Statskontoret (2000:20B: 25) also observes
that ministerial steering of the Swedish agencies is stronger towards the Council working
parties than towards the Commission expert committees. Furthermore, increased inter-sectoral
co-ordination between different ministries was also accompanied on January 1 1997 by a re-
organising of the Swedish ministries into one single Authority (Regeringskansliet). The fall of
1998 also witnessed the merger of four separate ministries (the Ministry of Labour, the
Ministry of Communication, the Ministry of Industry and Trade, and the Ministry of interior)
into one Ministry for Industry, Employment and Communications. Furthermore, the Swedish
MFA has organized its departments according to a desk system. In sum, Swedish EU
membership has accompanied increased co-ordination activities in the central administration,
thus supporting the empirical observations of Chapter 5. Few similar trends are observed in
the Norwegian central administration in the aftermath of the EEA affiliation in 1994.2
However, paralleling our observations that the individual institutional affiliations that embed
civil servants are important explanatory variables for their co-ordination activities,
Statskontoret (1996:7: 120) reports that a majority of the Swedish agencies do not get clear
mandates from the ministries or the political leadership. Moreover, within the Danish and the
Swedish government apparatus, co-ordination processes relating to EU issues increase as one
move from the agency level to the ministry level (Jacobsson and Sundström 1999a: 12 and
2000: 98; Pedersen 2000: 228). Similarly, Swedish ministry officials assign more weight to
the political leadership on EU related issues than do Swedish agency personnel (Sundström
1999: 47). Moreover, within the Norwegian government apparatus, contacts with the cabinet
level on EU related issues decrease significantly as one moves from the ministry level to the
agency level (Larsen et al. 1999: 118). Similarly, Larsen et al. (1999: 39-40) report that in the
Norwegian central administration, frame notes used for the purpose of co-ordinating EU
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dossiers are drawn up more frequently at the ministry level than at the agency level. Further,
Larsen et al. (1999) and Statskonsult (1999:6: 38) observe that the sectorally organized
‘special committees’ in the Norwegian central administration have gained a pivotal role in co-
ordinating EU/EEA related issues. Where42 per cent of all ministry departments have
participated on the cross-sectorally organized ‘Co-ordination board’ during the last year, 75
per cent have participated on the intra-sectorally organized ‘special committees’ (Larsen et al.
1999: 139-142). Similar to our observations in Chapter 5, this indicates that co-ordination
processes towards the Commission expert committees are more intra- than inter-sectoral.
Also, the Swedish central administration has witnessed an increased use of written
instructions as co-ordination tool-kits from 1995 to 2000, supplemented by informal co-
ordinating arrangements (Jacobsson 2000: 14; Statskontoret 2000:20). Consistent with our
observations, Statskontoret (1996:7: 121 and 2000:20: 65) also shows that co-ordination
through written instructions is most common amongst WP participants, whilst more informal
and oral co-ordination techniques tend to accompany EC attendance.
A comparative study of the experiences of member state officials in EU committees largely
supports the main conclusions of our study. Participants on Commission expert committees
are more weakly co-ordinated than officials participating on Council working parties
(Schaefer et al. 2000). Hence, the major empirical observations presented in Chapter 5 are
supported within the existing literature.
Finally, Chapter 5 shows that officials attending ECs report their ‘positions’ to be based on
professional expertise more extensively than do their colleagues participating on WPs. The
same pattern is revealed within the area of food politics in Norway (Veggeland 2000) and in
the transport sector within several other EU member states (Egeberg 1999b). Hence,
observing that officials from different countries attending ECs tend to evoke fairly similar co-
ordination behaviour, this study shows that committee affiliations may explain administrative
integration more fully than the membership versus non-membership dichotomy. However,
non-membership in the EU excludes WP participation. As such, the EU membership versus
non-membership distinction determines the possibility of attending WPs. In this respect, EU
membership “matters” as far as administrative integration is concerned. Still, this argument is
modified by the fact that officials from both EU member-states and from EEA states have
equal access to the Commission expert committees.
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On representational roles.
Many scholars have asserted that participants on EU institutions are re-socialized as far as
their role and identity perceptions are concerned (e.g. Franklin and Scarrow 1999; Hayes-
Renschaw and Wallace 1997: 235; Joerges 1999: 320; Laffan, O’Donnell and Smith 1999: 87;
Scully 2001; Weiler 1999: 342; Wessels 1999: 266). However, few empirical observations are
at present available that helps to confirm or reject this hypothesis. A frequent assertion in the
literature is that an ‘esprit de corps’ emerges within EU committees (Laffan 1998 and 2000;
Pag 1987; Wessels 1991), and this is especially the case if the participants interact fairly
frequently and intensively (e.g. Eriksen 2000: 61; cf. Haas 1958; Lewis 1999a). Contrary to
this, Wessels (1998: 227) argues that no loyalty transfers have taken place at the supranational
level.
Provoked by such assertions, scholars have now begun investigating empirically Haas’ (1958)
loyalty transfer hypothesis.  Lewis (1999: 19) shows empirically that a “club-like” atmosphere
or a “family-club” identity emerges amongst COREPER members. For example, Lewis
(2000) shows how a ‘community method’ emerges around consensus norms within the
COREPER. According to Lewis (2000), intensive interaction amongst the permanent
representatives instils several community norms in the officials. These include diffuse
reciprocity, thick trust, mutual responsiveness, consensus-reflexes and a culture of
compromise (cf. Flynn 2000; Verdun 2000). On this basis, Lewis (1999: 17) argues that
“COREPER is a mechanism where member-states endogenize new ways of articulating,
defending, and representing their ‘self interests’”. Similarly, Hayes-Renschaw and Wallace
(1997: 236) observe that intensive interaction amongst national officials within the ECOFIN
“encourages the emergence of stable and predictable relationships among the participants,
solidifies shared norms and intensifies interdependence among the participants”. Similarly,
Shore (2000) observes that, even amongst new recruits, Commission officials are socialized
into supranational allegiances. Furthermore, Shore (2000: 152) observes the enactment of an
‘esprit de corps’ and supranational allegiances amongst temporary national experts seconded
to the Commission on fixed-term contracts. Finally, Shore (2000) observes that Commission
officials experience ‘cognitive shifts’ that are fairly enduring and penetrative.
However, paralleling our observations that emerging supranational allegiances are indeed
secondary to national identifications, Lewis (2000: 274) argues that “[d]etailed investigation
of the EU permanent representatives has also shown the socialization to the Brussels political
241
game does not lead to the whole scale redefinition of national identities and interests. There is
no evidence of a transfer of loyalties or the emergence of a ‘European’ identity, although
there is an identifiable secondary allegiance among the permanent representatives to the
collective arena” (cf. Daemen and van Schendelen 1998: 138). Similarly, Scully (2001) and
Franklin and Scarrow (1999) find little evidence indicating that MEPs ‘go native’ and develop
strong and lasting European loyalties. MEPs have their primary institutional affiliations in
national parties. However, their institutional allegiances are seriously challenged by intensive
and sustained participation with fellow MEPs.
Scholars have recently begun analysing how EU committees affect the identities, role
conceptions and modes of behaviour evoked by the committee participants. Jan Beyers and
Guido Dierickx analyse how participation on Council working parties impacts the
communication networks and attitudes of the participants (Beyers 1998a and 1998b; Beyers
and Dierickx 1997; Dierickx and Beyers 1999). They basically show that communication
networks within Council working parties are largely influenced by the nationality of the
officials (Beyers and Dierickx 1997), but that intensive participation within these committees
enhance processes whereby these communication networks are affected by their ‘European
exposure’ (Dierickx and Beyers 1999). Moreover, Jan Beyers and Bart Kerremans (1996)
demonstrate the centrality of the Foreign Ministry with respect to contact patterns within the
Council working parties. Consistent with this pattern, participants on Council working parties
also tend to ascribe the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a vital role in the domestic co-ordination
of EU-related dossiers (Beyers and Kerremans 1996). Finally, Beyers (1998b) shows that the
attitudes towards European integration amongst these participants reflect prior national
socialization experiences (their primary institutional affiliations) and the period of entrance to
the Union. These studies, thus, reveal the re-socializing role played by EU committees. These
studies, however, also clarity the pivotal role of domestic government institutions in moulding
the role perceptions and institutional allegiances of the participants.
Morten Egeberg (1999b) adds the Commission expert committees to this picture and also
includes the Council working parties. Consistent with one of our main conclusions, he shows
that officials who attend Commission expert committees evoke other role and identity
perceptions than officials attending Council working parties. Officials attending Commission
expert committees tend to evoke intra-sectoral identifications and roles more frequently than
do officials participating on Council working parties. Moreover, officials attending both
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Commission expert committees and Council working parties tend to evoke multiple sets of
roles and identities. However, the enactment of supranational allegiances is shown to be only
secondary and complementary to pre-established allegiances. Thus, consistent with the
observations of Chapter 6 and parallel to observations made by researchers at the University
of Leuven (Beyers, Dierickx and Kerremans), Egeberg underscores the pivotal role played by
various domestic level primary institutional affiliations in affecting the enactment of
representational roles. Schaefer et al. (2000) and Statskontoret (2000:20: 83) largely confirm
these observations. Similarly, Veggeland (2000) shows how Norwegian government officials
tend to evoke multiple role conceptions, both expert roles and national representative roles.
Hence, he indicates that conflicting organizational principles are built into the EU committee
system, accompanying conflicting role perceptions amongst the committee participants.
Statskontoret (2000:20B) also highlights the role conflicts between professional
considerations and political loyalty amongst national civil servants attending EU committees.
However, similar to our observations, contemporary literature has indicated that supranational
allegiances and national identities need not conflict. Rather, supranational allegiances may be
a supplement to pre-established identities and role perceptions, not a replacement. In the
words of Castano (2000: 20), “the more people identify with their nation, the more they feel
European”. This assertion is empirically supported by Herrmann and Brewer (2000: 12) and
by Licata (2000). Similarly, Wallace (1999: 529) observes that “[o]utside experts … see
themselves as players on both national and European stages …”. Hence, “[a]lmost all actors
in the EU policy process have multiple identities, and many play multiple roles” (Wallace
2000: 529). National officials attending EU committees may thus evoke different role
perceptions sequentially, conditional upon their different institutional affiliations at different
points in time (cf. Sevòn 1996). Hence, different organization principles underpinning
different EU committees may evoke different parts of complex selves.
Supporting these observations, Trondal and Veggeland (2000) show that national civil
servants with similar institutional affiliations at the national level and at the EU level tend to
evoke similar role perceptions. Trondal and Veggeland (2000) also show, similar to the
observations made in Chapter 6, that officials who participate frequently with fellow
committee participants tend to evoke supranational role perceptions. This study also
highlights the fact that national civil servants attending Commission expert committees tend
foremost to evoke a ‘government representative’ role. The second most important role
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perception unveiled in the Trondal and Veggeland study is the ‘independent expert’ role. The
‘supranational agent’ role is deemed less important. This study also emphasizes the primacy
of national institutional affiliation in affecting the role and identity perceptions amongst the
EU committee participants.
*    *    *
Inspired by Haas’ pioneering work on supra-nationalism and European integration, recent
empirical studies have indicated how EU committees affect administrative integration across
the EU – nation-state intersection. However, as with the observations presented in Chapter 6,
the pivotal role of national government institutions is also underscored by contemporary
scholarly contributions as one vital driving force of administrative integration. The current
section has, foremost, provided empirical support to the main empirical observations on
administrative integration made throughout this study. The next section reconsiders the
theoretical framework outlined in Chapter 2.
The theoretical account reconsidered
“[I]t has been suggested that, as relatively autonomous and independent units become
integrated into a larger unit of organized activity, the internal dynamics of the original group
tend to change” (Brunsson and Olsen 1998: 31). The current study has revealed that cross-
level participation in Europe partially blurs the borderlines between EU committees and the
national government apparatus. To account for the enactment of supranational allegiances and
the evocation of particular patterns of co-ordination behaviour, two theoretical arguments
have been derived from a cognitive organization theory perspective. The first argument on
organizational specialization accounts for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative
integration. The second argument seeks to clarify the national-supranational spectrum of
administrative integration.
In accounting for the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration, the first
argument emphasises how particular models of horizontal specialization of government
institutions accompanies particular co-ordination behaviour and institutional allegiances
amongst the civil servants. Organizations that are specialized according to a sectoral principle
activate co-ordination behaviour and role and identity perceptions that are largely sectoral in
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character. Organizations that specialize according to a territorial principle, on the other hand,
activate more cross-sectoral patterns of co-ordination as well as more encompassing
institutional allegiances.
The empirical evidence juxtaposed in Chapters 5 and 6 largely support this argument.
Officials attending Commission expert committees, and officials employed at the agency level
in medium or lower rank positions specially earmarked for particular professional groups tend
to evoke both intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination and an ‘independent expert’ role fairly
extensively. Officials attending Council working parties on the other hand, and employed
within top-rank positions in the diplomatic realms at the permanent missions to the EU are
more geared towards evoking inter-sectoral patterns of co-ordination and a ‘government
representative’ role. As such, the argument on organizational specialization receives strong
empirical support in the current study.
Countervailing observations, however, are also found in the current study. Most clearly, all
officials attending EU committees, both Commission expert committees and Council working
parties, seem to evoke a ‘government representative’ role. This observation partially reflects
the element of territoriality that is organized into all EU committees, although most strongly
in the Council working parties. However, this observation may primarily also the primary
institutional affiliations embedding these officials. The fact that no major differences are
detected between officials attending ECs and officials attending WPs may reflect the
secondary nature of the EU committees in affecting administrative integration. However,
major differences have been observed between WP participants and EC participants with
respect to their assessments of fellow committee colleagues. In addition to being self-
conscious with respect to their own representative roles, officials may also have strong
opinions on how their colleagues perform and act in the EU committees. Officials attending
WPs tend to perceive other colleagues as mainly ‘government representatives’, whilst those
attending ECs tend to see fellow colleagues as having more mixed roles. Hence, the
representative roles correspond to the organizational principles underpinning the Council
working parties and the Commission expert committees.
National institutional affiliations are primary to these officials who devote most of their time
and energy towards these institutions. The officials studied are more exposed towards the
organizing principles underpinning national administrative bodies than towards the organizing
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principles built into the EU committees. Hence, officials employed at the agency level are
shown to evoke intra-sectoral modes of co-ordination and an ‘independent expert’ role more
strongly than officials employed at the permanent representations to the EU. The current
study thus supports the general argument on organizational specialization and the argument
on primary and secondary institutional affiliations. Further, supporting the argument that
primary institutional affiliations have a stronger impact on role enactment than secondary
institutional affiliations, Chapter 6 showed that the ‘supranational agent’ role is evoked less
strongly by EU committee participants than the ‘government representative’ role. National
institutional allegiances are thus largely sustained when national civil servants attend EU
committees, albeit most strongly amongst those entering the Council working parties.
However, additional supranational allegiances seem to supplement these pre-established
representational roles.
Finally, the national-supranational dimension of administrative integration was seeb in
Chapter 2 as reflecting the length and intensity of cross-level participation. The officials
studied are full-time participants within the national administrative system and only part-time
participants of the EU committees. Consequently, national institutional allegiances exceed
supranational ones. However, officials intensively attending EU committees evoke
supranational role and identity perceptions more strongly than officials attending these
committees with only minor intensity. This is especially clear amongst the permanent
representatives. Moreover, the intensity to which national officials attend EU committees
seems to affect both the co-ordination behaviour and the representational roles of these
participants more strongly than the length of attendance. Attending many EU committees and
many informal meetings is a stronger predictor of the co-ordination behaviour and the
representational roles of the participants than the length of attendance.
By and large, the current study provides ample evidence supporting the explanatory power of
the following three independent variables: (i) the horizontal specialization of government
institutions, (ii) the primary and secondary institutional affiliations embedding government
officials, and finally of (iii) the intensity of cross-level participation amongst these officials.
As such, the current study claims that the individual institutional affiliations embedding each
government official are one important explanation of administrative integration. This
conclusion largely supports a cognitive perspective on administrative integration across levels
of governance.
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According to standard views on administrative integration, governance levels are blurred and
increasingly symbiotic (e.g. Lewis 1999a: 10; Maurer, Mittag and Wessels 2000; Pag 1987;
Wessels 1998). The current study shows that the cognitive boundaries between the EU level
and the national level of governance have become only partially blurred. As seen from our
study, national officials attending EU committees do not necessarily mix and amalgamate pre-
established role perceptions with new supranational ones. Rather, these officials are able to
attend to several partially contending role perceptions and shift between these in different
situations (cf. Andeweg 1997). Rather than blurring different levels of governance, this study
shows that officials develop a mixed repertoire of roles for different organizational contexts
(Eulau et al. 1959: 750). However, the shifts between different roles may be moderate; most
civil servants attend to the ‘government representative’ role and the ‘independent expert’ role.
Still, the relative primacy of these roles varies in different organizational contexts. Rather than
administrative engrenage and perfectly integrated system levels, a picture of partial
administrative integration across levels of governance emerges from this study. The EU
committees and national bureaucracies thus resemble “loosely coupled rather than coherent,
hierarchical and tightly coupled” systems (Brunsson and Olsen 1998: 17).
However, this study has also shown that the Commission expert committees foster
administrative integration to a stronger degree than the Council working parties. This is
especially the case along the sectoral-territorial dimension of administrative integration.
Hence, different parts of the EU system are integrated more strongly with the national
government systems than other parts. However, considering the EU system as a multi-
functional and multi-faceted polity, differentiated administrative integration across different
sub-systems of the EU might be functional for integration at the system level. The role of the
Commission is to cultivate non-territorial interests and concerns. The Council of Ministers, on
the other hand, should pay particular attention to territorial needs and preferences. Hence,
different EU institutions should function according to different logics of governance in order
to secure European integration at large. According to a pendulum thesis, a strong emphasis on
supranational governance at one point in time, as shown in particular by the Delors’
administration, easily triggers contra-measures along the intergovernmental path. Put
generally, system maintenance requires the joint existence of conflicting and non-compatible
governance logics and organizing principles. Hence, overall system integrative is generated
by sub-system differences (Christiansen 1987; Jacobsen 1960; March and Olsen 1995). Thus,
European integration can gain from institutionalized sub-systemic variations. While neo-
247
functional perspectives and intergovernmental accounts of European integration largely
neglect this argument, the cognitive institutional perspective sheds light on the multi-faceted
character of administrative integration.
Supplementary theoretical approaches.
Empirical support for the cognitive organization theory perspective on administrative
integration does not render supplementary theoretical approaches useless. Administrative
integration might also be explained by different independent variables. The current study has
emphasised organizational affiliations, primary and secondary, organizational specialization,
as well as the length and intensity to which civil servants attend EU committees as major
explanatory variables. Amongst the number of theoretical approaches currently available,
some particular supplementary theoretical approaches to the study of administrative
integration are briefly touched upon in the following. This highlights the fact that the
cognitive organization theory approach is not the only justifiable approach (cf. Wallace
2000b: 69-70).
Cultural institutional perspectives.
Cultural perspectives pay attention to how co-ordination patterns and the enactment of
institutional role and identity perceptions reflect pre-established administrative cultures, codes
of conduct and non-codified norms. Cultural perspectives view organizations as institutions,
“infused with value beyond the technical requirements of the task at hand” (Selznick 1957: 17
– original emphasis). Processes of administrative integration across levels of governance are
expected to be filtered through pre-existing institutional identities and cultures in the national
administrations (Røvik 1998; Sverdrup 2000; Trondal 1999a and 1999c). “The longer a rule
has existed, the more it becomes linked to the values of organizational stakeholders” (March,
Schulz and Zhou 2000: 72-73). According to a cultural perspective, actors become norm- and
rule-driven. Actors are less driven by anticipation of future consequences and more by
matching identities to situations (March and Olsen 1989). Similar to a cultural perspective,
the cognitive organization theory perspective takes into account the pre-packed nature of
government agents. When entering EU committees these officials retain their national
institutional affiliations, act upon them and evoke role perceptions that deviate only
marginally from past role perceptions. Institutional filtering processes have considered by
way of reflecting on how primary institutional affiliations at the national governance level
contribute to sustaining pre-established behavioural patterns and institutional allegiances.
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Hence, administrative integration is seen to reflect national administrative structures,
especially those that are specialized according to a sectoral principle (Gulick 1937; Harmsen
1999; Knill and Lenschaw 1998a and 1998b; March and Olsen 1995).
Insufficient attention has been paid to processes of historical path-dependency and
incremental change. Process studies through time have been sacrificed for a variance study in
time (Roness 2000). Cultural perspectives are particular appropriate for process tracing and
studying change processes across time (Christensen and Lægreid 2001). They are also useful
tools when combined with longitudinal data, juxtaposed dynamic models and dynamic data.
The current study combines a static model with static data and focuses not on change patterns
but on how established institutions mould the actors in particular ways. Time series data are
not used nor have any process tracing been conducted. A “one-shot” picture has been taken of
processes of administrative integration across levels of governance.
Social constructivist approaches.
As in the variety of institutional perspectives in organizational theory, “one can find almost as
many constructivisms as there are constructivists” (Lewis 1999b: 34). Still, different
approaches to social construction share at least some basic characteristics and research foci.
The different social mechanisms addressed within social constructivist accounts are largely
identical, or at least strikingly similar to those posed by different organization theory
perspectives (Trondal 2001). However, where social constructivist approaches emphasise the
interactive processes that constantly occur within formal organizations, organization theory
perspectives pay particular attention to the structural/organizational arrangements within
which social interaction occurs. In order to make a distinction between social constructivism
and general organization theory perspectives, one can argue that organization theory studies
how different social contexts contribute to the enactment of certain elements within a fixed
repertoire of identities, roles and codes of conduct. Social constructivists, in contrast, study
the initial construction and formation of identities, role conceptions and codes of conduct,
thus rendering central features of the self as variables. Put differently, while social
constructivism seeks to understand how, for example, roles and identities are constructed,
organization theory focuses on understanding how pre-existing identities and roles are
activated and deactivated in particular organizational contexts. Organization theory pictures
agents as having a particular and fixed set of responses to be enacted in particular institutional
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contexts, whereas social constructivism analyses how different elements within this repertoire
initially came about (Trondal 2001).
However, the social constructivist versus institutionalist divide is not distinct or clear-cut
(Trondal 2001). To take only one example, most cognitive theory scholars agree that
organizations contribute in constructing actors’ mindsets, cognitive schemes and, ultimately,
their role perceptions and patterns of behaviour. Hence, organization theory may account for
the initial construction of role perceptions. The current study has emphasised that national
civil servants may construct supranational allegiances subsequent to becoming re-socialized
within the EU committees.
When compared to social constructivist accounts, organization theory perspectives are
relatively static on the conception of agency. Agents are largely seen as being “structurally
determined”. Critics of institutional perspectives have “seen the individual as helpless in the
face of structural arrangements” (Stryker and Statham 1985: 338). Hence, a cognitive
perspective on organizational dynamics “risks explanatory determinism, ignoring possibly
independent influence of actors and their strategic interaction…” (Knill and Lenschaw 2001:
8). Social constructivism is more open for agency dynamics. “Some recent theorizing and
research on the multiplicity of roles and on role conflict has begun to recognize that the
individual is not completely helpless and passive in the face of structural constraints” (Stryker
and Statham 1985: 339). Further, agency is institutionally constituted and not randomly
distributed. But, social constructivists have yet to suggest a theory of action. Additionally,
most institutionalist accounts are more implicit than social constructivists on the notion of
social interaction. While most institutionaslists pay attention to the institutional apparatus as
such, social constructivists pay more explicit attention to the social interaction, deliberation,
bargaining, and persuasion that take place within such institutions (e.g. Checkel 1999;
Jetschke 2000; Lewis 2000; Risse 2000). For example, Joerges and Neyer (1997) study
processes of argumentation and deliberation that occur within EU institutions and EU
committees. Social constructivists, however, pay only marginal attention to the particular
organizational contexts embedding social interaction (see beneath).
As scholarly disciplines, social constructivism is embryonic compared to organization theory.
Social constructivism, as developed within the study of international relations, has been
mainly devoted to meta-analyses. Organization theory is more middle-range in character and
250
analyses the ‘cogs and wheels’ that bring social elements into correlation.3 Reflecting this
meta-theoretical heritage, the institutional concepts addressed by most social constructivists
are criticized as being too vague; they “point to a ‘system’ out there” without unpacking
central characteristics of this system (Pasic 1996: 88). It is therefore difficult to deduce
precise implications with respect to determining the concrete construction of roles and
identities on the basis of the institutional concepts addressed by most social constructivists.
This criticism reflects a more general tendency amongst several social constructivist scholars
to ignore operationalizing and conceptionalizing the social contexts within which actors
operate (Inayatullah and Blaney 1996; Pasic 1996). This lacuna has contributed to a general
deficiency of, and a “striking unwillingness” by, social constructivists to set forth distinctive
and empirically testable hypotheses (Checkel 1999c; Moravcsik 1999: 678). Consequently,
social constructivism has not enabled empirical research on administrative integration, not the
least because of their lack of operational dimensions (Trondal 2001).
Myth perspectives.
Social constructivism and institutionalism focus on processes of re-socialisation as reflecting
intensive exposure towards certain stimuli. Myth perspectives, however, focus on two
different aspects of organizational dynamism: organizational hypocrisy and environmental
adaptation. First, a myth perspective pays attention to situations whereby incompatible and
conflicting expectations concerning appropriate role enactment and appropriate modes of
behaviour lead civil servants to de-couple these properties from the modes of presenting them.
If participation on committees and working parties under the EU Commission and the Council
facilitates exposure to conflicting expectations, civil servants might evoke role perceptions
that deviate significantly from ways of presenting themselves. For example, EU committee
participants may be inclined to adopt ‘Euro-talk’ picturing oneself as ‘Europeanized’, i.e.
using ‘Euro-jargon’, whilst at the same time acting in accordance with national expectations
and obligations. Combining pre-established national modes of acting and feeling and applying
standarized and ‘Europeanized’ language, civil servants may be able to satisfy inconsistent
expectations and demands. ‘Euro-talk’ might thus reflect “the norms geared exclusively for
talk” more than the norms of action and practice (Brunsson 1998: 267).
Where social constructivists argue that intensive interaction on EU committees drives
processes of re-socialization towards supranational allegiances, myth perspectives argue that
intensive interaction on EU committees may actually teach the participants to be cynical about
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ways of presenting themselves to their wider environment. “The more experience, the greater
the competence” (March, Schulz and Zhou 2000: 75). The role and identity perceptions
evoked may function as myth, signal and ceremony for the committee participants towards the
environment (Brunsson 1989; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; March 1984). Processes of identity
and role formation can be geared more towards organizational hypocrisy than to
organizational change (Brunsson 1989). As such, administrative integration represents more
of a signal and symbol than a reality. The notion of de-coupling talk and action is not
accounted for in the current study, nor is it fully tested empirically in current literature
(March, Schulz and Zhou 2000: 60; Røvik 1992: 274).
Second, and linked to the idea of organizational hypocrisy, myth perspectives may account for
variation in processes of administrative integration. Administrative integration can vary across
policy sectors as well as across nation-states due to policy sectors and different nation-states
being exposed to different institutional environments (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Røvik
1998). Organizations come to view different aspects of their environments as “rule-like”,
having a “taken-for-granted” status (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). “The symbolic significance
of any activity depends on the social norms within which it is undertaken” (Feldman and
March 1982: 184). However, institutionalised environments are fragmented with different sets
of institutionalised standards available for adoption to different parts of each organization. To
be sure, organizational fragmentation, sectoral variation and national differentiation may
reflect the adoption of different institutional standards by different parts of the organization
(Røvik 1998). Consistent with the cognitive organization theory perspective, this notion of the
myth perspective views actors as bounded rational actors. Dynamics of imitation are triggered
by uncertainty amongst the actors. One solution to uncertainty is to “imitate organizations
which are perceived to be more legitimate or more successful” (Radaelli 1999: 45).
Adaptation to the institutionalised environments follows a process of unconscious imitation.
Put generally, “[r]itual acknowledgement of managerial importance and appropriateness is
part of a social ceremony by which social life is made meaningful and acceptable…” (March
1984: 31).
A rational choice version of the myth approach highlights sectoral divergence and national
variation that results from different actors and nation-states strategically adapting to different
institutional environments (Brunsson 1989; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Røvik 1998).
According to this approach, organizations are mostly geared for survival. Organizational
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survival and viability is secured through processes whereby environmental actors view the
organization as legitimate and effective. Viewing organizational actors as rational, they may
strategically download different institutional standards to satisfy environmental expectations
and demands. Organizational fragmentation can thus reflect strategic adaptation to fragmented
institutional environments (Sevòn 1996). Administrative integration mirrors processes
whereby individual civil servants adapt, more or less consciously, to the requirements,
expectations and demands set by the EU committees. Owing to the level of uncertainty in EU
policy-making, as well as the level of uncertainty facing national civil servants attending EU
committees, processes of mimetic adaptation are likely to occur.
Environmental adaptation might also be called uni-lateral administrative integration, differing
from bi- or multi-lateral administrative integration (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a). Uni-lateral
administrative integration is a century-old mode of international standardization based on
imitation and copying across time and space (Rose 1993). Bi- and multi-lateral administrative
integration are more recent phenomena that reflect administrative adaptation through
intergovernmental and supranational organizations. The current study views administrative
integration as reflecting the multi-lateral adaptation of the decision-making behaviour and
institutional allegiances of EU committee participants. However, processes of uni-lateral
administrative integration have been observed recently in the Norwegian government system
as well as in other EU member states (Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Kassim, Peters and Wright
2000: 241-242; Sollien 1995; Sverdrup 2000). Similarly, adaptation to European integration
in non-EU member countries, like Norway, Switzerland, and Poland indicates that
administrative integration has more to it than merely multi-lateral adaptation (Biernat 1997;
Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Kux and Sverdrup 1997). While this study perceives
administrative integration as reflecting ‘integration through participation’ on EU committees,
the Europeanization of the Swiss central administration has been described as a process of
“integration without participation” (Sverdrup 2000: 121). As such, administrative integration
may reflect processes of uni-lateral adaptation. This notion of the myth perspective
supplements the ideas of organizational hypocrisy where administrative integration is a
symbol and signal to the institutional environments more than a description of the actual
integration of national government institutions and EU level institutions. However, uni-lateral
adaptation to environmental requirements can also have instrumental effects beyond simple
signals and symbols. In the end, organizational hypocrisy need not last forever as the symbols
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might affect the cognition of the actors, and ultimately the actual working of the organization
(March 1984).
Additional independent variables.
The current study has focused primarily on the primary and secondary institutional affiliations
that embed individual civil servants to explain why certain co-ordination behaviour and
representational roles are attended to. However, where you stand depends not only on where
you sit, or where you come from, but also to a degree on where you are going (cf. Allison
1969). In addition to being pre-socialized before attending EU committees, and re-socialized
in the course of the meetings, officials might also be pre-socialized towards future
institutional affiliations. The most likely agent of this latter pre-socialization mode is the
national administrations. Acting on the shadow of the future, the career possibilities as well as
the rewards and punishments for the committee members are largely national. When attending
EU committees the participants are thus likely to anticipate future career possibilities at the
national level of governance.
A second variable not emphasised in the current study is how positive and negative
experiences from the EU committees may affect the role perceptions of the participants. Past
experiences might be analysed from an experiential learning perspective. “[E]xperiential
learning offers a form of backward-looking wisdom” (Gavetti and Levinthal 2000: 114). If a
ministry officer spends a lot of time on EU committees, he or she may either become
increasingly fed up with it or, conversely, it can lead to an increased supranational attitude.
The enactment of supranational allegiances is less likely if the officials have negative
experiences from the committee meetings. For example, the meetings might be perceived as
dull and boring, highly technical, time consuming, less productive than anticipated,
preoccupied with formalism, poorly managed on behalf of the chair, etc. Such experiences
could reduce the likelihood for the construction of supranational role and identity perceptions
amongst the participants.
Not every potential explanatory variable has been attended to in this study. Rather, our
theoretical model contains only a few independent variables rather than a long “shopping list”
of possible explanatory variables. Hence, rather than accounting for what happened as it
happened (Elster 1989: 7) this study has stressed some key variables as suggested by our
theoretical perspective which are seen as vital for understanding administrative integration.
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The data and methodology revisited
Three methodological concerns are discussed below: the robustness of the empirical test of
the cognitive approach to administrative integration, the fruitfulness of the empirical proxies,
and finally, the generalisability of the empirical observations and the theoretical inferences
drawn from them.
First, regarding the question of robustness, this study has been carried out under less than
favourable conditions where the proposed relationships between our variables were less likely
to occur. Collegial arrangements are less likely to affect behavioural dynamics than
hierarchical organizations. This is especially so if the collegium is perceived as a secondary
institutional affiliation. As such, the proposed relationships between our independent and
dependent variables were taken to a “critical test” in the EU committees. One overall goal
when designing the questionnaires was to maximize the likelihood of falsifying our
theoretical arguments. One way of doing this was to increase the likelihood for officials
assigning identical scores on questions relating to Commission expert committees and
Council working parties. The officials were asked to give answers to several questions,
simultaneously indicating if there were any differences between these committees in relation
to the each question. As discussed in Chapter 2, different committees at the EU level may
affect the participants differently. Hence, one should expect different scores to be assigned to
different classes of committees within the questionnaire. However, when maximizing the
likelihood for refuting this theoretical argument by way of designing the questionnaire in
particular ways, the robustness of our theory was taken to a ‘critical test’.
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 have presented evidence indicating that most of the predicted empirical
patterns indeed materialise under these unfavourable conditions. As such, the empirical
observations indicate that the theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter 2 are fairly robust.
Second, other empirical proxies can measure administrative integration than the ones applied
in our study (cf. Chapter 4). The current study builds on how the civil servants perceive their
own co-ordination behaviour and their own role and identity perceptions. One vital argument
in favour on relying on the self-perceptions of the officials is that these perceptions are likely
to affect their actual decision behaviour. Assuming that civil servants are bounded rational
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actors, the stories they tell through interviews and questionnaires are likely to reflect not only
their actual patterns of acting but also the taken-for-granted nature of these patterns.
Different yardsticks and different methods can also measure administrative integration. For
example, co-ordination processes could be measured more directly by studying the actual co-
ordination behaviour of civil servants, studying the minutes from the co-ordination meetings,
studying the content of the frame notes and the instructions, etc. Policy co-ordination could
also be studied through direct observation. This last procedure, however, might potentially
affect the actual co-ordination practises of the actors. Administrative integration could also be
measured through processes whereby national administrative structures are re-shuffled and
reshaped through processes of legal adaptation to EU standards (laws, regulations,
agreements, conventions, directives and standards), through cultural changes in the national
institutions, through convergence or divergence in the policy outputs and policy outcomes
within various policy sector, through changes in the financial and budgetary allocations
nationally, through changes in the composition of personnel of national ministries and
agencies, etc. The list of potential dependent variables in the study of administrative
integration seems endless. When choosing among these, some indicators may prove more
adequate than others. Similar to Radaelli (2000), this study attempts to draw a demarcation
line between what is administrative integration and what is not. One major reason for focusing
on co-ordination behaviour and role and identity perceptions in the current study is that they
measure administrative integration fairly well (cf. Chapter 2). Additionally, these variables
are applied because of the general lack of such variables in existing literature (cf. Chapter 4).
Past and recent literature on processes of Europeanization of national administrations focus
mostly on (i) changes in the organizational structures of national central administrations,
including changes in the demographic composition and the temporal orders of these systems
(e.g. Auer, Demmke and Polet 1996; Dehousse 1997; Ekengren 1996; Metcalfe 1994; Page
and Wouters 1995), and (ii) changes in the policy output (e.g. Aspinwall 1996; Dong-Hguyen
et al. 1993; Egeberg and Trondal 1997a; Claes and Tranøy 1999). Fewer empirical studies
analyse how European integration and the EU polity affects actual decision processes within
national administrative systems and the way representational roles of the decision-makers are
moulded.
The next question is whether the empirical findings reported in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 are
generalizable beyond the Scandinavian countries, or even beyond the case of EU committees?
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The samples of respondents and informants in this study were systematically selected and
thus not representative in any meaningful sense. Systematic data samples do not warrant
empirical generalizations. However, our observations on the Scandinavian sample are
supported empirically by studies outside these countries (cf. above). Analytical and theoretical
generalizations are possible due to the general nature of our theoretical arguments (Yin 1993).
Furthermore, the current study applies empirical proxies that more or less reflect general
phenomena in organizational life.
As far as generalizability is concerned, the majority of the theoretical arguments forwarded in
Chapter 2 are sufficiently general so as to warrant generalizations across time and space. As
such, the relationships between the independent and the dependent variables may apply also
to non-Scandinavian countries. It is, however, questionable to what extent the theoretical
arguments on supra-nationalism can be generalized beyond the EU context, let alone, beyond
the EU committee setting. First, few other international organizations have supranational
characteristics to the same extent as the EU institutions. Worth mentioning, however,
international organizations like the WTO have indeed supranational characteristics. Hence,
the empirical observations on supranational allegiances might to some extent be generalized
outside EU institutions. Moreover, the arguments on cross-level participation require that this
participation is rutinized to a certain degree, for example within committees. Few other
government institutions have institutionalised cross-border or cross-level interaction to the
same magnitude as the EU (Rosamond 2000: 121). Consequently, the empirical observations
presented in this study, particularly on supra-nationalism, is limited to the study of
administrative integration at the intersection of the EU system and the nation-state. The
arguments on organizational specialization and on primary and secondary institutional
affiliations, however, are more general and merit generalization beyond the EU system (cf.
Egeberg 1999a; Gulick 1937; Hammond 1990). The concept of organizational specialization
and institutional affiliations claims no validity with respect to levels of governance.
Finally, are the empirical data applied in this study suitable for illustrating the theoretical
arguments that are advanced? Ideally, dynamic theoretical models should be tested against
dynamic data and vice versa. The theoretical arguments outlined in Chapter 2 are two-
dimensional as far as the level of dynamism in the arguments is concerned. First, along the
sector-territorial dimension of administrative integration the cognitive organization theory
perspective is geared towards understanding how pre-established identities and roles are
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activated and deactivated within particular EU committees. As such, this approach views
agents as having a particular and fixed set of responses to be enacted in particular institutional
contexts. A ‘one shot picture’ is taken of the role and identity perceptions evoked by national
civil servants attending EU committees, representing a static model. Hence, the static nature
of the model is paralleled by static data.4 Second, considering the national-supranational
dimension of administrative integration, the cognitive approach emphasises a re-socializing
dynamic. Arguably, re-socialization towards supranational allegiances may stem from
intensive and sustained participation on EU committees. This dynamism, however, is not
perfectly represented by any genuine dynamic data. The only element of dynamism in the data
relates to questions of how long the officials have participated on the committees, when they
first arrived, how many meetings they have attended during the last year and the last month,
etc. Inter-correlating these independent variables with different empirical proxies on role and
identity perceptions thus provide a dynamic element in the analysis. However, time series and
iterated interviews could have increased the dynamic element in the data, thus giving a better
fit between the dynamic elements in our arguments on the national-supranational dimension
of administrative integration. As such, along the national-supranational dimension of
administrative integration this lack of dynamic data may be a problem since we try to hit a
moving target with a ‘one-shot picture’.
Prospects for future research on administrative integration
EU “committees function as hybrids between EU governance and the organizations
represented” (Van Schendelen and Pedler 1998: 288). Administrative integration, as defined
in Chapter 4, is relational covering the relationships and interdependencies between different
administrative systems and between the members of these systems. Administrative integration
requires that actual contacts occur between (at least) two administrative systems (cf. Chapter
4). A stronger notion of integration requires, in addition, that these contacts affect the systems
(mutually) and the individual members within them (cf. Chapters 5 and 6). As such,
administrative integration should be seen as processes whereby the borderlines between (at
least) two administrative systems become increasingly blurred. The empirical analyses
conducted in this study, however, provide evidence only of partial blurring of the borderlines
between the EU system and the national administrative apparatus. Due to the fact that national
and sectoral allegiances exceed supranational ones amongst most national EU committee
participants, administrative integration is shown to be only partially two-dimensional.
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However, under certain institutional conditions we have observed the emergence of a two-
dimensional mode of administrative integration. This occurs under conditions of intensive
cross-level participation amongst the EU committee participants and under conditions
whereby these officials are embedded in government institutions that are largely organized
according to a sectoral principle. Hence, the current study agrees only partially with Wolfgang
Wessels’ (1998) assumption of a ‘fusion’ of national administrations and EU institutions.
Rather, the EU and the national central administration are imperfectly integrated orders.
However, the current study has limited the analysis of administrative integration to only one
side of the coin, namely how it is seen by the national civil servants. Because of this, a study
of full-time EU bureaucrats should supplement the picture provided by this study, thus
contributing to a more complete picture of the relational character of administrative
integration. Are Commission officials who frequently interact with national civil servants
becoming increasingly supranational with regard their role and identity perceptions (cf. Cini
1996, Hooghe 1999a; Landfried 1997; McDonald 1997; Wodak 2000)? This is, amongst
others, an important question to be answered in future research.
Second, additional empirical sources and foci should supplement the empirical focus of the
current study of administrative integration. This study provides only a general picture of
administrative integration across level of governance; in-depth case studies within different
policy sectors could provide increased knowledge on the micro-foundations affecting this
phenomenon (Scharpf 2000: 766). Case studies make it possible to test theoretical arguments
under conditions where possible noise from various independent variables is controlled.
Moreover, the possibilities for more inductive research facilitated by the case study approach
might potentially uncover relationships that were not recognized beforehand. Thus, the
general picture of administrative integration revealed in the current study could be confirmed
and enriched.
Finally, a more complete picture of administrative integration across governance levels should
include analyses of other EU institutions than the Commission expert committees and the
Council working parties. As mentioned above, future studies of administrative integration
should explain the behavioural patterns and the representative roles of permanent Commission
officials as well as the auxiliary agents of the EU Commission. A fuller picture of
administrative integration should also include additional empirical proxies than the ones used
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here (cf. the previous section). Further, the study of integration across levels of governance
should go beyond the administrative sphere. Consequentially, future research on political-
administrative integration in Europe should focus on permanent EU Commission officials and
Commissioners (cf. Cini 1996; Hooghe 1999a; Nugent 1997; Wodak 2000), on the semi-
autonomous agencies under the auspices of the Commission (cf. Covassi 1997; Kreher 1997),
the Council structure, including the level of COREPER (cf. de Zwaan 1995; Hayes-Renschaw
and Wallace 1997; Lewis 2000; Pendergast 1976), the EU Parliament, the MEPs and the
impact of participation on different Parliamentary committees (cf. Frankline and Scarrow
1999; Katz 1997; Kerr 1973; Scully 1999 and 2001), the comitology committees organized at
the intersection of the Commission and the Council (e.g. Schaefer et al. 2000; Wessels 1998),
and the re-socializing dynamics of the European Court of Justice (cf. Joerges 1997). Finally, a
more adequate portrait of administrative integration should also take into consideration
integration through more informal networks, epistemic communities, and advocacy coalitions
(e.g. Börzel 1998; Haas 1992; Kohler-Koch and Eising 1999; Sabatier 1998).
The current study of administrative integration does not raise all the relevant questions,
neither does it provide all possible answers. Still, it has shed light on the partial blurring of the
borderlines between national administrative systems and the EU government apparatus.
Subsequent to intensive and protracted cross-level interaction and due to sectoral
specialization of government institutions, administrative integration is shown to be emerging
across levels of governance. Hence, this study has moved beyond the neo-functional versus
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 The author would like to thank Jan Beyers and Morgen Egeberg for valuable comments on various versions of
this Chapter.
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 However, the desk system has also been introduced to the Norwegian MFA.
3
 Meta-analysis, however, is a recent characteristic of social constructivist literature. More contemporary studies
apply middle-range accounts to a greater extent (Checkel 1999; Caporaso, Cowles and Risse 2001). Hence, the
distinction between meta-analysis and middle-range analysis does not fit perfectly to more recent social
constructivist and organization theory research.
4
 Thanks to Johan P. Olsen for this point.
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Appendix 1: Letter and questionnaire to national officials from Denmark, Norway and
Sweden.
Kjære tjenestemann/-kvinne.
Som en del av forskningsprogrammet ARENA (Advanced Research on the Europeanization
of the Nation State) foretar jeg en undersøkelse av erfaringene til nasjonale tjenestemenn i
sentraladministrasjonene i Danmark, Norge og Sverige fra deres deltakelse i ekspertkomiteer
og arbeidsgrupper under EU-kommisjonen og Unionsrådet/Ministerrådet. For å få et best
mulig bilde av erfaringene fra slik deltakelse, er det ønskelig at du har anledning til å fylle ut
vedlagte spørreskjema.
Intervjuene vil gjennomføres slik at hver enkelt fyller ut et standardisert spørreskjema på
egenhånd. Selve utfyllingen vil ta omlag 30 minutter. Dernest ber jeg deg om å returnere
skjemaet i utfylt stand så snart som mulig i den frankerte konvolutten som medfølger, eller
sender den pr. fax (se nummer nedenfor). Hver informant vil være garantert full anonymitet
(Datatilsynet).
En liten veiledning i utfyllingen av skjemaet:
Spørreskjemaet er beregnet på tjenestemenn i Danmark, Norge og Sverige, og i deres
respektive delegasjoner i Brussel. Det jeg kaller ekspertkomiteer omfatter alle de
arbeidsgrupper, utvalg og komiteer som har en forberedende funksjon overfor EU-
kommisjonen. Rådsarbeidsgrupper omfatter de grupper, utvalg og komiteer som har en
tilsvarende funksjon overfor Ministerrådet (Unionsrådet). Dersom du har spørsmål i




Fax: + 47 22 85 44 11
tlf:   + 47 22 85 51 66
e-mail: jarle.trondal@stv.uio.no
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SENTRALFORVALTNINGEN I DANMARK, NORGE OG SVERIGE: ERFARINGER FRA
TJENESTEMENN SOM DELTAR I EKSPERTKOMITEER OG AREIDSGRUPPER I EU.
Jarle Trondal
Universitetet i Oslo,           Spørreskjema i
Institutt for statsvitenskap,   Sentraladministrasjonen
Postboks 1097 Blindern,         ARENA-programmet
0317 Oslo.                      Norges forskningsråd
Tlf: +47 22 85 51 66
Fax: +47 22 85 44 11
1. Land:____________________.
2. Hvilken instans er du ansatt i?
   _________________________________________________.
3. Hvilket politikk-/saksområde arbeider du på?
  __________________________________________________.
4. Hva er ditt nåværende stillingsnivå?
   _________________________________________________.
5. Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt i:






6. Har du arbeidet i EU-kommisjonen som:




Så følger noen spørsmål angående din deltakelse overfor
Den Europeiske Union.
7. I hvilken grad berører EU og/eller EØS-avtalen ditt
saksområde?
Meget                           Meget
stor grad                       liten grad
    1       2       3       4       5
8. Omtrent hvor stor andel av den samlede arbeidstiden din
går med til:
                        Meget               Meget
               stor andel        liten andel
 EU-/EØS-arbeid generelt    1     2     3     4     5
 Deltakelse i ekspert-
  komiteer under EU-
  kommisjonen                1     2     3     4     5
 Deltakelse i arbeids-
  grupper under Unionsrådet  1     2     3     4     5
 Deltakelse i komitologi-
  komiteer (komiteer for
  kontroll av EU-kommisjonens
  utøvelse av delegert       1     2     3     4     5
  myndighet
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9a. I forbindelse med din deltakelse i forberedende
ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis
EU-kommisjonen og Unionsrådet, hvor ofte har du hatt
kontakt med de følgende instansene i løpet av det siste
året:
Nøkkel:    Meget ofte      Av og til    Meget sjelden/
   aldri
               1       2       3      4        5
                         Ekspert-        Råds-
     komiteer        arbeidsgrupper
 Med the environmental
  DG under
  EU-kommisjonen         1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med andre General-
  direktorater under
  EU-kommisjonen         1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med ekspertkomiteer
  under EU-kommisjonen
  som jeg ikke deltar
  i selv                 1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med Unionsrådet        1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med COREPER            1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med arbeidsgrupper
  under Rådet som jeg    1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
  ikke deltar
  i selv
 Med Europa-parlamentet 1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med Europa-domstolen   1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
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 Med EØS- og EFTA-
  organer                1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med kolleger fra andre
  medlemsland som ikke
  deltar i den komite/   1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
  gruppe som jeg
  deltar i
 Med kolleger fra andre
  medlemsland som deltar
  i den komite/arbeids-
  gruppe jeg deltar i    1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
9b. Med hvilke av de nevnte instansene eller gruppene har
du oftest kontakt?
______________________________________________________.
10a. Hvor mange komiteer og rådsarbeidsgrupper har du
deltatt i?
                             Antall
 forberedende ekspertkomiteer
 rådsarbeidsgrupper
10b. Når omtrent ble du første gang involvert i slik
deltakelse?
 Forberedende ekspertkomiteer: ______________________.
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper: ________________________________.
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10c. Kan du angi navn på de ekspertkomiteer og/eller
arbeidsgrupper du har deltatt i?
       Ekspertkomiteer           Rådsarbeidsgrupper
10d. Hvor mange møter har du deltatt i?
         ekspertkomiteer  Rådsarbeidsgrupper
 siste år
 siste måned




11. Holder du innlegg på møtene i ekspertkomiteen(e)/
arbeidsgruppen(e)?
                             Meget       Meget sjelden/
                             ofte                 aldri
 Forberedende ekspertgrupper  1     2    3    4    5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper           1     2    3    4    5
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12. Får du rutinemessig innkallelse til møter i disse
komiteene/gruppene, eller må du selv ta initiativ til
deltakelse?
                               Blir                eget
                               innkalt        initiativ
 Forberedende ekspertkomiteer   1    2    3    4    5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper             1    2    3    4    5
12b. Dersom svart 1,2 eller 3 ovenfor, fra hvilken instans





13a. Er det omtrent de samme personene som deltar i
komiteen(e)/gruppen(e) fra møte til møte?
  I stor           Sjelden/
       grad             aldri
 Forberedende ekspertkomiteer   1    2    3    4    5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper             1    2    3    4    5
13b. Hvis svart 1,2 eller 3 ovenfor, omtrent hvor lang
fartstid har disse personene i komiteen/gruppen?
         Vet





14. Har du kontakt med noen av de øvrige komite-
/arbeidsgruppe-deltakerne ut over den kontakt dere har
gjennom de formelle komite-møtene?
                            I stor grad        sjelden/
        aldri
 Forberedende ekspertkomiteer   1    2    3    4    5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper             1    2    3    4    5
15. Konsulterer du enkelte av de øvrige deltakerne i
ekspertkomiteen(e)/gruppen(e) forut for og/eller i
etterkant av møter?
  Meget ofte          Meget sjelden/
Forberedende                                aldri
ekspertkomiteer:
 I forkant av møter     1      2      3      4      5
 I etterkant av møter   1      2      3      4      5
Rådsarbeidsgrupper:
 I forkant av møter     1      2      3      4      5
 I etterkant av møter   1      2      3      4      5
16. Kan du angi omtrent hvor lenge disse
komiteene/gruppene har eksistert?




17. Hvilken form for kontakt benytter du forut for og i
etterkant av slike møter, og hvor hyppig forekommer denne
type kontakt? 
                     Meget hyppig              sjelden/
                                                aldri
 Møter ansikt-til-
  ansikt                 1      2      3      4      5
 kontakter pr. tele-
  fon, fax og/eller
  e-mail                 1      2      3      4      5
 andre kontaktformer    1      2      3      4      5
18. I hvilken grad føler du tilhørighet til og ansvar
overfor de følgende enheter når du deltar i
ekspertkomite(er) og/eller arbeidsgrupper under
henholdsvis Kommisjonen og Rådet?
Nøkkel:  I meget                   I meget     Ikke
         stor grad    både og      liten grad  relevant
             1      2    3      4      5           9
                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 Egen avdeling           1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Eget departement/
  direktorat (centrale
  embetsverket) o.l.      1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
  som helhet
 Egen regjering          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Egen profesjon/
  utdannelsesbakgrunn     1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
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 Komite(er) som jeg
  deltar i under
  EU-Kommisjonen          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Arbeidsgrupp(er) som
  jeg deltar i under
  Rådet                   1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Den Europeisk Union     1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Egen policy-sektor      1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Annen (spesifiser)      1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
______________________________________________________.
19. Hvilken vekt vil du tillegge innspill fra de følgende
enheter når du deltar i ekspertkomite(er) og/eller
arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis Kommisjonen og Rådet?
Nøkkel:    Meget stor              Meget liten   Ikke
           betydning   både og   betydning   relevant
               1      2     3    4     5           9
                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 Egen avdeling           1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Eget departement        1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Eget direktorat         1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Utenriksdepartement     1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Parlamentet nasjonalt   1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Nasjonale interesse-
  grupper/bedrifter       1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kommisjonens
  representanter          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
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 Representanter fra ett
  eller flere andre       1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
  medlemsland
 Enkeltpersoner som
  jeg har blitt kjent
  med gjennom komiteen(e)/
  arbeidsgruppene         1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Euro-grupper/
  -bedrifter              1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Formannskapet           1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Rådssekretariatet       1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Europaparlamentet       1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
20. I hvilken grad mener du at tjenestemenn fra andre land
opptrer som "eksperter" eller som "regjerings-
representanter"?
 "eksperter"       "regjeringsrepr."
 I forberedende
  ekspertkomiteer      1     2     3     4      5
 I Rådsarbeidsgrupper 1     2     3     4      5
21. I hvilken grad mener du Kommisjonens representanter
opptrer uavhengig av nasjonale særinteresser?
                     "Uavhengig"             "Avhengig"
 I forberedende
  ekspertkomiteer        1     2     3     4      5
 I Rådsarbeidsgrupper   1     2     3     4      5
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22. Nedenfor er listet endel påstander. I hvilken grad er
du enig eller uenig i disse påstandene?
Nøkkel:      Helt enig        både og        Helt uenig
                 1       2        3      4       5
                             Ekspert-    Råds-
                             komiteer    arbeidsgrupper
 "Kommisjonen tar medlems-
  landenes syn seriøst"      1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
 "Kommisjonen tar EØS-landet
  Norges syn seriøst"        1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
 "Kommisjonen hører mer på
  representanter fra store   1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
  medlemsland"
 "Deltakelse i ekspert-
  komite(er)/arbeids-
  grupper er viktig          1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
  for å sikre faglig
  riktige vedtak
 "Deltakelse i ekspert-
  komite(er)/arbeidsgrupper
  er viktig fordi jeg        1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
  kan fremme våre nasjonale
  interesser"
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Deretter følger noen spørsmål om dine kontakter og arbeid
i sentralforvaltningen nasjonalt.
23a. Foretar du forhåndsklareringer med andre
sentraladministrative instanser forut for møter i:
                       I meget                 Sjelden/
     stor grad                aldri
 ekspertkomiteen(e)       1     2     3     4     5
 Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e)    1     2     3     4     5




23c. Foretar du forhåndsklareringer med andre avdelinger
innad i egen instans forut for møter i:
                       I meget                Sjelden/
    stor grad                aldri
 ekspertkomiteen(e)      1     2     3     4     5
 Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e)   1     2     3     4     5
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23d. Hvilke metoder benyttes for slike
forhåndsklareringer?
                       I meget                 Sjelden/
                       stor grad                aldri
Ekspertkomiteen(e)
 Uformelle kontakter
 (telefon, e-mail o.l)      1     2     3     4     5
 Formelle møter gjennom
  koordineringsstrukturen   1     2     3     4     5
  for EU-/EØS-saker




 (telefon, e-mail o.l)      1     2     3     4     5
 Formelle møter gjennom
  koordineringsstrukturen   1     2     3     4     5
  for EU-/EØS-saker
 Annet                     1     2     3     4     5
  Spesifiser____________________________________________.
24a. Utarbeides noen av de følgende dokumentene i ditt
arbeid overfor ekspertkomiteen(e):
                                            Sjelden/
                      Ofte                   aldri
 problemnotater        1     2     3     4     5
 rammenotater          1     2     3     4     5
 instrukser            1     2     3     4     5
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24b. Utarbeides noen av de følgende dokumentene i ditt
arbeid overfor rådsarbeidsgruppen(e):
                                             Sjelden/
                      Ofte                    aldri
 problemnotater        1     2     3     4     5
 rammenotater          1     2     3     4     5
 instrukser            1     2     3     4     5
24c. Føler du at disse dokumentene er styrende for de
standpunkter du tar i:
                     I meget       I meget     Ikke
                     stor grad     liten grad  relevant
 ekspertkomiteen(e)      1    2   3   4   5       9
 Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e)   1    2   3   4   5       9
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Så følger noen spørsmål om dine kontakter og vektlegginger
i utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver nasjonalt.
25. Hvor ofte vil du anslå, i forbindelse med din
deltakelse i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, at
du har hatt kontakt med de instanser/grupperinger som er
listet nedenfor i løpet av det siste året?
Nøkkel:  Meget                     Meget       Ikke
         ofte      av og til       sjelden/    relevant
                                   aldri
     1      2      3      4      5            9
                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
   i Rådet
 Kontakt med politisk
  ledelse                 1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 kontakt med eget
  direktorat (centrale
  embetsverket) o.l.      1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kontakt med eget
  overordnet departement  1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 kontakt med andre
  direktorater (centrale
  embetsverket) o.l.      1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kontakt med andre
  departementer           1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 kontakt med Utenriks-
  departementet           1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kontakt med Statsmini-
  sterens kontor          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
317
 Kontakt med andre
  avdelinger innad i      1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
  egen instans
 Kontakt med interesse-
  organisasjoner          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 kontakt med Parlamentet
  nasjonalt               1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kontakt med massemedia  1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
26. Kan du anslå, i forbindelse med din deltakelse i
ekpsertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, hvor viktige
følgende instanser eller grupperinger er når sentrale
beslutninger treffes innenfor ditt saksområde?
Nøkkel:  Meget                       Meget      Ikke
         viktig       både og      uvesentlig  relevant
      1      2      3      4      5           9
                       Ekspertkomiteer   Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 politisk ledelse       1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
 eget departement       1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
 eget direktorat
 (centrale embetsverket) 1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
 andre departementer    1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
 andre direktorater
 (centrale               1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
  embetsverket) o.l.
 interesse-
  organisasjoner         1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
318
 Parlamentet nasjonalt  1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
 Utenriksdepartementet  1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
 Massemedia             1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
27. Hvilken vekt vil du, i forbindelse med din deltakelse
i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, tillegge hvert
av de følgende hensyn ved utførelsen av dine
arbeidsoppgaver? (Kategoriene er ikke gjensidig
utelukkende.)
Nøkkel:   Meget                           Meget
          viktig          både og         uvesentlig
       1        2       3       4        5
                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 signaler fra politisk
  ledelse                  1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 faglig/profesjonelle
  hensyn                   1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 signaler fra bruker-
  grupper, klienter,
  særlig berørte parter    1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Hensynet til eget lands
  interesser               1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Hensynet til andre
  medlemsland i EU         1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Signaler fra EU-
  kommisjonen, dets
  ekspertkomiteer          1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
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 Signaler fra Unionsrådet,
  COREPER, dets
  arbeidsgrupper           1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Signaler fra massemedia  1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
28. Nedenfor er listet endel påstander om samordningen av
EU-/EØS-arbeidet. Vennligst ta stilling til hver enkelt
påstand.
Nøkkel:    Alltid eller   halvparten av   sjelden eller
           stort sett     tilfellene      aldri
                1              2                3
                               Ekspert-    Rådsarbeids-
                               komiteer    grupper
 "Deltakelse i komiteer
  og/eller arbeisgrupper er
  nyttig for meg når
  diskusjoner om min            1  2  3       1  2  3
  regjerings holdninger
  til en sak har startet"
 "Jeg må koordinere
  med Utenriksdepartementet
  eller andre sentrale          1  2  3       1  2  3
  koordinerende organer"
 "Min "posisjon" har blitt
  koordinert med alle
  relevante departementer"      1  2  3       1  2  3
 "Min "posisjon" har blitt
  koordinert med alle
  relevante avdelinger i        1  2  3       1  2  3
  min egen instans"
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 “Jeg har klare instruksjoner
  om hvilken "posisjon" jeg     1  2  3       1  2  3
  skal innta"
 "Jeg velger ofte selv
  hvilke "posisjoner" jeg       1  2  3       1  2  3
  skal innta"
 "Jeg tar de "posisjoner"
  jeg tror er i beste
  interesse for mitt land"      1  2  3       1  2  3
 "Jeg tar de "posisjoner"
  jeg tror er best på           1  2  3       1  2  3
  grunnlag av min profesjon-
  elle ekspertise"
 "Jeg tar de "posisjoner"
  jeg tror er til beste
  for medlemslandene som        1  2  3       1  2  3
  gruppe"
 "Jeg prøver å få relevante
  interessegrupper involvert
  i koordineringen av min       1  2  3       1  2  3
  "posisjon""
 "Jeg tar også kontakt og
  prøver å få "posisjonen" til
  det nasjonale Parlamentets    1  2  3       1  2  3
  relevante komiteer"
 "Jeg har store "frihetsgrader"
  når jeg deltar i ekspert-     1  2  3       1  2  3
  komiteene/arbeidsgruppene"
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Til slutt følger noen generelle konkluderende spørsmål.
29. Vennligst ta stilling til følgende påstand: "Det
utvikles en spesiell "esprit de corps" (korpsånd) over tid
i":
    Helt enig             Helt uenig
 De forberednede
  ekspertkomiteer          1     2     3     4     5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper       1     2     3     4     5
30. Mener du at samarbeidet innenfor EU/EF generelt har
vært fordelaktig eller ufordelaktig på ditt saksområde?
"fordelaktig"                           "ufordelaktig"
      1          2         3         4         5
31. Er du tilhenger av å styrke samarbeidet innenfor EU/EF
ytterligere?
 Innenfor eget saksområde:      JA           NEI
 Styrke EU-/EF-samarbeidet
  generelt:                      JA           NEI
32. Når du for første gang ble involvert i EU-/EF-relatert
arbeid, var du hovedsakelig positiv eller negativ til EU-
samarbeidet?
"positiv"                                "negativ"
     1          2          3        4        5
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33. Siden den gang, har du endret din holdning på dette
området?
1.       Har blitt mer positiv til EU-samarbeidet
2.       Ingen holdningsendring
3.       Har blitt mer negativ til EU-samarbeidet
34. Hvilken utdanning har du?
______________________________________________________.
35. Alder: Hva er din alder?
   1       Under 25 år      6       45-49 år
   2       25-29 år         7       50-54 år
   3       30-34 år         8       55-59 år
   4       35-39 år         9       60-64 år
   5       40-44 år        10       65 år og mer
36. Finnes det klare regler eller veletablert praksis
innad i din institusjon med hensyn til utførelsen av dine
arbeidsoppgaver?
1    Meget klare regler/praksis
2    Nokså klare regler/praksis
3    Både og
4    Må selv utøve nokså stort skjønn
5    Må selv utøve meget stort skjønn
Tusen takk for samarbeidet
323
Appendix 2: Interview guide to national officials from Denmark, Norway and Sweden.
 Hvor mye er du involvert i deltakelse i ekspertkomiteer og arbeidsgrupper?
 Finnes dokumentasjon/rapporter/notater som sier noe oppsummerende om EU-arbeidet
i din instans?
 Hva vil du karakterisere som hovedforskjellen mellom rådsarbeidsgruppene og ekspert-
komiteene?
 Endrer du ofte standpunkter når du deltar i møter?
 Utvikles det noen esprit de corps i komiteen, tilhørighet til komiteen…?
 Hvilke tilhørigheter er sterkest når du deltar i rådsgruppene og i ekspertkomiteene?
 overfor egen instans
 til eget land
 overfor komiteen som jeg deltar i
 til EU som helhet
 til sentraladministrative organer nasjonalt innenfor egen sektor
 til                          “                                   innenfor andre sektorer
 til Utenriksdepartementet
 
 Finnes det normer for sømmelig adferd i gruppen du deltar i?
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 hvilke kontakter har du mest hyppig i forbindelse med deltakelsen i rådsgruppene og i
ekspertkomiteene?
 kontakter innad i komiteen
 med øvrige EU-organ
 med sentraladministrative organer “hjemme” innenfor egen sektor
                                     “                                   på andre sektorer
 med Utenriksdepartementet
 Hvem representerer du primært i komiteen/gruppen?
 landet du kommer fra
 instansen du jobber i
 uavhengig fagekspertise
 Føler du at hvem du representerer har endret seg noe over tid - ettersom du har deltatt i
slike komiteer?
 
 Hvordan koordineres de posisjoner du fremfører i komiteene / gruppene?
     Klarert med UD, politisk ledelse, andre departementer, andre direktorater?
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Appendix 3: Letter and questionnaire to permanent representatives of Denmark,
Norway and Sweden.
Kjære tjenestemann/-kvinne.
Som en del av forskningsprogrammet ARENA (Advanced Research on the Europeanization
of the Nation State) foretar jeg en undersøkelse av erfaringene til nasjonale tjenestemenn ved
de permanente delegasjoner/representasjoner til den Europeiske Union fra deres deltakelse i
ekspertkomiteer og arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis EU-kommisjonen og
Unionsrådet/Ministerrådet. Undersøkelsen omfatter Danmark, Norge og Sverige. For å få et
best mulig bilde av erfaringene fra slik deltakelse, er det ønskelig at du har anledning til å
fylle ut vedlagte spørreskjema.
Intervjuene vil gjennomføres slik at hver enkelt fyller ut et standardisert spørreskjema på
egenhånd. Selve utfyllingen vil ta omlag 30 minutter. Dernest ber jeg deg om å returnere
skjemaet i utfylt stand så snart som mulig i den frankerte konvolutten som medfølger, eller
sender den pr. fax (se nummer nedenfor). Hver informant vil være garantert full anonymitet
(Datatilsynets konsesjon).
En liten veiledning i utfyllingen av skjemaet:
Spørreskjemaet er beregnet på danske, norske og svenske tjenestemenn i deres respektive
delegasjoner i Brussel. Det jeg kaller ekspertkomiteer omfatter alle de arbeidsgrupper, utvalg
og komiteer som har en forberedende funksjon overfor EU-kommisjonen. Rådsarbeidsgrupper
omfatter de grupper, utvalg og komiteer som har en tilsvarende funksjon overfor
Ministerrådet (Unionsrådet). Dersom du har spørsmål i forbindelse med undersøkelsen eller




Fax: + 47 22 85 44 11
tlf:   + 47 22 85 51 66
e-mail: jarle.trondal@stv.uio.no
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DE DANSKE, NORSKE OG SVENSKE EU-DELEGASJONER: ERFARINGER FRA
TJENESTEMENN SOM DELTAR I EKSPERTKOMITEER OG AREIDSGRUPPER I EU.
Jarle Trondal
Universitetet i Oslo,           Spørreskjema i
Institutt for statsvitenskap,   EU-delegasjoner
Postboks 1097 Blindern,         ARENA-programmet
0317 Oslo.                      Norges forskningsråd
Tlf: +47 22 85 51 66
Fax: +47 22 85 44 11
1. Land:____________________.
2. Hvilket politikk-/saksområde arbeider du på?
  __________________________________________________.
3. Hva er din nåværende stilling?
   _________________________________________________.
4. Hvor lenge har du vært ansatt i:





5. Har du arbeidet i EU-kommisjonen som:





Så følger noen spørsmål angående din deltakelse overfor
Den Europeiske Union.
6. Omtrent hvor stor andel av den samlede arbeidstiden din
går med til:
                          Meget             Meget
               stor andel        liten andel
 Deltakelse i ekspert-
  komiteer under EU-
  kommisjonen                1     2     3     4     5
 Deltakelse i arbeids-
  grupper under Unionsrådet  1     2     3     4     5
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7a. I forbindelse med din deltakelse i forberedende
ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis
EU-kommisjonen og Unionsrådet, hvor ofte har du hatt
kontakt med de følgende instansene i løpet av det siste
året:
Nøkkel:    Meget ofte      Av og til    Meget sjelden/
   aldri
               1       2       3      4        5
                         Ekspert-        Råds-
     komiteer        arbeidsgrupper
 Med ulike General-
  direktorater under
  EU-kommisjonen         1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med deltakere i
  ekspertkomiteer under
  EU-kommisjonen som jeg
  ikke deltar i selv     1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med andre lands
  deltakere i
  COREPER I eller II     1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med deltakere i
  arbeidsgrupper under
  Rådet som jeg ikke     1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
  deltar i selv
 Med Europa-parlamentet 1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med Europa-domstolen   1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Med EØS- og EFTA-
  organer                1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
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                         Ekspert-        Råds-
     komiteer        arbeidsgrupper
 Med kolleger fra andre
  medlemsland som ikke
  deltar i den komite/   1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
  gruppe som jeg
  deltar i
 Med kolleger fra andre
  medlemsland som deltar
  i den komite/arbeids-
  gruppe jeg deltar i    1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
7b. Med hvilke av de nevnte instansene eller gruppene har
du oftest kontakt?
______________________________________________________.
8a. Hvor mange komiteer og rådsarbeidsgrupper har du
deltatt i?
                             Antall
 forberedende ekspertkomiteer
 rådsarbeidsgrupper
8b. Når omtrent ble du første gang involvert i slik
deltakelse?
 Forberedende ekspertkomiteer: ______________________.
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper: ________________________________.
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8c. Hvor mange møter har du deltatt i?
         ekspertkomiteer  Rådsarbeidsgrupper
 siste år
 siste måned
8d. Omtrent hvor lenge varer møtene gjennomsnittlig?
 Forberedende ekspertkomiteer_______________________.
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper_________________________________.
9. Holder du innlegg på møtene i ekspertkomiteen(e)/
arbeidsgruppen(e)?
                             Meget       Meget sjelden/
                             ofte                 aldri
 Forberedende ekspertgrupper  1     2    3    4    5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper           1     2    3    4    5
10. Får du rutinemessig innkallelse til møter i disse
komiteene/gruppene, eller må du selv ta initiativ til
deltakelse?
                               Blir                eget
                               innkalt        initiativ
 Forberedende ekspertkomiteer   1    2    3    4    5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper             1    2    3    4    5
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10b. Dersom svart 1,2 eller 3 ovenfor, fra hvilken instans





11a. Er det omtrent de samme personene som deltar i
komiteen(e)/gruppen(e) fra møte til møte?
  I stor           Sjelden/
       grad               aldri
 Forberedende ekspertkomiteer   1    2    3    4    5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper             1    2    3    4    5
11b. Hvis svart 1,2 eller 3 ovenfor, omtrent hvor lenge
har disse personene deltatt i komiteen/gruppen?
         Vet




12. Kan du angi omtrent hvor lenge disse
komiteene/gruppene har eksistert i gjennomsnitt?




13. Har du kontakt med noen av de øvrige komite-
/arbeidsgruppe-deltakerne ut over den kontakt dere har
gjennom de formelle komite-møtene?
                            I stor grad        sjelden/
         aldri
 Forberedende ekspertkomiteer   1    2    3    4    5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper             1    2    3    4    5
14. Konsulterer du enkelte av de øvrige deltakerne i
ekspertkomiteen(e)/gruppen(e) forut for og/eller i
etterkant av møter?
  Meget ofte          Meget sjelden/
Forberedende                                     aldri
ekspertkomiteer:
 I forkant av møter     1      2      3      4      5
 I etterkant av møter   1      2      3      4      5
Rådsarbeidsgrupper:
 I forkant av møter     1      2      3      4      5
 I etterkant av møter   1      2      3      4      5
15. Hvilken form for kontakt benytter du forut for og i
etterkant av slike møter, og hvor hyppig forekommer denne
type kontakt? 
                     Meget hyppig              sjelden/
                                                  aldri
 Møter ansikt-til-
  ansikt                 1      2      3      4      5
 kontakter pr. tele-
  fon, fax og/eller
  e-mail                 1      2      3      4      5
333
16. I hvilken grad føler du tilhørighet til og ansvar
overfor de følgende enheter når du deltar i
ekspertkomite(er) og/eller arbeidsgrupper under
henholdsvis Kommisjonen og Rådet?
Nøkkel:  I meget                   I meget     Ikke
         stor grad    både og      liten grad  relevant
             1      2    3      4      5           9
                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 EU-delegasjonen         1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Eget fagdepartement/
  direktorat (centrale
  embetsverk) o.l.        1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
  som helhet
 Utenriksdepartementet   1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Egen regjering          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Egen profesjon/
  utdannelsesbakgrunn     1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Komite(er) som jeg
  deltar i under
  EU-Kommisjonen          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Arbeidsgrupp(er) som
  jeg deltar i under
  Rådet                   1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Den Europeisk Union     1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Eget saksområde/sektor  1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
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17. Hvilken vekt vil du tillegge innspill/uttalelser fra
de følgende enheter når du deltar i ekspertkomite(er)
og/eller arbeidsgrupper under henholdsvis Kommisjonen og
Rådet?
Nøkkel:    Meget stor              Meget liten   Ikke
           betydning   både og   betydning   relevant
               1      2     3    4     5           9
                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 Eget fagdepartement
  nasjonalt               1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Eget direktorat o.l.
  nasjonalt               1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Utenriksdepartement     1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Parlamentet nasjonalt   1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Nasjonale interesse-
  grupper/bedrifter       1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kommisjonens
  representanter          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Representanter fra ett
  eller flere andre       1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
  medlemsland
 Enkeltpersoner som
  jeg har blitt kjent
  med gjennom komiteen(e)/
  arbeidsgruppene         1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Interessegrupper/bedrifter
  på europeisk nivå       1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
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                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 Formannskapet           1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Rådssekretariatet       1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Europaparlamentet       1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
18. I hvilken grad mener du at tjenestemenn fra andre land
opptrer som "eksperter" eller som "regjerings-
representanter"?
 "eksperter"       "regjeringsrepr."
 I forberedende
  ekspertkomiteer      1     2     3     4      5
 I Rådsarbeidsgrupper 1     2     3     4      5
19. I hvilken grad mener du Kommisjonens representanter
opptrer uavhengig av nasjonale særinteresser?
                     "Uavhengig"             "Avhengig"
 I forberedende
  ekspertkomiteer        1     2     3     4      5
 I Rådsarbeidsgrupper   1     2     3     4      5
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20. Nedenfor er listet endel påstander. I hvilken grad er
du enig eller uenig i disse påstandene?
Nøkkel:      Helt enig        både og        Helt uenig
                 1       2        3      4       5
                             Ekspert-    Råds-
                             komiteer    arbeidsgrupper
 "Kommisjonen tar medlems-
  landenes syn seriøst"      1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
 "Kommisjonen tar EØS-landet
  Norges syn seriøst"        1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
 "Kommisjonen hører mer på
  representanter fra store   1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
  medlemsland"
 "Deltakelse i ekspert-
  komite(er)/arbeids-
  grupper er viktig          1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
  for å sikre faglig
  riktige vedtak
 "Deltakelse i ekspert-
  komite(er)/arbeidsgrupper
  er viktig fordi jeg        1 2 3 4 5      1 2 3 4 5
  kan fremme våre nasjonale
  interesser"
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Deretter følger noen spørsmål om dine kontakter og arbeid
i EU-delegasjonen.
21a. Foretar du forhåndsklareringer med andre
sentraladministrative instanser forut for møter i:
                       I meget                 Sjelden/
    stor grad                 aldri
 Ekspertkomiteen(e)       1     2     3     4     5
 Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e)    1     2     3     4     5




21c. Foretar du forhåndsklareringer med andre lands faste
EU-delegasjoner/representasjoenr forut for møter i:
                       I meget                Sjelden/
   stor grad                 aldri
 ekspertkomiteen(e)      1     2     3     4     5
 Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e)   1     2     3     4     5
22a. Utarbeides noen av de følgende dokumentene i ditt
arbeid overfor ekspertkomiteen(e):
                                            Sjelden/
                      Ofte                   aldri
 problemnotater        1     2     3     4     5
 rammenotater          1     2     3     4     5
 instrukser            1     2     3     4     5
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22b. Utarbeides noen av de følgende dokumentene i ditt
arbeid overfor rådsarbeidsgruppen(e):
                                             Sjelden/
                      Ofte                    aldri
 problemnotater        1     2     3     4     5
 rammenotater          1     2     3     4     5
 instrukser            1     2     3     4     5
22c. Føler du at disse dokumentene er styrende for de
standpunkter du tar i:
                     I meget       I meget     Ikke
                     stor grad     liten grad  relevant
 ekspertkomiteen(e)      1    2   3   4   5       9
 Rådsarbeidsgruppen(e)   1    2   3   4   5       9
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Så følger noen spørsmål om dine kontakter og vektlegginger
i utførelsen av dine arbeidsoppgaver.
23. Hvor ofte vil du anslå, i forbindelse med din
deltakelse i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, at
du har hatt kontakt med de instanser/grupperinger som er
listet nedenfor i løpet av det siste året?
Nøkkel:  Meget                     Meget       Ikke
         ofte      av og til       sjelden/    relevant
                                   aldri
     1      2      3      4      5            9
                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
   i Rådet
 Kontakt med politisk
  ledelse                 1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 kontakt med eget
  direktorat nasjonalt
  (centrale embetsverk)   1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kontakt med eget fag-
  departement nasjonalt   1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 kontakt med andre
  direktorater nasjonalt
  (centrale embetsverk)   1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kontakt med andre fag-
  departementer nasjonalt 1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 kontakt med Utenriks-
  departementet           1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
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                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
   i Rådet
 Kontakt med Statsmini-
  sterens kontor          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kontakt med interesse-
  organisasjoner          1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 kontakt med Parlamentet
  nasjonalt               1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
 Kontakt med massemedia  1 2 3 4 5 9       1 2 3 4 5 9
24. Kan du anslå, i forbindelse med din deltakelse i
ekpsertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, hvor viktige
følgende instanser eller grupperinger er når sentrale
beslutninger treffes innenfor ditt saksområde?
Nøkkel:  Meget                       Meget      Ikke
         viktig       både og      uvesentlig  relevant
      1      2      3      4      5           9
                       Ekspertkomiteer   Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 eget departement
  nasjonalt              1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
 eget direktorat
  nasjonalt(centrale     1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
  embetsverk)
 andre departementer
  nasjonalt              1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
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                         Ekspertkomiteer   Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 andre direktorater
  nasjonalt(centrale     1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
  embetsverk)
 Parlamentet nasjonalt  1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
 Massemedia             1 2 3 4 5 9        1 2 3 4 5 9
25. Hvilken vekt vil du, i forbindelse med din deltakelse
i ekspertkomiteer og/eller arbeidsgrupper, tillegge hvert
av de følgende hensyn ved utførelsen av dine
arbeidsoppgaver?
Nøkkel:   Meget                           Meget
          viktig          både og         uvesentlig
       1        2       3       4        5
                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
 signaler fra politisk
  ledelse                  1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 faglig/profesjonelle
  hensyn                   1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Signaler fra bruker-
  grupper, klienter,
  særlig berørte parter    1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Hensynet til eget lands
  interesser               1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
                        Ekspertkomiteer  Arbeidsgrupper
    i Rådet
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 Hensynet til andre
  medlemsland i EU         1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Drøfting i
  ekspertkomiteer som
  jeg selv deltar i        1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Drøfting i
  arbeidsgrupper som
  jeg selv deltar I        1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
 Omtale i/innspill fra
  massemedia               1 2 3 4 5          1 2 3 4 5
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26. Nedenfor er listet endel påstander om samordningen av
EU-/EØS-arbeidet. Vennligst ta stilling til hver enkelt
påstand.
Nøkkel:    Alltid eller   halvparten av   sjelden eller
           stort sett     tilfellene      aldri
                1              2                3
                               Ekspert-    Rådsarbeids-
                               komiteer    grupper
 "Jeg må koordinere
  med Utenriksdepartementet
  eller andre sentrale          1  2  3       1  2  3
  koordinerende organer"
 "Min "posisjon" har blitt
  koordinert med alle
  relevante departementer
  nasjonalt"                    1  2  3       1  2  3
 "Jeg har klare instruksjoner
  om hvilken "posisjon" jeg     1  2  3       1  2  3
  skal innta"
 "Jeg velger ofte selv
  hvilke "posisjoner" jeg       1  2  3       1  2  3
  skal innta"
 "Jeg tar de "posisjoner"
  jeg tror er i beste
  interesse for mitt land"      1  2  3       1  2  3
 "Jeg tar de "posisjoner"
  jeg tror er best på           1  2  3       1  2  3
  grunnlag av min profesjon-
  elle ekspertise"
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                               Ekspert-    Rådsarbeids-
                               komiteer    grupper
 "Jeg tar de "posisjoner"
  jeg tror er til beste
  for medlemslandene som        1  2  3       1  2  3
  gruppe"
 "Jeg har store "frihetsgrader"
  når jeg deltar i ekspert-     1  2  3       1  2  3
  komiteene/arbeidsgruppene"
Til slutt følger noen generelle konkluderende spørsmål.
27. Vennligst ta stilling til følgende påstand: "Det
utvikles en spesiell "esprit de corps" (korpsånd) over tid
i":
    Helt enig             Helt uenig
 De forberednede
  ekspertkomiteer          1     2     3     4     5
 Rådsarbeidsgrupper       1     2     3     4     5
28. Mener du at samarbeidet innenfor EU/EF generelt har
vært fordelaktig eller ufordelaktig på ditt saksområde?
"fordelaktig"                           "ufordelaktig"
      1          2         3         4         5
345
29. Er du tilhenger av å styrke samarbeidet innenfor EU/EF
ytterligere?
 Innenfor eget saksområde:      JA           NEI
 Styrke EU-/EF-samarbeidet
  generelt:                      JA           NEI
30. Når du for første gang ble involvert i EU-/EF-relatert
arbeid, var du hovedsakelig positiv eller negativ til EU-
samarbeidet?
"positiv"                                "negativ"
     1          2          3        4        5
31. Siden den gang, har du endret din holdning på dette
området?
1.       Har blitt mer positiv til EU-samarbeidet
2.       Ingen holdningsendring
3.       Har blitt mer negativ til EU-samarbeidet
32. Hvilken utdanning har du?
______________________________________________________.
33. Alder: Hva er din alder?
   1       Under 25 år      6       45-49 år
   2       25-29 år         7       50-54 år
   3       30-34 år         8       55-59 år
   4       35-39 år         9       60-64 år
   5       40-44 år        10       65 år og mer
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34. Finnes det klare regler eller veletablert praksis
innad i din institusjon med hensyn til utførelsen av dine
arbeidsoppgaver?
1    Meget klare regler/praksis
2    Nokså klare regler/praksis
3    Både og
4    Må selv utøve nokså stort skjønn
5    Må selv utøve meget stort skjønn
Tusen takk for samarbeidet
